The Empire and the Khanate

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF QING RELATIONS WITH KHOQAND C. 1760-1860

L. J. NEWBY

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THE EMPIRE AND THE KHANATE

A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860

BY

L.J. NEWBY

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PREFACE

When I first began to look at relations between China during the Qing dynasty and Central Asia, I expected to discover that late Qing officials had understood considerably more about the region than was generally assumed. Only as my work progressed and began to focus on the political history of Qing policy towards the Central Asian khanate of Khoqand over an extended period did I realize, not only that this assumption was wrong, but just how dramatically the degree of knowledge and understanding of the region that existed in the Qianlong period—an age full of 'imperial promise'—had stagnated and even diminished by the mid-19th century. But why? And what were the effects of this, both in the realm of foreign policy and the consolidation of China's northwestern frontier? These are the questions that this book seeks to answer.

The study covers some one hundred years of relations between the Qing dynasty and Khoqand, from *c.*1760–1860, and thus charts the changes in the content, form and execution of policy towards Khoqand that characterized the transition from the Qianlong era (1736–95) to subsequent ages. It explores how the diminishing expertise on Central Asia among Qing officials at court affected the management of the frontier region of southern Xinjiang, how mal-administration and economic decline encouraged local support for attacks by Khoqand and the displaced khojas, and how financial and domestic political constraints gradually conspired to dissuade all but a handful of Qing officials from concerning themselves with political developments in the lands beyond the mountain checkpoints of the north-western frontier. With the construction of this mental palisade, there emerged a sharper distinction between inner and outer, and a notion of border defined by geography, politics and military logistics, with little reference to the shared culture, history and social movements that had been accommodated by the concept of the earlier open and more fluid notion of frontier. This shift in Qing policy and the emergence of an inward looking mentality with a focus on consolidation of the frontier went hand in hand with opposition to retrenchment. By paving the way for the incorporation of the northwest into the empire long before the upheavals of the late 19th century, these developments presaged the slow transition from empire to nation-state.

Within the 100-odd years of interaction covered by this study, the focus lies on the Daoguang period (1821–50) and the questions of how and by whom policy towards Khoqand was formulated during these three decades. The period is of interest not only because it covers the most fraught and

well-documented phase of relations between the Qing and Khoqand, but also because it immediately precedes and overlaps with a period of Sino-Western relations which has been generously served by academic studies. As such, it also provides a new context in which to test some of the previous assumptions about the decline of the so-called tribute system and the conduct of Qing foreign management in the early 19th century.

In view of the relative dearth of English language sources on this corner of Qing history and in an effort to understand the accumulated experiences and curious elisions on which Qing policy towards Khoqand was premised, the study is presented in the currently unfashionable form of political narrative and follows a chronological approach to events. Inevitably, this approach is not without its own problems. Despite being drawn from Qing documentary records, the narrative does not claim to recreate the 'true' record of events, still less the understanding of those events, held in the collective memory of Qing officials at court or on the frontier. Yet it seems to me, no other structure can better hope to illustrate the increasing bankruptcy of Qing policy towards Khoqand or the shifting notion of empire that lies at the thematic core of the study. Moreover, no other structure can better hope to tell this little-known story of Qing policy in Central Asia as it was, or might have been.

Sources

Given that this is a political history of Qing relations with Khoqand, the sources employed are predominantly Qing official documents in Chinese; some of these have already been collated in various published works, while many more are held in the First Historical Archives in Beijing. In the late 1990s, a catalogue of the relevant Manchu documents held in the First Historical Archives finally became available.[1] However, while the Manchu archive is rich in respect of relations with Central Asia during the Qianlong period, significantly, it includes relatively few documents relating to Khoqand in the Jiaqing (1796–1820) and Daoguang periods. The perspective offered by the Manchu sources does not differ from that of the materials in Chinese, but these documents do, nevertheless, provide an important supplement to the Chinese archive.

The Chinese documents (*lufu* and *zhupi zouzhe*) are cited according to their bundle number, document number and the date as it appears in the handwritten catalogues. The catalogue number refers to the 'new' numbering system. Where there is no date on the document and the catalogue provides only the dates for the earliest and latest documents

[1] See *Qingdai bianjiang Manwen dang'an mulu*. Vols.6–11 cover Xinjiang.

within a certain package, these are supplied in brackets. 'N.d.' is used to indicate where there is no date on the document or in the catalogue. The Manchu documents (*lufu zouzhe*) are cited according to the published catalogue (see footnote 1) with one slight adjustment. The bundle number, the number of the document package, and the number of the microfiche reel accord with the catalogue, but the final number, i.e. the microfiche frame number, relates to the first page of the cited document and not the cover page of the packet (which may contain several documents) as shown in the catalogue. The date appears as in the catalogue.

No apology is made for the heavy reliance on Qing sources because, above all, this study is concerned with the Qing empire and seeks to further our understanding of how and why it adopted specific policies towards the khanate of Khoqand, how the late Qing court substantiated its claim to supreme power over China and its environs, and what sense it had of its own changing place in the world. Yet, as with any work which touches on foreign relations, it would have been a bonus to have had insight into the official papers of 'the other side'. Unfortunately, the archive of the Khoqand government pertaining to this period is lost, and possibly destroyed.[2] To balance the Chinese official accounts we must, therefore, rely on Western sources from the 19th century and scattered writings, chronicles and travel accounts penned by various Central Asians, as well as the clutch of diplomatic letters which emanated from Khoqand and are now lodged in the First Historical Archives. Some of these sources it has been possible to consult in their original, others were only accessible in translation. Yet, the full extent of the gulf between the Qing understanding of Central Asia and the reality of the aspirations, frustrations and designs of the regional powers, specifically Khoqand, will only become evident as further researches based on Islamic sources are carried out. In the meantime, it is hoped that this study will be of interest not only to Qing historians, but also to scholars of Central Asia and Russian imperialism who wish to engage with an analysis of how the Qing viewed Central Asia at this time.

Among 20th century scholarship of China's far northwest during the Qing dynasty, the writings of the late Joseph Fletcher, Luo Yunzhi, Lü Yiran, Viacheslav Kuznetsov, Morris Rossabi, Saguchi Tōru and, more recently, James Millward have all, to a greater or lesser extent, touched on the role of Khoqand, but only one monograph, by the Chinese scholar, Pan Zhiping, has previously dealt specifically with relations between the Qing empire

[2] The extant Khoqand archive only covers the period after 1860, and holds no materials relevant to relations with China. See *Katalog Arkhiva Kokandskikh Khanov XIX veka*.

and Khoqand.[3] At the heart of Pan Zhiping's thesis lies the suggestion that Khoqand's relationship with Qing China shifted from that of a dependent state (*shuguo*) between 1759 and 1820 to that of a neighbouring state (*linguo*), and by implication, therefore, equal and independent after 1820. Meanwhile, in the West, it was Fletcher who first brought Khoqand to the attention of many Western scholars of the Qing dynasty with his observation that by the 1830s the khanate had gained 'full extraterritoriality' in Altishahr (southern Xinjiang), thereby presaging the rights acquired by Westerners in the treaty ports of the eastern seaboard. This book seeks to engage with both these theses which, to date, have remained largely unstudied and unchallenged.[4]

[3] Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo yu Qingdai Xinjiang*.

[4] Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet', p.378. For what is probably the earliest treatment by a Western scholar of China's relations with Khoqand, however, see Parker's interesting but somewhat problematic 19th century account based on the *Donghua lu*. Parker, 'Khokand and China'.

NOTES ON ROMANIZATION AND TERMINOLOGY

The *pinyin* system of romanization has been used for Chinese terms, place-names and personal names. Manchu (and Mongol) personal names have been given in *pinyin* according to their Chinese transliteration with no break between syllables. Manchu terms, on the other hand, have been given according to Jerry Norman's system in *A Concise Manchu-English Lexicon*.

For geographical references in Central Asia, including cities and regions, I have followed the spellings used for the relevant period in Yuri Bregel's, *A Historical Atlas of Central Asia* e.g. Kashgar, Aqsu, Samarqand etc., with two notable exceptions: Khoqand and Yarkand, for Bregel's Qoqand and Yarkend. Where possible, Turkic, Persian and Arabic words have been transcribed according to the system used by the Library of Congress, but with some modifications. Diacritic signs have been omitted, but macrons have been used where deemed necessary to assist pronunciation for the non-specialist. All diacritics have been omitted from familiar place-names and names of tribes, as well as frequently-used titles and offices, e.g. aqsaqal, akhund, hakim bek, khoja and mulla, except where these are considered part of a person's name and/or title, e.g. Yūsuf Khōja, but Āfāqī khojas. Where non-Chinese personal names have only been identified from Chinese sources, they are rendered according to their written form (i.e. rather than according to pronunciation transcribed in Chinese). Where non-Chinese personal names or place-names are known only in their Chinese transcriptions and it has not been possible to reconstruct the original with any certitude, the *pinyin* is provided, but all syllables are hyphenated to indicate that the name is not of Chinese origin. In some cases, the original can be easily reconstructed from the Chinese transliteration, e.g. Yi-shan-a-ji, the *pinyin* for Īshān-hājjjī. In other cases, based on circumstantial evidence, I have taken the liberty of hazarding a guess in order to assist reading, e.g. the *pinyin* Lu-zi-gu-li is given as Rizā Qulī. In the case of place-names or personal names drawn from secondary Western sources, where it has not been possible to verify transcriptions, these have been rendered in the form given in the relevant source.

Where it has been deemed necessary to clarify the language in which a proper noun or term is being rendered, the following abbreviations are used: Ch. = Chinese, Man. = Manchu, Tur. = Central Asian Turkic (Chaghatai).

The transliteration of Cyrillic follows the system of transliteration used by the Library of Congress.

Throughout the work the terms Xinjiang and Eastern Turkestan are used interchangeably and without political prejudice. Central Asia is applied as a general term to refer loosely to the vast territory of the former Soviet Central Asia (previously *Pax Rossica*) plus Balkh and Badakhshan, Bolor, Kashmir and Chitral. As will be obvious from the text, on occasions 'Central Asia' also includes Eastern Turkestan / Xinjiang, as it surely should do. However, in the interests of clarity, it has frequently been necessary to exclude Eastern Turkestan / Xinjiang from that definition in order to draw a political distinction between the area that came under Qing control in the mid-18th century and the wider Central Asian region.

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'The White Hawk' by Lang Shining (Joseph Castiglione); courtesy of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC.

Maps

Altishahr in the late 18th – 19th century.

The khanate of Khoqand in the early 19th century.

The caravan route from Khoqand to Kashgar. From R.H. Davies, *Report on the Trade & Resources of the Countries on the North Western Boundary of British India* (Lahore: 1862); courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Kashgar and the surrounding area. From the *Yili zongtong tushuo* (early 19th century); courtesy of the library of the Zhongguo Kexueyuan, Beijing.

Illustrations

A Muslim man and woman from Khoqand. From the *Huang Qing zhigong tu* (1761).

A Muslim man and woman from the cities of Altishahr. From the *Huang Qing zhigong tu* (1761).

LIST OF MEASURES

1 bolt (*pi*) = approximately 40 feet of cloth

1 *jin* = approximately 1.3 pounds

1 *li* = approximately one third of a mile

1 *mu* = approximately one seventh of an acre

1 tael (*liang*) = approximately 1.3 ounces

ABBREVIATIONS

CWGZN	*Chang wenxiang gong ziding nianpu*
DG	Daoguang
GZSL	*Da Qing lichao shilu*: *Gaozong*
HJNFL	*Qinding pingding Huijiang jiaoqin niyi fanglüe*
HJTZ	*Huijiang tongzhi*
IOR	India Office Records (British Library, London)
JQ	Jiaqing
KX	Kangxi
LFZZ MZL	*Junjichu lufu zouzhe*, *Minzu lei* (First Historical Archives, Beijing)
LFZZ WJL/ZE	*Junjichu lufu zouzhe*, *Waijiao lei*, *Zhong-E guanxi* (First Historical Archives, Beijing)
MWDA	*Manwen dang'an* (First Historical Archives, Beijing)
NWYGZY	*Na wenyi gong zouyi*
QL	Qianlong
QSG	*Qing shigao*
RZSL	*Da Qing lichao shilu*: *Renzong*
SGXHFL	*Qinding pingding Shaan-Gan Xinjiang Huifei fanglüe*
SYXZG	*Songyun Xinjiang zougao*
WJSL	*Qingdai waijiao shiliao – Daoguang*
WZSL	*Da Qing lichao shilu, Wenzong shilu*
XF	Xianfeng
XJZL	*Qinding Xinjiang zhilüe*
XYTWZ	*Qinding Xiyu tongwen zhi*
XYTZ	*Qinding huangyu Xiyu tuzhi*
XZSL	*Da Qing lichao*: *Xuanzong*
ZFL	*Qinding pingding Zhunga'er fanglüe*
ZPZZ MZL	*Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe*, *Minzu lei* (First Historical Archives, Beijing)
ZPZZ WJL/ZE	*Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe*, *Waijiao lei*, *Zhong-E guanxi* (First Historical Archives, Beijing)



Altishahr in the late 18th–19th century



The khanate of Khoqand in the early 19th century

The caravan route from Khoqand to Kashgar



Kashgar and the surrounding area in the early 19th century

Illustration of a Muslim man and woman of Khoqand



Illustration of a Muslim man and woman of the cities Altishahr

INTRODUCTION

Background

On April 11th 1760, the 48-year-old Qianlong emperor processed some 50 *li* to the south of the Imperial City. It was a mark of unusual honour that he should travel so far to welcome a triumphant army. He stayed overnight at the 'temporary palace' (*xinggong*) in Huangxin village and at noon the following day, decked in full ceremonial regalia and accompanied by the ministers of his court, he rode a further five *li* to the town of Liangxiang. To the south of the town, tents and an altar had already been erected; the generals and officers of the victorious army were assembled to await his arrival. As the Manchu emperor neared the altar, he dismounted from his horse and greeted his second cousin, the commanding general Zhaohui. The sacrifice to Heaven and Earth was then duly performed, after which the emperor withdrew to the imperial tent where he received his generals. Praising their achievements, he personally bestowed Zhaohui and his assistant general Fude with a string of semi-precious beads, they were seated and served with tea. As the audience drew to a close, Zhaohui and Fude were each presented with a horse, the conch shells sounded and the procession returned to the palace accompanied by the strains of martial music.[1]

The meritorious service that Zhaohui and his officers had rendered the emperor was no less than the conquest of the area that was to become known as the new frontier, Xinjiang.[2] Two vast regions, the Jungharian steppe plateau to the north of the Tianshan Range and the Tarim Basin to its south, had fallen in rapid succession to the armies of the Qianlong emperor (r.1736–95). If one adds to these lands the Turfan Depression, at the head of the Gansu Corridor,[3] where the hitherto tentative Qing rule had been made steadfast by the annihilation of the Junghar Mongol power, the entire region totalled some 650,000 square miles. In the space

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[1] The description is drawn from the following works: de Moyriac de Mailla, *Histoire générale de la Chine*, (based on the *Tongjian gangmu*), vol.12, pp.578–9; Courant, *L'Asie Centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, p.121; *Gaozong shilu* [hereafter GZSL], 607:13a–b, QL25.2 *xinchou*, *renyin*; *Qinding pingding Zhunga'er fanglüe* [hereafter ZFL] *zheng* 85:24a–26a, QL25.2 *renyin*.

[2] The Chinese term *Xinjiang* came into use soon after the conquest as a general appellation for the region that is almost coterminous with the present-day Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It did not, however, indicate an official administrative area until the region became a province in 1884.

[3] This is the area historically known as Uighuristan. Elias suggests that it may have continued to be known by this name from the 9th to as late as the 15th century. Elias and Ross, *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, pp.99–114.

of five to six years the territorial expanse of the Qing empire had been almost doubled.

The conquest of such an immense tract of land was not an end in itself. Populated not only by the remnants of the Junghar Mongols in the north and sedentary Turkic Muslims in the south,[4] but also Qazaqs, Qirghiz, Tajiks and settlers from various parts of Central Asia, the region had to be pacified, administered and, most importantly, secured from external threat. For the first time in over 700 years the territories of the Celestial Empire once again extended deep into the heart of Central Asia. Historical records from the Han (206 BC–219 AD) and the Tang (618–907) dynasties, when the empire had previously controlled the Western Regions, not only failed to compensate for the lack of contemporary knowledge of Central Asia, but were frequently inaccurate and misleading. Much of the information about Xinjiang and its adjacent territories that appeared in the first Qing gazetteers of the region was, therefore, gleaned in the course of the military campaign and the 'mopping up' that followed.[5] In pursuit of rebel leaders, Qing military

[4] The Junghars were a confederation of western Mongol tribes known jointly as the Oirat ('confederates' or 'allies'). By the 18th century the four principal tribes comprising the Oirat were the Choros (who as the dominant tribe were also referred to as the Oirat), Torghut, Khoshut, and Dörböt. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol.2, p.165. The term Uyghur (Uighur) has been avoided as it was not used during the Qing period and was only adopted by the non-nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples of Xinjiang in 1921. Fletcher, 'China and Central Asia 1368–1884', p.364, note 96. It is frequently suggested that until the 20th century the settled population of Altishahr identified themselves only in terms of being a person of such and such town or locality, e.g. Kashgarliq, Khotanliq and had no notion of 'nationhood'. This may be true, but it is equally clear that by the 19th century the sedentary peoples of Altishahr already distinguished themselves as an autochthonous group that was distinct from Turkic Muslims in neighbouring regions. Note, for example, the use of the term 'chalghurt' to indicate the child of a local woman and a man from another region. See Forsyth, *Mission to Yarkund*, p.82 and Fletcher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia', p.70.

[5] The two principal surveys of the region, which were carried out in 1756 and 1759–60, were assisted by the Jesuit priests, Felix da Rocha and Joseph d'Espinha. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp.285–6. The first survey focussed on Jungharia, while the second covered Altishahr and neighbouring polities. For details of these expeditions and the maps they informed, see Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia and China*, pp.cxc–cxci and Enoki, 'Researches in Chinese Turkestan during the Ch'ien-lung period', pp.9–16. The geographical knowledge gathered in the course of these surveys laid the foundations for the mapping of this region of Central Asia. Over 100 years later, when the British and the Russians were wrangling over the new frontier of Afghanistan, it transpired that the Russians were still relying on sources drawn from an edition of the so-called Qianlong Atlas, which incorporated the findings of these surveys. One of the Russian objections to the new frontier resulted from the fact that they believed Wakhan was contiguous with Qarategin and thus Afghan territory was being extended far to the north. This misconception appears to have resulted from the fact that in the photographic copy of the Chinese map used by the Russians, the section of the map containing Wakhan had been erroneously turned through 90°. 'On Badakshan and Wakhan', *Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society*, 1873, pp.110–2.

units ventured far beyond the unbounded territory of the new frontier, seeking the submission of the various tribal and local leaders as they went. In the post-conquest months as the political powers of Central Asia, large and small, strong and weak, took stock of the defeat of the Junghar empire and the emergence of a new and potentially mightier power on their doorstep, Chinese records note a stream of 'outer vassals' (*waifan*) who duly submitted to imperial authority and dispatched tribute missions to Beijing.[6]

Among the first to arrive in the Qing capital was the envoy Toqtā Muhammad, the ruling official, or bek (*beg*, *bey*, Ch. *bo-ke*), of Andijan, who was sent by Irdana, the ruler of the city of Khoqand.[7] The beks of Marghilan, Namangan and Andijan, cities soon to be absorbed into the Khoqand khanate, all submitted to the Qing independently, but it would appear that they already took their lead from Irdana in matters as important as relations with the emperor of China.[8]

Irdana was the grandson of Shāhrukh, of the Mīng clan, who had taken control of Khoqand in 1709/10. On Shāhrukh's death in 1721/2, power then passed to his sons and after a brief struggle in the early 1750s, Irdana (Erdeni) established his rule of the city in 1753.[9] The city of Khoqand and the territory that was to form the heart of the khanate over the next hundred years lay in the fertile Ferghana Valley, an area populated primarily by a sedentary Turkic-speaking population but also Tajiks, Qirghiz and other tribal peoples. Irdana took advantage of the demise of the Junghars to consolidate his rule over the neighbouring cities, an enterprise that was continued by his successors until, at the height of its

[6] Despite the common practice of translating *waifan* as outer vassal and *neifan* as inner vassal, the term 'vassal' carries few of the connotations associated with European feudalism and should be understood only in the sense of 'subordinate'. Even this is a notion that is implied rather than stated in the Chinese. *Fan* is here read in the second tone and has a basic meaning of 'frontier' or 'boundary'. Thus there is a case for suggesting that the terms *waifan* and *neifan* merely imply 'a peoples beyond the frontier' and 'a peoples within the frontier' respectively. However, *neifan* was never used to refer to Han or Manchu peoples, which may account for why a similar character meaning 'foreign', also read *fan* but pronounced in the first tone and written without the water radical and with, or without, the grass radical, was sometimes substituted in the term *waifan* (but not in *neifan*). See Fairbank, 'A Preliminary Framework', pp.9–10. It should also be noted that the peoples to whom these terms were applied did not necessarily accept that they were in any way subordinates of the Qing empire. *Cf.* below, note 25 on *waiyi* and *neiyi*.

[7] GZSL 604:12b–13a, QL25.1 *yimao*; *Qinding huangyu Xiyu tuzhi* [hereafter XYTZ], 45:19b.

[8] XYTZ 45:19a–20b. Having initially refused to meet the imperial envoy, Toqtā Muhammad had soon had a change of heart and was offering to make the journey personally to Beijing. J. Klaproth, 'Notices', translated from *Da Qing yitongzhi* (c.1790), *juan* 420 and appended to Nazarov, 'Voyage à Khokand entrepris en 1813 et 1814', p.88.

[9] Beisembiev, "*Ta'rikh-i Shahrukhī*" *kak istoricheskiī istochnik*, p.11; Pan Zhiping, 'Zhongya Haohan wang tong kao', pp.131–40.

power, the khanate had a population of over three million and stretched from Bukhara in the west, to Altishahr in the east,[10] south to the small principalities of Qarategin, Darvaz, Shughnan and Badakhshan, and north beyond Aq-Masjid (Qizil Orda in present-day Kazakhstan) to the pastures of the Qazaq Middle Horde.

The cultural, political and religious ties between Khoqand and Altishahr were long-established, as were their trading links. To reach Beijing, the envoy Toqtā Muhammad and his companions would have taken one of the familiar trade routes heading southeast over the Pamirs to Kashgar, then on to Yarkand, eastward along the southern oasis cities and then northeast towards Hami (Qomul). From Hami they would have journeyed down through the Gansu Corridor into the Chinese heartland, arriving in Beijing two to three months after their departure.

Toqtā Muhammad's arrival in Beijing marked the first of a succession of Khoqandi envoys and emissaries who would appear in Beijing over the course of the next century and whose messages and greetings would not always be as pleasing to the emperor's ear as these initial expressions of gratitude and subservience. As Toqtā Muhammad was initiated into the guest ritual in Beijing, presented to the emperor, served tea in the Qianqing Palace and feasted with emissaries from Chilik, Bolor and Badakhshan,[11] there was no reason to suspect that the fledgling khanate he represented would prove one of the greatest challenges to Qing power in Central Asia.

Due largely to the 19th century works of Demetrius Boulger and A.N. Kuropatkin,[12] Khoqand is generally known to Western students of Chinese history as home of 'the adventurer' Ya'qūb Bek (1820–77) who, on the eve of the Great Game, overthrew Qing rule in Xinjiang and governed much of the region for some twelve years before the troops of General Zuo Zongtang re-established Qing authority in 1877. Much less widely known is the fact that for over 100 years prior to Ya'qūb Bek's rule, Khoqand had enjoyed closer, and frequently more strained relations

[10] Altishahr, literally 'six cities', refers to the region south of the Tianshan Range. It is uncertain when this term was first used and local sources of the 18th and 19th century also make general reference to the area as 'four cities' (Tur. *Dorben shahr*) and 'seven cities' (Tur. *Yeti shahr*). In 19th century Western sources, the region is referred to variously as Kashgaria, Bukharia, Little Bukharia and (eastern) Turkestan, while in Qing sources it is generally known as *Huijiang* (Muslim frontier), *Huibu* (Muslim tribal area), *Bacheng* (eight cities) or, primarily for administrative purposes, *nanlu* (southern circuit). See also below, note 47 and chapter 2, note 55.

[11] GZSL 604:12b–13b, QL25.1 *yimao*, *bingchen*.

[12] See Boulger, *The Life of Yakoob Bek* and Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*. A more recent study by Kim Ho-dong reappraises Ya'qūb Bek's achievements and refutes the notion that he was merely an adventurer. See Kim Ho-dong, *The Muslim Rebellion and the Kashgar Emirate*.

with the Qing than any other Central Asian power. As the khanate consolidated and extended its authority in the early 19th century, it not only traded extensively with Altishahr, but nurtured and sponsored a succession of rebellions in the region which rocked the foundations of Qing rule in Central Asia. It was these uprisings that triggered the repeated debates among Qing scholars and officials as to whether or not Xinjiang, and in particular the southern region of Altishahr, should be retained as part of the empire. Only in 1884, seven years after the suppression of Ya'qūb Bek, did the Qing court finally decide to unite the regions north and south of Tianshan with the Turfan Basin and to incorporate the entire area of Xinjiang into the empire, with provincial status.

This, then, is a political history of Qing relations with the Central Asian realm of Khoqand. Along with much of the rest of Central Asia, Khoqand was eventually absorbed into the Russian empire. Its relatively brief existence as a regional power, from the late 18th century to 1868,[13] has meant that it has received significantly less scholarly attention than, for example, the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.[14] Yet no other Islamic Central Asian power engaged in such extensive intercourse with the court at Beijing, nor had such a far-reaching impact on the affairs of the Qing empire.

The tools of foreign policy

Although the study of imperial China's foreign relations has fallen out of vogue in recent years, a steady trickle of case studies has continued to revise and reassess our understanding of the so-called tribute system, so much so that the very usefulness of the concept in relation to the late Ming-Qing period has now been brought into question.

When John King Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yü first summarized contemporary understanding of the system in 1941, it was generally accepted as a theory which shaped the conduct of all relations between the Chinese empire and outsiders; not only did it serve the purpose of defence as well as commerce, but as reflected in a plethora of associated rituals, procedures and terminology, it perpetuated the notion of China's cultural

[13] Although not annexed until 1876, by 1868 Khoqand had all but lost its autonomy to Russia.

[14] Almost all contemporary scholarship on the history of Khoqand is in Russian, see for example, Rashid N. Nabiev, *Iz istorii Khoqandskogo Khanstva*; V.M. Ploskikh, *Kirgizy i Khoqandskoe Khanstvo* and the seminal works of Timur Beisembiev on the chronicles of Khoqand, notably "*Ta'rikh-i Shahrukhī*" *kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*. For a brief, although not entirely reliable, history in English, see Schuyler, *Turkistan*, appendix I, pp.337–59; also Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, pp.816–45.

superiority and represented an outward extension of the internal hierarchical social order.[15] The Fairbank and Teng article was primarily concerned to describe the bureaucratic management of the tribute relations under the Qing, but in so doing the authors could not fail to draw attention to incongruities between the theory and the practice. It was not for some twenty years, however, that the tribute system was first held up for scrutiny by Fairbank himself and fellow contributors to *The Chinese World Order*. Detailed case studies, particularly from the Qing, had begun to reveal the full extent of the gulf between the ideological claim for China's foreign policy and its practice. The system was clearly far more complex and less static than had previously been believed.[16] As the academic waters grew increasingly muddy, in the late 1980s John Wills, who had himself made a significant contribution to our understanding of the flexibility and pragmatism involved in the Qing court's management of foreign affairs, felt compelled to label the tribute system "a conceptual muddle."[17] Yet, even he did not advocate its total rejection.

By the late 1990s, a consensus appeared to be emerging that the fabric surrounding China's management of foreign relations only coalesced as a system with the institutionalisation of the early Ming (1368–1644). More importantly, however, for the purposes of this study, is the view that by the mid-to-late Ming the system was already in decline. By the Qing period, it was no longer functioning effectively as a comprehensive or coherent framework.[18]

The reasons for this decline have yet to be thoroughly explored. To suggest that it resulted from a failure to respond to the increasing complexity of China's foreign relations, or an inability to meet the challenges of a new commercial age and the demands of a different and incompatible system of statecraft, is to invite accusations of portraying late imperial China as a stagnant, passive and defensive power. However, if one adds to these explanations the fact that, as Wills states, the Manchus were unlikely to have adopted the Sino-centric ideology of the tribute system wholesale[19] and that the Qing court introduced significant and vital

[15] Fairbank and Teng, 'On the Ch'ing Tributary System', pp.135–246.

[16] It is one of the ironies of 20th century scholarship on China that Fairbank's *The Chinese World Order* is invariably remembered for its introductory chapter in which Fairbank presents the classical notion of the Chinese world-view. In this paradigm, China stands at the centre, or peak, of expanding concentric rings on which are positioned other polities whose peoples are considered to possess a diminishing degree of civilization the further they are sited from the centre. In fact, the whole thrust of the book was to test this idealized framework and to challenge the relationship between ritual and practice. See Crossley's discussion of this point in 'Review of *Cherishing Men from Afar*', pp.598–9.

[17] Wills, 'Tribute, Defensiveness and Dependency', p.227.

[18] Wills, *Embassies and Illusions*, pp.14, 23.

[19] Wills, *Pepper, Guns and Parleys*, p.13; Wills, *Embassies and Illusions*, p.24.

institutional changes reflecting a new perspective on the management of foreign affairs, then the picture takes on a new life. It is no longer difficult to see how, by the early Qing, the always fragile coherence of the Ming tribute system might have been stretched to breaking point, gradually releasing its component parts to take on new functions and interpretations.

The fact that the Manchus did adopt many of the institutions, the ceremonial and documentary forms that underpinned the Ming bureaucratic management of foreign relations, has often been regarded as evidence of the continuity between the Ming and Qing conduct of foreign discourse. In fact, there were important conceptual shifts that characterized early and mid-Qing adoption of these practices.[20] The tribute relations were no longer primarily a symbol of China's cultural superiority; for the Manchu ruling elite their prime importance lay in the confirmation of the political and moral authority that legitimised Manchu rule.

As several scholars have noted, while traditionally the tribute system was used to export Chinese culture to the societies of east and southeast Asia, where China enjoyed generally good relations, to the north, it had long been used to hold the marauding nomads in check and thus served to emphasise cultural distinctions.[21] As the Manchus pushed back the perimeters of their empire, so this same pattern was repeated within the Qing realm.[22] In the southwest of the empire policies frequently accorded with what has been termed the 'Confucian civilizing mission', while in the north there was little attempt to re-educate or 'civilize' society along Chinese cultural lines until well into the 19th century.[23] What appears to have changed under the Qing, however, was the rationale for these different approaches. For the Manchus, a reluctance to impose Chinese culture on their northern subjects and neighbours seems to have been born of a tacit respect for the cultures of these peoples, or rather the belief that

[20] Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World*, p.64.

[21] See for example, Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World*, p.40. Mancall attributes these different relationships, and hence the different functions of the tribute system, to ecological and economic factors. He suggests that the agricultural economies of the regions to the south, east and southeast of China gave rise to a relationship based on "the convenience of exchange", while the economies relying on animal husbandry to the north produced relations based on "necessary exchanges". Mancall, 'The Ch'ing Tribute System', pp.74–5.

[22] The division was institutionalised in that tribute missions from the south, including the *tusi* (native chieftains) from Yunnan and Guizhou, were supervised by the *Libu* (Board of Rites), while embassies representing the tribes and principalities of Central Asia, including the beks from Xinjiang, the Mongol *taiji* and the Tibetan (*Xifan*) envoys came under the *Lifanyuan* (Court of Colonial Affairs).

[23] For a recent discussion of the 'Confucian civilizing mission', see Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers*, pp.18–23.

meddling with them, and thereby the very identities of their new subjects, was politically undesirable.[24]

This ideological shift was no doubt partly a reflection of the importance that the Qing ruling house placed on preserving Manchu cultural distinctiveness. However, other factors also undermined the legitimacy of continuing to view China's tribute relations in terms of a *hua-yi* (Sino-barbarian/foreign) dichotomy. The expansion of the empire meant that different groups of peoples were now being incorporated into the Middle Kingdom in unprecedented numbers. In the north in particular, many of these peoples came from well-established cultural traditions and, in the case of the Turkic Muslims, maintained strong ties of religion and language with their ancestral stock who remained beyond the territorial limits of the empire. Moreover, while it may have been considered inappropriate to term subjects of the empire *yi*, they were certainly not *hua*.[25]

The Qing emperors were not unaware of the importance of forging a strong relationship with their new neighbours in the north. Thus, just as 'outer vassals' (*waifan*), such as the rulers of Bolor, Badakhshan and Khoqand, all of which lay beyond the fringes of the Qing empire, sent tribute missions to Beijing, so did the officials of the newly annexed territories, the beks of Xinjiang, the Mongol *taiji* and the various Tibetan (*Xifan*) leaders who, in the eyes of the court, were 'inner vassals' (*neifan*) positioned firmly within the realm.[26] While the former may have been

[24] Building on the works of Fletcher, Crossley, Farquhar and Chia (see bibliography), Hevia discusses how various 'lords', from within and outside the empire were incorporated into Qing imperial sovereignty. Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar*, pp.29–56. For further discussion of what Millward terms "the pluralist Qing empire" see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.197–203; also Millward and Newby, 'The Qing and Islam on the Western Frontier', in Crossley, Siu and Sutton (eds.), *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity and Frontier in Early Modern China*, forthcoming.

[25] While the term *waiyi* is commonly used in Qing sources to refer to peoples from outside the Qing borders, the corresponding term *neiyi* is only very rarely used for those non-Han and non-Manchu peoples dwelling within the empire. Significantly perhaps, it tends to appear only in writings pertaining to revolt and its aftermath. For example, it is used in Wei Yuan's précis of a memorial concerning rehabilitation after the Jahāngīr rising, (although it is not used in the original version). Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:40a. The use of a similar term, *kanei yi Hui* (i.e. 'rebellious' Muslims from within the frontier), can be found in a report relating to the Yūsuf rising. *Xuanzong shilu* [hereafter XZSL], 177:10a, DG10.10 *dingyou*. Because the common English rendering of *waiyi* (also, *siyi* and *yi*) as 'barbarian' is so culturally and temporally specific, carrying connotations not necessarily embedded in the various Qing usages of the Chinese character *yi*, I have, somewhat controversially, adopted the more neutral translation of 'outsider'. I employ the same term for *waifan* (*Cf.* the use of *waifan*, *neifan*, note 6 above), except where it is necessary to distinguish between those *waiyi* who offered tribute to the Qing and those who did not; in these instances 'outer vassal' is used.

[26] The main difference in the nature of the tribute missions from 'inner' and 'outer' vassals was that in the case of the former they were strictly controlled by the court; they were arranged on a rotational basis and the amount and nature of the tribute was stipulated. Far less could be done to regulate missions from beyond the empire, although in the case of Khoqand, measures were taken to limit their frequency. Little scholarly attention has yet been given to the fact that the same rituals were being employed to construct very different relationships. For example, Chia's important study of the role of ritual in the incorporation of Inner Asia (i.e. Qing Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang) into the empire makes no reference to its continued diplomatic role in respect of the 'outer vassals' from Bukhara, Khoqand, etc., Chia, 'The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)', pp.60–92. Similarly, Millward's comments on the interpretations of *fan* do not address fully the distinction that late 18th century Chinese texts make between *waifan* and *neifan*. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, p.158.

responding to invitation and the latter to obligation, the ritual and regulations surrounding the missions were almost identical and the whole question, therefore, of what it meant to be an 'inner vassal' as opposed to an 'outer vassal', in terms of *hua* versus *yi*, was at best a hazy concept during much of the Qing.[27] As scholars have continued to unravel the tribute system, to grapple with the relationship between tribute and tax, and the relative importance of trade, diplomacy and ritual in Qing foreign relations, one point has become clear: the tribute mission and accompanying ritual did not define the nature of the relationship, or shape policy, but rather as James Hevia has shown, it was a medium for constructing power relations.[28]

In his study of the Macartney mission, Hevia finds that the Qing dynasty guest ritual does not deal in crude distinctions between *hua* and *yi*, but with incorporating the latter through, what he terms 'centring' (*fengjian shi zhong*). Hevia focusses on the role of ritual in performing this process of centring.[29] In so doing, he challenges the dichotomy between the reality and the illusion, between the practice of a pragmatic foreign policy and the rituals of the diplomatic traditions, long perceived as static and inflexible. Ritual was an integral part of Qing foreign policy that eased the passage of the minority Manchu ruling elite as it negotiated boundaries between historical continuity and change. It provided safeguards, the possibility of broadening or limiting, intensifying or defusing disputes—it was, in fact, above all an agent of flexibility. The 'tribute system' is an empty and misleading term to apply to the conduct

[27] Crossley's discussion of the "idealized constituencies" to which the Qing imperial voice addressed itself is a salient reminder that, first and foremost, it was geography, or rather territory, that mattered to the imperial order, and not ethnography. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp.332–3.

[28] I would not, however, go as far as to agree with Hevia, and the anthropologists on whose works he draws, that rituals themselves produce power relations. Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar*, p.21.

[29] Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar*, p.128. As Esherick points out, Hevia has elevated what has hitherto been understood as simply a term of admonition by the emperor to "a process" and arguably given it undue weight in the guest ritual. Esherick, 'Cherishing Sources from Afar', p.140.

of foreign relations during the Qing period only if one insists on viewing it as a holistic system informed by a coherent ideology. By the 18th century it was no more, or less, than a diplomatic toolbox, a toolbox replete with a vast range of instruments, all of which had been tried and tested by the rulers of China over centuries. From the rough and tumble of border markets to the highly choreographed imperial audience, the Manchu emperors recognized that these tools could be employed and adapted in order to regulate a wide spectrum of relations. They were the means by which the Manchus would endeavour to maintain the authority of the Aisin Gioro lineage within, as well as beyond, the fringes of their empire.

There is no paucity of statecraft writings dating from the mid-to-late Qing that might loosely fall under the heading of foreign relations. However, for the most part, these focus on issues concerning defence and specifically, defence of the southern and coastal regions. At least until the mid-19th century, relatively few Han Chinese officials had first-hand knowledge of the northwest. Yet those who did acquire an intimate understanding of the region, usually by virtue of a period of enforced exile, as well as those Manchu and Mongol military officials who built their careers on years of service in the region, all appear to have been wary of documenting any form of broad strategic thinking about the north-western frontier, its defence, and relations with neighbouring polities. Consequently, with no comprehensive treatises on the rationale that informed Qing policy towards its north-western neighbours during the late 18th and 19th centuries, one must endeavour to construct a picture of the shifting perceptions, assumptions and goals as gleaned from the execution of specific policies and the political context from which they emerged.

It is commonly accepted that foreign policy is indivisible from domestic politics and that an analysis of any given event or situation involving external forces must consider not only the power and prestige of the rulers concerned, the stability of their rule and the resources at their command, but also the less perceptible tendencies and processes that shape domestic politics at any one time. In the case of Khoqand, however, there is an even more patent reason why a study of Qing policy towards the khanate must inevitably be concerned with domestic politics: policy towards Khoqand was intrinsically bound both to the security of the empire's frontier and the domestic administration of Altishahr.

From frontier to border[30]

This work is not a social, cultural or administrative history of Xinjiang and does not, therefore, attempt to engage with the vast and heterogeneous body of work that passes under the name of frontier history or border studies, save in one specific area. It is concerned with how the empire's interaction with peoples outside its territorial jurisdiction contributed towards the move from an open, fluid frontier to a non-negotiable, closed concept of border, thus presaging the shift from a Qing empire to nation-state. As in the 2nd century BC, so in the 19th century AD, the right to trade, unrestricted trade, largely determined whether there was to be war or peace on China's northern frontier, but here the analogy ends. By the 19th century, the great nomadic confederations of the steppe were a phenomenon of the past and the threat to the empire came from new sedentary powers and Islamic forces. Initially, the Qing was able to draw on the traditional approaches to frontier management in order to curtail the new demands, but as the scales of power tipped, so the old order proved untenable and the notion of an unlimited, inclusive frontier was brought into question.

In the search to identify the processes and structures that mark the shift from empire to nation-state, the importance of frontiers and borders, both mental and physical, has long been recognized. In Western literature the transformation of the north-western frontier of the Qing empire into a territory that is today commonly held to be an integral region of the nation-state of China is generally associated with the political events of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But as the following chapters will illustrate, as early as the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the interaction between internal and external factors on the north-western frontier was already contributing towards the gradual hardening of the concept of border and the development of a border consciousness.

The notion of demarcating sovereign territory is no newcomer to the history of China. Although the primary function of the Great Walls of the Qin (221–207 BC) and the Han may have been defensive, they also served as the physical markers of imperial jurisdiction, although not of territorial limits. Many centuries later, the Liaodong palisade of the Ming and the willow palisade erected by the early Qing rulers to delimit a border with Korea, similarly reflected an appreciation of the need for a physical demarcation between polities, despite not serving to define precise

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[30] Usage of the terms frontier, border and boundary is notoriously confusing. Throughout this study 'frontier' is used to designate a loosely defined region which is not delimited and 'border' to refer to a line of demarcation or a delimited frontier. For a discussion on the use of these terms see Anderson, *Frontiers*, pp.9–10.

territorial limits, nor providing the defensive function of walls. Equally importantly, in the 11th century, the border negotiations and relief maps drawn up to reflect the frontier between the Liao (916–1125) and the northern Song (960–1127), suggest that China's rulers had early appreciated how a combination of natural geographical features, border posts, ditches and stone-markers could serve to demarcate a border.[31] Only in the late 17th century, however, was the Qing court introduced to the Western notion of border treaties and the mapping of lines mutually agreed between sovereign powers in order to demarcate precise territorial limits which corresponded to the respective legal and political jurisdiction of the parties concerned. In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk determined a large section of the border between the territories of the Romanov and Qing dynasties, but in the following decades, the Qing court demonstrated no signs of having been persuaded by the wisdom of the practice or of wishing to extend it to other frontier areas of the empire. Thus while in the 18th century the concept of inside and outside the territorial limits of the empire clearly existed, the *jie* (boundary) was by no means commensurate with the authority of the emperor and was seldom clearly delimited, whether on maps, in documents or on the ground itself.

If for the West, the 19th and early 20th centuries were the heyday of border demarcation, the late 20th century saw Western politicians and academics shift their attentions from borders to frontier regions. In many parts of the world, border or boundary disputes continue to rumble on into the 21st century, but it is now recognized that these are the symbols of much deeper processes. It is over frontiers, not borders, that wars are fought; it is frontiers that create myths about territorial unity, give rise to territorial grievances, shape the identity of individuals, define and challenge loyalties, and are employed as instruments of state policy. Clearly, at any given time there may be numerous reasons why a sovereign power might wish to retain a particular frontier region or, indeed, be prepared to relinquish it; however, only by studying a frontier as a historical process is it possible to uncover the full complexity of those reasons, and the forces that may hinder or prevent their being translated into policy.[32]

[31] For an excellent discussion of these border negotiations, see Lamouroux, 'Geography and Politics: The Song-Liao Border Dispute 1074/75'.

[32] For general discussion of the changes that have taken place in the study of frontiers in recent years see, for example, the introductions of van der Velde and van Houtum, *Borders, Regions and People*; Anderson, *Frontiers*; and Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*. For a good example of how these new approaches have been applied to China's historical frontiers, see Dabringhaus and Ptak, *China and her Neighbours*.

So, why did the Qing strive so hard to retain this north-western corner of its empire? In order to understand the essential fragility of the Qing hold on Altishahr, which Joseph Fletcher aptly termed the "weakest appendage" of the Qing empire,[33] and the tenacity with which many sought to retain it, one has to return to the conquest.

A retrospective rationale for conquest

While the Qing military achievements to the northwest of China were neither the first nor the last of what was subsequently to be known as the 'Ten Victories' (*shiquan wugong*) of the Qianlong emperor, as several commentators have pointed out, they were heralded, celebrated and commemorated in a manner that has secured their place as the most illustrious of those victories.[34] Above all, the conquests of Jungharia and the Tarim Basin afforded the occasion to equate the Qing with the glory and, by inference, the legitimacy of the Han and the Tang dynasties.

Given that many of the serving officers had fought in the campaigns against both the Junghar Mongols (*Zhunbu*) to the north of Tianshan and the Turkic Muslims (*Huibu*) to the south, it was not surprising perhaps that the victory celebrations and the various commemorative works made little distinction between the two conquests. Not only were the official records of the campaigns compiled as one work, the *Qinding pingding Zhunga'er fanglüe* (Imperially commissioned history of the pacification of the Junghars), but the *Ziguangge* (Pavilion of Purple Radiance), that stood on the west bank of Zhonghai lake in the imperial city, was rebuilt in 1760 as a memorial hall and used to display the standards and the captured weapons of both campaigns. The hall was hung with carvings of a poem by the emperor celebrating the victories and the texts of two commemorative memorials, one for each of the two campaigns.[35] Sixteen paintings of campaign scenes by the Jesuit missionary Giuseppe Castiglione (Ch. Lang Shining) and his colleagues also adorned the walls, as did the portraits of fifty distinguished officers and statesmen who had contributed to the victories.[36]

[33] Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.395.

[34] See, for example, Enoki, 'Researches in Chinese Turkestan during the Ch'ien-lung Period', pp.1–5.

[35] For the texts of the *Pingding Zhunga'er gaocheng taixue bei* and the *Pingding Huibu gaocheng taixue bei*, see GZSL 499:8a–16b, QL20.10 *wuwu* and GZSL 600:7b–13b, QL24.11 *xinhai* respectively. Pelliot notes that 220 poems relating to the campaigns of 1755–9 were attributed to the Qianlong emperor. Pelliot, 'Les Conquêtes de l'Empereur de la Chine', p.237. For a sample of these poems relating to the pacification of Altishahr, see *Qing Gaozong yuzhi shiwen quanji*, *Yuzhi shi erji*, 88:26b–28b.

[36] For Castiglione's works depicting the battle scenes and the victory celebration at the *Ziguangge*, see Beurdeley, pp. 80–83, 185, 189. Subsequently the portraits of officers who

Even the post-conquest rationalization served to reinforce the idea that the two campaigns were intrinsically linked. Official accounts portrayed the campaign against the south as the moral conclusion of that against the north.[37] Thus despite the distinct ethnographical and geographical nature of the two regions, severed by the Tianshan Range, the perception that there had been but one conquest prepared the way for an argument that was to resurface again and again in Qing official circles over the next century: the north could not be held without the south; in other words, effective control of the Turkic Muslims of the southern Altishahr region was deemed essential to the security of the empire.

In fact, the campaigns were in many ways quite separate enterprises. The final suppression of the Junghars in 1759 was the culmination of decades of intermittent military action to break Junghar supremacy in the northwest. The threat of Mongol resurgence was a legacy of the 13th century that no subsequent ruler of China had been able to ignore, and for the Manchus, if sensitivity to the emergence of nomad powers in the north was not instinctively acute, there was also good reason for their concern to prevent a Mongol-Tibetan alliance. In the 1690s, when negotiations between the Qing court and the Junghar leader Galdan (r.1676–97) failed to produce a lasting peace agreement, the Kangxi emperor (r.1662–1722) launched the first of a series of campaigns against the splintered Junghar confederation. With the death of Galdan in 1697, the threat to China's security receded, but at the court in Beijing the desire for a final solution to the Mongol problem remained.[38]

The first decade of the Qianlong emperor's reign coincided with a period of relative peace along the north-western border. However, on the death of Galdan Cereng (r.1727–45), Galdan's great nephew, the struggle for succession led to virulent internecine fighting among the Junghar confederation. For a peoples whose numbers had been ravaged by the smallpox epidemic of 1739, this further loss of life, coupled with the defection of those seeking sanctuary within the Qing *karun*,[39] left the

had distinguished themselves in later campaigns, both in Xinjiang and elsewhere in the empire, were also hung in the *Ziguangge* and the building served as an audience hall for foreign embassies. Enoki, 'Researches in Chinese Turkestan', pp.2–3; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.74. For details of the portraits, see Hu Jing, *Guochao yuanhua lu*, 1:20b–21b.

[37] See, for example, *Huijiang zhi*, p.5.

[38] The Yongzheng emperor (r.1723–35) noted that a decisive strike against the Mongols would be the realization of the "unfulfilled project of my late imperial father." Cited in Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*, p.120.

[39] The Manchu word *karun* (Ch. *ka-lun*) literally means guard-post. Although the *karun* were sometimes positioned at strategic points within Xinjiang, for example, along the south of Tianshan, for the most part they were located in the border zone of the Qing empire and were used as check-points, trading posts and bases from which to send out patrols into neighbouring regions. They did not, however, mark a defined territorial

Junghars a depleted and broken power. Thus, when in 1754 the Qianlong emperor launched a fresh campaign against the Junghars, tentatively united under Davachi (r.1753–55), the possibility of a Junghar invasion was no longer a pressing concern for the Qing court. Nevertheless, the prospect of eliminating the Mongol threat once and for all was appealing. More importantly for the Qianlong emperor, intent on reasserting Manchu identity and legitimacy, it was an opportunity to rekindle the flame of Manchu military prowess. In a stirring edict to the officers of the eight Manchu Banners, he impressed upon them that this was their chance to prove themselves the equals, or indeed the betters, of the Ming and to re-establish Manchu military supremacy:

> The rulers and officials of the former Ming were all men of the Han. Yet even at the time of their decline they were able to uphold justice and propriety and showed not the slightest tolerance of rebels. How much the more should this apply now that We, a Manchu ruler, govern the empire in a period when the realm enjoys peace and prosperity? Manchu officials and servants must stir themselves to action. How can they be as fearful and timid as this...? If we are lax in following procedures and fail to act quickly to put matters right and to revive the old ways and customs, then there is no knowing where it will end in a few years from now.[40]

But the Qing forces were once again denied a swift victory. Amursana, a Mongol chieftain of the Khoit tribe, turned against Davachi and assisted the Qing in their successful expedition of 1754–55. Subsequently, however, dissatisfied to find that he was not to be instated as khan of all the remaining Oirat tribes of the Junghar confederation, Amursana rebelled against his erstwhile allies. In 1757 the Qing launched another drive against the western Mongols, led by the general Zhaohui. Unable to garner the support of the Khalka tribes, Amursana's troops failed to withstand the attack. In summer, Amursana sought refuge among the Qazaq tribes before fleeing to Siberia where, a few months later, he died of smallpox. Meanwhile, the Qing forces consolidated their control of what had been the Jungharian heartland—a process that involved the slaughter of tens of thousands of Oirats.[41]

border. Following the Chinese usage, *karun* is employed throughout this work to refer to both the actual guard-posts and the notional border (*cf.* Ch. *ka-lun nei/wai*). See Xiao Fu, 'Guangjunfan kalun lai xin pingjie', p.177. For a detailed study of the establishment of both the *karun* and the post-stations (*juntai*) in Xinjiang, see Luo Yunzhi, *Qing Gaozong tongzhi Xinjiang zhengce de tantao*, pp.361–474.

[40] GZSL 474:18a, QL19.10 *wuwu*.

[41] Of those who survived and remained in Jungharia, some were given grazing lands in the Ili region and others were moved to Heilongjiang. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.11. The relatively small number who fled westwards appear to have settled in scattered communities, such as the one near Marghilan. See chapter 1.

By comparison, the conquest of Altishahr was a mere afterthought. The southern oasis cities had been held under Junghar control with varying degrees of stricture since the 1670s. Unlike the Mongols, a peoples with whom the Manchus had had close relations since before their conquest of China, prior to the campaign of 1758, Qing contact with the Turkic Muslims had been limited primarily to those living in the vicinities of Hami and Turfan. The strategic importance of these two cities, situated in the Turfan Depression at the head of the Gansu Corridor, meant that historically they had had far stronger links with China than had the oasis cities of the south. Constantly caught in the eye of the conflict between the Junghars and China, the rulers of Hami and Turfan had given allegiance to the Qing in 1698 and 1754 respectively. Thereafter, they were to provide vital assistance to the Qing in both the conquest and administration of the south.

In the oasis cities of the south, the Altishahr region, two Naqshbandī sufi orders, had been contending for religious and political authority since the 17th century. The two orders, the Āfāqiyya and the Ishāqiyya, were both led by khoja descendants of the Islamic leader Makhdūm-i A'zam (*c*.1461–1542).[42] In 1720, in an effort to tighten their control of the south, the Junghars had instated the Ishāqī khojas as rulers of the south, while removing eminent members of both branches to the northern city of Ili where they were held hostage. As the Qing troops struck against the Junghars in the north, the Ishāqiyya took the opportunity to rebel. In response, in 1755, the Qing backed a move to release the senior Āfāqī khoja, Burhān al-Dīn, in order that he might overthrow the rebellious Ishāqiyya and establish his own rule as a Qing dependency. Within the year Burhān al-Dīn had been joined in Altishahr by his younger brother Khōja-Jahān (Yahyā), who had taken advantage of the upheavals in Ili to make his escape. Khōja-Jahān was less willing than his elder brother to accept any form of Qing overlordship and by early 1757, Zhaohui was memorialising that the two khoja brothers were showing signs of recalcitrance. The emperor, however, was inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt and not until several months later, when the brothers

[42] A Naqshbandī religious leader who was active in Central Asia and claimed descent from the Prophet in the twenty-second generation. Makhdūm-i A'zam's descendants are commonly referred to as the Makhdūmzāda khojas. For a genealogy of their descent from the Prophet, see Shaw, 'The History of the Khōjas of Eastern Turkistān', pp.8–9 and a slightly different version in *Qinding Xiyu tongwen zhi* [hereafter XYTWZ], 11:7a–25a. The term *khōja* (*khwāja*) was used throughout Central Asia to signify 'descendant of the Prophet'.

were in open rebellion, were Zhaohui and his troops finally ordered to make preparations to attack the south.[43]

The southern campaign was, therefore, quite distinct from that of the north in its conception and rationale. One can only conjecture as to what type of relationship Altishahr might have enjoyed with the empire had the khoja brothers proved compliant. It is not inconceivable that had the military conquest been avoided, the small number of Manchu troops already sent south to assist the Āfāqiyya in the transfer of power might have been quietly withdrawn, perhaps leaving Altishahr to slip into a relationship with Beijing akin to that of Badakhshan and other Central Asian polities; a relationship which amounted to little more than a nominal acceptance of Qing authority and the dispatch of irregular tribute missions to Beijing.[44] In the event, it was the relatively unexpected and swift nature of the military achievement in Altishahr that made it the jewel in the crown of the Qing victories in the northwest.

The administration of Altishahr

Despite an imperial pronouncement that from Ili in the north to Yarkand in the south, Xinjiang should now be considered part of the interior (*neidi*),[45] it remained in the eyes of many Chinese officials and literati, a distant land beyond the fringes of the Chinese cultural world. The conquest did not cut the linguistic, cultural and religious ties that bound the region to Central Asia, any more than it changed its physical location of more than two months arduous journey from Beijing. Sparsely populated, with a harsh climate and poor communications, even before the conquest was complete, in 1758 the court had already designated Xinjiang as a penal colony and place of exile for disgraced officials. The decision not to integrate the new frontier fully into the provincial system was, therefore, not entirely surprising. Instead, the establishment of a military protectorate supported by the *Lifanyuan* (Court of Colonial Affairs), indicated that this was to be a special area, akin to Mongolia and Tibet, where local leaders were to retain considerable authority, albeit under Qing military supervision.[46]

[43] GZSL 524:25a–b, QL21.10 *wuyin*; ZFL *zheng* 33:5a–8b, QL21.10 *bingzi* and 39:26a–28b, QL22.4 *dingwei*.

[44] There is no record of the deal struck on the release of Burhān al-Dīn, but it is evident that the Qing authorities expected Altishahr to pay tribute-tax. ZFL *zheng* 33:5a–8b, QL21.10 *bingzi*.

[45] See, for example, GZSL 601:30b, QL24.11 *jiawu*.

[46] The *Lifanyuan*, which was staffed by Manchu and Mongol bannermen, was established in 1638 to manage relations with the Mongols, but as the empire and its interaction with its northern neighbours expanded, so the responsibilities of the office were extended to include Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as the peoples of Russia and Central

In 1758 Ili, the old Junghar stronghold in the north, was designated the centre of administration for the newly conquered lands and after the conquest of the south its authority extended to cover that area too.[47] A Manchu military governor (*jiangjun*) was instated in 1762 and the following year a commander-in-chief (*dutong*) was established in Urumchi. In the southern region of Altishahr, the Qing chose to adopt a relatively loose rein administration. Unlike in Tibet, there was no policy of "privileging the clergy"[48] and as this study illustrates, the Qing authorities made no attempt to exploit Islam for political purposes. Thus, day-to-day management of civil affairs remained in the hands of the local Turkic Muslim beks, who were by and large descended from the sedentarized steppe aristocracy.[49] The Qing retained the pre-existing structure of beks, absorbing them into the official system by affording them rank and emoluments. The hakim bek (*hākim bek*, Ch. *a-qi-mu bo-ke*), or chief official, of a locality was responsible for a number of beks each of whom had clearly defined responsibilities ranging from water-control to policing and education, depending on the size of the population and nature of the locality. The hakim beks themselves were directly responsible to the local Manchu or Mongol imperial agent (*banshi dachen)*. During the period that Kashgar was the Qing administrative centre of Altishahr, a total of nearly fifty years, the hakim bek of Kashgar was the senior local official in the region, and as such he held a pivotal position in relations between the Qing and Khoqand.

With the exception of Kashgar, a Manchu or Mongol imperial agent was appointed to every major city of the south (Yarkand, Khotan, Aqsu, Uch Turfan, Qucha, Yangi Hisar and Qarashahr). With a handful of *yamen*[50] officials and garrisons ranging in size from over one thousand in Yarkand to 200-odd in Khotan, the imperial agents were ultimately responsible for the administration of their city and surrounding area. In

Asia who dwelt outside the Qing empire. The *Laiyuansi*, which was largely responsible for Xinjiang, was added in 1761. It was not concerned with day-to-day policy, but with administrative tasks such as government communications, organizing tribute missions, population and household censuses, collection of taxes, salaries and compilation of the genealogies of local leaders. Zhang Deze, *Qingdai guojia jiguan kaolüe*, pp.151–2. Major policy for the region was, of course, determined by the emperor and the Grand Council (*junji chu*) in conjunction, to a greater or lesser extent, with the frontier officials.

[47] For administrative purposes the entire region was divided into three: the northern circuit (*beilu*), the area around Ili and Tarbagatai; the southern circuit (*nanlu*), largely synonymous with Altishahr; and the eastern circuit (*donglu*) which included Urumchi, Turfan and Hami. However, the terms *beilu* and *nanlu* were also used more generally to refer to the regions north and south of Tianshan, i.e. Jungharia and Altishahr.

[48] Dabringhaus, 'Chinese Emperors and Tibetan Monks', p.132.

[49] Togan, 'The Khojas of Eastern Turkestan', p.143.

[50] *Yamen* is the Chinese term given to the local government offices.

Kashgar, where the garrison was even larger than that of Yarkand, a councillor (*canzan dachen*), to whom all the imperial agents were responsible, was appointed. From 1765–88 the councillorship was moved to Uch Turfan and from 1831–64 it was transferred to Yarkand. These shifts were accompanied by fluctuations in the size of the Qing administration and the various garrisons, but the administrative structure remained basically unchanged until 1864.[51]

Until the re-establishment of Qing authority after the fall of Ya'qūb Bek nearly all high-ranking posts north and south of Tianshan were filled by Manchu and Mongol bannermen. As early as spring 1760, the Grand Council had already notified the relevant bodies that garrisons in Jungharia and Altishahr were to be placed under the supervision of generals of the Manchu banners and not those of the Green Standard troops.[52] In one or two exceptional cases in Altishahr, Turkic Muslims were appointed to the post of imperial agent, but never, until the late 19th century, Han Chinese. The precedent for excluding the Han from high office in strategically important border regions dated from the Kangxi era, when in an edict of 1688, the emperor instructed that only Manchus were to be appointed to the offices of financial commissioner, judicial commissioner, governor and governor general in Shanxi, Shaanxi and Gansu.[53] However, while in the final century of Qing rule Han Chinese were appointed to senior posts in the afore-mentioned provinces, this was not the case in Xinjiang until after 1877.

By its very nature then the conquest, the ensuing celebrations and the administration of Xinjiang bore the hallmarks of a specifically Manchu endeavour. Thus in examining Qing relations with Khoqand and the efforts of the court to retain its hold on the borderlands of the northwest, this study contributes in a limited way to the work of those scholars who in recent years have challenged the long-held belief that the Manchus, as a

[51] For events surrounding the transfer of the councillorship to Uch Turfan see chapter 1. For further discussion on the size of the garrisons and the relocation of the councillorship to Yarkand, see chapters 4 and 6.

[52] See GZSL 610:18a, QL25.4 *yichou.*

[53] *Qinding Da Qing huidian* (1733) 8:2a–b. A Kangxi edict of 1712 addressed to the Grand Council, Grand Secretaries and Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the boards confirms that Han Chinese were considered ill-equipped for duties in the north and north-western borderlands, but also suggests, somewhat unconvincingly, that the Han Chinese themselves were reluctant to take up office in these regions: "As for important military work, they [the Han Chinese] have generally demonstrated incompetence…I have repeatedly told them, that since they cannot ride horses or stand hardship, I must appoint bannermen to do the work whenever an emergency arises in the border areas…Moreover, Han Chinese often decline to take up an appointment in the northern or western border areas with the excuse that they cannot ride horses and that they find it too difficult to move around on foot in large areas where there is little water." *Donghua lu, Kangxi* 96:8b–9a, as cited in Chu and Saywell, *Career Patterns in the Ch'ing Dynasty*, p.46.

self-conscious ruling elite, had all but disappeared by the mid-Qing.[54] If Altishahr were lost it would be a Manchu loss, a blow to Manchu honour and authority throughout the empire and beyond.

Yet this is not to suggest that Han Chinese literati and officials per se were uninterested in, or opposed to, the retention of Xinjiang, and specifically Altishahr. Half a century after the conquest, many had come to regard the region as no less part of *their* empire than did the Manchus. Indeed, some of the leading advocates of the arguments to retain the region came from Han Chinese.[55] On the other hand, Manchu and Mongol officials were not unknown to suggest retrenchment. A close examination of the formulation of Qing policy towards Khoqand and the security of the frontier reveals no clear-cut divide between Han and Manchu/Mongol views; on the contrary, it was the convergence of Manchu self-consciousness and Han proto-nationalism, with all the muted anti-Manchu sentiment that this involved, which ultimately determined the political fate of Xinjiang.

Ironically, perhaps, the Qing conquest of Altishahr also marked the first step towards the establishment of Xinjiang as a political entity in its own right. It may even be argued that it foreshadowed the emergence in the 20th century of Eastern Turkestan nationalism. While this work makes no attempt to grapple with the politically-charged complexities of ethnic formation, the effect of Qing policies on the consolidation of regional identity cannot be ignored. Time and again, policies adopted in the light of relations with Khoqand and the rebellions instigated by the khojas served as agents of centralization, accentuating boundaries between Xinjiang and the rest of Central Asia, while paradoxically assisting the diffusion of Turkic Muslim culture throughout the region of present-day Xinjiang.

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[54] See, for example, Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*; Elliott, *The Manchu Way*; Rawski, *The Last Emperors*.

[55] Two of the most famous exponents of the argument for retaining Xinjiang were Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan. See chapter 4. For a discussion of how other scholars and officials, Han and non-Han, embraced Xinjiang in their writings, see Newby, 'The Literary Conquest of Xinjiang'.

CHAPTER ONE

QING EXPANSION INTO TURKIC CENTRAL ASIA

First contacts with the 'outer vassals'

After half a century of long and bitter campaigns against the Junghars, as the Qing forces moved to secure their victory to the north of the Tianshan Range, there was an expectancy in Beijing that the erstwhile Junghar dependency in the south, the Altishahr region, would now bow to Chinese suzerainty (*guihua*). In 1756, Burhān al-Dīn Khōja, the hereditary Turkic Muslim leader of the Āfāqiyya who had been held hostage by the Junghars, was released with Qing support and charged with taking control of the south from his old rivals the Ishāqiyya.[1] Within the year, Burhān al-Dīn, joined by his younger brother Khōja-Jahān, had risen in revolt against his sponsors. In spring 1757, the brothers' forces massacred a unit of over one hundred Qing troops that had been stationed in Qucha to assist the transfer of power. Faced with this unacceptable provocation, plans were laid for a Qing military campaign against the southern oasis cities of Altishahr.

For the forces of the Manchu general Zhaohui and his assistant general Fude, the campaign of 1758 was not as smooth as had been anticipated.[2] At Qucha, the gateway to the south, Qing forces besieged the city for three months but even when the city gates were finally drawn open, the victory was hollow. A series of misjudgements on the part of the Manchu

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[1] In the early 18th century, the Āfāqiyya and the Ishāqiyya became known as the *Aqtāghliq* (White Mountain faction) and the *Qarātāghliq* (Black Mountain faction) respectively. It is commonly held that they took these names from the Qirghiz who were associated with them. One group of Qirghiz is said to have originated from the Pamirs (Qaratagh) and the other from mountains north of Artush (Aqtagh). On the use of 'Aqtagh' and 'Qaratagh', and the "confusion and false geography to which they have given rise", see Shaw, 'A Sketch of the Turki Language' (1878), p.11. For other suggestions as to why the factions became associated with these names, see Han Zhongyi, 'Lüelun Xinjiang Heishanpai', pp.66–7. In Qing sources the *Aqtāghliq* and the *Qarātāghliq* are frequently referred to as the White and Black Hat Muslims (*bai/heimao Hui*) respectively. Although Fletcher maintains that "these Chinese designations cannot be correlated with the distinction between Āfāqiyya and Ishāqiyya in Altishahr", I have found no deviations from that correlation in 18th and 19th century Chinese texts relating to Altishahr. Fletcher, 'The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China', pp.10–11, note 3. For an account of the khoja lineages see Schwarz, 'The Khwājas of Eastern Turkestan', pp.266–96; Shaw, 'The History of the Khōjas of Eastern Turkistān'; Hartmann, 'Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choğas in Kašgarien', pp.1–174. Both Shaw and Hartmann base their works on the *Tadhkira-i khwājagān* (or *Tadhkira-i 'azīzān*), *c.*1768, by Muhammad Sādiq Kāshgarī.

[2] The Qianlong emperor had been of the opinion that it would not require many men to pacify the Turkic Muslims. GZSL 560:5a–6b, QL23.4 *wuwu*.

commanding officer culminated in Khōja-Jahān managing to escape with over four hundred of his followers. The younger khoja fled south to Yarkand where he, in turn, besieged Zhaohui and his troops on the south bank of the River Qarasu for over three months. Meanwhile, Burhān al-Dīn and his followers held out in Kashgar, but when in the summer of 1759 massive Qing reinforcements, led by generals Fude and Shuhede, began to converge on Yarkand and Kashgar simultaneously, the brothers faced inevitable defeat. In the late summer, they gathered what forces and provisions they could and fled west across the Pamirs. Despite clashing three more times with the imperial troops and suffering enormous losses among their followers, the khoja brothers eluded capture.[3]

But the Qing troops did not turn back. Undeterred by the wild mountainous terrain of the Pamirs and the vast Muslim lands beyond, they continued their pursuit. As Zhaohui subsequently reported to the Qianlong emperor, by this stage the two brothers were living on borrowed time, like "wandering ghosts" who had "temporarily borrowed a place of rest."[4] Nor was such confidence merely the product of hindsight, for by 1759 the imperial forces had already extended the arm of Qing authority deep into the heart of Central Asia.

In 1757 Sultān Ablai, who ruled the Senior Horde of the Qazaqs as well as the easternmost tribes of the Middle Horde, had already submitted to the Qianlong emperor.[5] The following year, the remaining Qazaqs of the Middle Horde, under Abū al-Muhammad, followed suit. Theirs were the most westerly of the Middle Horde's pastures, but in early 1758 as the Qing forces were still consolidating their hold in Jungharia, General Fude had led his men far into their territory in pursuit of Shilaq, a Qazaq leader who had supported the last stage of Junghar resistance. On arrival in the vicinity of Tashkent some 1,300 *li* west of Kashgar, Fude found the city torn by civil war involving the Qazaqs and three ruling religious families. Pitching camp outside a neighbouring town, he dispatched a detachment

[3] Narratives of the Qianlong campaigns in both Altishahr and Jungharia can be found in Zhuang Jifa, *Qing Gaozong shi quan wugong yanjiu* and Dai Yi, *Qianlongdi ji qi shidai*. Both draw on the ZFL. For further sources see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.266–7, note 18.

[4] ZFL *zheng* 81:27a–b, QL24.10 *renyin*.

[5] XYTZ 44:4a–b. As Fletcher points out, the Qing authorities called the tribes of the Senior Horde and the easternmost tribes of the Middle Horde 'the tribes of the left', while the more westerly Qazaqs of the Middle Horde were known as 'the tribes of the right'. Fletcher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia *c*.1800', p.63. In fact, Sultān Ablai shared control of the Middle Horde with Abū al-Muhammad, but from the mid-1740s Abū al-Muhammad had retired to the city of Turkestan and Ablai had become *de facto* leader of the Middle Horde. Levshin, *Descriptions des Hordes*, p.245. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, pp.645–6.

to Tashkent to restore order.[6] This was not altruism but shrewd diplomacy. There could be no more effective method of informing the local leaders of the imperial presence in the region and eliciting their allegiance. Shortly, word arrived at Fude's encampment that the city had been pacified—albeit only temporarily. All parties pledged their loyalty to the emperor, including the powerful Qazaq chieftain Tuli Biy who duly sent envoys to Beijing.[7]

As the imperial troops continued in their dogged pursuit of Shilaq they had also entered the territory of the five eastern Qirghiz tribes to the northwest of Altishahr.[8] Like the Qazaqs, their pastures also bordered on Jungharia, and the massacre that Qing forces had so recently inflicted on the Junghars would have been no secret to them. Moreover, they too had good reason to be grateful for the removal of the Junghars from the political stage, for it had enabled them to repossess pastures upon which the Junghars had encroached. The mere presence of the imperial forces in the region was, therefore, sufficient to elicit word that the five tribes of eastern Qirghiz, with a total of well over 6,000 households desired to submit (*neifu*).[9] Qing detachments travelled for days to deliver the imperial decree to various tribal leaders in camps as far away as Talas.[10] According to Chinese accounts, with a clenched fist pressed to their forehead as a sign of submission, the Qirghiz of the Sayaq and Sari-Bagish tribes faced east, kowtowed and offered their wholehearted allegiance to the emperor of China. Lamenting that their long-held desire to submit had been thwarted by the presence of the "cruel and immoral" Junghars, they reportedly expressed boundless joy at the unexpected pleasure of now being able to become servants of the emperor of China.

[6] The city of Tashkent was an important juncture on the Silk Route, known to the Chinese from Han and Tang times when it was referred to as *Shiguo* ('stone country' after the Turkic for stone *tash*). See Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, vol.2, pp.55–6. In 1740, it passed under the domination of the Junghars and was ruled by the Qazaq Kusiak Biy, on their behalf, until at least 1749. However, with the disintegration of the Junghar confederation, power had been divided among the heads of three religious families. One of the three leaders was supported by the Qazaqs and consequently, when he was ousted from power, the Qazaqs took up arms. Howorth states that the Chinese occupied Tashkent in 1750, but this is clearly an error and should read 1758. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, pp.818–9.

[7] XYTZ 45:26a–27a and 44:33a–34b.

[8] Valikhanov states that the Qirghiz tribes did not think of themselves as divided into an eastern and western confederation as suggested by the Qing sources. Valikhanov, 'Zapiska o Kokandskom khanstve', pp.301–2. The Qirghiz are the peoples also referred to as the Qara-Qirghiz, or the Burut (Ch. *Bu-le-te*).

[9] 6,000-odd households is the figure given in Qing sources for the three most important tribes of the eastern Qirghiz. XYTZ 45:1a–b.

[10] It was, of course, at the battle of Talas that the Chinese were defeated in 751 by Arab Muslim forces. References to the city are found in Chinese sources from at least the 7th century. See Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, vol.1, pp.228–9, note 585.

Mahmud Qulī, the 90-odd-year-old chieftain of all the eastern Qirghiz, was prevented from travelling any great distance by frailty and a large pot-belly. Instead, he delegated three tribal leaders to convey offerings of a hundred head of cattle and sheep to the Qing military camp. On their arrival, Zhaohui not only feasted the Qirghiz envoys, but treated them to a demonstration of his troop's martial art skills, a display which apparently left them awe-struck:[11]

> We have long known of the power of the bows and arrows of the empire, but as for hitting the target with every shot, piercing layers of armour, throwing three spears in succession from horseback, shooting five arrows one after another to the left and right, leaving the horse to touch the ground and leaping back [into the saddle], such exceptional feats as these are indeed rare.[12]

Thus, among the tribes to the west of Xinjiang, the Qing peace offensive was already well under way by 1759. While Chinese transcriptions of the messages and missives of submission undoubtedly owe much to the clichés of imperial parlance, their essence was probably an accurate reflection of the political environment. Few Central Asian tribes would have been eager to engage with the Qing military machine. Moreover, there was no indication that the Manchus wanted to encroach upon their lands, to tax them, to enlist them in their fighting ranks or subjugate them in any other way.[13] What was true for the various tribes would have been equally true for the numerous supra-tribal polities of the region.

The small city-state of Khoqand was situated some twenty days journey to the northwest of Kashgar. As the imperial army had prepared to advance against the khoja brothers along two separate routes, one from Aqsu to Kashgar and one from Khotan to Yarkand, Qush Qipaq, who had served as hakim of Kashgar under the Junghars, notified Zhaohui that the

[11] XYTZ 45:1a–3a. Note that Mahmud Qulī's name is rendered as Ma-mu-te-hu-li on 2a, but on the previous page, 1b, and elsewhere it appears in the Chinese sources as Ma-mu-ke-hu-li. The lack of standardization in the transliterations of names of places and people associated with Central Asia was a problem recognized by the court, hence the compilation of various multilingual thesauruses such as the *Wuti Qingwen jian* and the *Qinding Xiyu tongwen zhi,* but even these failed to solve the problem altogether. See Enoki, 'Researches in Chinese Turkestan during the Ch'ien-lung Period', p.5 *ff.*

[12] XYTZ 45:2b.

[13] Although the Qing had no pressing need to enlist the Qirghiz at this time, this had not always been the case. When in 1758 Zhaohui was besieged on the banks of the River Qarasu, the imperial bodyguard, Buzhantai was dispatched to enlist troops among the western Qirghiz of the Pamirs, in the hope that they could be persuaded to attack Kashgar and so divide the rebels at Yarkand. When he reached the pastures at Atbash the Qirghiz chief, Ming Ilha, refused the summons. Only in the following year, when the imperial forces had broken through the siege and the fate of the khoja brothers was all but sealed, did Ming Ilha present himself to Zhaohui in Aqsu and request to make his submission. HJTZ 6:8a; Fletcher, 'The Biography of Khwush Kipäk bek (d.1781)', p.169.

two brothers were on good terms with Irdana (r.1753–69), the ruler of Khoqand, and might attempt to take refuge in his territory.[14]

To reach Khoqand a detachment of Qing troops travelled via the pastures of the Edigene Qirghiz between Artush, north of Kashgar, and Andijan. This was one of the fifteen tribes of the western Qirghiz whose pastures lay 300 *li* to the northwest of Kashgar and stretched across the Pamirs from the eastern border of Bukhara to the Congling Mountains. The 700-odd households belonging to the Edigene and Mongoldor tribes were under the leadership of a certain Hājjī Biy who received the imperial bodyguard Daketana with the familiar assurances that his people had long desired to submit, but had been prevented from doing so by the Junghars. Professedly overwhelmed by their good fortune, he spoke on behalf of all fifteen tribes as he pledged over 200,000 Qirghiz to be servants of the emperor.[15]

The pastures of the Edigene were several days' journey east of Khoqand, thus by the time that Daketana and his men had made their way via Andijan and Marghilan to the city of Khoqand, Irdana was fully prepared for their arrival. The Qing officers were feasted with mutton and wine and Irdana responded to the requests that Khoqand should submit to the rule of the Qing emperor with an effusive letter of homage:

> Irdana respectfully greets the general of His Majesty's troops. The emperor's bounty is great and the people are content. When we heard that the Qazaqs and the Qirghiz had received the summons we looked forward to your arrival. Now that the imperial guard and his men have come our joy is boundless. I am sending trusted envoys with a message and hope they will be allowed to travel to the capital. We await your instructions.[16]

Contact had been established and later that year, at Irdana's behest, Toqtā Muhammad, the ruling bek of the town of Andijan, travelled to Beijing for an audience with the emperor.[17]

The picture that emerges, therefore, is not incompatible with Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov's 19th century assessment that the fall of the

[14] HJTZ 6:8a–b; Fletcher, 'The Biography of Khwush Kipäk bek (d.1781)', p.170. The reign dates for Irdana and many of his successors are still controversial. I follow evidence drawn from Qing documentary sources. See Pan Zhiping, 'Zhongya Haohan wang tong kao'.

[15] XYTZ 45:8b–9b. The XYTZ account is obviously heavily edited, but the version of Hājjī Biy's letter cited in the campaign history smacks of a certain authenticity in that here Hājjī Biy compares the Qing emperor's benevolence, majesty and valour to that of the legendary heroes: Sulayman (King Solomon), Iskandar (Alexander the Great) and Rustam (hero of the *Shāh-nāma*). ZFL *zheng* 78:13a–15a, QL24.9 *gengshen.*

[16] ZFL *zheng* 82:5b, QL24.11 *wuwu.*

[17] Once again several of the Chinese sources give slightly different transliterations of, in this case, Toqtā Muhammad's name. XYTZ 45:14b; ZFL *zheng* 82:5a, QL24.11 *wuwu;* GZSL 604:12b, QL25.1 *yimao.*

Junghars and the conquest of the Altishahr caused "a panic throughout the whole of Asia."[18] One after another the leaders of the nomadic and settled polities on the eastern flank of Central Asia offered themselves as servants of the Qing emperor and promised not to assist the khojas and their followers.

For one small realm, however, the issue was not so straightforward. It was not to Khoqand that the khoja brothers were driven in search of refuge, as Qush Qipaq had predicted, but to Badakhshan, a small principality of some one hundred thousand households that lay to the southwest of Kashgar (in present-day Afghanistan and Tajikistan). According to the religious elders of Badakhshan, the scriptures determined that given their status as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, the khoja brothers could not be extradited. Thus Sultān Shāh, the ruler of Badakhshan, was faced with the dilemma of incurring the wrath of the Muslim clergy, if he handed over the khojas, or the ire of the Qing emperor, if he failed to do so. No sooner had he taken both the brothers captive than it was rumoured that neighbouring tribes were about to come to their assistance. Meanwhile, Qing envoys were arriving from Fude's camp in Wakhan with gifts of silk and scarcely veiled threats of military action. The Qing court had no intention of engaging in an argument over the authority of the Islamic scriptures. As elsewhere in the empire, Allah's will could be tolerated, even respected, as long as it was clear that it was at all times subservient to the will of the Son of Heaven. Sultān Shāh again consulted with his countrymen and concluded that the security of his kingdom was paramount—the khojas must die.[19]

Rumours soon abounded as to how exactly the two brothers had met their deaths and whether or not Khōja-Jahān had succumbed to wounds received in battle. A more worrying detail for Fude, however, was that before Burhān al-Dīn's body could be officially identified by the Qing authorities, it had disappeared, leaving nothing but traces of blood where the corpse was said to have lain. As for Khōja-Jahān, his heavily scarred body was examined and his head, clearly identifiable by the pox scars on

[18] Valikhanov, 'Zapiska o Kokandskom Khanstve', p.460.

[19] When Sultān Shāh finally released the corpse of Khōja-Jahān, he let it be known, in a clear bid to seek Qing protection, that in so doing he was committing an even greater crime than handing over the khoja while still alive. *Manwen dang'an, lufu* [hereafter MWDA], 1789–014 054–2723, QL24.10.2 (Ch./Man.). Subsequently, on several occasions the rulers of Khoqand also justified their refusal to hand over descendants of the khojas to the Qing by citing the authority of the Islamic scriptures (Ch. *jingdian*, Man. *nomun*), or at least the lack of a precedent in the scriptures. Although the reluctance of Islamic states to surrender Muslims to non-Islamic authorities is one with which we are still familiar today, I have not been able to establish the written authority for this and it may well have pre-Islamic roots. The terms *jingdian* and *nomun* are translated throughout as 'scriptures' or 'Islamic scriptures', rather than the *Qur'ān*.

the left temple, was swiftly forwarded to the Qing encampment whence it was conveyed to Beijing. On its arrival in the capital several weeks later, the cranial trophy was ceremoniously presented to the emperor and displayed at the main gate (*wumen*) on the southern wall of the Forbidden City.[20] On the basis of various testimonies, there could be little doubt that Burhān al-Dīn was also dead—though not forgotten; three years later his body was disinterred in the Badakhshani city of Faizabad and handed over to the Qing authorities.[21] But the Qing had by no means seen the end of the Āfāqī lineage.

Determining policy

As conveyed in the Chinese records, the expressions attributed to Irdana, Hājjī Biy, and the other Turkic Muslim leaders who came into contact with the Qing forces at this time all indicate their submission to the Qing emperor (e.g. *chengxin neifu, xiang hua laigui, wei da huangdi chenpu*). All are terms that are regularly interpreted in Western writings as denoting acceptance of 'tributary status'. Indeed, most of the tribes and small polities that offered their submission to the Qing troops did send at least one mission to Beijing conveying goodwill and gifts for the emperor, but in every other respect their status and relationship with the Qing court varied dramatically. In the decade following the conquest of Xinjiang, not only were the Qing authorities grappling with their new role in Central Asia, but the Muslim leaders were also unclear as to the nature of their relations with the Qing empire.

Significantly, though not surprisingly perhaps, Central Asian sources make no mention of any alliances with China at this time, not to mention

[20] ZFL *zheng* 79:17a–28b, QL24.9 *dingchou* and 81:1a–12b, QL24.11 *xinhai*. According to ZFL, it was Khōja-Jahān's arrogant behaviour, culminating in a provocative attack on a Badakhshani village that caused Sultān Shāh to lose patience with the brothers. A slightly different version of events appears in XYTZ 46:1a–2b. The disparity between later accounts is an indication that the story of the death of the khoja brothers quickly became the stuff of legend. Wood states that Khōja-Jahān sought refuge in Badakhshan with 40,000 of his followers, but the size of his harem and his great wealth attracted the envy of Sultān Shāh, who attacked him. "On suing for his life in vain, he [Khōja-Jahān] cursed Badakshan, and prayed that it might be three times depopulated, and that not even a dog might be left in it alive." Wood, *A Journey to the Source of the River Oxus*, pp.161–2. See also de Mailla, who suggests that it was Burhān al-Dīn who died of his wounds. De Moyriac de Mailla, *Histoire générale de la China*, vol.11, p.573. Several subsequent Chinese accounts, on which Western scholars have drawn, erroneously state that Sultān Shāh fought against the khojas and captured and killed both before forwarding their heads to Zhaohui. See, for example, *Qingjian gangmu*, 7:420 and Fuheng *et al.*, *Huang Qing zhigong tu*, p.215. For eyewitness accounts of the deaths of the brothers, see MWDA 1789–014 054–2723, QL24.10.2.

[21] ZFL *xu* 21:1a–3b, QL28.3 *wuwu*.

acts of submission.[22] The unimportance of any such act or agreement in the minds of the Central Asian leaders is perhaps best gauged by the fact that the Qazaq leaders Sultān Ablai and Abū al-Muhammad had, according to Russian sources, submitted to the Tsar of Russia in 1740, nearly twenty years before they offered their peoples as subjects of the Qing. Given that Ablai had fought alongside the Junghars, against the Qing, in the years prior to the imperial conquest, it is not inconceivable that shortly after professing his subservience to the Qianlong emperor, he should have sent a letter to the Russians stating that he had had no alternative but to submit to the Chinese and that he was still prepared to fight against them.[23] Yet, to suggest that Ablai and Abū al-Muhammad were deceitful in their dealings with the Qing, or indeed particularly loyal to Russia, would be to misunderstand the dynamics of Central Asian politics during the 18th and 19th centuries. As J.P. Ferrier observed during his travels in the 1840s, the regional and tribal rulers "will change their protectors as often as it suits them ... they rarely pay their tribute to whichever suzerain they attach themselves for the time, and he is generally obliged to present them with khalats [robes], or in other ways propitiate their transient good-will."[24] Thus in verbally accepting the protectorship of the Qing emperor and send-ing envoys to Beijing to receive his imperial munificence, the Central Asian leaders did not consider themselves to have compromised their authority or independence, still less their religion, in any way; they had merely gained certain trading privileges and a potential protector.

As the Qing military envoys travelled far afield securing the allegiance of the various Central Asian leaders and receiving their declarations of submission, there were no elaborate ceremonies marking the onset of 'tribute relations' and, apart from the proclamation of the imperial official decree requesting submission, no instructions were issued as to how they were to conduct themselves in their new relationship with the Middle Kingdom. Like the people of Annam, the Ryukyus and Siam, the Qazaqs were required only to become versed in the moral teaching of the empire; they were to be held on a 'loose rein' (*jimi*), but what exactly was meant

[22] See, for example, Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskago Khanstva* (or the French translation, Nalivkine, *Histoire du khanat de Khokand*), which is based on several Central Asia sources.

[23] Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, p.647. Howorth also states that Ablai was one of the Qazaq chiefs who swore an oath of allegiance on the accession of Catherine II in 1762. *Ibid*, p.648. In 1778 Ablai was officially recognized by the Russian court as 'khan'. Levshin, *Descriptions des Hordes*, p.261.

[24] Noelle, *State and Tribe in 19th Century Afghanistan*, p.74, quoting J.P. Ferrier, *Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan*, trans. W. Jesse.

by this would be discovered by trial and error. They were not, for example, to be allowed to return to their old grazing lands in Jungharia without permission.[25] On the other hand, when soon after Ablai's submission, the Russians wrote to the Qianlong emperor informing him that the Qazaq leader was in fact their subject, the emperor simply brushed the matter aside; had the Russians treated Ablai and his people well, he wrote in reply, they would not have submitted to him.[26]

As far as the Qing court was concerned, theoretically the emperor's authority was absolute; in practice, however, no steps were taken to limit the autonomy of those who submitted. No taxes were imposed on the empire's new subjects and although the first tribute mission and concomitant ritual may be deemed to represent the official onset of relations, the requirement to send an envoy to court (*chaojin*) was presented as an opportunity rather than a binding obligation.[27] Submission denoted recognition of a higher moral power, but these were not conquered or subjugated peoples. As evidenced by the emperor's instruction to the Qirghiz, there was no intention to incorporate these peoples administratively or culturally:

> Now all the Junghar tribes have been pacified and your territory borders Our frontier lands, if, like the Qazaqs, you are drawn to the civilized ways of the empire and submit (*muhua laigui*), then We shall ensure that you continue to live peacefully. There is no need for you to adopt our ways. We shall not give you official ranks and titles, nor burden you with taxes. You have only to send an envoy to pay your respects and We shall extend Our favour with rewards. Perhaps you think that it is not appropriate to surrender (*toucheng xiangfu*) because the customs of the 'outer vassals' differ from those of China, in that case, you may do as you wish.[28]

Consequently, the relationship between the empire and its newly acquired 'outer vassals' left ample room for manoeuvre, and misunderstanding, on both sides. On one issue, however, the message from Beijing was unequivocal. From the very start of the Qing's political involvement in this region of Central Asia, the court's policy was premised on an

[25] Hong Tao, 'Ping Qianlong huangdi di Hasake zhengce', p.26.

[26] In 1779, when Ablai's son visited the Russian court, the Qianlong emperor had reason to recall his earlier reaction to Qazaq duplicity. See GZSL 1094:1b–2a, QL44.11 *xinsi*.

[27] Most leaders did not travel in person to Beijing, but sent a representative, not least for fear of catching smallpox. See XYTZ 45:9b–10a; ZFL *zheng* 82:6b, QL24.11 *wuwu*.

[28] ZFL *zheng* 49:26a–b, QL23.1 *bingchen* As Qishiyi suggests, the Qazaqs did in fact receive ranks, as well as the imperial calendar. Qishiyi, *Xiyu wenjian lu*, 3:35a. While making no reference to the presenting of the calendar at the time of 'submission', documentary sources concur that from 1763 those who led tribute missions to court were frequently conferred with titles of distinction or rank. See Hong Tao, 'Ping Qianlong huangdi di Hasake zhengce', pp.26–7.

overriding concern to preserve the new status quo.[29] All the rulers and chiefs who sent envoys to Beijing from beyond the *karun* were therefore explicitly informed that the imperial authorities would not interfere with them as long as they kept the peace; if on the contrary they made trouble, they would be called to account by the Qing forces. There were two fundamental problems with this approach. The first lay in the essentially volatile nature of Central Asian politics where few leaders were sufficiently secure to retain power without making continual effort to increase their lands and/or their wealth.[30] There followed from this the fact that the imposition of Qing authority would necessarily require the presence of a large number of troops in Xinjiang who could be dispatched beyond the *karun* at short notice to act as peace-keepers and to punish aggressors. Thus the first decade of Qing rule in Central Asia was a period of testing. Just what did the Qing presence in the region mean? How far would the Manchu rulers allow themselves to become embroiled in the fray of regional politics and would they prove to be arbitrators or aggressors?

Early warnings

Early Qing reports had spoken of good relations between Irdana of Khoqand and Hājjī Biy, the Qirghiz leader of the Edigene tribe, but officials in Altishahr were soon receiving information that Khoqand was clashing with the Edigene tribe in the Osh region of the Ferghana Valley. The course of events is somewhat confused, but there can be little doubt that by late 1760 the Edigene, as well as other Qirghiz tribes, were regularly attacking and robbing Khoqandi traders as they travelled back and forth to Altishahr. As the Qing authorities became increasingly reluctant to pay compensation and were apparently unable or unwilling to suppress the Qirghiz bandits, the Khoqandis took matters into their own hands and retaliated by occupying an area of Qirghiz agricultural land in

[29] I have used the term 'court' throughout to refer both specifically to the Grand Council (*junji chu*), but also more generally to the inner court, including the emperor.

[30] For a discussion of Turko-Mongolian steppe values and the importance of 'redistribution' associated with tribal organization, opposed to the accumulative economic tendencies of sedentary societies, see Togan, 'Difference in ideology and practice', and *Flexibility and Limitation*, pp.1–16. Togan defines 'redistribution', not simply as an economic practice, but as an ideology which incorporated "power-sharing and individual advancement" (*Flexibility and Limitation*, p.16). My understanding of the organization of Central Asian polities suggests that by the late 18th/19th centuries, most rulers were precariously balanced between these two modes. While aspiring towards a centralized sedentary organization, which would allow them to levy taxes, establish an institutionalized bureaucracy and obviate the succession struggle, they were still dependent for their military strength, and hence security, on the good-will and co-operation of tribes who generally adhered to the Turko-Mongolian steppe values.

the vicinity of Osh. Then, while Khoqand was engaged in fighting against Khojand, the strategically important city that stood at the gateway of the Ferghana Valley, Hājjī Biy seized the opportunity to attack Khoqand. From Kashgar the Manchu councillor, Yonggui, sent messages to both sides instructing them to maintain the peace, but to no avail.[31] By 1762 renewed reports were reaching Kashgar that Irdana was occupying Osh. This time the court lost patience. Admonishing Yonggui for his failure to take a strong stand, the emperor instructed him to threaten Khoqand with the use of force.[32]

Even before this injunction had probably reached Khoqand, in the autumn of 1762, the court learned that in a recent communication to Yonggui, Irdana had referred to the Kashgar Mountains as forming the border (*wei jie*) between Altishahr and Khoqand.[33] The intimation was clear: all the Edigene Qirghiz and their pastures were under Khoqand's jurisdiction and Khoqand was effectively an immediate neighbour of Altishahr.

Although the concept of the inclusive universal empire may have been underpinned by the notion that the emperor's rule knew no bounds, by the 18th century, the Qing court was by no means a stranger to the idea of delimiting sovereign authority, as evidenced not least by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689.[34] And yet for Qing officials, both on the north-western frontier and in Beijing, the boundary of Xinjiang remained an abstraction. The closest it came to any physical representation were the *karun,* the guard-posts positioned on the routes and passes that were frequently used by travellers entering or leaving Qing territory.[35] These *karun* represented the limits of Qing legal jurisdiction, but not the territorial limits of the

[31] ZFL *xu* 14:6b–8a, QL26.10 *jisi*. Although primarily nomadic herders, many Qirghiz were also engaged in farming. For attacks on Khoqandi merchants by the Chong-bagish Qirghiz, see ZFL *xu* 7:23a–24a, QL25.10 *xinyou*; 9:7b–9a, QL26.1 *yimao* and 16:13b–14b, QL27.3 *jisi*. For the court's reaction to Khoqand's claims for compensation in respect of Qirghiz attacks on their traders journeying to Altishahr, see for example ZFL *xu* 16:13a–14b, QL27.4 *jisi*. However, it was not until the mid-1790s that as a result of the problems caused by these attacks, measures were taken to restrict traders from travelling beyond the *karun*. See MWDA 3483–014 159–0760, QL59.10.6; GZSL 1464:1b–3a, QL59.11 *yiyou*.

[32] ZFL *xu* 17:27b–28a, QL27.5 *yihai*.

[33] Saguchi Tōru suggests that the Kashgar Mountains refer specifically to the Ga-bu-lan (elsewhere He-bu-lan) and Su-ti-bu-la-ke mountains in the Congling Range. Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan*, p.351–2. However, the term 'Kashgar Range' was often used simply as a variant for the Congling Range which encircles the Sariqol plateau in the Pamirs. See de Filippi, *The Italian Expedition*, p.484.

[34] The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) determined the eastern section of the frontier between China and Russia as demarcated by the Argun and Gorbitsa rivers, then proceeding eastward to the watershed between the Amur and Lena rivers and on to the sea.

[35] *Karun* were also located in non-border areas. See introduction, note 39.

empire.[36] In that this region of the empire was bounded at all, the boundary was amorphous and certainly not to be demarcated by geographical features, still less determined unilaterally by Khoqand.

When it was learned that in the same communication Irdana had styled himself 'khan',[37] the court changed tactics. Evidently, its concerns now lay less with Khoqand's annexation of the Qirghiz pastures than a reluctance to become embroiled in the petty squabbles of its neighbours and perhaps a sense of disquiet concerning Irdana's long-term political ambitions. By focussing attention on the affront to the emperor's supreme moral authority, a purely abstract conflict was introduced into a potentially tense situation: if the military cost of ejecting Khoqand from the Qirghiz pastures was considered too high, Khoqand could, nevertheless, be taken to task for violating the universal moral order. Yonggui was instructed to reply to Irdana's letter demanding to know on what grounds the Kashgar Mountains were now regarded as marking the border of the empire and why Irdana, who had previously styled himself 'bek', was flaunting the title of 'khan'.[38] Given that according to most sources, it was not until the rule of 'Ālim (1799–1811), the son of Irdana's successor, that the title 'khan' was adopted in Khoqand,[39] it is possible that its use here was no more than an unfortunate error of translation. In Beijing, however, this one errant Chinese character gave the court the opportunity to reaffirm the universal authority of the emperor and to warn Irdana to keep his expansionist desires in check. The fact that less than two years later the emperor himself would refer to 'Irdana khan' in a poem written to commemorate the arrival of tribute from Khoqand[40] points not only to the fluidity and vagary of the idealized

[36] Similarly, the boundary markers in the Amur Basin were erected well within the Qing territorial limits as agreed under the Treaty of Nerchinsk. *Cf.* Thongchai Winichakul's discussion of discontinuous 'boundaries' in Siam, which were positioned "geographically speaking, well *inside* the border." Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped*, pp.75–7.

[37] ZFL *xu* 19:25a, QL27.12 *xinchou*.

[38] ZFL *xu* 19:25a–b, QL27.12 *xinchou*. Unfortunately, the original copy of this letter does not appear to be held in the Qing archives.

[39] See, for example, Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.76 and Schyuler, *Turkistan*, vol.1, appendix 1, p.341. McChesney gives the slightly earlier date of 1798 for the adoption of the title 'khan' by the Khoqandi rulers, but provides no reference for his source. McChesney, *Central Asia*, p.140. His assertion that this was the first time a non-Chinggisid had adopted the title has been challenged by Schiewek who notes that "les chefs des Ming se considéraient et ont été considérés comme des Gengiskhanides ou au moins des Bâbourides." Schiewek, 'À Propos des Exilés de Boukhara et de Kokand à Shahr-i Sabz', p.193, note 10. See also Wathan, who states that Shāhrukh, who came to power in Khoqand in 1721/2, traced his ancestry back to Chinggis khan. Wathan, 'Memoir of the U'sbek state of Kokan', p.373.

[40] XYTZ 45:15b. The problem arises, of course, in part from confusion as to whether 'khan' (Ch. *han*, Man. *han*) was synonymous with 'emperor' or a lesser title such as 'king' or 'lord'. Most official Qing sources continued to refer to the ruler of Khoqand as 'the bek of Khoqand' throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, although in their correspondence with the Qing authorities subsequent rulers of Khoqand did not refrain from using their seals, complete with the title 'khan'.

order of the late Qing court, but also to the highly politicized use of language.

Khoqand did indeed comply with the instruction to withdraw from Osh and a military crisis was avoided.[41] The incident consequently provides no clear answers as to whether or not the Qianlong court might have been prepared to sanction military intervention in order to settle the territorial conflicts between two neighbouring peoples. Significantly, however, Khoqand did not relinquish its efforts to occupy Osh and in the 1790s it consolidated its position in the area without eliciting a military response from the Qing.[42]

Meanwhile, however, Khoqand was not the only polity causing unrest on the borders of Altishahr. In early 1763, the emperor was informed that Sultān Shāh of Badakhshan had seized the Chitral region of Bolor, a tiny political entity of some 30,000 households to the southeast of Badakhshan. The reason for the occupation was purportedly that the ruler of Bolor had killed Sultān Shāh's younger brother. However, Bolor, and thus Chitral, was considered to have 'submitted' to Qing rule, and the imperial agent at Yarkand had not hesitated in ordering Badakhshan to withdraw or face the military consequences. Sultān Shāh's response must have been received with some surprise in Yarkand, for he made no mention of Chitral. Instead, he requested that the emperor afford Badakhshan military assistance because Bukhara and Afghanistan still held him responsible for the deaths of the khoja brothers and were consequently raising troops in order to make a punitive attack against him. Such fears were not unfounded, for under Ahmad Shāh Durrānī (r.1747–73) Afghanistan was now united for the first time and although this great militarist had established his reputation in his campaigns against northern India, in the last decade of his life his attention was focussed closer to home. Moreover, the fate of the khojas was a live issue. Burhān al-Dīn's

[41] ZFL *xu* 21:8a–b, QL28.3 *guiyou*.

[42] In early 1764, the Qing authorities in Altishahr received reports that Irdana had arrested Hājjī Biy and was again occupying Osh and collecting taxes. Irdana denied the accusation, and claimed to have sent 50 families to settle in the area simply because the Qirghiz there were leaderless and he was afraid that they would scatter (and presumably cause trouble). Hājjī Biy subsequently confirmed that Irdana had returned the land and had withdrawn the 50 households. ZFL *xu* 25:14b–15a, QL29.4 *guihai*. Nevertheless, the Khoqandi rulers did not relinquish their expansionist aims and by the late 1790s, Nārbutā, the then ruler of Khoqand, was making no secret of his jurisdiction over the Edigene Qirghiz in correspondence with the Qing authorities. See *Lufu zouzhe* [hereafter LFZZ] *Minzu lei* [hereafter MZL], 8050.17, JQ2.8.17.

body had recently been 'discovered' in the Badakhshani city of Faizabad and the Qing authorities had persuaded Sultān Shāh to surrender the corpse along with three of the elder khoja's wives, their children and several retainers. Given these developments, the Qianlong emperor was inclined to be lenient in his instructions to the authorities in Altishahr. Pointedly ignoring all reference to Badakhshan's request for militarily assistance, he noted that Sultān Shāh's missive was respectful and that he had ultimately co-operated with the extradition order. Consequently, he now ordered that while Sultān Shāh should again be encouraged to return Chitral, the threat of military action could be dropped. Whether in response to the Qing directive or because of new and more pressing concerns, Badakhshan complied, captives were returned to Bolor and the occupying troops withdrawn.[43]

Non-Qing sources also suggest that between 1762 and 1764 tensions in the region were high and Qing forces may have narrowly escaped military confrontation. According to Valikhanov, in autumn 1762 Qing envoys, at the head of 130 men, visited Sultān Ablai and Abū al-Muhammad of the Senior and Middle Hordes, and informed them that the Qianlong emperor was intending to send an army to Turkestan and Samarqand, and they had therefore been sent to requisition men, horses, oxen and sheep. Irdana, Fāzil Biy of Khojand and the Qirghiz chieftains promptly sent an anxious message to Ahmad Shāh of Afghanistan to request assistance and Ahmad Shāh, always keen to champion the cause of Islam in the name of territorial expansion, dispatched an army northwards. While his troops occupied the area between Tashkent and Khoqand, the Afghan leader is said to have endeavoured to call a halt to Central Asian trade with China and to form an alliance against the Qing. The alliance failed to materialise and by the end of 1764 the Afghans had withdrawn from the area.[44]

[43] ZFL *xu* 20:2b, QL28.1 *renxu*; 20:3b–5a, QL28.3 *guihai* and 21:3b–5b, QL28.3 *wuwu*. XYTZ 46:3a, 10a.

[44] Valikhanov, 'Zapiska o Kokandskom Khanstve', pp.461–2; Fletcher, 'China and Central Asia 1368–1884', p.220. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, p.648. Contrary to Valikhanov's suggestion, Khoqand did not take control of Tashkent until 1809. Howorth's date of 1814 is also erroneous. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, p.677. Pan Zhiping suggests that Ahmad Shāh's campaign against Bukhara (1761) would account for the presence of Afghan troops between Khoqand and Tashkent, but does not explain why they should have still been there some 2–3 years later. Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo*, pp.52–3. Barthold states that the Afghan troops advanced into 'Turkestan' in 1763, which seems more likely than 1762 (suggested by Fletcher) when Ahmad Shāh was still heavily involved in campaigns against the Sikhs. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, vol.3, p.462. See also Levshin, *Descriptions des Hordes*, pp.245–6. For a comprehensive review of the Russian sources (including new archival documents) on these events, see Bregel, *Firdaws al-iqbāl*, pp.591–3, note 406. Not surprisingly, Bregel concludes, "There is no doubt that all these stories were based on rumors, with typical wild exaggerations and wishful thinking (some merchants from Khojand, for instance, claimed that Ahmad Shah had ten times more forces than China), that were spread in the steppes of Central Asia in the mid-1760s, after the Chinese conquest of Jungharia...." Unfortunately, Afghan sources on the period from December 1762 to October 1763 of Ahmad Shāh's rule are apparently lacking. See Singh, *Ahmed Shah Durrani*, p.291.

There is no clear corroboration of these events in Qing sources, but in January 1763, Mingrui, the military governor in Ili, did memorialize the throne requesting permission to send troops against Khoqand and Badakhshan.[45] Meanwhile in Kashgar, troops were made ready for expeditions against both these polities as well as Afghanistan.[46] Presumably scouts had been active among the Qirghiz some time prior to this, and preparations in Altishahr may well have included the requisitioning of men and supplies from among the Qirghiz. However, ultimately, as seen, the campaign was aborted. A few months later, Yonggui reported that Afghanistan had sent an envoy to Khoqand to inquire about Khoqand's relations with China and that a return-messenger had been dispatched to Afghanistan.[47] This may, as the emperor suggested, have been no more than normal diplomatic activity, but the concern it generated among Qing officials in Kashgar reflects the heightened level of tension and suspicion that pervaded the region at this time.

Set against this backcloth it becomes clear that the stream of envoys who trekked their way across the mountain ranges to Kashgar and onward to Beijing in the early 1760s had a broader agenda than simply paying homage to the Son of Heaven. Central Asian and Qing sources agree that in late 1762 Ahmad Shāh of Afghanistan had sent an embassy to Beijing. But while, according to the former, his intention was to address the emperor on the matter of Qing rule in Central Asia and to petition on behalf of the Āfāqī khoja house,[48] Qing sources make no mention of any discussion on this subject. The Afghan envoy presented the emperor with four splendid horses,[49] but failed to make a good impression, not least because he refused to perform the kowtow. The court rapidly concluded that the Afghans were uncultured troublemakers who, in future, were not

[45] MWDA 2006–013 066–0885, QL 28.1.24 and 2006–014.1 066–0890, QL 28.1.24.

[46] Yonggui, the councillor at Kashgar, believed that Ahmad Shāh had an over-inflated impression of the strength of his forces and that if confronted by the Qing army, his men would flee in fear. MWDA 2011–010 066–1632, QL28.2.3 and 2012–018 066–1854, QL28.2.7.

[47] ZFL *xu* 21:19b–20a, QL28.4 *dingyou*.

[48] Valikhanov, 'Zapiska o Kokandskom Khanstve', pp.461–2; Bregel, *Firdaws al-iqbāl*, p.591, note 406.

[49] The four horses presented to the emperor by this Afghan mission are depicted in one of Castiglione's most famous paintings. See Beurdeley, *Giuseppe Castiglione*, pp.120–2, 167–8.

to be encouraged to send envoys to Beijing.[50] The Qianlong emperor took the opportunity of the audience to dispatch a letter to Ahmad Shāh in which he set out the empire's expectations of the new Central Asian order. He commended the fact that on learning that Bukhara had already submitted to China (*guifu Zhongguo*) Ahmad Shāh had apparently called off his attack on the principality; however, noting with disapproval the details of Ahmad Shāh's other recent military exploits, he instructed the Afghan ruler on the folly of war and concluded the missive with a reminder that he, the Qianlong emperor, was "the lord of all under Heaven (*tianxia*) who watches over everything inside and outside the empire and who rewards good and punishes evil." He then ordered that letters to this effect should also be copied to the rulers of Badakhshan, Khoqand, the Edigene Qirghiz and the westerly Qazaqs of the Middle Horde.[51]

The case of 'Abd al-Rahīm

In the following year, 1764, there occurred another incident, which once again brought Khoqand to the attention of the Qing court. This was the first in a succession of 'scares' arising from the belief among the Qing authorities that there was an anti-Qing element in Kashgar, usually identified as supporters of the Āfāqī khojas, who were endeavouring to encourage their co-religionists in Khoqand to attack Altishahr. Even before the khojas reappeared on the political stage and were linked with Khoqand, it would not have been unreasonable to assume that the disaffected of the oasis cities of Altishahr looked to Khoqand for external support. Not only did the sedentary Turkic Muslims of Altishahr and the Uzbeks of Khoqand share the same religion, language and culture, they also had strong trading links and a long history of migration in both directions.

In April 1764, Nashitong, the new Qing councillor in Kashgar, memorialized that 'Abd al-Rahīm was in secret communication with Khoqand; 'Abd al-Rahīm was no less a public figure than the *ishikāghā bek* (assistant to the hakim) of Kashgar. As a supporter of the Āfāqī khojas he had surrendered to the Qing troops in 1759 and been rewarded with his current office.[52] However, he had already gained a reputation as a

[50] Of all the Muslim envoys who went to court at this time, only the Afghans appear to have refused to kowtow. Court officials angrily reprimanded the Afghan envoy, pointing out that even the Westerners and Russians had performed the kowtow. MWDA 2011–010 066–1632, QL28.2.3. The Afghans did, in fact, continue to send tribute missions to court, but only occasionally.

[51] ZFL *xu* 20:6a–9a, QL28.1 *jisi*; GZSL 678:17a–21b, QL28.1 *jisi*.

[52] Many adherents of the Āfāqiyya had either been killed or had fled with the khoja brothers; nevertheless, large numbers remained in Altishahr after the conquest. The Qing authorities chose not to target them for persecution and several Āfāqī beks who had served

troublemaker and, according to Nashitong, he was just the sort of untrustworthy character who was likely to be involved in treason. Information gathered by the hakim bek of Kashgar, Ghadīmat, suggested that whenever 'Abd al-Rahīm sent people to trade outside the *karun* they reported on the internal affairs of Altishahr to Khoqand. In particular, it was alleged that in winter 1762, when an envoy was dispatched to Khoqand to demand that Irdana withdraw from Osh, 'Abd al-Rahīm, who had accompanied the mission, had sent a secret missive to Irdana. The letter had purportedly advised Irdana that the Qing court was not serious in its threat to send troops and thus there was no need for him to appear submissive and fearful by travelling a great distance from the city to meet the delegation; it purportedly further suggested that there would be no harm in Irdana's agreeing to the Qing request to withdraw from Osh, irrespective of his true intention.[53] The letter itself does not appear to have been produced as evidence, but following the interrogation of all the members of the mission, its contents were deemed to have been even more incriminating. 'Abd al-Rahīm was now said to have appealed to Irdana as follows:

> The khojas and leaders of the Muslim tribes have all been slaughtered. You alone are still living….There are very few soldiers stationed in Kashgar and the other cities. If you lead your forces here now, I shall provide support from within.[54]

'Abd al-Rahīm was found guilty of treason and sentenced to slow death by torture. His immediate male relatives were executed, and other members of the family were sent to Beijing as bondservants.[55] Irdana, who had apparently declined the invitation to invade Altishahr on the grounds that he was temporarily preoccupied with warring against Khojand, was firmly reprimanded for even contemplating such folly and warned that should he attempt to attack Kashgar, Qing troops would march against Khoqand and annihilate it.[56]

This firm reprimand from the Qianlong emperor undoubtedly unnerved Irdana. In autumn 1764, a remnant group of Junghars, who had been living outside the Khoqandi city of Marghilan, arrived at one of the Qing *karun* seeking sanctuary. According to their story, earlier that year Irdana

the khoja brothers were afforded official rank under the Qing. As further evidence of Qing reluctance to alienate adherents of the order, no attempt was made to close Āfāqī shrines. Miao Pusheng, 'Guanyu Qingchao zhengfu dui Xinjiang Yisilanjiao zhengce zhong de jige wenti', pp.43–4.

[53] ZFL *xu* 24:25b–28b, QL29.1 *guiyou*. For 'Abd al-Rahīm's attack on Hudī (Ch. *E-dui*), the hakim bek of Yarkand, see ZFL *xu* 6:30a–b, QL25.9 *renwu*; HJTZ 5:3b.

[54] ZFL *xu* 26:7a–b, QL29.7 *bingyin*.

[55] ZFL *xu* 26:6a–b, QL29.7 *bingyin* and 26:17a–b, QL29.7 *wuxu*.

[56] ZFL *xu* 26:7a–8b, QL29.7 *bingyin*.

had been leading his troops against Fāzil Biy of Khojand when, fearing that the Qing forces were about to attack Khoqand, he turned back. Perhaps because the Junghars, like the Qing, were infidel, it was rumoured that Irdana suspected they would be the first to submit and so planned to have them rounded up and killed. The group from Marghilan had not waited to find out. News of these events was welcomed in Beijing where they were interpreted as an indication that Irdana had received the emperor's warning in the wake of the 'Abd al-Rahīm affair and had returned to Khoqand fearing that Qing forces were about to make a pre-emptive attack. As with Irdana's failure to respond to 'Abd al-Rahīm's overture, the court regarded this as further evidence that Irdana was on the defensive and had no intention of launching an assault on Kashgar.[57]

The outcome of the 'Abd al-Rahīm affair was consequently highly satisfactory for the Qing authorities. A case of suspected treason had been nipped in the bud and an imperial edict issued to the Muslims of Altishahr prescribing that in accordance with the laws of the empire anyone who leaked information about internal affairs to outsiders would be found guilty of treason.[58] Equally important, it had been made explicitly clear to the ruler of Khoqand that, but for the emperor's magnanimity, his realm would have been reduced to dust and in future the Qing forces would march westwards at the first sign of a threat to Altishahr. The emperor's authority had been enhanced and lessons taught, at very little cost.

The incident, however, raises an issue that perpetually irked Qing relations with Khoqand: linguistically and culturally isolated from the peoples they governed, the Qing officials in Altishahr were totally reliant on the Turkic Muslim beks to gather intelligence and keep them informed of affairs outside the *karun*. In the early years after the conquest, the Qing relied heavily on officials appointed from the eastern region of Hami and Turfan, several of whom were not only conversant in Chinese and/or Manchu, but had proved their loyalty to the empire by assisting in the campaign against Altishahr. Their appointment to the posts of senior beks in the various southern oasis cities, along with the abolition of hereditary appointments and introduction of the law of avoidance for the higher-ranking local officials, were all intended to contribute to the Qing effort to undermine local power bases.[59] However, in the short-term this resulted in a period of widespread infighting and intrigue among the Turkic Muslim

[57] ZFL *xu* 26:20a–21a, QL29.7 *dingwei*.

[58] ZFL *xu* 24:28a–b, QL29.1 *guiyou*.

[59] For detailed discussion of the bek system in Qing Xinjiang, including the roles of the ruling families from Hami and Turfan, see Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū*, pp.103–92 and Newby, 'The Begs of Xinjiang'. See also Miao Pusheng, *Bo-ke zhidu*.

elite as they jockeyed for power under the new Qing administration. Although there is no firm evidence, the possibility that unbeknown to the court officials 'Abd al-Rahīm was framed cannot be discounted.

The Uch Turfan Rebellion

With relations between Irdana and the Qianlong emperor already strained, the following year Khoqand again came under suspicion of collusion with rebels. In 1765, the Qing authorities in Xinjiang faced their first serious outbreak of rebellion. It occurred not in the religious and political centre of Kashgar, as might have been expected, but in Uch Turfan, a city just south of the Tianshan Range where the extortion and exploitation that the local people endured under the administration of the hakim bek, 'Abdallāh, and the imperial agent, Sucheng, finally erupted in a wide-scale outbreak of violence.[60] As the Qing troops were advancing on the city and officials were striving to prevent the rebellion from spreading, information was received that messengers had been sent from Uch Turfan with nineteen *yambu* (Ch. *yuanbao*) to ask Khoqand for help.[61] The court's reaction followed the now well-tested formula: compliance would be rewarded, while recalcitrance would be met with military action. If Irdana agreed to arrest the messengers and hand them over to the Qing authorities, the matter could be laid to rest. On the other hand, if he showed any signs of resistance, troops would be sent to attack Khoqand. Significantly, however, even at this tentative stage of the proposal for military action, the emperor was mindful to point out to the officials in Kashgar that there was no intention to establish a high-ranking Qing official in Khoqand, but rather to replace Irdana with a new ruler.[62] Whatever the court's true intentions with regard to military action beyond the *karun*, it evidently saw no virtue in further territorial acquisition.

In the event, the messengers from Uch Turfan were captured by Qirghiz and delivered to a Qing military camp. On interrogation, they

[60] Qing sources vary both in their detail and explanation of what sparked the revolt. A composite version of events would suggest that 240 Turkic Muslims who had been conscripted to transport oleaster trees were appropriated by Sucheng's son to transport his luggage to Beijing. The party had not travelled far when a bek, who was accompanying the convoy and whose wife had previously been raped by Sucheng, took advantage of the porters' resentment to stir up trouble, thus igniting the revolt. For details of the Uch Turfan uprising and its suppression, see ZFL *xu* 28:9a – 31:31b; HJTZ 12:4b-6b; Qishiyi, 'Xiyu wenjian lu', 79a–83b; Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, vol.1, 4:31b–33a. Note that Wei Yuan mistakenly dates the revolt as having occurred in 1764 (QL29.2). For a detailed account drawn from the Manchu archives, see Zhao Yumei, 'Cong Qingdai Manwen dang'an kan Wushi shijian shimo'.

[61] ZFL *xu* 28:15a–b, QL30.2 *dingsi*. *Yambu* was the name used locally for the hoof-shaped silver ingot imprinted with an official Chinese stamp. In 1812–13, it was said to trade for about 160 rupees. See 'Izzat Allah Mīr, *Travels in Central Asia*, p.27.

[62] ZFL *xu* 28:16a–b, QL30.2 *jiwei* and 29:7a–b, QL30.2 *jiashen*.

confessed that they had been charged with spreading the word of the Uch Turfan revolt and had indeed been entrusted with silver and silks with which to seek assistance from the Khoqandis and the Qirghiz.[63] Meanwhile, as the court instructed that the passes be guarded to prevent the Uch Turfan rebels escaping to Khoqand, Irdana sent word to Kashgar refuting any knowledge of the affair and pleading that the Qing officials refrain from listening to idle rumour. In Kashgar, a change of personnel appears to have given rise to some confusion and the message was thought to refer to the 'Abd al-Rahīm incident.[64] The crisis passed. The other cities of Altishahr remained calm and no other Central Asian powers went to the assistance of the Muslims of Uch Turfan. The Qing suppression was violent and absolute. Of those who survived the fighting, all males above the age of 13 years were massacred, while women and children were transported to Ili where they were placed in servitude.[65] As the empty city was gradually rebuilt and repopulated with Muslims from other parts of Altishahr, the councillorship was relocated from Kashgar; it would remain in Uch Turfan until 1788.

Emerging patterns

Gradually, throughout the early 1760s, the Qianlong emperor established his authority among the polities and tribes whose lands bordered the newly-conquered territory of Xinjiang. His policy was an adroit combination of military threat and largesse set against a framework of persistent attention to the etiquette and diplomatic formalities that reinforced the dynasty's moral authority and provided for the escalation or diffusion of tensions as the court deemed necessary. On the one hand, the emperor delegated the management of affairs beyond the *karun* to the authorities in Altishahr, explicitly informing the envoys from Khoqand, Badakhshan, Chilik and the Edigene Qirghiz that they should "take instructions from the authorities in Kashgar and Yarkand on all matters."[66]

[63] ZFL *xu* 30:7a–8b, QL30.4 *yimao*.
[64] ZFL *xu* 30:7a–8b, QL30.4 *yimao* and 31:27b–29a, QL30.6 *wuxu*.
[65] ZFL *xu* 31:31, QL30.6 *renyin*. Figures for the population of Uch Turfan immediately before the rising are difficult to ascertain. Qishiyi suggests that there was "originally a population of several tens of thousands" (Qishiyi, *Xiyu wenjian lu*, 24a), while an untitled work of *c*.1762–3 gives the figure of 472 households, 1,555 people, in the city itself and a total of 2,900-odd households, 12,100 people, in the city and surrounding villages. The 20th century editor of this work suggests that Qishiyi's estimate may pre-date Junghar rule. See *Xiyu dili tushuo zhu*, pp.18–19, 22.
[66] GZSL 678:17a–b, 18a–b, 19a, QL28.1 *jisi*. See also GZSL 866:17a, QL35.8 *jiashen*. Pan Zhiping points out that no such instruction was issued to Afghanistan, which only occasionally sent missions to court. This, he suggests, indicates that unlike Khoqand, Badakhshan and Bolor, etc., Afghanistan was only nominally under Qing rule. See Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo*, pp.54–5. There are two problems with this view. First, it implies that the relative frequency of the tribute missions from Khoqand and Bukhara, for example, was at the behest of the court, and second, it assumes that these powers were in some real sense under Qing control.

On the other hand, no detail was too small for the emperor's attention. Thus the councillor Nashitong was instructed to inform Irdana of Khoqand that traders were not to be used as envoys and that if Irdana wished to send a representative, instead of coming in person, he should be sure to select a high-ranking bek.[67] Moreover, the councillor was ordered not to lavish entertainment on the large parties of envoys from Khoqand, nor to ply them with gifts.[68] The outsiders, the emperor was wont to point out, were cunning and a councillor must not show any sign of weakness. Correspondence from the outsiders was regularly scrutinized for signs of discourtesy and the slightest glimmer of impudence or lack of respect was sure to elicit a reprimand and a negative response to any request. Conversely, any show of courtesy, humility and co-operation was invariably rewarded with lavish praise and bolts of silk. This was not so much rule by virtue, as by a pragmatic understanding of the law of the steppe.

In her study of the Grand Council, Beatrice Bartlett refers to the impenetrability of "the verbiage of imperial centrality in which decisions were expressed and which the Grand Council was always careful to employ."[69] From the 1760s to the early 19th century, the long and highly detailed edicts from the court leave no doubt that policy was being formulated in Beijing and not by frontier officials in Altishahr. Even the Qianlong emperor's admonition that outsiders should take instruction from his officials in Altishahr was not so much a delegation of duty as a means of enhancing his own authority and pre-eminence by emphasizing his distance from the outsiders. There is no indication that the Qianlong emperor was particularly knowledgeable about affairs in the northwest, his rescripts are generally standard phrases, and where he does provide detailed comment, it is invariably only to condone loyalty and chastise troublemakers. He was, however, well-served on the Grand Council by those who had participated in the conquest and the establishment of the Qing administration of Xinjiang. Men such as Zhaohui, Fude, Shuhede and Agui, all of whom had an intimate knowledge of the northwest, took their turn in serving alongside Fuheng on the Grand Council. Power was concentrated in the hands of the half dozen or so members of this body who dominated the administration of the inner court and whose policies were executed as an extension of the monarchy. In particular, the presence

[67] ZFL *xu* 27:16a–b, QL29.11 *yihai*.
[68] ZFL *xu* 27:4b–5a, QL29.10 *yiwei*.
[69] Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*, p.269.

of Agui, who served uninterruptedly on the Grand Council from 1776–96 when he was relieved of his post due to ill-health, ensured that even with the transition of power from the Qianlong emperor to his favourite, Heshen, the formulation of policy towards Xinjiang and its neighbouring peoples remained firmly with the centre.

Just as the conquest narrative upheld the ideological framework of the traditional Chinese world order, so did the language and ritual in which policy towards the Central Asian polities was presented. But beneath this veneer lay a distinctly Qing interpretation, or rather interpretations, of how the expanding empire might be ordered and ruled. Much has been written about Qing efforts to establish legitimacy among its Tibetan and Mongolian constituencies, with the building of ostentatious sites of worship, the meticulous construction of symbolic rituals and the bestowal of prestigious titles.[70] On the other hand, attempts to explain why there was no such similar effort to address the empire's Islamic constituency have been largely perfunctory and shied from acknowledging that not only did the Manchus have no entry into Islam through any aspect of their culture and history, but in the early post-conquest era, they perceived no need for religious agents to serve as intermediaries in this part of the empire. The Qing emperor's point of ideological contact with the Turkic Muslims, both inside and outside the *karun,* was his claim to Chinggisid lineage and an appeal to Mongol-style universalism. In accordance with the principles of the steppe, he had only to cast himself as supreme leader of the notional universal confederacy. In fact, his lack of Islamic credentials did not necessarily pose an obstacle, for the regional Turkic Muslim leaders had no inherent objection to acknowledging a non-Muslim supreme overlord.[71] Nevertheless, there was one potential hurdle for the Qing emperor here, in that any claim to the title khan of khans (*khāqān*), or indeed emperor-khan, necessarily rested on military supremacy and a willingness to impose military defeat on any errant tribes. The decline in martial skills and horsemanship among the Manchu garrisons was a problem that the Qianlong emperor could and did attempt to address. But neither he, nor his successors, could ignore, or fail to be constrained by, the vast expense of fielding an army to do battle thousands of miles from the political centre.

[70] See, for example, Rawski, *The Last Emperors* and Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*. I follow the latter in adopting the term 'constituency' to refer to the various regional grouping of peoples within the empire.

[71] There is no doubt that the Qing emperor was recognized by the Turkic Muslims of Central Asia as a khan of khan's (although not necessarily as *their* khan). In the chronicles of Khoqand, for example, he is frequently referred to as the *Khāqān-i Chīn*. I am grateful to Timur Beisembiev for this point.

Only gradually did a pattern begin to emerge. Despite regular threats of force, particularly when the security of Altishahr was in question, on no occasion after 1760 did the Qianlong emperor dispatch troops to fight beyond the *karun*. The Qing authorities in Altishahr quickly concluded that hostility among the various tribes and polities of Central Asia was endemic. Thus on the court's instruction, they resolutely avoided military intervention and grew increasingly resigned to the constant squabbles and territorial battles among their Central Asian neighbours. On occasions, such as when in 1767 Ablai requested the use of 20,000 Qing troops to punish Irdana of Khoqand for having abducted his wife and daughters and killed his brother and four sons, the emperor did not even care to arbitrate. The court's concern was only that the status quo should be maintained as far as possible and Altishahr be kept tranquil. In this instance, the emperor resorted to moral justification: how could he possibly assist one 'vassal' (*chenpu)* against another?[72] However, when in 1769, Sultān Shāh of Badakhshan once again suspected that Afghan forces were massing against him, the emperor explained his reluctance to assist in more practical terms. This time Sultān Shāh requested the use of 10,000 Qing troops, again implying that it was his involvement in the fate of the khoja brothers that had earned him the wrath of Ahmad Shāh. Not only was Sultān Shāh's request refused, but the emperor retorted somewhat scornfully that Badakhshan scarcely possessed the resources to support so many troops.[73] In the event, later that year, Badakhshan and other districts south of the Amu Darya (Oxus) were conquered by Ahmad Shāh and Sultān Shāh was put to death.[74]

Knowledge of how the rulers of Central Asia regarded China is more difficult to glean. While the various pragmatically-minded Central Asian leaders may have been unconvinced by the Qianlong emperor's claim to hold sway over everything under Heaven,[75] the question mark over his willingness to engage troops in the region remained. On the one hand, the repeated requests for assistance and intervention are a clear indication that

[72] GZSL 793:20a–22a, QL32.8 *jichou*.

[73] GZSL 835:10a–11a, QL34.5 *guimao*.

[74] Badakhshan was not finally incorporated into Afghanistan until 1823; however, according to Howorth, in "about 1765" Badakhshan and the surrounding region was invaded by Afghanistan and Sultān Shāh was put to death. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, p.866. Courant states only that Ahmad Shāh invaded Badakhshan in 1768, took Faizabad and then relinquished it. Courant, *L'Asie Centrale*, p.128. See also *Bregel, Firdaws al-iqbāl*, p.591, note 406.

[75] See, for example, the Qianlong emperor's missive to the Qirghiz, ZFL *zheng* 49:25b, QL23.1 *bingchen*. As Hamada Masami suggests, "les musulmans étaient totalement étrangers au culte du Ciel tel qu'il existe matériellement au dessus d'eux et considéraient l'empereur comme *kāfir*." Hamada Masami, 'Le Sufisms et "ses opposants" au Turkestan Oriental', pp.543–4.

the rulers of Central Asia saw the Qing emperor as a possible protector and champion of justice. Yet, by the same argument, the Qing forces could pose a substantial threat to their very existence. Thus despite the lack of military action, during the last decades of the 18th century, the great achievement of the Qianlong emperor and his court in the northwest was to translate the military victory of 1760 into an enduring semblance of power and authority. The perception of the potential threat from China consequently remained undiminished long after the Junghar defeat and long after the empire was prepared to back its military threats by dispatching an army beyond the *karun*. In 1797, nearly forty years after Fude had pitched camp outside Tashkent, Russian emissaries to the city were apparently asked for help in the event of attack from China.[76] Ironically it was not China, but Khoqand, that would ultimately conquer Tashkent.

[76] According to Quested, the Russians finally agreed in principle, although they considered such an eventuality unlikely. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia 1857–1860*, p.10.

CHAPTER TWO

EARLY RELATIONS WITH KHOQAND

The tribute missions

As some kind of political order was re-established in the vacuum left by the Junghars and as Qing officials settled into a policy of non-interference in regional territorial disputes, tribute missions became the central feature of the empire's relations with Khoqand. In the first decade following the conquest of Xinjiang, Irdana of Khoqand sent four missions to Beijing with gifts of fine horses, great eagles and falcons for hunting.[1] In 1765 when the envoys from Khoqand arrived with a particularly striking white hawk, the Qianlong emperor was so moved by the bird's magnificence that he had it painted by Giuseppe Castiglione and attempted to capture its spirit in the accompanying verse.[2] For his part, Irdana also had reason to be satisfied with the missions. In addition to the return-gifts from the emperor and the opportunity for substantial trade (in which he himself would undoubtedly have had a financial interest), the missions also served to enhance the prestige of the fledgling khanate among its neighbours.

From the time when the Khoqandi envoys reached Kashgar to their arrival in Beijing they were not only afforded free board and accommodation at each stage of their journey, but were feasted and fêted at every major city through which they passed. For the welcoming banquet in Kashgar officials would supply one sheep, 18 *jin* of white flour, white rice, oil, tea, firewood (quantities unspecified) and 52 *wen* for miscellaneous expenses. Thereafter, envoys would be given a sheep and half a *jin* of white rice for every day of their stay, with an additional one *jin* of white flour per day for every servant. And once they were ready to depart for Yarkand they would receive two sheep, rice and tea and cash to see them through the five-day journey.[3] When Toqtā Muhammad and his colleagues made the journey to Beijing in 1760, they were reportedly overwhelmed by the hospitality they received all along their route, and in Xi'an where their arrival fortuitously coincided with the Chinese New Year, they were enraptured by the sight of the festivities, the streets

[1] XYTZ 45:14a; Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, part 2, division 2, p.817. Howorth refers to the horses as 'arghamaks', that is horses "of a specially fine breed." See Jarring, *Materials to the Knowledge of Eastern Turki*, vol.1, p.125 note 1.

[2] See cover illustration. XYTZ 45:15b; Beurdeley, *Giuseppe Castiglione*, p.170.

[3] HJTZ 7:14b. 1 *jin* = 1.33 lbs.

festooned with lanterns and the opera performances staged at almost every crossroads.[4]

Nothing, however, appears to have prepared the Khoqandi envoys for the awe and majesty of the imperial audience. After the death of Irdana in 1769, in the following year his second cousin Nārbutā (r.1770–99) eventually came to the throne, and duly sent his envoy to present the Qianlong emperor with a *longquan* dish and inform him of the transfer of power.[5] In the course of Nārbutā's rule three more Khoqandi missions were sent to Beijing and one envoy, probably from the mission of 1792–3, has left a graphic description of the audience:

> Quand on approcha du palais, je descendis et j'y entrai à pied. Je vis une résidence ravissante et manifique; les murs et le plafond étaient dorés et incrustés de glaces; au mileu se trouvait un pavillon élégant couvert de dorures et de glaces fixées dans les murailles. Je me conformai aux instructions de la personne qui m'accompagnait et je saluai en me prosternant à terre. Je vis paraître au haut du pavillon une main, et une personne m'interpella en langue turque du Khita en me disant: "L'empereur daigne demander: Mons fils Ner Boutèh Bi jouit-il d'une bonne santé et de tout contentement?" Après ces paroles, je me prosternai selon la recommendation qui me fut faitre et je répondis humblement: "Ner Boutèh Bi n'a d'autre occupation que celle de faire des voeux pour Sa Majesté." Lorsque j'eus la permission de me retirer, l'empereur fit présent au khan d'objets et de curiosités de Chine dont la valeur était de dix laks de roupies. Il m'accorda en or la somme de vingt mille roupies sans compter des cadeaux en produits de l'industrie de ce pays.[6]

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[4] LFZZ MZL 8072.7, QL24.12.29.

[5] GZSL 866:16b–17a, QL35.8 *jiashen*; XYTZ 45:15b–16a. Although this might appear to be a case of 'coals to Newcastle', *longquan*, a green glazed stoneware from Longquan district in Zhejiang, which had been prevalent in the Song (960–1279), was a rarity in Qing China, prompting the Qianlong emperor to reflect, "Nowadays we rarely see *longquan* from the Song era, how is it that foreign parts still possess it?" (XYTZ 45:16a). The fact that Nārbutā deemed it a suitable gift for the emperor provides an interesting insight into how highly *longquan* was valued in parts of Central Asia.

In the XYTZ (45:14a), as in other Qing accounts, the date of Irdana's death is given erroneously as 1770/1. Irdana had no male offspring and after his death power passed to the descendants of his paternal uncles, 'Abd al-Karīm and Shādi Bek. Sulayman, the son of Shādi Bek, succeeded Irdana but was murdered some three months later. The throne then passed to Nārbutā, 'Abd al-Karīm's grandson. See Pan Zhiping, 'Zhongya Haohan wang tong kao', pp.136–7.

[6] 'Abd al-Karīm, *Histoire de l'Asia Centrale*, pp.282–3. This passage appears in appendix III of Schefer's translation of 'Abd al-Karīm's work and is taken from a notice that appears at the end of the *Tārīkh-i Ahmad*, a history of Afghanistan covering the 47 years of Ahmad's rule (1750–97). Note the use of the term 'khan' by the narrator, opposed to 'biy' (chief) in the dialogue between the emperor and the envoy, which would appear to attest to the authenticity of the account. Also, despite the Qianlong emperor's oft-cited claim to be able to speak *Huiyu*, i.e. 'the Muslim language' (see, for example, Rawski, *The Last Emperors*, p.6), given the dialectical variations, perhaps one should not be too surprised that he did not presume to try out his *Huiyu* on the envoy from Khoqand. A *lak* = 100,000. Jarring, *Materials to the Knowledge of Eastern Turki*, vol.2, p.143, note 2. According to Timur Beisembiev, however, in some Khoqandi sources a *lak* equals only 10,000, (personal communication).

The above is the description given by the Khoqandi envoy of his audience with the Qianlong emperor as recounted to the Afghan envoy Shāh Ghafran, who was sent to Khoqand in 1794 by the Afghan ruler Zamān Shāh (r.1793–99).[7] The description was recorded as a notice at the end of *Tārīkh-i Ahmad* and subsequently included in the geographical notes that Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm of Bukhara presented to Arif Bay, master of ceremonies in the court of Constantinople in the early 19th century. Despite the fine detail in this account that gives it a ring of authenticity, the tortuous route by which it reaches us prompts caution about its accuracy as a record of an imperial audience. This, however, only serves to emphasize the role that both oral and written versions of this account must have played in the projection of the cosmo-moral order as defined by the rulers of the Qing empire over a vast period of time and space. In reflecting both the wealth and power of the emperor, combined with his magnanimity and concern for the welfare of his 'outer vassals', it accords exactly with the image the court would have wished to project. And although there may have been few written accounts of such audiences, given that every Khoqandi delegation comprised three or four envoys, oral accounts of a similar ilk would undoubtedly have proliferated and spread equally far and wide.[8]

Nor would the transmission of such an account through the market places and palaces of Central Asia have displeased the rulers of Khoqand. Khoqand's position in Central Asia was still vulnerable and it was only a matter of time before an inevitable outbreak of hostilities with neighbouring Bukhara. As Khoqand struggled to establish itself as a regional power in the late 18th century, it was firmly in the interests of Irdana and his successors to broadcast Khoqand's good relations with the vast and powerful empire to its east.[9]

As was the case with all the Central Asian polities that had offered their submission to the Qing, Khoqand did not send regular tribute missions to Beijing and the envoys arriving in Altishahr were only allowed to visit the capital when so instructed. Procedures inevitably

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[7] According to Shāh Ghafran his informant, the Khoqandi envoy, was the *qādī al-qudāt* (Chief of Justice) of Khoqand. This is presumably the envoy referred to as Mīzrā Mahmud Rahīm (Ch. *Mi-er-za-mai-ma-la-yi-mu*) in the Chinese sources.

[8] The only other written account of which I am aware, concerning an audience between the emperor of China and an envoy from Khoqand, is *Gharā'ib-i sipāh* (Persian, anon, n.d.), held in the Institute of Oriental Studies, Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent (MS No.5408). The account is based on the journey to Beijing undertaken by 'Ālim Pāshāh in 1832. See chapter 7.

[9] *Qinding pingding Huijiang jiaoqin niyi fanglüe* [hereafter HJNFL], 4:5a–6a, DG1.8 *yiwei*.

varied slightly over the years, but in general, Khoqandi envoys, accompanied by a caravan of traders, would halt first at the *karun* to the northwest of Kashgar where the details of their baggage and persons would be recorded before they were permitted to proceed to the city. On arrival, they would then petition the Qing authorities to be allowed to travel to Beijing. If that permission were granted, all the expenses for travel and provisions for the entire mission, plus some forty days' stay in the capital, would be borne by the court.

Lists of the items presented to the court by the tribute missions reveal that they were not generally of great value in terms of quantity or rarity. In 1792, for example, the Khoqandi envoy presented the Qianlong emperor with 2 horses, 2 daggers, 2 small knives, 2 bolts of gold threaded satin and 2 bolts of camel felt and 6 items made from fox pelts. In the same year the return-gifts from the emperor to Nārbutā comprised 13 bolts of various silks and satins, 2 ceramic dishes, 1 glass dish, 4 jars of fine tea, 1 jar of snuff, 1 snuff box, 1 pair of large pouches, 4 pairs of small pouches and 120 squirrel skins, while each of the envoys received 9 bolts of satins, serge and velvet, 2 ceramic dishes, 2 glass dishes, 1 crystal, 2 snuff boxes, 2 jars of fine tea, 2 pairs of large pouches, 3 pairs of small pouches and 100 taels of silver.[10] Thus while the emperor's gifts were undoubtedly generous, the exchange could not be deemed to represent a vast source of revenue for Khoqand. Clearly, therefore, the prime financial motive for the missions lay not in the gift-exchange, but the profits to be made from trade.

The merchants attached to the tribute missions travelling to Beijing not only enjoyed free transport for their goods, but were allowed to trade tax-free. The greater part of a caravan's freight would comprise items for trade and on the return journey the number of carts and pack animals would invariably have multiplied. The considerable amount of trade carried out by Khoqandi merchants under the auspices of the tribute

[10] The items made from fox pelts (Ch. *huguapi yong*) are possibly muffs or caps. For a record of the tribute gifts presented by Khoqand between 1759 and 1809 (and the return-gifts from the emperor) see MWDA 3881–018 187–0976, JQ21.7.10. By the mid-19th century the gifts from Khoqand appear to have increased in quantity and value, but still remained modest; for example, 20 bolts of various silks and satins threaded with gold, 8 beaver skins, 8 bolts of camel felt, 8 gold-handled knives, 8 sugar-sticks, 2 black horses and 2 saddles inlaid with gold. LFZZ *Waijiao lei Zhong-E* [hereafter WJL/ZE], 7701.56, n.d.. Although catalogued with a batch of memorials dating from the 1830s, this appears to be a list of the tribute that the envoy 'Abd al-Karīm took with him on his ill-fated mission in 1859. See chapter 9. The sugar-sticks are rendered in Chinese as *ta-er-tang*. According to Wang Zengyi, these were made from white sugar and flour, which was shaped into sticks with pointed ends measuring about one foot in length. Sugar was highly prized in the region and the sticks were considered as a delicacy to be offered to honoured guests. Wang Zengyi, 'Huijiang zaji', 2:84a.

missions and the financial burden that such large and frequent missions placed on provincial authorities did not go unnoticed in Beijing. In 1809, the Khoqandi envoy was instructed that in future Khoqand's missions to Beijing should not exceed the limit of one every three to five years, as established during the reign of the Qianlong emperor, and that the Khoqandis would only be allowed tax exemption on 50% of the goods brought to Kashgar regardless of the quantity.[11] The admonition could hardly have been more pertinent for, on its return journey, this particular Khoqandi embassy reached Hami with a total of 88 cart-loads of merchandise—teas, silks and ceramics—weighing over 53,000 *jin*.[12]

For the rulers of Khoqand who stood to benefit not only from the imperial gifts and the trade carried out on his behalf but, just as importantly, from the taxes raised on all the merchandise imported from China, the missions were lucrative and to be encouraged. Between 1760 and 1811, nine missions from Khoqand were permitted to proceed to Beijing, while some sixteen more envoys, accompanied by a varying number of traders, arrived in Altishahr during the same period.[13] From 1810–20, despite the insistence of the court that Khoqand should only be allowed to send a mission to Beijing once every three to five years, nevertheless, the number of Khoqandi envoys who arrived in Altishahr rose significantly.[14] When envoys were refused permission to proceed to the capital, the Khoqandi traders who accompanied the missions would invariably be allowed to sell their goods in Kashgar but, and here lay the perennial bone of contention, in this case they would be subject to tax.[15]

[11] NWYGZY 19:14b, JQ14.12.20.

[12] In this instance, the Qing authorities satisfied themselves that the Khoqandis were not smuggling on behalf of the Chinese merchants and concluded that they simply could not resist purchasing Chinese goods. NWYGZY 22:34a–42b, JQ15.7.23 – JQ15.10.28.

[13] HJNFL 3:35b–36a, DG1.3 *jisi* gives a figure of eight missions to Beijing during the reigns of 'Umar's grandfather, father and elder brother. This actually refers to the reigns of 'Umar's grandfather's cousin, Irdana (r.1753–69), 'Umar's father, Nārbutā, (r.1770–99) and 'Umar's brother 'Ālim (r.1799–1811), but appears to omit the first mission of 1760. According to Nayancheng, 22 envoys were sent from Khoqand to Kashgar between 1760 and 1801, including those who proceeded to court. *Na wenyi gong zouyi* [hereafter NWYGZY], 19:5a, JQ14.8.1. Three more arrived between 1801 and 1809 making a total of 25.

[14] In the 61 years from 1760 to 1821, 48 Khoqandi envoys arrived in Kashgar. HJNFL 3:35b, DG1.3 *jisi*. This would suggest that some 23 arrived in the decade from 1810 to 1820. Once again the figures appear to include those who continued to Beijing.

[15] In 1759 merchants coming into Altishahr from other parts of Central Asia paid customs duties of 5%. The following year the duties on cattle were reduced to 3.3%, while remaining the same for hides, silk and cotton. GZSL 593:13b, QL24.7 *gengwu* and 605:11a, QL25.1 *xinwei*. By 1814, however, duty on all goods coming from Khoqand, and presumably for most other regions outside the *karun*, had dropped to 2.5%, while by the late 1820s, the entire system of levying taxes on foreign trade was in disarray. LFZZ MZL 8072.21, JQ19.2.14; XZSL 151:31a–b, DG9.2 *wuyin*. In 1829, the court ruled that duties

The frequency with which the Khoqandis petitioned to send tribute missions suggests that both for the rulers themselves and the merchants who accompanied the missions, the rewards were substantial, well worth the arduous journey and the high risk of attack by the Qirghiz whose territory had to be traversed before reaching Altishahr.[16] Not surprisingly then, any attempt to restrict or halt the tribute missions would have been unwelcome both to a large body of Khoqandi traders and also to the ruler of Khoqand. According to many sources, however, by the end of the 18th century, tribute missions and trade were not the only way that Khoqand profited from its relations with the Qing.

The re-emergence of the Makhdūmzāda khojas

With the principalities and tribes of Central Asia by and large accepting of the new political order, the one thorn in the side of Qing rule in Xinjiang was the descendants of the Āfāqī khoja lineage. To appreciate the tenacity and sacrifice that the khojas made in pursuit of their cause throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries, one has to trace the social and political shifts of earlier centuries that had converged to establish their claim on the ruling house of Altishahr.

The legitimacy of the Chaghatai descendant to rule the Altishahr region was established in the 13th century when Turkestan fell under the rule of Chaghatai, Chinggis (Genghis) Khān's second son.[17] So firmly embedded was the Turko-Mongolian law of succession in the political fabric of the region that even in the 14th century when the khanate was fragmented and the power of the Chaghatai rulers broken by Turkic nobility, the Chaghatai descendants were kept in the wings by the new rulers and used when necessary as puppet sovereigns. In the mid-14th century, Tughluq Temur Khān (r.1347–63), who was the first independent Chaghatai ruler to embrace Islam, temporarily reunited the old Chaghatai khanate or, more accurately, established a new state in the region of Transoxiana. With the rise of Tamerlane (r.1364–1405), however, Chaghatai rule was again eclipsed. Thereafter the reduced Chaghatai khanate was focussed on

of 3.3% should again be levied on all foreign traders in the region, but within three years this initiative had been abandoned. See chapter 7, note 24.

[16] See, for example, the correspondence of 1821 between 'Umar and the Qing authorities in Kashgar, in which the former vigorously argues for permission to send a tribute mission to Beijing. MWDA 3955–019 192–0015, [DG1.3]; 3955–020 192–0023, [DG1.3] and 3964–021 (1–4) 192–1778, DG1.9.22.

[17] For an excellent discussion of the Turko-Mongolian heritage and the enduring importance of formal legitimation in steppe culture, see Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, pp.2–16.

eastern Turkestan, where once again the khans were largely nominal rulers, serving to legitimize the authority of the Mongol Dūghlāt clan.

The challenge to this seemingly immutable claim on the right to rule, irrespective of actual military or political power, came from an unexpected direction. As Fletcher has shown, it was probably in the late 14th century that the teachings of the Naqshbandī sufi order were carried westwards across the Pamirs by traders heading to Altishahr. Not until the 15th and 16th centuries, however, did the Naqshbandī teachings begin to penetrate deeply among both the sedentary and nomadic peoples of the region, by which time a strict adherence to the sharī'a had become central to the order's teachings. If Islam was to secure a permanent future in the region, the sharī'a had to assert itself over the rule of Turko-Mongolian law. Thus the Naqshbandī leaders, who had adopted the title of 'khoja', gravitated ever closer towards the political life of the region.

Makhdūm-i A'zam (1461/2–1542/3) had devoted his life to spreading his teachings and working miracles in the area of Samarqand. It is thought that he never visited Altishahr in person, but as the progenitor of the men who became known as the Makhdūmzāda khojas, his influence on the region was unparalleled. In the mid-16th century his teachings were brought to Altishahr by his son, Ishāq Valī (d. *c*.1599).[18] The new order initiated by Ishāq Valī, from whom the Ishāqiyya subsequently took its name, was swiftly established as pre-eminent, not only among other Naqshbandī orders but all other sufi orders in Altishahr.

Meanwhile, over the preceding centuries, slowly but surely the Chaghatai house had forgone many of the Turko-Mongolian values of the steppe, distanced itself from the nomadic way of life and become sedentary. In the course of this process, many of its tribesmen whose livelihoods tied them to the nomadic way of life had broken away from the dynasty's control; some merged with the Qazaqs, while those who established their pasturelands in the Pamirs and the Tianshan became known as the Qirghiz. The Chaghatai ruling elite, who had come increasingly under the theocratic and centralizing tendencies of Islam,[19] had consequently become alienated from the mainstay of their fighting force. Yet ironically, as the nomadic people sought a new focus and identity for themselves they, like the now sedentary descendants of Chinggis, were open to the influence of the sufi orders. In the mid-16th

[18] Togan states that Ishāq Valī was Makhdūm-i A'zam's 2nd son and gives his death as 1579, while Fletcher suggests that he was the 7th, or perhaps 4th, son and died in 1599. Togan, 'The Khojas of Eastern Turkistan', p.145, note 15; Fletcher, 'The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China', p.7. Schwarz suggests he may have died as late as 1605. Schwarz, 'The Khwājas of Eastern Turkestan', p.275.

[19] Togan, 'The Khojas of Eastern Turkistan'.

century as the Chaghatai line succeeded in wresting power back from the Dūghlāt clan, the Ishāqī khojas took advantage of these developments gradually to tighten their hold on the traditional sources of secular power.

By the late 16th century, Ishāq Valī and his followers were so heavily embroiled in the politics of the Chaghatai ruling house that they were able to play a significant role in having one of their adherents, Muhammad Khān (r.1591–1609), placed on the throne at Yarkand. In an effort to marry formally their spiritual pre-eminence with the temporal powers of the region, the Ishāqiyya now had Muhammad Khān proclaimed Grand Master of the order. While this title was to revert to Ishāq Valī's descendants after Muhammad Khān's death, the creation of a genealogy that traced the former's maternal ancestry back to the first Qarakhanid ruler, Satūq Bughrā Khān, served as a more enduring symbol of the khojas' claim to secular legitimacy.[20] As descendants of Makhdūm-i A'zam, who was himself established as a descendant of the 22nd generation of the Prophet Muhammad, the religious credentials of the Ishāqī khojas were seemingly indisputable.

In the early 17th century, however, Muhammad Yūsuf (d.1652/3) arrived in Altishahr posing a challenge to the Ishāqiyya and, as a descendant of the eldest son of Makhdūm-i A'zam, also its legitimacy. The Chinggisid ruling elite regarded Muhammad Yūsuf and his followers as a potential counterbalance to the now increasingly powerful Ishāqiyya. Thus they gave their support to the new arrivals, who further won the acceptance of the secular rulers when Muhammad Yūsuf's son, Hidāyat Allāh Āfāq (d.1694), married a woman who was both of the Chinggisid line and a member of the Dūghlāt nobility. Nevertheless, after Muhammad Yūsuf's death, his followers lost much of their official support and in the late 1670s Āfāq Khōja (Hidāyat Allāh Āfāq), from whom the Āfāqiyya took its name, was forced to flee allowing the Ishāqiyya to reassert itself, if but briefly.

If in the 17th century the religious teachings of Muhammad Yūsuf were indeed characterized by a fundamental doctrinal difference from those of the Ishāqiyya, the 19th century records make no mention of such a schism. What did emerge over time, however, was a highly-developed political division resulting in deep factionalist rivalry. While the Āfāqiyya drew its

[20] According to legend, Satūq Bughrā Khān (d.955/6) of the Qarakhanid ruling house was the first Central Asian leader to embrace Islam. The Qarakhanids dominated the region around Kashgar from the mid-10th to the 13th century. See Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion*, p.255; Elias and Ross, *Tarikh-i Rashidi, A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia*, p.287, note 1; Shaw, 'A Sketch of the Turki Language' (1877), pp.326–29, 334. Also, Grenard, 'La Légende de Satok Boghra Khan et l'Histoire' and Hamada Masami, 'Le Mausolée et le Culte de Satūq Bughrā Khān'.

military support from the Qirghiz of Aqtagh, in the sedentary communities its support lay primarily among the uneducated, common people. The Ishāqiyya, for its part, allied not only with the Qarātāgh Qirghiz, but more importantly with the aristocracy and local officials of Altishahr. Inevitably perhaps, this association with the elite of the sedentarized community was reflected in its claim to Islamic orthodoxy and repudiation of what it regarded as the un-Islamic practices of the Āfāqiyya. Isenbike Togan notes a further ideological divide in seeing the Ishāqiyya as being associated with redistribution practices of power-sharing and co-operation with the nobility, opposed to the Āfāqiyya who are identified with accumulative economic practices and a "popularly supported monopoly of power."[21] Once again then, the division appears to be political and economic rather than doctrinal.

By the late 17th century Chinggisid power in the region, which had been temporarily revived by Muhammad Khān's father, 'Abd al-Rashīd Khān (r.1533–59), was again on the wane and Āfāq Khōja and his followers sought patronage from Galdan, the ruler of the Junghar confederation of Oirat Mongols. When in 1679 Galdan ousted the declining Chinggisids from Altishahr, he moved the seat of power from its traditional base in Yarkand to Kashgar and established Āfāq Khōja as governor of the region. Religious and political power had finally converged in the hands of the khojas.

For the next eighty years authority in the region swung between the rival Naqshbandī orders of the Ishāqiyya and the Āfāqiyya. With the Junghar conquest, all other secular claims to power were eliminated from the political stage in Altishahr and the vacillating fortunes of the two orders were now dependent primarily on the will of the Junghars. However, with their khanate based in Ili, the Junghars were little more than absentee landlords who regarded Altishahr as a tax farm and certainly made no attempt to impose their Buddhist faith on their Muslim subjects. In this respect, the Junghars left little lasting impact on the region, but by the same token, it was during the period of Junghar rule that the concept of an Islamic state took root in Altishahr and political legitimacy passed firmly into the hands of the khoja lineages.[22] If, as

[21] Togan notes, however, that under the Qing, the "redistributive policies" associated with the sedentary elite and the Ishāqiyya were lost and individual beks became the accumulative, or rather exploitative, centres. See Togan, 'Differences in Ideology and Practice', pp.28, 36.

[22] Immediately prior to the Qing conquest, the Ishāqiyya was in control of Altishahr and the Afāqī khoja, Burhān al-Dīn, was held hostage by the Junghars in Ili. The fact that the Qing released Burhān al-Dīn, with the intention that he should serve as a local governor of Altishahr, suggests that like the Junghars, the Qing recognized the extent of the political authority that the khojas held in the region.

Togan has convincingly argued, it was between the 14th and 16th centuries that the old steppe principles of rule were gradually eroded and replaced by Islamic principles,[23] it was under the Junghars in the 17th century that these principles were tested in Altishahr and acquired the authority of precedence.

Centuries of gradual, political and social change were, therefore, being brought to bear when the great grandsons of Āfāq Khōja, Burhān al-Dīn and Khōja-Jahān, took advantage of the Qing defeat of the Junghars to make a bid for independence. To interpret this rebellion, or those of their descendants, as no more than a demonstration of Islamic reaction against infidel rule is to oversimplify the khojas' claim to be the legitimate rulers of the region—a claim forged over a long period of time from a complex intermingling of religious and secular principles. It is also to overlook the important role played by the khojas as intermediaries between the nomadic and sedentary societies and in the consolidation of the Islamic identity of Eastern Turkestan.

Khōja-Jahān, it appears, had no children or, if he did, their lack of any mention in the Qing sources indicates that they played no role in the political maelstrom of 19th century Central Asia.[24] Burhān al-Dīn, however, is known to have had at least four sons, three of whom were among those who were extradited to China from Badakhshan in 1763, together with the disinterred corpse of their father; Qāsim, Bahā' al-Dīn and 'Abd al-Khāliq, their three respective mothers and nine retainers all embarked on the journey to Altishahr.[25] The arrival of the party, however, is not recorded and of Qāsim and Bahā' al-Dīn, the sources make no further mention. Only 'Abd al-Khāliq can categorically be said to have reached Beijing where he grew up in enforced exile, provided for by the emolument from a peerage.[26] As for the fourth of Burhān al-Dīn's sons, Sarimsāq, he now became the focus of resistance to Qing rule in Altishahr.

Although Qing documents reveal only a sketchy knowledge of the Altishahr Naqshbandī orders and their political and religious influence in the region, officials in Altishahr were well enough informed to realize that they could not afford to be complacent about the possibility of a revival of the Āfāqī khojas. The exhumation of Burhān al-Dīn's body and the extradition of three of his sons had greatly reduced the potential threat, but

[23] Togan,'The Khojas of Eastern Turkistan'.

[24] Hartmann's assertion that Sarimsāq (aka. Samsāq) and 'Abd al-Khāliq were the children of Khoja-Jahān is not substantiated in any other sources. Hartmann, 'Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam', pp.120, 144.

[25] ZFL *xu* 21:1a–5b, QL28.3 *wuwu*.

[26] For 'Abd al-Khāliq, see chapter 4.

not eradicated it. After the khojas' flight from Altishahr, the infant Sarimsāq appears to have been placed in the care of a retainer and taken to the mountainous region of Qunduz on the north-eastern border of Afghanistan.[27] On one occasion, in the late 1760s, while Sarimsāq was still a child, Yarkandi merchants bound for Qunduz were charged with inducing him to accompany them back to Altishahr.[28] But it was not until the mid-1780s, when Sarimsāq was reported to have been living in poverty in Samarqand, that Qing documents begin to reflect something of a preoccupation with rumours concerning his activities and whereabouts. Throughout the 1780s, he was believed to have been in frequent contact with the Turkic Muslims of Kashgar with a view to raising money and support. As the Qing authorities in Altishahr grew increasingly nervous, attempts were made, in vain, to entice Sarimsāq to Kashgar with assurances of his personal safety and offers of clothes, food and an official title.[29] By 1788, he was thought to be living in Khojand, which was temporarily, though not yet conclusively, under Khoqandi rule. The Qing authorities demanded that the Khoqandi ruler, Nārbutā, arrest Sarimsāq and extradite him, but while Nārbutā did apparently apprehend the khoja, he was unwilling to hand him over to the Qing and released him again. Angered, the Qianlong emperor stopped Khoqandi tribute missions to Beijing for three years from 1789–91.[30]

While Nārbutā's refusal to extradite Sarimsāq is a clear indication that he did not regard himself in any sense as a 'vassal' of the Qing, it also highlights the complex relationship that had existed in Ferghana since the 17th century between temporal rule, represented by tribal and sedentary rulers, and theocratic rule, represented by the khoja lineages. Ever since Nārbutā's great grandfather, Shāhrukh, had defeated the khojas of northern Ferghana and established his authority in the region of Khoqand city, the rulers of Khoqand had striven to keep the theocratic ambitions of the various khoja lineages in check. Support for the khoja lineages was widespread among the established local populace as well as the newly-arrived immigrant communities, such as those from Samarqand and Altishahr who sought asylum in the Ferghana Valley throughout the 18th century. The khojas were also frequently supported by the Qazaqs, Qirghiz and other nomadic tribes as they strove to promote their own

[27] ZFL *xu* 12:4b–5a, QL26.11 *wuyin*.

[28] GZSL 835:10a–11a, QL34.5 *guimao*; Saguchi Tōru, 'The Revival of the White Mountain Khwājas, 1760–1820', p.9.

[29] GZSL 1200:23a–24b, QL49.3 *dingyou* and 1202:2a–4b, QL49 intercalary 3 *bingchen*. Given the irregularity of missions to Beijing, in fact, this three-year ban did not constitute an unusual break in relations. Previous Khoqandi missions had been allowed to journey to court in 1759/60, 1762/3, 1770/1 and 1782/3.

[30] GZSL 1420:12b–13a, QL58.1 *jiachen*.

tribal interests. Not surprisingly, as the rulers of Khoqand sought to consolidate and enhance their own position, they toed a delicate line between the need to patronize the various khoja leaders and the urge to suppress them. Thus their relationship with the khojas was in constant flux, waxing and waning according to the influence of khoja sympathizers at their court.[31]

After 1789, all mention of Sarimsāq and his activities fade from Qing official correspondence for some seven to eight years and not until 1797 was he again brought to the attention of the court. For some time during the 1790s, Sarimsāq appears to have been living with his son, Yūsuf (Muhammad Yūsuf), in Ura-tube, on the south-western fringes of the realm of Khoqand. Father and son were then believed to have made their way to Shahr-i Sabz,[32] home of Sarimsāq's father-in-law, where reportedly Sarimsāq set about gathering some 1,000 men, primarily Qirghiz from the region of Qarategin, in preparation for an attack on Kashgar.

Changlin, the new councillor in Altishahr, remained calm, reassured by reports of the local peoples' loyalty to the emperor and commitment to capturing Sarimsāq. The news from Khoqand was also encouraging. On hearing reports of Sarimsāq's movements, Nārbutā claimed to have sent 3,000 troops to cut him off at the town of Marghilan and to block the mountain passes to Altishahr. Meanwhile, he had issued threats to the Edigene Qirghiz to dissuade them from joining Sarimsāq and sent his most-favoured son, Muhammad Amīn, to engage with Sarimsāq's forces. As Sarimsāq fled back to Ura-tube, Muhammad Amīn led a force of 500 men in pursuit of Yūsuf, but failed to intercept his flight to Darvaz. Although Nārbutā did not hesitate to keep the Altishahr authorities informed of his exertions on behalf of the emperor, he was adamant that he could not countenance the khoja's extradition. In not unfamiliar terms, Nārbutā's envoy related how his ruler had consulted the chief akhund (*akhūnd*, Ch. *a-hong*) of Khoqand:

> Nārbutā questioned him saying, "Now Sarimsāq intends to attack Kashgar, I am a servant of the Great Emperor and I must exert myself. I want to capture Sarimsāq and send him to Kashgar. Is that in accordance with the scriptures?" The akhund said, "If Sarimsāq intends to act so recklessly, of course you should seize him, but the scriptures have no precedent for the extradition of a captured co-religionist." Nārbutā then asked again saying, "Given that Sarimsāq is so treacherous and lawless, even if I were to let him go when the Great Emperor wants me to do something, how could I countenance letting this sort of a brigand live here. If I were to kill him, would this be in accordance with the scriptures?" The akhund replied that killing Sarimsāq was, indeed, in accordance with the scriptures."[33]

[31] See chapter 3.

[32] Shahr-i Sabz was a small, independent polity on the eastern side of Bukhara. For its role as a refuge for exiles from both Bukhara and Khoqand, see Schiewek, 'À Propos des Exilés de Boukhara et de Kokand à Shahr-i Sabz', pp.181–97.

Yet, despite the fact that neither Sarimsāq nor his son, Yūsuf, had been killed, the Jiaqing emperor was pleased by the reports of Nārbutā's contribution to these potentially dangerous developments on the empire's north-western frontier. As a mark of his considerable appreciation, he wished to reward Nārbutā for his efforts by making him a *beile* (prince of the 3rd rank) with the insignia of the three-eyed peacock feather and jewelled button for his cap. Changlin, however, was not so impressed. In fact, he was sufficiently concerned to jeopardize his career. Diffidently he memorialized the throne pointing out that since Nārbutā wore a white turban, recited the scriptures, refrained from alcohol and regarded himself as an akhund, according to the Islamic scriptures he was not allowed to assume an official rank. The authority for Changlin's statement is dubious, but in the light of Khoqand's now patent political ambitions, his reasons for reining in the emperor's enthusiasm may be easily surmised: Nārbutā's sincerity was highly questionable. In Changlin's view, Khoqand regarded Sarimsāq and his offspring as valuable pawns in its relations with China and would have no scruples about employing them as political leverage. To afford Nārbutā imperial rank, would have been grist to the mill. Changlin's gamble paid off; not only did he personally escape criticism for querying the emperor's instructions, but Nārbutā did not receive imperial rank, and was instead rewarded with a coral rosary and five bolts of rich brocades and silks.[34]

Insignificant as this clash of views between a frontier official and the court may appear, it marks a watershed in policy towards the northwest. In 1796, the Qianlong emperor had abdicated, leaving the Jiaqing emperor "to reign but not to rule."[35] The retirement and death the following year of the ranking grand councillor Agui had meant that for the first time in twenty years the Grand Council no longer benefited from the authoritative voice of an elder statesman with extensive knowledge and first-hand experience of the north-western frontier.[36] Gradually over the next decade, Qing policy towards the tribes and polities of Central Asia was left increasingly in the hands of frontier officials, and although this was ultimately to be reversed, never again did the directives from the court

[33] LFZZ MZL 8050.26, JQ2.11.15.

[34] LFZZ MZL 8050.17, JQ2.8.17; 8050.21. JQ2.9.13; 8050.26, JQ2.8.27 and 8050.28, JQ2.11.15; XZSL 24:10a–12a, JQ2.11 *gengchen*.

[35] Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, p.229.

[36] See Alateng Aoqier (Altan-Ochir), 'Agui zai Xinjiang', pp.34–41.

regain the firm, unflinching authority that they had possessed during the heyday of the Qianlong emperor's rule. It was already nearly forty years since the military prowess of the Qing had awed the Central Asian tribes into submission and memories were beginning to fade—in both Khoqand and Beijing.

After Sarimsāq's abortive advance on Kashgar in 1797, it appeared briefly that he might be prepared to surrender himself and his family to the Qing authorities. In a letter delivered to officials in Altishahr, he acknowledged the hardships that he and his family had suffered since fleeing their homeland, but denied that he had ever planned to lead a rising against the Qing and vigorously denounced Nārbutā whom he accused of fabricating stories about his activities in order to curry favour with the Qing authorities.[37] However, no sooner had negotiations begun than mistrust set in on both sides and, under pressure from his brother-in-law, Sarimsāq changed his mind.[38] Eight years later the hakim bek of Kashgar, Iskandar, again endeavoured to persuade the khoja to surrender, with the prospect of even greater reward if his arrival in Kashgar would coincide with the emperor's birthday on the 13th day of the 8th month.[39] Once again, however, negotiations faltered and hereafter records of Sarimsāq's activities are scant. Qing informants concur that he died in Bukhara in late 1809, leaving his three sons Yūsuf, Jahāngīr, and Bahā' al-Dīn to assume the mantle of the Makhdūmzāda khojas.[40]

The question of the stipend

It is against this background that we must consider the now long-accepted view among many scholars that sometime in the late 18th century, Khoqand began receiving an annual stipend from the Qing government for keeping the descendants of the rebel khoja brothers in check. The notion that the Qing court was dependent upon its 'outer vassals' for the security of Altishahr and, indeed, paid them for their co-operation sits comfortably with the interpretation of the tribute system reflected in much Western scholarship since the 1970s, whereby illusion belies reality and theory repudiates practice. So familiar are the redoubtable editorial skills of Chinese officials and historians that the absence of evidence of any such arrangement in Qing sources, or indeed in extant Khoqandi correspondence to the court, is invariably accepted without comment. Yet,

[37] MWDA 3583–016 165–0303, JQ3.3 (no day).
[38] *Renzong shilu* [hereafter RZSL], 31:2b–3b, JQ3.6.*guisi* and 33:13a–b, JQ3.8 *jiyou*.
[39] LFZZ MZL 8057.15, JQ10.9.18.
[40] *Zhupi zouzhe* [hereafter ZPZZ], *Minzu lei* [hereafter MZL], 451.1, JQ15.1 (no day). Kuropatkin and others have suggested erroneously that Sarimsāq died around 1820. Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, p.137.

the discrepancies and contradictions among those sources that claim a stipend was paid to Khoqand suggest the need for re-examination.[41]

Although in 1789 tribute missions were stopped for three years because of Khoqand's refusal to hand over Sarimsāq, after this the Qing authorities temporarily appeared to lose interest in whether or not there were any living descendants of the Makhdūmzāda khojas. Three years later, in 1791, when the tribute missions to Beijing were allowed to resume, the extradition of Sarimsāq was no longer deemed an issue necessary to raise with Khoqandi envoys.[42] Not until 1797 was Sarimsāq again brought to the court's attention, when his plan to attack Kashgar was thwarted by Nārbutā. As already mentioned, on this occasion the ruler of Khoqand was rewarded generously for his troubles, which in itself suggests that he had performed an extraordinary service, and not merely a duty for which he received an annual stipend.[43]

Most sources are unclear as to when the stipend was stopped (or indeed started), but many imply that it continued until the late 1810s, if not into the 1820s. There is a problem here. In 1814, the military governor at Ili, Songyun, a Mongol who had begun his career as an interpreter in the

[41] The range of often conflicting detail in many of these sources is noteworthy. Qurbān 'Alī Ayaghūzī states that the Chinese made a secret agreement with Khoqand by which they agreed to pay an annual 'gift' of a certain amount of silver ingots, on the condition that the khojas were kept under house arrest. He suggests that the agreement was struck at either the beginning of Muhammad 'Alī's rule or the end of 'Umar's, and that it was discontinued after the Jahāngīr rebellion. Nalivkin also claims somewhat vaguely that the Qing began paying Khoqand "a certain sum" after the conquest of Altishahr, while according to Valikhanov, the Qing initiated payments of 1,000 *yambu c*.1756. Lansdell asserts that the Qing began subsidizing the ruler of Khoqand from 1813 to the tune of "200 yambus (£2,250)." Boulger, on the other hand, suggests that Khoqand stopped paying tribute to China in 1812 and two to three years later the court agreed to give Khoqand an annual sum, equivalent to £3,500 for watching the khojas. Among 20th century scholars, Kuznetsov states that Nārbutā received an official title and sum of money in 1797 for keeping Sarimsāq under surveillance. Fletcher proposes that tea was given as well as 200–1,000 *yambu* (i.e.10–50,000 silver taels), for a period which commenced during Sarimsāq's lifetime and ended in 1817. Finally, Zeng Wenwu asserts that the 50-odd years of peace that Xinjiang supposedly enjoyed after the Uch Turfan rebellion is attributable to the fact that Khoqand was given 10,000 taels of silver annually for keeping watch over the khojas. Qurbān'Alī Ayaghūzī, 'Tavārīkh-i ḥamsa-i sharqī' (Russian trans.), pp.326–7, 9; Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskago Khanstva*, p.109; Valikhanov, 'Zapiski o' organizatsii poezdki v Kashgar', p.172; Lansdell, *Chinese Central Asia*, vol.2, p.56; Boulger, *The Life of Yakoob Bek*, p.64; Kuznetsov, *Tsinskaia imperiia na rubezhakh Tsentral'noi Azii*, pp.59–60; Fletcher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia *c*.1800', p.88 and 'Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.361; Zeng Wenwu, *Zhongguo jingying Xiyu shi*, vol.2, p.302.

[42] GZSL 1420:12b–13a, QL58.1 *jiachen*. For further evidence of the 'normalization' of relations between Nārbutā and the local authorities in Kashgar after this brief interval, see Ousley, 'Narrative of the Travels of Haji Muhammad Hussein Khan', p.336.

[43] Contrary to Kuznetsov's suggestion, Nārbutā was not conferred with official rank in 1797, so there was no possibility of an emolument associated with peerage being confused with the said stipend. Kuznetsov, *Tsinkaia imperiia na rubezhakh Tsentral'noi Azii*, pp.59–60.

Lifanyuan and spent much of his working life in administration of the northern borderlands, became concerned to put a halt to rumours circulating in Kashgar that Sarimsāq was still alive.[44] In particular, he was worried that the continued efforts of Yūnus, the hakim bek of Kashgar, to gather information as to Sarimsāq's whereabouts was giving Khoqand a false, and over inflated, impression of the khoja's importance to the Qing authorities. An enquiry, which Songyun initiated among envoys from Khoqand and the heads of various trading communities operating in Kashgar, established conclusively that Sarimsāq was dead and, erroneously as it transpired, that he had no living descendant.[45] Neither Yūnus' enquiries nor Songyun's investigation would appear to be consistent with the suggestion that the court was paying Khoqand a stipend to keep the khojas in check; moreover, Songyun's findings negate any possibility that payments might have continued until the 1820s. There is, however, another possible explanation for how the stories of a payment might have arisen, one which hinges not so much on whether or not quantities of tea, silver ingots or other valuables did change hands, as on how such acts were interpreted by the parties involved.

The following quote, from 'Abd al-Karīm's work, is the earliest extant mention of the stipend, and may well have been the original source from which the later 19th century Western scholars took their information. Having stated that the ruler of Khoqand received an annual stipend from the Qing court for keeping Sarimsāq and his descendants in check, 'Abd al-Karīm notes that under the rule of 'Ālim (r. 1799–1811), Nārbutā's second son and successor, matters did not proceed so smoothly:

> Tous les deux ou trois ans, un ambassadeur se rend à Pékin et revient à Khoqand, après avoir été gratifié de cadeaux. La pension cessa une fois d'être payée à Alim Khan qui, pendant trois années, empêcha les caravanes parties de Boukhara et de Khoqand de se rendre à Kachgar. Il en résulta qu'il reçut en une seule fois la pension de trois années et que la bonne harmonie fut rétablie.[46]

Unfortunately, 'Abd al-Karīm gives no precise dates for these events and his information, drawn probably from informants rather than written sources, may not be totally reliable.[47] From other records which cover 'Ālim's reign and the period immediately prior to it, we know the following: in early 1798 Nārbutā would have received the emperor's special gift of corals and silks as a mark of the court's appreciation for his action against Sarimsāq. The following year a Khoqandi mission arrived in Kashgar but was refused permission to travel to Beijing because of a backlog of missions by local beks.[48] A few months later, in late 1799, Nārbutā died and was succeeded by 'Ālim. In late December 1801, another Khoqandi mission arrived in Kashgar and was granted leave to proceed to the capital. During the remainder of 'Ālim Khān's reign, Khoqand sent a further three missions to Kashgar. Neither in 1804 nor 1807 were the khanate's envoys given licence to make the journey to court, but on both occasions the merchants who accompanied them were allowed to trade their merchandise tax-free and the envoys returned with gifts both for themselves and their khan.[49] Finally in 1809, permission was once again granted for a Khoqandi embassy to proceed to court, but not before an apology had been received for the discourteous tone of the letter that 'Ālim had had his envoy deliver to the Qing authorities in Altishahr.[50]

It is not impossible to see how, particularly after the events of 1797, the connection between the imperial gifts afforded the Khoqandi rulers and 'payment' for restraining the khojas might have arisen, but the task of marrying the above details with 'Abd al-Karīm's comments is obviously problematic. With an average of less than one caravan arriving in Kashgar

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[44] For Songyun, see Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 691–2; *Guochao xianzheng shilüe*, 5b–11a; Alateng Aoqier (Altan-Ochir), *Qingdai Yili jiangjun lungao*, pp.96–107.

[45] LFZZ MZL 8072.21, JQ19.2.14; RZSL 284:14a–16a, JQ19.2 *wuxu*. Shortly after assuming office in 1811, Yūnus had had a certain Shāh Dōst and three associates put to death for collecting money in the name of the khojas. Pan Zhiping suggests that Songyun's informants may have been friends and colleagues of these four (Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo*, p.87), but in any case they confirmed that Yūnus had made an error of judgement and that there were no living descendants of the khoja brothers, Burhān al-Dīn and Khoja-Jahān. Songyun needed little persuasion. He was already convinced that Yūnus' preoccupation with the khojas and his sending of gifts to the Khoqand ruler was an invitation to trouble, and now concluded that Yūnus had fabricated the earlier case against Shāh Dōst and his three associates and planted incriminating evidence on them. Yūnus escaped the death sentence because he was the grandson of Amīn Khōja of Turfan who had assisted the Qing in their conquest of Altishahr, and son of Iskandar who had served as hakim bek in Kashgar for 25 years. However, he was removed from office and imprisoned in Ili and Turfan for nearly nine years. RZSL247:8b–9b, JQ16.8 *jiwei*; 285:15a–16a, JQ19.2 *bingchen* and 286:13b–15b, JQ19 intercalary 2 *jiaxu*. See also chapter 4, note 17.

[46] 'Abd al-Karīm (Schefer trans.), *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale*, p.218.

[47] Schefer is of the opinion that 'Abd al-Karīm is more accurate in his coverage of Bukhara, Khiva and Khoqand, than of Afghanistan; however, he adds that his dates are almost always incorrect. 'Abd al-Karīm (Schefer trans.), *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale*, introduction, p.iii.

[48] HJNFL 4:5a, DG1.8 *yiwei*.

[49] The return-gifts, however, were of a significantly smaller quantity and lesser value than those customarily conferred at court. MWDA 3677–028 172–1978, JQ 9.11.25; 3778–046 172–2348, JQ10.2 and 3715–007 175–3170, JQ12.2.3.

[50] It was the use of the term 'friend' (Tur. *dōst*) to address the emperor that infuriated the court, and for which the Khoqandi envoy apologised stating that 'Ālim was "young and ignorant." Despite the court's decision to allow the embassy to proceed to Beijing, Nayancheng, the councillor in Kashgar, charged the returning envoy with a letter in which he chastised 'Ālim for his over familiarity, warned him to curb his military exploits and instructed him that in future his traders would only receive 50% tax relief on their merchandise. NWYGZY 19:4a–11b, 17b, JQ14.8.1; MWDA 3777–039 180–0303, JQ14.10.11.

every two years between 1759 and 1809, the two-year or three-year intervals that punctuated the arrival of Khoqandi embassies in Kashgar during ʻĀlim's reign could hardly be considered abnormal and, indeed, no other source makes mention of a halt in trade between Khoqand, or Bukhara, and Altishahr at this time. On the contrary, it was the hiatus of seven years between the embassy of 1801 and the next occasion on which ʻĀlim's envoy was allowed to proceed to court in 1809 that may have required an explanation, at least in Khoqand.

It was ʻĀlim who laid the foundations for Khoqand's rise as a regional power. First and foremost a soldier, throughout his reign, he was to keep his troops almost permanently engaged in battle, securing a succession of territorial gains that included Ura-tube and Tashkent. Ambitious and self-confident, he carved out a new redistribution of power among the ruling parties and was the first ruler of Khoqand to title himself khan and have coinage struck bearing his name. His letters to the authorities in Altishahr pay lip-service to his desire to maintain the good relations that, in his opinion, Khoqand had enjoyed with China since the time of Irdana, his grandfather's cousin. The brevity, directness and even familiarity of these communications, however, clearly reveal that he was less willing than Irdana, or even his father, Nārbutā, to play the role of the subservient vassal.[51] It is not impossible, therefore, that when his envoys and traders were refused permission to travel to Beijing in 1804 and 1807, and thus failed to return with the customary opulent gifts from the emperor, he might have let it be understood among Khoqand's merchant community and beyond, that because of the Qing court's failure to pay its dues (i.e. refusal to allow his envoy to court), he, ʻĀlim, intended to halt all official trade with China. Whatever the case, the traders accompanying the mission of 1809–10 made the most of the long-awaited opportunity to travel to Beijing, for this was the Khoqandi mission that returned from the capital with 88 cart-loads of goods. The sight of such an exceptionally large caravan arriving on the streets of Khoqand from distant Beijing could not but have caused a stir. After so long a rupture in missions to the capital, the unusually large size of the caravan might well have fuelled speculation that the emperor of China was contrite and had agreed to pay the backlog of his dues.

ʻAbd al-Karīm's notes on Khoqand were written *c.*1818, during the reign of ʻUmar (1811–22), which also raises the possibility that the reference to ʻĀlim Khān might even be an error for ʻĀlim's father,

[51] See, for example, MWDA 3678–017 172–2185, [JQ10.1] and 3678–048 172–2355, [JQ10.2]. For a translation from the Manchu of the correspondence between the Qing authorities in Kashgar and ʻĀlim in 1807, see Di Cosmo, 'A Set of Manchu Documents Concerning a Khokand Mission to Kashgar (1807)'.

Nārbutā. In this case, the embargo he mentions would no doubt refer to that of 1789–91 which, despite being imposed not by Khoqand but by the Qing, is the only suspension of trade or tribute missions prior to 1828 to be corroborated by other primary sources. The size of the 1809–10 caravan would then lose its relevance (and there is no evidence that the returning caravan of 1792/3 was unduly large), but the general hypothesis would still stand: imperial gifts dispatched from Beijing may well have been understood in Khoqand as a form of payment. Indeed, the Khoqandis would not have been alone in placing their own interpretation on the imperial gifts. Alexander Burnes who, in 1831–33, was sent to Central Asia by the government of India on a fact-finding mission, and who presumably relied on local informants for his information, states, "the Chinese sent a yearly present to Budukshan for putting the khojas to death until five or six years ago when Budukshan was seized by the Meer of Koondooz."[52]

Yet, any suggestion of a convergence between stipends and the gifts entrusted to the tribute envoys must inevitably remain tentative, not least because, even at their most frequent, the tribute missions were never annual. Nevertheless, the role of the imperial gift is one that is fundamental to the understanding of the conduct of Qing foreign relations. Despite the obvious semantic distinction between the concept of giving a 'stipend', a 'reward', or indeed a 'bribe', what is given, the gift itself, cannot be absolved from a symbolic function, and therefore remains open to interpretation. The emperor's gifts to visiting envoys were intended as representations of an imperial munificence and largesse which served to enhance the emperor's prestige and centrality in the world order. As rewards for compliance in the symbolic acknowledgement of the emperor's suzerainty, they were obviously not disinterested, but more than that, they carried with them the expectation that the recipient had obligations and duties to the giver. The fact that these were rarely articulated in any detail only enhanced the role of the gift. Thus, whether the recipient chose to regard the gift as a payment for past and present co-operation, or as a bribe to elicit future acquiescence and complicity, was of little import in Beijing; the imperial gifts formed bonds of perceived mutual interest. It is the fact that the symbols and ritual employed by the court in its dealings with foreigners were open to infinite interpretation and misinterpretation, wilful or otherwise, that made them so useful for the conduct of foreign relations—and so confounding for the historian.

[52] Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, vol. 2, pp.228–9.

Trade, tax and aqsaqals

Despite the fact that the frequency of tribute missions to Beijing was now officially restricted, the caravans arriving in Kashgar from Khoqand continued to increase in number and size; in 1817 a caravan of 600–700 traders (with 743 bundles) arrived in Kashgar requesting tax exemption and permission to proceed to Beijing.[53] While the possibility of accompanying a caravan to Beijing was clearly an attractive proposition, there was another factor that drew Khoqandi caravans to southern Xinjiang. Merchants from Ferghana had been trading and settling in Altishahr since before the Qing conquest of the region. In the decades following the conquest, the Khoqandi trading community based in Kashgar expanded and grew increasingly prosperous; not only did it benefit from new links with the interior of China, but also from the fact that in the late 1790s the Qing authorities prohibited the Altishahri merchants from travelling any great distance outside the *karun* to trade, and even insisted that those wishing to trade with the neighbouring Qirghiz be provided with passes.[54] Thus, working hand in hand, the Khoqandi merchants who resided in Altishahr and those who accompanied the Khoqandi tribute missions were able to maximize their profits.

Although the Khoqandis were by no means the only foreign merchants in Altishahr, they were the most numerous. They could be found in all the major towns of the region (with the exception of Qarashahr), as well as Ili in the north. By 1828, there were reportedly several thousand Khoqandi households in Aqsu and the western cities.[55] In addition to the transient merchant population, many had settled permanently, taking local wives and purchasing land. The growing authority of this community and its use as a bridgehead for extending Khoqand's influence within the Altishahr region is mirrored in the controversy surrounding the role of the head trader, the aqsaqal.

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[53] LFZZ MZL 8072.24, JQ22.11.4.

[54] In 1794 Yongbao, the councillor at Kashgar, memorialized the court on the continuing problem of attacks on Altishahri merchants and drew up regulations for traders wishing to travel beyond the *karun*. See MWDA 3483–014 159–0760, QL59.10.6; GZSL 1464:1b–3a, QL59.11 *yiyou*. However, as Millward points out, enforcement of the restrictions would have been difficult. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.123–4. By 1814 the emperor himself took it for granted that there were traders from the empire (presumably not Han Chinese, or Sino-Muslims) as far afield as Khoqand. See below, p.69.

[55] NWYGZY 77:15a, DG8.12.28. Although Altishahr literally means 'six cities', for administrative purposes the Qing had identified eight major cities in southern Xinjiang. Four of these—Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar and Khotan—were conventionally referred to as the four western cities, while the other four—Qucha, Uch Turfan, Aqsu and Qarashahr—were known as the eastern cities.

The Turkic term *aqsaqāl* means 'white beard' and was used throughout Central Asia in the 19th century, and still today, to mean 'elder' or 'greybeard'. However, in the 19th century it was also used in a more official context as the title given to someone who was responsible for the administration of civil affairs. For example, Eugene Schuyler writes that in the Syr Darya region:

> Among the settled population one *aksakal*, literally 'greybeard,' is chosen over each considerable village by the vote of the people themselves; and in the cities each ward has its own *aksakal*, whose duties are the same as those of the elders in the police administration among the Kirghiz.[56]

Similarly, Vladimir Nalivkin in his description of Khoqand records that:

> Every *vilāyat* [province] is subdivided into *bekliq*, which are controlled by beks...The *bekliq*, in turn, comprise administrative units controlled by an *amin* or an *aqsaqāl*.[57]

In Qing sources relating to Xinjiang, the title 'aqsaqal' was used to denote a foreign merchant who resided in southern Xinjiang and administered the affairs of his own merchant community.[58] Given the economic and political predominance of the Khoqandi trading community, it frequently referred to the head of the Khoqandi trading community, but other communities such as the Bukharans, the Kashmiris and the traders from Tashkent also had their own 'chief traders'.[59]

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[56] Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol.2, p.205.

[57] Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.208.

[58] Azadaev suggests that one of the main duties of the aqsaqal in Central Asia was, in fact, to oversee the commercial activities in the bazaar. Azadaev, *Tashkent vo vtoroĭ polovine XIX veka*, p.32.

[59] It would appear that Tashkent continued to have an aqsaqal in Kashgar, even after it came under Khoqandi control in 1809. See LFZZ MZL 8072.21, JQ19.2.14. Although it is generally accepted that *aqsaqāl* (Ch. *a-ka-sa-ke-er*) is synonymous with the Chinese terms *shangmu* or *maimai touren* (head trader), its identification with the Manchu term *hūda-i da* has been questioned. In the early 1960s, Saguchi Tōru suggested that the *hūda-i da* were the head merchants of the Khoqandi trading communities, who were appointed with the approval of the Qing authorities, and that they were subsequently replaced by aqsaqals who were Khoqandi tax collectors. See Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan*, pp.391–2, 403, and Kuznetsov, who makes the same point, *Ekonomicheskaia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane*, p.137. As will become evident, although there is justification for suggesting a development, if not a change, in the status and activities of the head Khoqandi trader, this did not coincide with a change in terminology. While in Chinese sources transliteration of the term *aqsaqāl* began to replace that of *hūda-i da* in the 1830s, at the time when it may be argued the role of the head trader was shifting, by the 1840s and '50s *hūda-i da* was again in regular use. Both terms, therefore, appear to have been used interchangeably in Chinese documents and are not indicative of a change in the head trader's function. As identified by Okada Hidehiro, the Manchu term *hūda-i da* is the origin of the Chinese rendition *hu-dai-da* or *hu-dai-yi-da* (Fletcher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800', p.84), but the Manchu term itself appears to originate from the Persian 'khudādād' (given by God). (I am grateful to T. Beisembiev and P. Bergne for this point). At the end of the 19th century when, as Skrine notes, the term *aqsaqāl* was applied to the

At the heart of the aqsaqal question, as it developed between the Qing authorities and Khoqand, lay the issue of who made the appointments and what were the duties of the appointees. According to the Qing records, the appointment of a head merchant among the Khoqandis[60] who engaged in trade in the Altishahr region pre-dated the Qing conquest and his duties were 'to restrain' his traders.[61] Prior to the 1830s, Qing sources make no mention of tax-collection in connection with the office.

Qing records date the first appointment after the conquest at 1762, when the hakim bek, Ghadīmat, appointed Rizā Qulī as aqsaqal in Yarkand. Within ten years of the appointment of the first aqsaqal, however, the number of Khoqandi traders in the region had so increased that Ghadīmat appointed a second Khoqandi, Ni'mat Jān from Tashkent to assist him.[62] A report which was given to a British official based in India by a certain Muhammad Amīn of Yarkand in the mid-19th century states that the first head of the Khoqandi merchant community in Kashgar was Ni'mat Jān, who was appointed during the reign of the Khoqandi ruler Nārbutā "with the permission of Akbek [the hakim bek of Kashgar] and the Chinese Governor."[63] Presumably, therefore, Rizā Qulī, or his successor remained at Yarkand, while Ni'mat Jān resided at Kashgar. Chinese sources from this period are not only silent on the issue of tax-collection, but make no suggestion that the ruler of Khoqand was in any way involved in the appointments. They indicate only that the aqsaqal was nominated from among the Khoqandi trading community and that his appointment was conferred by the hakim bek, and ratified by the Qing authorities.

The first indication of Khoqand's overt attempt to exert influence over the appointment of the head of the trading community in Altishahr dates

chief representative of any foreign (including western) trading community resident in Xinjiang (Skrine, *Chinese Central Asia*, p.108), the aqsaqal representing the British and the Russians were, of course, also functioning as political informants. For purposes of simplicity, I use *aqsaqāl* rather than *hūda-i da* throughout, except in quotations where I adhere to the term used in the text.

[60] In the Qing sources traders from Khoqand, and thus all merchants from the Ferghana region who traded in Altishahr, were commonly referred to as Andijanis, even if they were in fact from the cities of Khoqand, Marghilan or elsewhere. Presumably, this practice had arisen because Andijan, situated approximately 1,600 *li* to the northwest of Kashgar, was the old capital of the Ferghana region and had traditionally had extensive relations with Altishahr. See Imbault-Hart, *Recueil de Documents sur l'Asie Centrale*, pp.15–6, note 1. Thus, anyone who spoke 'Andijan-Turkish' (i.e. the dialect of the Ferghana region) was referred to as an Andijani by the people of Altishahr and consequently also by Qing officials. See Jarring, *Materials to the Knowledge of Eastern Turki*, vol.2, p.4. I use 'Khoqandi' rather than 'Andijani' throughout, except in quotations where I adhere to the text.

[61] GZSL 787:11b-12a, QL32.6 *jiayin*.

[62] LFZZ MZL 8072.15, JQ13.11.12.

[63] Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.339.

from 1808 when 'Ālim Khān informed the authorities in Kashgar that he wanted the aqsaqal, Sālih Jān, extradited to Khoqand where his financial affairs were under investigation. Sālih Jān had reportedly been involved in the financial administration of Khoqand, but he had left Khoqand in 1799/1800 (JQ4) to visit his father, Ni'mat Jān, the aqsaqal in Kashgar. Having stayed on in Kashgar to care for his now elderly father, when Ni'mat Jān died in 1808, Sālih Jān succeeded to his father's post, as Rizā Qulī's son had done when Rizā Qulī died some ten years earlier. 'Ālim's demand for Sālih Jān's return was accompanied by the assertion that in appointing Sālih Jān to office, the Qing authorities had departed from the normal procedure, according to which the ruler of Khoqand, and not the hakim bek of Kashgar, was responsible for the appointment of the aqsaqal. The Qing councillor in Kashgar, Chenglin, refused to consider extraditing Sālih Jān, insisting that not only had there been no change in practice, but there was a precedent for a son succeeding to his father's post as aqsaqal. Suspecting that 'Ālim's real motive was to appropriate Sālih Jān's inheritance, Chenglin also pointed out that when a Khoqandi died on Chinese soil it was incumbent upon his relatives to decide what to do with his wealth and not the responsibility of the Qing authorities to have his assets returned to the Khoqand government.[64]

When this affair was reported to the Jiaqing emperor concern was expressed; if Sālih Jān had indeed committed a criminal offence in Khoqand, he should not be allowed to continue as aqsaqal. Sālih Jān was, therefore, interrogated but, satisfied with his version of events, Chenglin remained convinced that 'Ālim's motives were purely mercenary. The following year, however, 'Ālim sent a messenger to Kashgar with further details supporting his accusation and insisting that Sālih Jān had lied. This time the envoy was accompanied by the Khoqandi wife and son of Sālih Jān who were brought face-to-face with Sālih Jān for questioning. The office of councillor at Kashgar was now held by Nayancheng, who was persuaded that Sālih Jān did have a case to answer in Khoqand and heeded the court's earlier instruction; Sālih Jān was dismissed from his post and extradited to face charges in Khoqand.[65] While careful to avoid any show

[64] LFZZ MZL 8072.15, JQ13.11.12. This was not the first time that 'Ālim Khān had angered the Qing authorities by attempting to 'interfere' in affairs in Altishahr. In 1801, he had written to the Qing councillor in Kashgar urging him to look into the matter of several outstanding debts owed to Khoqandi traders by locals of Altishahr. Despite investigating the cases, the Qing authorities found that the claims were baseless and 'Ālim was instructed not to attempt to intervene in such matters again. MWDA 3635–009 169–0431, JQ6.11.22.

[65] LFZZ MZL 8072.16, JQ14.1.24 and 8072.19, JQ15.1.24; NWYGZY 19:4b–5a, JQ14.8.1 and 12b–14a, 16b–17b, JQ14.12.20.

of weakness, the language of the message entrusted to 'Ālim's envoy by Nayancheng was both magnanimous and conciliatory:

> As Sālih Jān has already admitted that he once served Nārbutā and 'Ālim and that there was a dispute that has not been clarified, We sympathize with you and out of generosity allow you to take him back. If after this you come again causing trouble and asking to investigate Sālih Jān's possessions or wanting his brothers or sisters and so on, We shall turn a deaf ear and you will return empty-handed.[66]

At no point in its exchanges with 'Ālim Khān had the court conceded that the office of aqsaqal was an appointment conferred by a foreign government independently of the Qing authorities. Nevertheless, the case of Sālih Jān demonstrates that where crimes had been committed beyond the frontiers of the empire, the Qing court was prepared to respect a ruler's jurisdiction over his subjects residing within Qing territory—even if, as in this case, the rulers of that polity were not willing to reciprocate by extraditing those who posed a threat to the security of the empire.

In 1811, 'Ālim Khān was murdered as he returned from a campaign against Tashkent, and his younger brother 'Umar (r.1811–22) came to power in Khoqand. 'Umar built on his brother's legacy and it was under his rule that Khoqand's position in Central Asia was consolidated.[67] On the one hand, like 'Ālim, he kept his troops almost permanently engaged in campaigns to expand the frontiers of his realm; on the other, he extended and tightened his grip on regional trade. Within months of coming to power, 'Umar had not only successfully managed to have Sālih Jān reinstated as the Khoqandi aqsaqal in Kashgar, albeit with the acquiescence of the Qing authorities, but was making no secret of the fact that he had conferred him with a seal of office.[68] Three years later, in 1814, confident of Khoqand's considerably enhanced political and economic power, 'Umar requested permission from the Qing court to replace the semi-official aqsaqal with an official representative of the Khoqandi government. The new official, it was proposed, would be given the title *qādī* (judge), and would assume full responsibility for supervising trade and taxation of the Khoqandi merchants, thus absolving the need for the hakim bek to concern himself with them. All Khoqandi traders would

[66] LFZZ MZL 8072.19, JQ15.1.24; NWYGZY 19:11b–14a, JQ14.12.20.
[67] For an assessment of 'Umar's achievements and his patronage of the arts, see Nettleton, 'Ruler, Patron, Poet'.
[68] MWDA 3801–013.1 181–2509; 3801–013.1 181–2513, [JQ16.5] and 3936–052.3 190–3369, [JQ25.2].

be taxed at 2.5% and the *qādī* would also collect death duties—a minimum of 300 *wen*.[69]

There was, however, a clear distinction in the minds of the Jiaqing emperor and his officials between a semi-official aqsaqal appointed by the hakim bek and a *qādī* appointed by a foreign power. The hakim bek in Kashgar, Yūnus, who was deemed to be indirectly responsible for having encouraged 'Umar to make the request, was disciplined, all communication between the local officials of Altishahr and Khoqand was forbidden, and 'Umar was firmly reprimanded by the emperor for his impertinence:

> Your Khoqandi tribes are no more than petty outsiders from beyond Our frontier (*bianwai xiaoyi*), it is out of exceptional kindness that the empire allows you to trade back and forth. Now you dare to make this greedy request. Just think, are there not traders from Our empire in your territory, yet We have never established officials on your territory to take charge of tax matters. The imperial court has never been willing to intrude in your internal affairs. How could you entertain the absurd notion of violating the established practices and acting recklessly within the territory of the imperial court? If in future you fail to be compliant and respectful, if you do not abide by the laws and institutions, then We will order every *karun* to prohibit your people from coming to trade.[70]

As with the Sālih Jān affair, this incident clearly illustrates how the nature of discourse which the court accepted, and in which it was prepared to engage with outsiders, was undergoing a subtle shift. While superficially the same "regime of truth",[71] which afforded the court an unrivalled position in the hierarchy of power, still held good, the language and content of the court's directives, both to its own frontier officials and the outsiders themselves, was beginning to reveal a much greater recognition of the limitations of imperial power.

In 1820, with Khoqand now confident of its standing as a regional political power, 'Umar resumed his efforts, this time petitioning to have two official representatives, entitled aqsaqal, stationed in Kashgar. Like the *qādī* proposed in 1814, they would administer the affairs of the Khoqandi merchants and act as tax collectors for the ruler of Khoqand, thus absolving the need for the hakim bek to take responsibility for them.

[69] *Qinding Xinjiang zhilüe* [hereafter XJZL], 3:21b; RZSL 284:2a–b, JQ19.2 *guisi*; LFZZ MZL 8072.21, JQ19.2.14.
[70] RZSL 284:32b–33a, JQ19.2 *bingwu*. What exactly was meant by 'internal affairs' (*yue jie zhi shi*, lit. cross-border affairs) is unclear, but given that traders and envoys regularly went back and forth, it would appear to refer to internal politics and legal matters.
[71] See Foucault, 'Truth and Power'.

Once again the khan's request was categorically refused. As the emperor pointedly observed:

> In the past the Kashgar *hūda-i da* [Ch. *hu-da-da*, sic] was chosen by the hakim bek, and the bek of Khoqand never interfered. Then after 'Umar took the throne he asked to establish a *qādī*, and on that occasion was refused by Songyun. Now he has just changed the name.[72]

To add further to the court's displeasure, on investigation it was revealed that 'Umar had already appointed an aqsaqal, by the name of Bātur Jān, who having failed to perform to the khan's satisfaction was now to be replaced by a certain Toqtā Khōja. Both men were immediately repatriated to Khoqand, 'Umar was reprimanded for his transgressions and all tax privileges for his merchants were withdrawn.[73]

A shifting balance of power

Fifty-odd years after Zhaohui had stunned the Qirghiz with a display of his troops' military prowess and an awe-struck Toqtā Muhammad had made the long journey to the court of Qianlong, much had changed. Khoqand had now consolidated its power in the Ferghana Valley and extended its territory some two- or threefold. Its growing hold over the trade routes had brought its citizens and rulers alike an increased affluence and self-confidence. Khoqandi merchants regularly travelled back and forth to Altishahr, if not Beijing, providing a vital link in the trans-continental trade that stretched from the eastern seaboard of China to western Europe. Khoqand had added large numbers of Qazaqs and Qirghiz to its fighting force and militarily was already a match for the neighbouring amirate of Bukhara.[74] It remained only to prove itself as a centre of religious authority and a protector of Islam in order to assert untrammelled authority throughout the region.

Meanwhile, since its first cataclysmic inroad into the Central Asian heartland, the great Qing empire had posed no significant threat to regional politics. While in the early years the pronouncements of the Qianlong emperor had inspired a degree of fear and trepidation among the local rulers, half a century later this was no longer the case. The legacy of Heshen's administration and the damage wrought to the economy by the unfettered corruption and factionalism that it engendered was to have an

[72] RZSL 366:18a–b, JQ25.1 *yiyou*.

[73] *Ibid*; HJNFL 3:34a–b, DG1.3 *jisi*; MWDA 3936–052.3 190–3369, [JQ25.2].

[74] For an account of Khoqand's triumph over Bukhara in the war of 1814, see Nazarov, 'Voyage à Khokand', pp.74–5. The adoption of the title *amīr* by the Manghit ruler, Shāh Murād, in 1785 had signalled Bukhara's claim to Islamic authority in the region and indicated its recourse to Islamic (opposed to Chinggisid) principles for the legitimization of its rulers.

enduring impact on every aspect of Qing rule, not least in respect of intercourse with foreign powers.

The instructions and admonitions that the Jiaqing court issued to outsiders beyond its north-western frontier still assumed unquestioning compliance, but they were no longer couched in the same overt claims to universalism. As in Turkic Central Asia, so elsewhere on the frontier there was now little evidence to suggest that the court was prepared to deploy troops in the territories of neighbouring polities. In the 18th century, for example, the Qing army had entered Tibet on no less than four occasions to defend the empire's interests. The last time, in 1792, the invading Gurkhas had been expelled and Nepal forced to send quinquennial tribute missions to Beijing. By 1814, however, the picture was very different. Not only was Nepal unable to engage the court as a 'protector' in its struggle against the British, it failed to persuade Beijing to take any action to avert a potential threat to Tibet.[75] Clearly, Khoqand and Bukhara could safely assume that Qing forces would not intervene in their mutual conflict—but neither would it come to their relief when Russia began its inexorable advance.

As the limitations on the use of Qing military force became clearer, Khoqand could afford to be more assertive in its dealings with the empire. After the repatriation of Sālih Jān, a significant triumph for 'Ālim Khān, Khoqand's rulers grew ever more insistent in their demands for trading privileges. The Qing empire might still bark from time to time, but Khoqand was confident that it would not bite. Such an assessment is unlikely to have been based on a consideration of the mounting social and economic pressures under which the Qing court was functioning, but rather on close observation of the developing crisis in Xinjiang. The failure of the Qing authorities to introduce any significant political or social reform since establishing the new order in the 1760s had, little by little, given rise to an entrenched, corrupt and weakened administration. In the aftermath of the conquest, with a few exceptions, the calibre of the Qing officials sent to Altishahr had gradually deteriorated and once the strong arm of the Qianlong court was no longer felt, these weaknesses were exposed.[76] Nowhere was the apathy among Qing officialdom, which

[75] Manandhar, *A Documentary History of Nepalese Quinquennial Missions to China 1792–1906*, see 'Background'; Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, p.69; Dhanalaxmi, *British Attitude to Nepal's Relations with Tibet and China (1814–1914)*, pp. 21–9.

[76] One of the most far-reaching examples of abuse and corruption by Qing officials to have occurred during the late 1770s was the case of Gao Pu, the imperial agent at Yarkand, and his involvement in jade smuggling. Yet, while this case, in which local beks were also embroiled, may have been exceptional in both its scale and gravity, there is no evidence of any attempt to 'clean-up' the administration of Altishahr in its aftermath; on the contrary,

was to be so harshly criticized by the Hanlin academician Hong Liangji (1746–1809) and the literati, more clearly evident that in Altishahr. Meanwhile, the beks had become increasingly self-confident. Earlier efforts to undermine their traditional familial and local power bases had faltered, and once again they were exercising unfettered authority. With little attempt by the Qing administration to keep them in check, their abuses and exploitation of the local Muslim population became ever more acute.

By the late 1810s with the issues of tax exemption and the duties of the aqsaqal still causing friction, relations between the Qing empire and Khoqand were becoming increasingly strained. In this tense and uneasy political environment, a new generation of khojas appeared on the political stage—the grandsons of Burhān al-Dīn.

efforts were made to limit the investigation. For details of the case see Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department*, pp.136–71.

CHAPTER THREE

UNREST IN ALTISHAHR

The akhund's uprising

First to assume the mantle of the Āfāqī khojas was Jahāngīr, the second of Sarimsāq's sons. Described as a man in his mid-thirties, of medium build, with a dark complexion, a drooping moustache and a pock-marked nose, he was to pose the first real challenge to Qing rule of the Altishahr region.[1]

According to 'Umar Khān of Khoqand, Jahāngīr's first attempt to attack Kashgar occurred in 1814. In an action reminiscent of an earlier episode in which Nārbutā claimed to have thwarted Sarimsāq's advance, Khoqandi troops forced Jahāngīr to retreat before he reached the town of Marghilan, several hundred *li* west of the Qing *karun*. It was with the expectation of gratitude for this service that 'Umar had requested that he be allowed to establish a *qādī* in Altishahr with responsibility for tax-collection among the Khoqandi traders. The request was firmly refused, not least because at this time there was considerable doubt in the minds of some Qing officials as to whether there were any surviving Āfāqī khojas in Khoqand to lead an advance on Kashgar.[2]

For nearly six more years, until 1820 when Jahāngīr made his second and potentially more serious attempt to regain Altishahr, Qing officials preferred to believe that there were no living descendants of Burhān al-Dīn Khōja. The hakim beks were no longer allowed to have contact with Khoqand,[3] and the Qing officials in Kashgar indulged in complacent lethargy, apparently mindless of the social tensions rising around them. The Ziyā' al-Dīn affair of 1815 was symptomatic of the escalating crisis.

The Ziyā' al-Dīn uprising was a small local affair unconnected with the rebellions led by the Makhdūmzāda khojas, and perhaps for this reason it has largely escaped the attention of scholars.[4] Yet while not directly involving either the khojas or Khoqand, the Qing documents pertaining to the incident offer a unique insight into the society of Altishahr and relations between the Qing authorities and their subjects.[5] The case vividly illustrates

[1] HJNFL 33:22b, DG 6.11 *yiyou*.
[2] XZSL 284:32b–33a, JQ19.2 *guisi*; HJNFL 3:34b–35a, DG1.3 *jisi*; LFZZ MZL 8072.21, JQ19.2.14.
[3] XZSL 15:10b, DG1.3 *jisi*; HJNFL 3:27b, DG1.3 *jisi*.
[4] The incident has received limited attention in the following works: Saguchi Tōru, *18-19 seiki Higashi Torukistan*, pp.422–6; Fletcher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia *c*.1800', p.90; Pan Zhiping, '1759 nian – 1911 nian Xinjiang de bianluan', p.46.
[5] In addition to a cluster of memorials in the *Xuanzong shilu*, Qing sources on the incident comprise unpublished documents in the First Historical Archives in Beijing and

the tensions existing in southern Xinjiang at this time and the problems that beset the Qing administration in its effort to rule a territory so far removed both culturally and physically from the Chinese heartland. An examination of the incident provides a useful backcloth against which to understand the events of the 1820s.

The story as it first reached Songyun, the military governor in Ili, was that on 5th September 1815, as local people celebrated the Muslim New Year, Ziyā' al-Dīn, an akhund from the village of Tashmaliq, 120 *li* to the southwest of Kashgar, had led 200–300 armed Turkic Muslims in an attack on a Qing horse ranch, killing soldiers, stealing horses and burning fodder. The Manchu councillor in Kashgar, Chengning, who passed this news to Songyun informed the military governor that he had already ordered some 400 Green Standard troops to be moved from the cities of Uch Turfan and Yarkand to strengthen the garrison at Kashgar. He also requested that, in Ili, a thousand-strong force of able-bodied men be made ready for action.[6]

Songyun's first reaction was one of caution. He suspected that Chengning was overreacting to what was still little more than rumour. He noted that the initial report of rebellion had come from a Han Chinese merchant, a certain Gao Jianluo, and suspected that the 'rebellion' may well have been caused or even fabricated by the merchants themselves. The exploitation of the Muslims by Han traders was well known to the authorities; the Han traders regularly caused trouble among the local people, fought among themselves and spread false rumours. Thus, as Songyun surmised in his first memorial on the incident, it was quite possible that the local people of Tashmaliq had complained of Gao's extortion to the local akhund, that Ziyā' al-Dīn had had Gao driven from the village and that Gao was now seeking revenge by fabricating the story that Ziyā' al-Dīn had rebelled.[7]

Despite the fact that Songyun's suspicions proved incorrect in this case, they are, nevertheless, enlightening. Although regulations existed that confined Han traders to the towns and cities of southern Xinjiang, Songyun

Songyun Xinjiang zougao [hereafter SYXZG], a collection of Songyun's memorials which were compiled in a lithographed edition by the late eminent archivist Wu Fengpei, in 1980. To the best of my knowledge, there are no 19th century Central Asian sources that give details of the incident, although Valikhanov does make a brief reference to it. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.316. (For a partial translation of Valikhanov's writings on Altishahr see J. and R. Michell, *The Russians in Central Asia*). According to Timur Beisembiev (private correspondence), the *'Umar-nāma* (an early Khoqand chronicle from *c.*1810) mentions that at about this time 'Umar Khān of Khoqand received a report of the execution of a Muslim in Kashgar who had been killed for his faith; the khan reacted by ordering the production of a large amount of munitions. It seems highly probable that this is a reference to the Ziyā' al-Dīn incident.

[6] SYXZG 1a, JQ20.8.15.

[7] SYXZG 1a–b, JQ20.8.15.

clearly suggests that the rules had been allowed to lapse. Merchants from the interior were regularly penetrating the villages of Altishahr and doing just what the regulations had been designed to prevent—practising exploitative usury, and provoking unrest.

As for the attack on the horse ranch, while pondering whether the fire might not have been spread on the wind from nearby Tashmaliq, Songyun also considered the possibility that the soldiers might have occupied a horse ranch belonging to the Muslims.[8] Here he touches on another known cause of tension between the Muslims and Qing authorities—land appropriation. Arable and grazing land was at a premium in the south and this was one reason why Han immigrants and traders had been forbidden to settle there in the early years after the conquest. Nevertheless, land was inevitably appropriated by the authorities to billet the garrisons and to rear and graze their horses. As evidenced by Songyun's comments, this was a familiar cause of friction.

Despite the tentative nature of Songyun's various hypotheses, on one count he was adamant: the local people would not have made trouble without due provocation. The prevailing tone of Songyun's memorial is, in fact, critical of the councillor Chengning, whom he not only suspected of being lax in having allowed Han traders into the villages, but who, now that the disturbance had been reported, appeared to be showing signs of panic. With such a range of possible causes presenting themselves and indications of incompetence at the highest level of the administration in Altishahr, it is perhaps not surprising that the military governor saw fit to reassure the emperor that he himself was preparing to go to Kashgar to investigate.[9]

Even before Songyun arrived in Kashgar, he received word that a number of arrests had been made, including that of Ziyā' al-Dīn and several members of his family. Songyun's theories on the possible causes of the disturbance were now overtaken by the evidence drawn from the testimonies of those arrested. Ziyā' al-Dīn's deposition set the course for the investigation:

> Last year I married the daughter of Qāshīn Khōja who formerly served as a duke (*gongjue*). She was my second wife. As this girl lived outside Kashgar Muslim city at the *mazār* (tomb complex) of the khojas, I thus twice requested permission of hakim bek Yūsuf to allow her to move to the village of Tashmaliq to live, but unfortunately he kept refusing. I reckoned I was a person of some standing in the area, and yet I was not being allowed to move my wife to my village so that we could live together. I got angry because of this and decided to lead a group of men to remove her by force. If I was prevented again, I was going to make trouble for Yūsuf. I would certainly not

[8] SYXZG 1b, JQ20.8.15.

[9] SYXZG 2a, JQ20.8.15.

have dared rebel against the emperor and there was no question of my making trouble for the councillor and the other officials.[10]

Ziyā' al-Dīn was then cross-examined as to why, if his story were true, he had not gone to Kashgar to take up the matter with the councillor. He appears to have had no ready explanation for this, or perhaps his reply was purposely omitted from the report for fear of recrimination. Nevertheless, Ziyā' al-Dīn's version of events was corroborated by Yūsuf, the hakim bek of Kashgar, who explained that the father of Ziyā' al-Dīn's bride was a descendant of the Peighambar (the Prophet Muhammad) and it was therefore inappropriate for her to move away from her ancestors' tomb; to have allowed her to do so would have caused trouble.[11]

The *mazār* outside Kashgar was associated with the Āfāqiyya. Surprisingly perhaps, in the wake of the revolt led by the Āfāqī khoja brothers, Burhān al-Dīn and Khōja-Jahān, in the 1760s, the Qing authorities had made no attempt to purge or suppress the Āfāqiyya. One branch of the Āfāqī khojas, headed by Husayn Erke Khōja and Pārsī, had not in fact participated in the rebellion against the Qing and several members of this family were ennobled and sent to Beijing. Ziyā' al-Dīn's bride was the granddaughter of Husayn Erke and her father, Qāshīn Khōja, who inherited his imperial title, may well have remained in Beijing until his death in 1796. By 1815, however, some members of the family were living in Altishahr where, together with eleven other Āfāqī families, they had been allowed to settle on 30 *batmān* of land close to their ancestral tombs outside Kashgar.[12]

Ziyā' al-Dīn was an Ishāqī akhund and it is notable, therefore, that an eminent Āfāqī family did not oppose his marriage to their daughter, neither did Ziyā' al-Dīn appear to have any reservations about taking her to live in his village, in accordance with the local custom of virilocality after marriage. The objection came instead from Yūsuf, the hakim bek of Kashgar, who claimed that he had only allowed the marriage on the grounds that the bride remained at her parents' home after the marriage. Yūsuf may,

[10] SYXZG 4b, JQ20.8.17. A *mazār* is actually a shrine at the tomb of a Muslim 'saint' or holy man. Across Central Asia these sites became places of worship to which the faithful performed pilgrimages (and in many cases still do today). Those of the more important 'saints' often developed into complexes, including a mosque and accommodation for the guardians of the shrine as well as pilgrims.

[11] Yūsuf had been appointed to the office of hakim bek in Kashgar earlier in 1815 when his predecessor, Yūnus, was accused by Songyun of being too assiduous in his efforts to gain information on Sarimsāq's whereabouts, and of maintaining improper contacts with Khoqand. See chapter 2.

[12] SYXZG 5a, JQ20.9.17; GZSL 614:2a–b, QL25.6 *guiyou*. 1 *batmān* = approx. 5.3 *shi* of grain. Traditionally, land area was calculated according to the grain harvest it could support. According to Lin Enxian, 1 *mu* (733.5 sq. yds.) supports 1 *dou*, therefore, 1 *batmān* = 5 *shi* 3 *dou* = 53 *mu*. Lin Enxian, *Qingchao zai Xinjiang de Han-Hui geli zhengce*, p.78.

by his own admission, have been irresponsible in not having reported Ziyā' al-Dīn's request to the Manchu councillor, but it would appear that he was merely adhering to local Muslim custom that frowned on marriage between different sufi orders and that he genuinely feared that the girl's move would cause trouble between the two communities.[13]

At the time of the conquest, many of the old nobility of Altishahr, who traditionally had strong links with the Ishāqiyya, had assisted the Qing in ousting the Āfāqī khojas from power. Given that hundreds of Āfāqī supporters then fled into exile, when the Qing perpetuated the role of the old nobility, appointing them as beks and conferring them with insignia (*dingdai*), it was the Ishāqiyya who gained the most politically. Yet the Qing authorities did not discriminate against the Āfāqī followers who remained in Altishahr. Indeed, perhaps because they did not do so, it is tempting to assume that under Qing rule the traditional friction between the Āfāqī and Ishāqī communities was perpetuated, if not accentuated. True as this may have been initially, as indicated by this episode, by the 19th century the nature of relations between the two orders and their adherents was somewhat more complex. It appears that opposition to infidel rule, combined with the lack of any attempt by the Qing authorities to exploit the pre-existing tensions, may even have been serving to diminish the traditional hostility between the two factions.[14]

Had it not been for the attack on the horse ranch and the death of the Qing soldiers, the evidence in Ziyā' al-Dīn's own testimony and the information supplied by Yūsuf might have satisfied the investigators that the incident was, in essence, a matter of settling grievances within the Muslim community. However, the attack on the ranch still awaited explanation. It was not long in coming. Before Songyun arrived in Kashgar, Councillor Chengning had already reported emphatically to the emperor that Ziyā' al-Dīn had plotted to rebel and to establish himself as ruler of 'the eight cities'.[15] This information, which accorded with Chengning's initial interpretation of events, was drawn from the testimony of a certain Sālih who served the Qing authorities as an interpreter at one of the *karun* and had been implicated in the affair at an early stage.[16]

[13] SYXZG 5a, JQ20.9.17.

[14] *Cf.* Valikhanov, who in commenting on the Ziyā' al-Dīn affair, asserts that while the Ishāqī followers hated the Qing, they hated the Āfāqī even more. However, Valikhanov has only the sketchiest of information about the incident, which he dates at 1816, instead of 1815. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.316.

[15] Altishahr was commonly referred to in Chinese as *bacheng* (eight cities), i.e. the eight administrative cities of Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar, Khotan, Qucha, Uch Turfan, Aqsu and Qarashahr. See chapter 2, note 55.

[16] SYXZG 3b, [JQ20.9].

According to Sālih, in the spring of 1814, Ziyā' al-Dīn had confided in him that he intended to seize Altishahr and establish himself as ruler. Sometime later in summer 1815, Ziyā' al-Dīn apparently further informed Sālih that he had already organized the men and horses and planned to take Kashgar, followed by Yarkand, Aqsu and the other cities of Altishahr.[17] In his testimony, Sālih also claimed that Ziyā' al-Dīn had sent a messenger to the khanate of Khoqand to ask for reinforcements. True or false, this would suggest that among the local people of Kashgar, Khoqand was already firmly associated with the notion of resistance and rebellion against the Qing. Meanwhile, given that Khoqand was known to have strong links with the Makhdūmzāda khojas, it was not a matter that the Qing authorities could afford to ignore. Nevertheless, even the Jiaqing emperor found it far-fetched that a hitherto relatively unknown akhund from a small village should have presumed to take control of the whole of Altishahr, with or without the assistance of Khoqand. The emperor recalled Songyun's opinion that the Muslims would not have dared to revolt without good cause and decided that Chengning must inevitably shoulder some of the blame—he was "old and incompetent." Songyun was, therefore, instructed that on arrival in Kashgar, he should temporarily assume the position of councillor and take over responsibility for the investigation. Chengning was to return to Beijing at his own expense and await disciplinary action.[18]

Meanwhile, the question that now troubled Songyun as he travelled from Ili via Aqsu and Yarkand to Kashgar was what was so special about Ziyā' al-Dīn that made him rise in revolt, for despite the akhund's claims to the contrary, in the eyes of the emperor, attacking Qing soldiers constituted exactly that. As Songyun journeyed down through Altishahr speaking to beks and akhunds and observing life in the towns and villages, he saw no signs of unrest. Yet, he was well aware that as word of the incident spread, the fear that innocent people could be implicated might well trigger further disturbances. Consequently, the explanation that he would finally attribute to Ziyā' al-Dīn's actions needed both to satisfy the emperor and assuage the local population.

Ziyā' al-Dīn was an akhund and, as he pointed out in his initial testimony, a man of some standing in his community. But as enquiries among the local people of Tashmaliq revealed, Ziyā' al-Dīn's grandfather had been a Badakhshani who was sold into servitude to Kashgari Muslims. The buying and selling of slaves was still common practice throughout Central Asia in the 19th century, and continued in Xinjiang until the 1890s, despite the fact that the trade had been forbidden by the Qing authorities in

[17] SYXZG 10a, JQ20.10.7.
[18] SYXZG 11a, JQ20.10.7.

1778/9 (QL44) after a Yarkandi merchant who had purchased several Muslims in Shughnan was attacked and killed by his human merchandise as he escorted them back to Altishahr.[19] Ziyā' al-Dīn's grandfather had obviously been resourceful because, having arrived in Altishahr as a slave, he had not only managed to acquire land and property in the village of Tashmaliq, but had also become an akhund.[20] An adherent of the Ishāqiyya, he had resisted Khōja-Jahān at the time of the Qing conquest and as a consequence both he and his eldest son had been killed. His second son, however, had escaped to Andijan. In 1761/2 (QL26) after the establishment of Qing rule, this second son, Ziyā' al-Dīn's father, returned to the village of Tashmaliq and once the Qing authorities had confirmed that his family had previously owned land there, he was allowed to settle. Ziyā' al-Dīn was, therefore, the second generation to have been born and raised in Altishahr, and was a respected member of the community. Yet, when Songyun heard local people refer to him as a Ghalcha (Ch. *ga-le-cha*), a term used to describe foreigners sold into servitude, and presumably their descendants, he seized upon this (as may have been intended by his informants), as the distinguishing feature that marked out Ziyā' al-Dīn from the rest of the villagers. Proclamations were now issued in every town of Altishahr to the effect that Ziyā' al-Dīn was a Ghalcha and that although he would be harshly punished for his crime by the emperor, the matter had nothing to do with the "good Muslims" of Altishahr.[21]

Some idea of the fear aroused among all those associated with Ziyā' al-Dīn is evidenced by the fact that almost as soon as news of the unrest broke, the hakim bek of Shayar felt compelled to report to the imperial agent at

[19] A similar incident took place in 1795 when traders from Yangi Hisar were attacked by slaves whom they had purchased in Shughnan. See MWDA 3495–041 159–3130 and 3495–042 159–3138, QL60.2.25. See also the efforts of the British Consul-General at Kashgar, Sir George Macartney, to have slavery abolished in the late 1890s, as documented in the India Office archives (British Library), L/P&S/7/98, and an article based largely on this material by Xu Jianying, 'Qingmo Xinjiang Yingnu wenti ji qi jiejue'.

[20] There is little information on the training required to become an akhund in Xinjiang at this time, but presumably literacy was a minimum requirement (*cf.* one early Qing account which states that anyone who could recite the scriptures was known as a mulla (*mullā, mollah*). Qishiyi, *Xiyu wenjian lu*, 105b–106a). It was a title which gave the bearer considerable social standing in his community and, as with other professions, tended to pass from father to son. For a general discussion on literacy levels in pre-modern Xinjiang, see Bellér-Hann, *The Written and the Spoken*, pp.10-29.

[21] SYXZG 6a–b, JQ20.10.2; ZPZZ MZL, 635.1, JQ20.10.3. *Ghalcha* was the term used for Mountain Tajiks. As Ismā'īli Shiites, the Mountain Tajiks were regarded as heretics by their predominantly Sunni neighbours and therefore fair game for enslavement. Ziyā' al-Dīn's Badakhshani grandfather would almost undoubtedly have been a Mountain Tajik, but the term also came to be used for any 'foreigner' who was sold into servitude. Shaw, 'A Sketch of the Turki Language' (1878), p.137, and Jarring, *Materials to the Knowledge of Eastern Turki*, vol.1, p.121, note 1.

Qucha that his daughter was the widow of Ziyā' al-Dīn's eldest son. 'Ā'isha and her young son were immediately taken into custody, but as her statement revealed she had left Tashmaliq two to three years earlier and had little to contribute to the investigation.[22]

> I am the eldest daughter of Ba-yan-dai, I am in my 25th year. My first husband Mahmud and I didn't get on and after we divorced in the 14th year of Jiaqing (1809/10), I married Ziyā' al-Dīn's eldest son, 'Ābid, and we had a son called Shams al-Dīn who is in his 5th year. In the 5th month of the 17th year of Jiaqing (1812), 'Ābid died and I took my son and returned to my father, the hakim of Shayar, in the last month of the lunar year. This re-location was all done officially with documentation. While I was in Kashgar, I did not see Ziyā' al-Dīn do anything illegal, nor show any sign in his behaviour of doing anything illegal. Nor did I hear 'Ābid ever mention that his father had any criminal plans. Although in the last few years since I left Ziyā' al-Dīn's place, people have occasionally brought letters, they were just greetings and made no mention of anything else. He is in Kashgar and I am in Shayar, 2–3,000 *li* away, how could I know about his recent activities? And as for my father, naturally he doesn't know anything at all. If he had heard even the slightest thing, he would surely have mentioned it to me. This is the truth. I would not dare lie. If you don't believe me you have only to ask Ziyā' al-Dīn, and then you'll know it's the truth.[23]

In November, however, the enquiry took a new turn when the interpreter, Sālih, was again interrogated and it emerged that he had earlier given false testimony. Although he still maintained that Ziyā' al-Dīn had intended to rebel and to make trouble for the hakim bek Yūsuf, he now explained that he had once heard a certain Mullā Sālih inciting Ziyā' al-Dīn to establish himself as the headman (*touren*) of Kashgar.[24] According to the interpreter Sālih:

> I thought that the headman was the ruler, so when he [Ziyā' al-Dīn] rebelled using as an excuse the fact that he had been unable to transfer his wife's residence, and when I was implicated, I testified that he planned to be ruler of the eight cities. Everything else I said in my previous testimony about his seizing Kashgar and then Yarkand and Aqsu and so on, I made up because I hated him.[25]

Ziyā' al-Dīn was then questioned again. The akhund insisted that a villager like himself who rallied a few hundred men would never have dreamed of

[22] SYXZG 4a, [JQ20.9.] 'Ā'isha was subsequently allowed to return to her father's home, but her son was taken into custody and removed to Beijing. ZPZZ MZL 627.2, JQ20.9.17.

[23] ZPZZ MZL 625.1, JQ20.9.4.

[24] To assist in distinguishing the two Sālihs (Ch. *Sa-lai*), in the Chinese texts they are always referred to as 'Mullā Sālih' or 'interpreter Sālih'.

[25] SYXZG 12b, JQ20.10.11.

taking the Altishahr region.[26] However, he acknowledged that when his request to move his new wife to Tashmaliq was repeatedly refused, Mullā Sālih (about whom the sources reveal no further information) had suggested that he ought to take her by force, and that he might as well seize Kashgar while he was about it.[27]

Songyun now had Ziyā' al-Dīn interrogated about the issue of sending to Khoqand for assistance, while impressing upon him that he was already facing slow death by torture and an admission could hardly make matters any worse. But Ziyā' al-Dīn continued to deny any such action and the interpreter Sālih finally admitted that this too, he had fabricated. Piecing together the two testimonies, it appears that a Qirghiz named Shīr Ghāzī had, perhaps earlier that year, travelled to Qarategin to trade with another Qirghiz, named Bāzār. When Shīr Ghāzī returned to Tashmaliq, he brought some cloth and a leather belt for Ziyā' al-Dīn from Bāzār together with a request that Ziyā' al-Dīn should recite the scriptures on his behalf. Shīr Ghāzī then made another journey to Qarategin and Ziyā' al-Dīn entrusted some tea to him to give as a present to Bāzār. At that time, two destitute Muslims from Yangi Hisar were in hiding in Ziyā' al-Dīn's home in an attempt to avoid creditors. These two characters, Haqq and Ba-ke, accompanied Shīr Ghāzī on his second trip to Qarategin.[28] According to the interpreter Sālih:

> When I was arrested and sent to the town for questioning and to make a deposition, I was interrogated repeatedly and I did not have anything to say, so I just made up that Ziyā' al-Dīn had sent the Qirghiz, Shīr Ghāzī, and the Muslims, Ba-ke and Haqq, from Yangi Hisar to Andijan to raise men and horses and that the hakim of Andijan had refused and that Ba-ke and Haqq were still there.[29]

Reluctant to leave any stone unturned, Songyun instructed the new hakim bek of Kashgar, Ishāq,[30] to send a message to Qarategin to enquire about Bāzār and also to dispatch someone to Bāzār's home to ask whether his visitors had indeed been engaged in securing horses and recruiting men.

[26] SYXZG 12b, JQ20.10.11.

[27] SYXZG 13a, JQ20.10.17.

[28] SYXZG 13a–14a, JQ20.10.17.

[29] SYXZG 13b, JQ20.10.17. Although the text actually says "hakim of Andijan", it is possible that this may have referred to the khan of Khoqand and was certainly interpreted in this way by Songyun. ZPZZ MZL 636.2, JQ20.11.16. For the use of 'Andijan' to refer to Khoqand, see chapter 2, note 60.

[30] Ishāq replaced the hakim bek, Yūsuf, who as a result of his unsatisfactory performance during this affair had been relieved of his right to attend the imperial audience, stripped of his peacock feather (*hualing*) and demoted from a 3rd ranking to 6th ranking bek. RZSL311:15a, JQ20.10 *renshen*. Ishāq was the grandson of Hudī of Qucha who had assisted the Qing in the conquest of Altishahr. Throughout his troubled career Ishāq proved similarly loyal to the Qing, despite accusations to the contrary. See chapter 6.

Moreover, if Haqq and Ba-ke were still in Qarategin, they were to be returned to Kashgar for questioning.[31] A few weeks later, when an envoy arrived from 'Umar of Khoqand, he was questioned as to whether Ziyā' al-Dīn had sent to Khoqand for assistance. Nothing further emerged to change Songyun's conclusion that the interpreter Sālih's original evidence had been false and that although Ziyā' al-Dīn's crime constituted revolt, he had not planned to take control of Altishahr and establish himself as ruler.[32]

The rising and its aftermath took a heavy toll. It is impossible to calculate exactly how many local people were killed as they fled Altishahr, or how many were executed after having been taken captive. The various reports would suggest, however, that the figure rose to several hundred.[33] Ziyā' al-Dīn was sentenced to slow death by torture, as were the interpreter Sālih and Mullā Sālih. These executions were carried out in Kashgar and on the emperor's specific instructions local people were gathered to watch. All adult male family members of the three main culprits were also executed, while Ziyā' al-Dīn's wives and daughters, a total of thirteen, plus his youngest son, Bahā' al-Dīn (who was still a child), and grandson, Shams al-Dīn, were sent to Beijing where their fate was to be determined by the Board of Punishment. Twenty-four Āfāqī Muslims who lived in the vicinity of the khojas' *mazār* and were found to have known nothing of Ziyā' al-Dīn's plans were sent to Ili to serve as bondservants to the remnant Junghar Mongol community.[34] But the fall out from the affair spread beyond the families of those immediately involved. While, on the one hand, many local beks and tribal leaders received rewards for their co-operation in the capturing of Ziyā' al-Dīn and his associates,[35] Yūsuf, the hakim bek of Kashgar, was not the only local official to be removed from office for dereliction of duty. The hakim bek of Yangi Hisar was also demoted and several beks from Tashmaliq and surrounding villages were demoted, or removed from office entirely.[36]

Here the investigation might have ended but for the execution of Tūrdī Muhammad. Tūrdī was a Qipchaq Qirghiz chief, whose pastures lay close to Tashmaliq. His name had been raised several times in the course of the

[31] SYXZG 14a, JQ20.10.17.
[32] ZPZZ MZL 636.2, JQ20.11.16; SYXZG 14b, [JQ20.10].
[33] One memorial refers to over 100 people having been put to death, but this was clearly not the grand total. ZPZZ MZL 629.1, JQ20.10.2. Figures for those actively involved in the rising range from 200–300 (SYXZG 1a, JQ20.8.15) to 500–600 (LFZZ MZL 8075.43, JQ20.10.29).
[34] SYXZG 14a, 16a–17a, JQ20.10.17; ZPZZ MZL 627.2, JQ20.9.17.
[35] SYXZG 16a–b, JQ20.10.17; LFZZ MZL 8075.45, JQ20.12.18; RZSL 317:18b–19a, JQ21.3 *guimao*.
[36] RZSL 311:15a–b, JQ20.10 *renshen*; LFZZ MZL 8075.44, JQ20.11.8; SYXZG 8b, JQ20.10.7.

enquiry, but it was not until after Songyun's arrival in Kashgar that his role was fully investigated. Tūrdī had assisted in the search to track down and capture Ziyā' al-Dīn and his associates, but he was known to the Qing authorities for his 'deceitful and tricky' character and after the akhund's capture, his assistance was deemed to have been half-hearted. It was not long before he was linked with the theft of the weapons and tents belonging to the soldiers killed at the *karun,* and reported to have laid claim to Ziyā' al-Dīn's fields and possessions. Songyun had the hakim bek Ishāq investigate discreetly. Tūrdī and his friends were, therefore, invited for a meal with Ishāq, according to whom, in the course of conversation (and presumably under the influence of alcohol), Tūrdī confessed to having plotted with Ziyā' al-Dīn.[37] When Ziyā' al-Dīn admitted that he and Tūrdī had indeed sworn an oath of brotherhood the previous year, the case was considered cut and dried. Tūrdī was sentenced to slow death by torture.

Officials at court were troubled by this news; there was seemingly no evidence that Tūrdī had actually participated in the revolt, and while he might have been guilty of some misdemeanour, they doubted that he would have confessed to Ishāq—even over a good meal. The emperor suspected that Songyun had been misguided in passing sentence. In late 1815, Changling, a Mongol of the Plain White Banner, was therefore sent to Altishahr to relieve Songyun of his duties and to reinvestigate the affair.[38] Like Songyun, Changling had spent much of his early career in the *Lifanyuan,* but subsequently he had established his reputation as a military commander and had been involved in the suppression of rebellions in Kokonor, Hubei and Shaanxi.[39]

By the time Changling arrived in Kashgar, almost all of Tūrdī's relatives had been killed or fled. Two who still remained, his third son and his son-in-law, both gave evidence to the effect that Tūrdī had not actually participated in the attack on the *karun.* The former councillor, Chengning, who had initially been recalled to Beijing in disgrace, was instructed to return to Kashgar to assist Changling. He too confirmed that to the best of his knowledge there was no evidence linking Tūrdī to the revolt. Thus, Changling concluded that although Tūrdī may have been guilty of intent, he had not committed the crime and Songyun had, therefore, been over-zealous in passing sentence. Finally, the case was closed. Ishāq, the hakim bek, was dismissed from office and demoted on account of his perfunctory handling of the investigation into Tūrdī's activities. Songyun, meanwhile,

[37] SYXZG 19a–20b, JQ20.10.26; LFZZ MZL 8075.1, JQ20.11.27; 8075.3, JQ21.1.19 and 8075.4, JQ21.1.23.
[38] RZSL 312: 29b:33b, JQ20.11 *wushen* and 313:13a–b, JQ20.12 *xinyou*.
[39] On Changling, see Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp.67–9; *Guochao xianzheng shilüe*, 22:29a–33b; Alateng Aoqier (Altan-Ochir), *Qingdai Yili jiangjun lungao*, pp.108–22.

was stripped of his title as Grand Tutor (*taizi taibao*) and given a nominal dishonourable discharge from the office of military governor which, nevertheless, allowed him to continue in office (*gezhi liuren*).[40]

Compared with what was to come, the Ziyā' al-Dīn affair was not of great significance, but in the space of little more than a year, Kashgar had seen three changes of hakim bek and three changes of councillor. Scores of innocent people had fled their homes, if only temporarily, for fear of being implicated in revolt and many more had fled beyond the *karun* or been killed. The court had made prodigious efforts to ensure that the law was upheld and that its officials carried out their duties diligently in this remote part of the empire, but there can be little doubt that it had failed.

Mal-administration in Kashgar and Jahāngīr's incursion

Just days after the Daoguang emperor had acceded to the throne in October 1820, a memorial from the imperial agent at Uch Turfan reported that some 300-odd Khoqandis and Qirghiz were causing disturbances a short distance beyond the *karun*.[41] Jahāngīr was advancing towards Kashgar, accompanied by Su-lan-qi of the Chong-bagish Qirghiz and several hundred men. The armed horsemen attacked the *karun* at Tishuk-tash and Qarangey to the northwest of Kashgar. They stole horses and killed over a dozen Qing soldiers and two Muslim beks. Yet despite the support of local people, as in 1814, the khoja was driven back by Qing troops and failed to reach Kashgar. In Beijing, the court was reassured by the swift result, but neither Jahāngīr nor his leading supporters had been captured and several questions remained unanswered.

Despite repeated requests, the Daoguang emperor was unable to elicit a clear explanation as to the causes of the trouble. Given that Jahāngīr was known to have been living in straitened circumstances for several years, poverty alone could not satisfactorily explain why he had attacked at this particular time, still less why such large numbers of local people had rallied to his support. What was Su-lan-qi's involvement? And why had so many captives been put to death before having been thoroughly interrogated? Councillor Binjing was not forthcoming and Qingxiang, the Mongol military governor at Ili, was ordered to Kashgar to investigate further. The

[40] ZPZZ MZL 628.3, JQ20.12.27; LFZZ MZL 8075.3, JQ21.1.19; RZSL 317:10a, JQ21.3 *gengyin*; Changling, *Chang wenxiang gong ziding nianpu* [hereafter CWGZN], 2:35b–37a. Tūrdī's third son, 'Azīz subsequently fled beyond the *karun*, presumably fearing that no good could come of the re-investigation. A few years later, he participated in the Jahāngīr revolt. See chapter 4.

[41] XZSL 3:22b–23a, JQ25.8 *guichou*.

court suspected that the whole affair smacked of a cover-up for an incident provoked by the garrison officials.[42]

The cover-up, for indeed there was one, concerned a series of abuses by officials in Kashgar spanning at least two years. Reading between the lines of Qingxiang's reports, it is clear that the desire to silence the captives as swiftly as possible had stemmed from concern that cross-examination might bring to light a series of offences committed by Councillor Binjing, his brother-in-law, Zhang Defu, and two other officials, Suishan and Jiabing.[43] In exposing the misconduct of these officials, Qingxiang was performing a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, he had been expressly ordered to investigate the possibility of internal provocation; on the other, if an incident as serious as revolt were to be attributed to internal causes resulting from mal-administration, then as military governor he would have to shoulder ultimate responsibility. Thus, although Qingxiang was unequivocal in his condemnation of the conduct of Zhang Defu and his associates, whose crimes included debauchery and exploitation of the local beks, he was equally categorical in refuting a direct link between the cause of the revolt and any malfeasance.

According to Qingxiang, Binjing was elderly, ailing and befuddled, he had turned a blind eye to the misconduct of his brother-in-law's coterie and was unfit to hold the post of councillor.[44] Yet although Qingxiang's reports alluded to the fact that Binjing himself was guilty of minor sexual misconduct, no mention was made of one serious scandal in which the councillor had reportedly been the chief protagonist. As the Daoguang emperor subsequently stated, had this particular incident come to light at the time, it would have ensured Binjing's immediate execution.[45]

Only in the wake of the upheavals of 1826, when Changling, the incumbent military governor at Ili, was carrying out an enquiry into the conduct of recent councillors in Altishahr, did it emerge that in 1818, Binjing had raped the daughter of Sālih Jān, the Khoqandi aqsaqal in Kashgar. According to one account circulating at this time, Sālih Jān was so enraged that he had cut off his daughter's head and delivered it in person to the *yamen*,[46] while another version of the events, reported by Changling,

[42] HJNFL 1:1a–2b, JQ25.9 *gengshen*; XZSL 4:24b–25a, JQ25.9 *bingyin*; 5:10a–11a, JQ25.9 *yihai* and 7:8b–10a, JQ25.10 *xinchou*; ZPZZ MZL 478.3, JQ25.8.30; 479.2, JQ25.9.30 and 479.7, JQ25.11.11.

[43] ZPZZ MZL 480.1, JQ25.11.2.

[44] ZPZZ MZL 480.1, JQ25.11.2 and 480.3, DG1.3.3.

[45] HJNFL 36:14b–15a, DG6.12 *xinyou*. In fact, Binjing was given the death sentence in 1827, but this was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. XZSL 137:27b–28a, DG8.6 *jiashen*.

[46] HJNFL 36:12a–b, DG6.12 *xinyou*; 31:9b–10a, DG6.10 *gengshen*. By the time Binjing took up his position as councillor in 1818, the aqsaqal Sālih Jān, who had been

suggests that Sālih Jān turned his sword on himself. Setting aside the question of fatalities, the incident, apocryphal or otherwise, had left a deep scar on relations between the Qing administration and the local Muslims. The dissemination and embellishment of such a story, the seeds of which had obviously been sown during Binjing's councillorship, reflect the tensions that existed between the local people of Kashgar and the Qing administration in the period preceding Jahāngīr's second incursion.

It is well documented that where tensions already exist, incidents of inter-communal liaison, and notably of rape, often prove to be the catalyst of violence and unrest.[47] The story of a Muslim girl sullied by a high-ranking official of the infidel occupying forces is inevitably suggestive of the wider 'rape' of the nation by the colonial masters, but, notwithstanding that the incident involved the daughter of a Khoqandi, in the case of 19th century Altishahr, it would be premature to suppose that the concept of the nation already existed. What did exist, as this story evidences, was an emerging sense of common identity among the Turkic Muslims of the region, notably an Islamic identity shaped in opposition to their colonizers. Despite what may be considered the unique structures and processes of Qing rule in Altishahr, Manchu colonialism was drawing forth responses from the local populace that reverberate across the common colonial experience; the colonizer is cast as evil and immoral, the colonized as wronged and moral, but most importantly, bound to a value system, a God, for whom he is prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice. The story of the rape of Sālih Jān's daughter did not trigger an immediate revolt, but its circulation at this time was symptomatic of the ready welcome that Jahāngīr, popularly perceived as a descendant of the Prophet and legitimate ruler of the region, was soon to receive in Altishahr. Moreover, the story's relevance to the Khoqandi community would have ensured that it was carried far beyond the Qing *karun,* together with reports of a corrupt and decadent Altishahr administration.

However, after the outbreak of the disturbances in 1820, not only was the emperor kept in ignorance of the full extent of Binjing's crimes in Kashgar, he also had difficulty in securing information about the involvement of the Qirghiz leader, Su-lan-qi who, according to at least one

repatriated in 1809, had already resumed his post in Kashgar (see chapter 2). Fletcher erroneously dates the incident as having occurred in 1808. Fletcher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia *c*.1800', p.86. See also Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.349 and Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukistan*, pp.465–6.

[47] In addition to the Uch Turfan rebellion (chapter 1, note 60), another example of rape sparking revolt is found in the history of Republican Xinjiang. In 1931, the rape of a Muslim girl by a Han Chinese official was commonly held to have triggered the Hami revolt. See Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims*, p.48.

report, may even have been the prime instigator.[48] The Qirghiz were not known for the constancy of their loyalty to any external authority, but Su-lan-qi, a Chong-bagish chief, who went to Kashgar to trade at least once or twice a year, would appear to have had a vested interest in the Qing order. He had inherited an official title consequent of his grandfather's participation in the suppression of the Uch Turfan rising of 1765 and in 1815, he had himself assisted the Qing authorities in quelling the revolt led by the Ishāqī akhund, Ziyā' al-Dīn, for which he was awarded the button insignia of the 2nd rank.[49] But here again, Qingxiang's reports were unhelpful and as Su-lan-qi had escaped arrest there was no deposition to reveal his motives. Only some time later did it come to light that it might have been more than the prospect of a good battle and plentiful loot that had led him to support Jahāngīr. Apparently, Su-lan-qi had earlier visited the *yamen* at Kashgar and reported Jahāngīr's plan to attack the city to the commander (*zhangjing*), Suishan. Yet, instead of receiving thanks and, as he would have expected, no doubt, a reward of at least a few bolts of silk, he was met with a scornful rebuttal. Affronted, Su-lan-qi had then joined forces with Jahāngīr.[50]

Evidently, Altishahr was not merely suffering from one or two isolated incidents of abuse by officials, but rather a breakdown in the whole process of the frontier administration. Since the conquest, Qing authority in the region had relied explicitly on retaining the goodwill of the local leaders, be they beks or nomad leaders; it was an unwritten rule that they be rewarded for any gesture of co-operation, however small. Despite Qingxiang's best efforts to play down the internal causes, the court was well aware that this incident and the manner of its suppression constituted a major failure in frontier administration that jeopardized Qing control throughout Xinjiang.[51]

While Su-lan-qi's participation in the violence was a disturbing sign that the Qing authorities were losing the support of those hitherto considered loyal to the emperor, on the other hand, the identification of 'known criminals' as participants in the attack would have been welcome to Qing officialdom. It meant that in line with well-established practice, the rehabilitation policy (*shanhou*) following the suppression of hostilities could involve making examples of an isolated group of troublemakers,

[48] HJNFL 63:12a–b, DG8.5 *renzi*.

[49] For his assistance in the Uch Turfan rising, Su-lan-qi's grandfather, Aval, had also been given bondsmen (Ch. *yan-qi*, Tur. *inchü*) and a house at Artush so that he had somewhere to stay when he came to trade within the *karun*, but it is unclear whether the property was inherited by Su-lan-qi. HJNFL 1:9b–10a, JQ25.9 *bingyin* and 2:5b–6a, JQ25.11 *gengchen*; RZSL 317:18b–19a, JQ21.3 *guimao*.

[50] NWYGZY 80:9a, DG8.12.10; XZSL 150:10a, DG9.1 *dingwei*; *Qing shigao* [hereafter QSG], 529 (*liezhuan* 316):14718.

[51] XZSL 10:18b–19a, JQ25.12 *renchen*.

while extending magnanimity to the wider populace. On this occasion, the 'named criminals' included not only Su-lan-qi, but relatives of the Qirghiz chief, Tūrdī who had been executed after being implicated in the Ziyā' al-Dīn revolt.

In the wake of the Ziyā' al-Dīn rising in 1815, Yue-ha-xi-di, Tūrdī's cousin and two of Tūrdī's sons, 'Usmān and 'Azīz, had escaped the punishment meted out to other members of the family by fleeing to Khoqand. Not only did they, therefore, have good reason to harbour a strong grudge against the Qing authorities (whose investigations subsequently revealed that Tūrdī had in fact been unjustly executed), they had a clear personal agenda in supporting Jahāngīr.[52]

> I am a Qirghiz chieftain of the Qipchaq tribe, in my 53rd year, and I am the younger brother of Tūrdī Muhammad who has already been sentenced to death. Previously because my elder brother revolted he was sentenced to death.[53] Afterwards my two nephews, 'Usmān and 'Azīz (Hu-ze), and I fled outside the *karun*. We escaped to the area of Khoqand where we had an audience with the Khoqand bek and we explained to 'Umar our reasons for fleeing. He said, "Since you are here, you must live peacefully in my land." Later my elder nephew, 'Azīz, went to serve the Khoqandi bek Rahmān Qulī. My younger nephew 'Usmān went to live in the area of the Alai Mountains. With my wife and children, I settled in the area of Mai-ge-er. This year in the 7th month, I don't remember the day, five men came from Khoqand … and they said to me, "'Umar took Jahāngīr hunting in the area around the *mazār* of Yar and leading a dozen followers Jahāngīr took the opportunity to escape to the Sayak tribe. He wants to raise men for an attack on Kashgar. Will you join us or not?" I reflected that previously my brother had been sentenced to death because of the Ziyā' al-Dīn affair and we had already lost all my elder brother's land, but now if I accompanied the khoja to attack Kashgar, I might be able to repossess my brother's land. So I agreed, and accompanied them to the home of the Qirghiz chief of the Sayak tribe, Jiang-ha-la-qi, where I met the khoja and I told him that I wanted to go with him to attack Kashgar and he was greatly pleased. Then, with Jiang-ha-la-qi…and the others, totalling over 200 men, we met up with Su-lan-qi and on the 11th day of the 8th month we went to the small *karun* and killed the Manchu soldiers. Then we went to the big *karun* and burnt down the gate in the wall and killed all the soldiers. When we reached Artush the khoja had 'Abd al-Rahmān tied up and asked him why he had not come out to welcome us. He said, "My family has received the kindness of the emperor for generations. There is no way I would follow you and participate in the rebellion." The khoja was angry and told the crowd to beat him to death with clubs and hatchets. Then together with the Muslims from that village and the Qirghiz we had brought with us, altogether numbering 300-odd, we went to attack the city. When we reached Huo-er-han village we met with the imperial troops and joined battle. We were scattered and fled separately; Jahāngīr and Su-lan-qi had fast horses and fled first, our horses were slower and we were captured. This is the truth.[54]

[52] HJNFL 1:6b, JQ25.9 *jiazi*; HJNFL 1:12a–b, JQ25.9 *yihai*; ZPZZ MZL 479.3, JQ25.10.15. 'Azīz's name is rendered variously in Chinese as Ai-zi-yi, Hu-ze and Huo-ze-yi.

[53] Even though Yue-ha-xi-di was almost certainly Tūrdī's younger cousin (see, for example, HJNFL 1:12a, JQ25.9 *yihai* and XZSL 5:10a–b, JQ25.9 *yihai*) it would have been normal for him to refer to himself as Tūrdī's younger brother and to Tūrdī's children as his nephews.

The phrase 'this is the truth', which regularly appears at the end of the thousands of depositions taken from the Turkic Muslims in the course of Qing rule, is a sharp reminder that this is not an account recollected in tranquillity, but a statement extracted under duress, from a captive who has already been sentenced to certain death. Although there is no means of knowing the degree of physical or mental torture to which Yue-ha-xi-di might have been subjected before this testimony was extracted, the methods of persuasion commonly used to extract depositions are well documented.[55] Equally important is the recognition that the depositions exist only in Chinese as relayed by Qing interpreters and may not always be an accurate rendering of the original statement.[56] Yet, nevertheless, like most of the depositions, Yue-ha-xi-di's testimony offers details and insights of which there might otherwise be no record. Yue-ha-xi-di's motives in supporting Jahāngīr were apparently not ideological or religious, but practical and economic—he hoped to recover his cousin's confiscated lands. As with Jahāngīr himself, legitimacy, not religion, was the driving force. Yue-ha-xi-di's statement is, however, also witness to the deep divisions within the local society and the increasing tendency of many beks, descendants of the old aristocracy, to give their loyalty to the 'khan of khans' in Beijing. Reading of 'Abd al-Rahmān's fate, even the emperor himself was moved to comment, "It is both commendable and moving to find such a virtuous person among the Muslim tribes; naturally there should be a rich reward."[57]

Not only was there no discrimination against, or persecution of, the Āfāqī followers in the aftermath of the conquest, but in the following decades Qing officials appear to have avoided any overt attempt to distinguish between the Āfāqī and Ishāqī orders, whether on religious

[54] ZPZZ MZL 479.5 [JQ20.9.20 – 25.11.11].

[55] See, for example, Bichang, *Muling yajue*, 5a–b. The problems of using depositions as reliable sources have been discussed by Susan Naquin. As she suggests, it would be only human nature to minimize one's own involvement in rebellion, but, in general, interrogators were diligent and in cases where there is a large body of extant depositions, these provide an invaluable supplement to the official accounts. See Naquin, *Millenarian Rebellion in China*, pp. 285–6, note 4, and 'True Confessions'.

[56] Depositions taken from captives were invariably recorded by the clerks (Ch. *bi-tie-shi*, Man. *bithesi*) in Chinese rather than Manchu, suggesting that the local interpreters translated into Chinese. For discussion of the interpreters and their abuses, see *Xiyu fanyi shi*, pp.221–2.

[57] ZPZZ MZL 479.5 [JQ20.9.20 – 25.11.11].

grounds or otherwise. In suppressing revolts and outbreaks of violence within the Muslim community of Xinjiang, they therefore tended merely to categorize local people as 'good Muslims' (*liang Hui)* or 'wicked Muslims' (*fei Hui)* according to whether or not they participated in the revolt.[58] Not surprisingly then, just as Qing officials had made little of the fact that the Ziyā' al-Dīn revolt had been triggered by an Ishāqī akhund wishing to take an Āfāqī bride, so they appear to have disregarded the fact that while the 1815 incident had revealed Tūrdī to have links with the Ishāqī follower, Ziyā' al-Dīn, now his family was supporting an Āfāqī khoja.

For the Turkic Muslims, after half a century of Qing rule, it appears that secular grievances had begun to erode the rivalry between the two major sufi orders in the region; the focus for the local people's discontent was now their infidel overlords and those among the bek aristocracy who supported them. Qing records do, however, note that while the disturbances of 1820 revealed support for Jahāngīr among many of the Muslims of Altishahr, it was particularly strong among the Āfāqī adherents. Despite Qingxiang's insistence that mal-administration was not responsible for the disturbances, clearly there had been a breakdown in relations between the local Muslim population and the Qing authorities.[59]

The populace of Altishahr had begun to look elsewhere for leadership and deliverance. With the Qirghiz frequently acting as intermediaries, local people were not only in communication with the Āfāqī khojas, but also supporting them financially and contributing to their cause. The threat of punishment served as no deterrent and the Qing authorities were at a loss to know how to contain the revival of interest in the khojas.[60] More significantly, there was evidence that Jahāngīr had substantial support

[58] Both the Āfāqiyya and the Ishāqiyya were branches of the Khafiyya Naqshbandīs whose adherents performed the silent *dhikr* (recitation of the 99 revealed names of God) and were, of course, established in the region long before the arrival of the Qing. Thus there was no question of differentiating between them in terms of *xinjiao* and *laojiao* (new and old teachings), as the Qing had attempted to do elsewhere in the empire when conflict arose within the Sino-Muslim community. Both orders were apparently considered to be *laojiao* and efforts were made to keep the teachings of the *xinjiao* out of the region. However, by the late 18th century there was already considerable confusion as to what was meant by *xinjiao* and *laojia*. When, in 1792, a local Muslim from Yarkand was found to be teaching a group of Sino-Muslim traders to shake their heads while performing the silent *dhikr*, he was condemned for the teaching and practising of *xinjiao*. See GZSL 1410:34a–35a, QL57.8 *xinsi*. As Lipman notes, by the late 19th century even the original 'New Teaching', the Jahriyya with its vocal *dhikr*, had been 'recategorized' as 'Old Teaching'. Lipman, 'Sufism in the Chinese Courts', p.560.

[59] For a damning condemnation of the corrupt and failing administration in Altishahr at this time, see Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji* (first published 1842), 4:33b.

[60] HJNFL 2:4b, JQ25.11 *gengchen*; 3:32a–b, DG1.3 *jisi* and 4:14b, DG4.7 *wushen*. There were also reports that Jahāngīr's elder brother Yūsuf, an akhund in Bukhara, was in communication with the Muslims of Altishahr and that money was being raised in his name. HJNFL 4:15a, DG4.7 *wushen*.

among local akhunds who, despite Qing attempts to confine their influence to religious affairs, still held considerable sway as community leaders.[61] A picture, therefore, emerges of an increasing number of disaffected Muslims in and around the Altishahr region. Their grievances may have varied, but they all recognized, to a greater or lesser extent, the legitimacy of the khoja claim and were ready to rally to the cause.

Given that Songyun's investigation of 1814 had concluded that Sarimsāq had no descendants, the court was initially sceptical of Jahāngīr's identity.[62] Only in early 1821 did Qingxiang finally conclude, on the basis of overwhelming evidence taken from captives, that Jahāngīr was indeed the son of the Āfāqī khoja, Sarimsāq.[63] In a further attempt to focus attention on the external causes of the revolt, Qingxiang cited a missive from Khoqand in which 'Umar Khān explained that the Muslims believed Jahāngīr to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and needed no other inducement to rally to his cause.[64] Whether or not the court took account of 'Umar's interest in absolving himself of responsibility for the attack, it could no longer afford to doubt that the Āfāqī khoja lineage was alive and active.

Khoqand's relations with the khojas

The nature of the relationship between 'Umar Khān and Jahāngīr at this time is not easy to fathom. On the one hand, Nalivkin suggests that although constantly kept under surveillance, the khoja family was respected in Khoqand, allowed to frequent the court and in some cases given financial assistance.[65] Another account, however, suggests that there were already tensions between Jahāngīr and the khan.[66] The truth is more probably that the khoja's fate waxed and waned along with those of his sympathizers who surrounded the khan. Ambivalence was to be the hallmark of Khoqand's relationship with the khojas and to confound Qing policy in the region. The discovery of Khoqandis among Jahāngīr's forces was disconcerting for the Qing authorities and was assuaged only by repeated reports that 'Umar had

[61] HJNFL 2:16a–17b, JQ25.12 *renchen*. For a discussion of how the Qing authorities attempted to curb religious authority in the region, see Newby, 'The Begs of Xinjiang', pp.284–9.

[62] HJNFL 1:6b, JQ25.9 *jiazi*. See this chapter, note 2.

[63] HJNFL 3:3a–b, DG1.1 *dingsi*.

[64] ZPZZ MZL 478.8, DG1.2.22.

[65] Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.126. See Yue-ha-xi-di's deposition above for reference to Jahāngīr's escape while out hunting with 'Umar. For 'Umar's love of hunting which he combined with visits to local shrines, see Nettleton, 'Ruler, Patron, Poet', pp.132, 136.

[66] HJNFL 51:16a, DG7.10 *bingzi*. This account comes from the deposition of one of Jahāngīr's followers, a certain Mai-man-da-li, who was taken prisoner by the Qing. Mai-man-da-li claims that Khoqand fell out with one of Jahāngīr's relatives, Muhammad Khān, who was then imprisoned with Jahāngīr and Bahā' al-Dīn before being killed.

refused to lend Jahāngīr troops.[67] 'Umar may not have given the attack his official support, but if, as Qingxiang reported, he had indeed attempted to restrain him and place him under guard, it was a perfunctory attempt.[68]

Unlike in 1814 when Jahāngīr began his advance towards Kashgar, in the autumn of 1820 'Umar had made no attempt to send his own troops in pursuit. Moreover, once the attack had been repulsed, the khan was quick to plead ignorance of the khoja's whereabouts and hence his inability to assist in capturing him or his accomplices. Jahāngīr was a useful asset. It was in Khoqand's interests to afford him sanctuary in the khanate and to have him believe that, theoretically at least, Khoqand was sympathetic towards his cause: his presence might encourage the Qing court to look more favourably on Khoqand's increasingly insistent demands for tax privileges. Qingxiang made no bones about informing the court that 'Umar had probably welcomed Jahāngīr's attack on Altishahr, if only because it was guaranteed to dispel any lingering belief that Sarimsāq had no descendants. Nevertheless, the councillor urged that a campaign should not be launched against the Khoqandis on account of a few troublemakers; on the contrary, in his view, priority had to be given to the restoration of good relations with Khoqand. The court agreed and promptly responded that as this was the first year of the Daoguang emperor's reign, a Khoqandi embassy should be allowed to travel to Beijing with the rotation (*nianban*) of beks from Xinjiang who were due to make the journey that year.[69]

If 'Umar Khān had managed to remain on relatively amicable terms with Jahāngīr, when the khan died in 1822 and his son Muhammad 'Alī (Madalī, r.1822–42) came to power, there are indications that relations may have soured. According to Jahāngīr's own account, he was placed under arrest in Khoqand, but subsequently escaped. One source relates that he made his escape courtesy of an earthquake,[70] while another story has him fleeing disguised as a woman together with his younger brother Bahā' al-Dīn.[71] Whatever the case, it is clear that, while Jahāngīr's fortunes may have fluctuated according to the shifting balance of power at the khan's court, his

[67] XZSL 10:18b–20a, JQ25.12 *renchen*; HJNFL 1:5b, JQ25.9 *jiazi*; ZPZZ MZL 478.1, JQ25.8.20.

[68] HJNFL 2:5a, JQ25.11 *gengchen*.

[69] ZPZZ MZL 478.8, DG1.2.22; HJNFL 3:32b–39b, DG1.3 *jisi*.

[70] *Ming-Qing shiliao geng bian* [hereafter MQSL], vol.2, p.2055. Nalivkin states that Jahāngīr escaped during the earthquake that shook the Ferghana region in the summer of 1822. This would suggest the house arrest only lasted a matter of weeks or months. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.126. Valikhanov also notes that Jahāngīr escaped in 1822, "profiting from the death of 'Umar." Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.317.

[71] HJNFL 5:9a, DG4.10 *bingzi*.

activities were always closely followed by the various factions of Khoqand's ruling elite.[72]

Heightened tensions between Jahāngīr and the Qing authorities

Just as Jahāngīr's father, Sarimsāq, had from time to time entertained the idea of surrender to the Qing, so too did Jahāngīr, but suspicion on both sides guaranteed the failure of any concrete negotiations.[73] For the next two to three years Jahāngīr lived among the Qirghiz in the area of the Alai Mountains from where he and his followers made intermittent incursions into Altishahr and harried the Qing *karun*.[74] On one such occasion in the third year of the Daoguang emperor's rule (1823/4), he was joined by his younger brother, Bahā' al-Dīn. After the failure of this attack on the Uluk *karun*, south of Yangi Hisar, Jahāngīr withdrew in the direction of Sariqol (Tashqurghan). Bahā' al-Dīn travelled to Qunduz where his efforts to raise support were rebuffed because the ruler of Qunduz was unwilling to jeopardize his people's trade relations with Altishahr. Bahā' al-Dīn then set out for Bukhara where, according to Jahāngīr, he had intended to make contact with their eldest brother Yūsuf, an akhund who was living in Bukhara. On reaching Ura-tube, however, Bahā' al-Dīn fell ill and died.[75]

For the Qing troops periodically dispatched to track down Jahāngīr in the perilous terrain of the Pamirs, the task was frustrating. Moreover, while the court was keen to see Jahāngīr captured it was equally insistent that it was not worth exhausting the troops in fruitless effort and they should not penetrate too deeply into alien territory.[76] In the winter of 1825, the authorities in Kashgar learned that Jahāngīr had been hiding out among the Qirghiz of the Sayak tribe in the area of the Narin Mountains and it was rumoured, once again, that he might be willing to surrender. Leading a force of some two hundred men, the assistant imperial agent, Bayanbatu, went to investigate. Jahāngīr, however, had vanished and unable to elicit more information on his current whereabouts, Bayanbatu had his men

[72] For the shifting fortunes of the khojas during the reign of Muhammad 'Alī Khān, see Beisembiev, "*Ta'rikh-i Shahrukhī*" *kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*, p.245.

[73] *Ibid*; XZSL 81:12a–b, DG5.4 *bingyin* and 82:25a–26a, DG5.5 *renzi*.

[74] HJNFL 4:22a–b, DG 4.9 *jiayin* and 5:24a–b, DG5.1 *renyin*.

[75] MQSL vol.2, p.2055 (Jahāngīr's confession). Details of Bahā' al-Dīn's activities at this time vary. One source reports that the ruler of Qunduz restrained Bahā' al-Dīn and sought to have Jahāngīr surrender to him as well. HJNFL 7:5b–6a, DG 5.10 *yihai*. Another account suggests that when Bahā' al-Dīn died he was not on his way to see Yūsuf in Bukhara, but to meet Jahāngīr. HJNFL 11:20b-21b, DG6.5 *jiashen*. As late as September 1826, some Qing officials were still under the misapprehension that he was alive and had accompanied Jahāngīr on his return to Kashgar. XZSL102:20b, DG6.8 *dingsi* and 103:5a, DG6.8 *gengshen*.

[76] XZSL 78:15a–b, DG5.1 *renyin* and 82:25b–26a, DG5.5 *guiyou*.

massacre some twenty of Jahāngīr's followers along with several dozen Qirghiz, including women and children. The Sayak leader, Tāriq, who lost his entire family in the attack, retaliated. The following day as Bayanbatu and his forces headed back towards Kashgar they were ambushed. With his troops slaughtered almost to a man, the wounded Bayanbatu fell on his sword.[77]

This incident marked a watershed in Qirghiz relations with the Qing. While some Qirghiz tribes did remain loyal to the Qing, many others were now willing to give their support unreservedly to the khoja cause.[78] Yet, still Jahāngīr toyed with the idea of surrender. Soon after this incident, according to his own testament, he sent two of his relatives to Kashgar to negotiate a surrender; their deaths, for which he blamed the hakim bek of Kashgar, Muhammad Sayyid, strengthened his resolve to continue the struggle. Several years later, as Jahāngīr faced his Qing interrogators and a certain death, he recollected his feelings at this time with a simplicity that attests to his conviction that the Makhdūmzāda khojas were the legitimate rulers of Altishahr:

> Kashgar and those places are all the lands of my ancestors, what reason do they have to cheat and oppress me?[79]

Jahāngīr now sought refuge among the Qirghiz and bided his time while he made preparations for yet another attempt to oust the Qing from Altishahr.

[77] XZSL 92:23b–24b, DG5.12 *yichou*; HJNFL 36:14a, DG6.12 *xinyou*. According to Jahāngīr's deposition, he personally assisted in the retaliation. See MQSL vol.2, pp.2055–6.

[78] In the aftermath of the 1826 rebellion, a major element of the Qing rehabilitation policy would be directed at winning back Qirghiz support. NWYGZY 80:33a, DG9.2.20.

[79] MQSL vol.2, p.2056.

CHAPTER FOUR

JAHĀNGĪR KHŌJA AND REVOLT IN ALTISHAHR[1]

The return of khoja rule to the four western cities

It was sometime before the truth of the Bayanbatu affair was revealed to the court. Meanwhile, Yongqin, the councillor who was ultimately responsible for the débâcle, had died,[2] and in late 1825 Qingxiang was ordered to Kashgar to assume the councillorship, leaving the post of military governor at Ili to be filled by Changling.

Throughout the spring of 1826, Qing troops clashed with Jahāngīr and his followers several times. A number of Jahāngīr's close supporters were either captured or killed, but his resolve remained unbroken. By the summer, he was ready to make his move. Crossing into Altishahr between the Yislik and Tishuk-tash *karun*, he advanced towards Kashgar at the head of a force of several hundred men, comprising Bukharans, Qirghiz and Khoqandis. Stopping first at the *mazār* of Satūq Bughrā Khān near Artush, he was confronted by Qing troops under the command of the assistant imperial agent Shuerhashan and commandant Wulinga. In the ensuing battle over 400 of Jahāngīr's men lost their lives. Many withdrew towards the northeast, while the remainder took refuge within the *mazār* complex. With his forces depleted and surrounded by over a thousand Qing troops, here the khoja's *jihād* might have ended had Āfāqī supporters not come to his assistance. Under cover of darkness and in the midst of a providential thunderstorm Jahāngīr and his men broke through the Qing encirclement and proceeded virtually unchallenged towards

[1] Despite the reluctance of many Chinese scholars to describe the events in Altishahr at this time as a 'rising', 'revolt', or 'rebellion', there can be little doubt that this is what occurred. As for subsequent disturbances in which the khojas were involved, even Western scholars are divided as to whether these should be deemed rebellions, not least because of the role played by Khoqand. However, all the khoja-Khoqand attacks did, to a greater or lesser extent, trigger an anti-Qing response in Altishahr on a scale sufficient, in my view, to justify use of the term 'revolt', or the equivalent.

[2] Yongqin was removed from his post on account of ill health in late 1825 and was to die soon afterwards. In January 1826, the emperor decided that his punishment had been too lenient and his two sons were demoted from the rank of *fuguo jiangjun* (noble of the imperial lineage of the 11th rank) to *feng'en jiangjun* (noble of the imperial lineage of the 12th rank). XZSL 92:24b, DG5.12 *yichou*. The following year, after Changling's general investigation into the administration of Altishahr under various councillors, Yongqin's sons paid again for their father's failings and were stripped of the rank of *feng'en jiangjun*. XZSL 111:36b–38a, DG6.12 *xinyou*.

Kashgar city.[3] As they advanced, Āfāqī adherents in outlying villages rallied to Jahāngīr's support in their thousands.

The Qing had some 42,000 troops in Xinjiang at this time of which only 4,000–5,000 were garrisoned in Altishahr.[4] Concerned that Jahāngīr and his followers were stepping up the pressure on the *karun*, before leaving Ili, Qingxiang had ordered 2,000 men to be redeployed from Jungharia to Altishahr. The emperor subsequently ordered a further 500 men to transfer to Altishahr, yet still the court appeared to doubt the true nature and extent of the threat, trusting instead that the offer of a substantial reward for the capture of the khoja would, before long, bear fruit. Ideally then, in time-honoured fashion, the outsiders would be used to keep one another in check (*yi yi zhi yi zhi li*).[5]

Aware as the Qing administration now was of the problems in Altishahr, it was totally unprepared for the response of the local people to Jahāngīr's advance. The defence lines outside Kashgar were quickly broken, and as the Kashgaris unhesitatingly joined the khoja's cause, several hundred Qing soldiers fled towards Aqsu. The remaining imperial troops were forced to retreat into the Qing cantonment, situated to the west of the Muslim city.[6] Here they held out for seventy days. By September, rebellion had spread to Yangi Hisar,[7] Yarkand and Khotan. As water and provisions dwindled, Qingxiang dispatched his last communication to the imperial agent at Uch Turfan, composedly describing the critical nature of the situation at Kashgar and requesting reinforcements.[8] Jahāngīr's forces now broke through the wall of the *gulbāgh*, as the cantonment was known locally, and councillor Qingxiang hanged himself. Among the hundreds who lost their lives were the assistant imperial agent, Shuerhashan, and two commandants, Wulinga

[3] MQSL vol.2, p.2057; HJNFL 12:20b–21a, DG6.7 *guisi*; 13:16a–18b, DG6.7 *bingshen*.

[4] XJZL *juan* 2 and 3. Wei Yuan's oft-cited figure of *c*.20,000 for the total number of troops in Xinjiang at this time is clearly an underestimate designed to support his argument that the region was not an undue drain on the imperial resources. Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:10a.

[5] XZSL 94:33b, DG6.1 *dingwei*.

[6] After the conquest, Qing cantonments were frequently built on the outskirts of the existing Muslims cities, and were referred to as the Manchu city (*Mancheng*) or new city (*xincheng*) opposed to the old Muslim city (*Huicheng*). The Kashgar cantonment was known formally as Laining city. For a discussion of twin-cities in border regions, see Gaubatz, *Beyond the Great Wall*, pp.172–6.

[7] The Qing cantonment at Yangi Hisar was known as Yangi Shahr, but the latter term was frequently used in Qing sources to refer to the entire city. To add to the confusion, there were several other towns in Xinjiang known as Yangi Shahr (lit. new city). For reasons of clarity I use the term Yangi Hisar throughout, other than in quotations, where I follow the text.

[8] HJNFL 12:26a, DG6.7 *guisi*.

and Mukedengbu. 300-odd Qing soldiers were taken captive, along with several hundred merchants from the interior.[9] With their queues cut, all the non-Muslims were forced to convert to Islam on pain of death; many were then sent to Bukhara, Qunduz, Balkh and Khiva where they were sold into servitude.[10] The walls of the cantonment, the *yamen*, the soldiers' barracks and civilian dwellings were all razed to the ground. Jahāngīr assumed the title of Sayyid Jahāngīr Sultān and by autumn had extended his control to Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan. In these cities too, numerous Qing officials lost their lives; among them were the imperial agent, and the assistant imperial agent at Yarkand, while at Khotan, where the Qing garrison comprised no more than 124 men, Changling's nephew, the assistant imperial agent, was among those who died.[11] As in Kashgar, the Qing troops suffered huge casualties, and while some managed to flee, an untold number were taken captive and condemned to slavery.

Jahāngīr's campaign had not been without forethought and there is little doubt that initially, at least, the khoja and his men were received warmly by the local populace and regarded as liberators. In halting at the *mazār* of Satūq Bughrā Khān, Jahāngīr had clearly attested his religious credentials and affirmed that this was a *jihād*.[12] The long years of anticipation meant that for many Turkic Muslims of Altishahr, Jahāngīr

[9] XZSL 107:34a–b, DG6.8 *gengshen*. For a discussion of the Chinese mercantile penetration of Altishahr, see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.138–49.

[10] According to Qurbān 'Alī Ayaghūzī, the majority of the Chinese prisoners accepted Islam and were freed, but those who refused were enslaved. Qurbān 'Alī Ayaghūzī, *Tavārīkh-i ḥamsa-i sharqī* (Russian trans.), pp.328–9. Kuropatkin, however, follows Valikhanov in stating, "The Mandarins committed suicide, and the garrison consisting of 8,000–10,000 men, was put to the sword, with the exception of 400 Doongans [Sino-Muslims] and Chinese who embraced Islam." Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, p.139; Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.319. According to a report by Nayancheng, over 300 soldiers in the Manchu cantonment at Kashgar lost their queues (NWYGZY 73:10a, DG7.12.8). This was usually regarded as a sign of conversion to Islam, but whether or not they would then have been enslaved is unclear. Nineteenth century Western travellers do, however, frequently make reference to Chinese slaves in Central Asia; see, for example, Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara* (vol.2, pp.274, 283), and Wathan, who states, "The khan…lately deputed an envoy to St Petersburg, with an elephant and some Chinese slaves, as a present to His Czarish Majesty." Wathan, 'Memoir on the U'sbek state of Kokan', pp.374–5.

[11] XZSL107:36b–37a, DG6.8 *gengshen*; CWGZN 3:34b–35a; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.69.

[12] As Hamada Masami points out, the incentive to claim Satūq Bughrā Khān as an ancestor was somewhat greater for the leaders of the Ishāqiyya than those of the Āfāqīyya who, by virtue of Āfāq Khōja's marriage to a daughter of 'Abd al-Rashīd Khān, could trace their ancestry back to Chinggis Khān. Yet although the *mazār* appears to have been under the authority of the Ishāqī in the mid-18th century, it was also an Āfāqī site of worship and there is considerable evidence in Qing sources that the area of Artush became strongly associated with Āfāqī followers in the 19th century. See Hamada Masami, 'Le Mausolée et le Culte de Satūq Bughrā Khān', pp.77–82.

had assumed the image of a saviour and harbinger of good fortune. His supporters had been active, not only in raising money and expectations, but also in propagating tracts that extolled the khoja's virtues and love of his people, irrespective of sectarian divisions. According to popular wisdom:

> One has only to see his face, and two generations will enjoy good fortune,
> One has only to drink the tea from his cup, and one hundred worries will be forgotten.[13]

The success of the campaign to oust the Qing from Altishahr and to restore khoja rule brought forth tales of heroism and self-sacrifice that united the Turkic Muslims against the *kāfir* and which would live on to contribute to an emerging sense of a shared historical past long after Jahāngīr's rule had collapsed. Stories about those who donated their family fortunes, gold and jewels to assist the khoja's cause passed quickly into local folklore. One story tells of the daughter of a Yarkandi merchant who sent Jahāngīr 600 soldiers with weapons made of gold, while another tale extols a wealthy Muslim of Khotan who presented the khoja with a chest of jewels, the value of which was said to be equal to the amount of gold pieces that would be needed to cover a boy of 12 years old, standing upright.[14] These are the narratives which underpinned opposition to Qing rule and which, in their elision of all reference to social, ethnic and religious divisions within the local society, unconsciously mirror the features of anti-colonial literatures.

Yet, to a certain extent this picture of a united purpose is not untrue. One group within the Altishahr populace that, although marginalized by the dominant Turkic Muslim community, was undoubtedly instrumental in the rapid collapse of the Qing position, was the Dolans. Muslim by religion, the Dolans are thought by some to have been the descendants of the Dūghlāt Mongols, while others suggest that they originated from the Qazaqs or Qirghiz. In 19th century Altishahr, they were commonly regarded as an inferior, servant class, their main claim to fame having been that they served as retainers of the Āfāqī leader Khōja-Jahān.[15] They dwelt primarily in the area of Bugar and Qorla, but soon after the Qing conquest they were conscripted in large numbers to serve as labourers

[13] HJNFL 12:16a, DG6.7 *guisi*.
[14] Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, pp.127–8.
[15] Bichang, *Shoubian jiyao*, 26b–27a; Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:35b; Forsyth, *Report of a Mission to Yarkund in 1873*, pp.54–5. According to Skrine, who visited the region in the early 20th century, "The standard of living as well as of morals among the Dulanis [Dolans] is noticeably lower than among the Turkis." Skrine, *Chinese Central Asia*, pp.123–4, 241. Svanberg, 'Ethnic Categorizations and Cultural Diversity in Xinjiang', pp.270–82.

attached to the military post-stations (*juntai*). These post-stations that were dotted across Xinjiang formed the arteries of the Qing communication system. Attached to every military station were approximately ten households of Muslim labourers, frequently Dolans, who cultivated the adjacent land in order to supply the post-station soldiers. They received no salary from the Qing authorities and in many cases lived in abject poverty. Not surprisingly, the Dolans were quick to rebel and in so doing, were largely responsible for the swift dis-location of the Qing communication lines.[16]

Information on Jahāngīr's rule of the four western cities is sparse and must be gleaned for the most part from the not impartial accounts provided in Qing records, written after the collapse of the khoja's administration and the resumption of Qing rule. Under the new regime the role of Islam and the clergy appears to have been enhanced, but the administrative structure remained largely un-changed. There is no evidence of widespread persecution of Ishāqī adherents or, indeed, of any office-holders. The only local official who was known to have been put to death specifically on account of his resistance and unswerving loyalty to the Qing order was the hakim bek of Kashgar, Muhammad Sayyid; his wife, meanwhile, was hidden by an Ishāqī akhund.[17] Resistance was limited and came primarily from the Ishāqī adherents, such as the eminent Kashgari akhund Ni'mat and his followers. Ni'mat was arrested and taken to Khoqand along with three others. There the group was held hostage presumably with a view to ensuring the compliance of other Ishāqī adherents, and no doubt with the complicity of the Khoqandi authorities. Ni'mat's son, younger brother and nephew, all of whom remained in Altishahr, were subsequently involved in a plot to capture Jahāngīr, but their plan was discovered and they were put to death along with four associates.[18]

[16] HJNFL 13:2b, DG6.7 *jiawu*; 18:7a, DG6.8 *dingsi* and 25:10b–11a, DG6.9 *wuzi*.
[17] HJNFL 41:27b–28a, DG7.4 *xinyou*. Valikhanov states that with the exception of Muhammad Sayyid, all the other beks of Kashgar kept their posts. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.319. See also Qurbān 'Alī Ayaghūzī, *Tavārīkh-i ḥamsa-i sharqī* (Russian trans.), p.327. There is slight confusion in some of the secondary sources here because Yūnus, who had been dismissed from his post as hakim bek in 1814, was also killed in the attack. Having finally had his name cleared, Yūnus had returned to Kashgar to assist the councillor Qingxiang, but was not, at this time, serving as hakim bek. He was subsequently honoured by the court for his loyalty. XZSL110:35a, DG6.11 *bingwu*. For the particular loyalty shown by beks from the regions of Hami and Turfan towards the Qing, see Newby, 'The Begs of Xinjiang', pp.286–7. Fletcher follows Wathan in suggesting that Yūnus was executed by the Qing authorities. Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.363; Wathan, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', p.660; *cf.* Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, pp.341–3.
[18] NWYGZY 78:41b–42a, DG8.10.5. According to Councillor Wulonga, the Ishāqī adherents worshipped Ni'mat in the same way that the Āfāqī followers worshipped

Whether the resistance, limited as it was, arose from Qing loyalism or the persistence of traditional animosity between the Āfāqī and Ishāqī orders is unclear. Some beks did manage to flee before the Qing garrisons fell, but even among those who remained, it is impossible to estimate how many participated readily in the rebellion and how many co-operated with the rebels simply to ensure their personal safety. In Yarkand, hakim bek Yūsuf was imprisoned for his efforts to resist the rebel forces before he managed to escape; meanwhile Bābak, another Yarkandi bek, became one of Jahāngīr's most trusted supporters.[19] Even Hudī, the hakim bek of Aqsu and great grandson of his namesake who had assisted the Qing troops during the Qianlong conquest, came under suspicion of collaboration with the rebel forces. Finding himself in Kashgar at the time of Jahāngīr's attack, Hudī appears to have submitted to the khoja only to be entrusted with the task of returning to Aqsu to incite the inhabitants to rise against the Qing. Arrested by the Qing authorities, Hudī's family connections served to ensure that his punishment was lenient, but his case well illustrates the difficulty of identifying where loyalties lay.[20] What is evident is that as the months wore on and Jahāngīr's rule disintegrated into an orgy of pillage and debauchery, so some of the old antagonisms between the Āfāqī and Ishāqī orders were rekindled.[21] Consequently, those with a vested interest in the return of the Qing and those representing Ishāqī opposition to Āfāqī rule may well have found that they shared common ground.

In September, as the court finally grasped the critical nature of the situation in Altishahr, Changling was conferred with the title of *yangwei* (eminent) general, relieved of his duties at Ili and put in charge of the military operation to recover the western cities of Altishahr. Changling, who was to be assisted by two of the empire's most able generals, Yang Yuchun and Wulonga, memorialized that he would need 40,000 troops, as opposed to the 10,500 that the court had at this stage deployed. He also advised that Aqsu should serve as the headquarters for the administration of the campaign. By concentrating supplies and troops at Aqsu and making it, rather than the eastern city of Hami, the frontline, Changling not only hoped to prevent Jahāngīr taking control of the four eastern cities of Altishahr (Uch Turfan, Qucha, Qarashahr and Aqsu itself), but also to

Jahāngīr. NWYGZY 79:43a–44a, DG8.12.28. For Ni'mat's return to Altishahr, see chapter 5.

[19] HJNFL 41:27b–28a, DG7.4 *xinyou* and 50:21b, DG7.8 *wushen*.

[20] HJNFL 30:18b–20b, DG6.10 *jiayin*. Hudī's uncle, Ishāq, was meanwhile playing a prominent role in assisting the Qing troops. For more on Ishāq, see chapter 6. For a genealogy of Hudī's family, see HJTZ 12:9b–11b.

[21] NWYGZY 78:29a, DG8.5.6 and 80:38a, DG9.2.20; Qurbān 'Alī Ayaghūzī, *Tavārīkh-i ḥamsa–i sharqī* (Russian trans.), p.329; Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.128.

preclude any possibility of an attack on northern Xinjiang.[22] Over the next few months more than 36,000 Green Standard troops from Ili, Urumchi, Sichuan, Shaan-Gan, Jilin and Heilongjiang were re-deployed to Altishahr.

In the early stages of the campaign to recover Altishahr, the court was still reluctant to believe that support for Jahāngīr could be widespread. Nevertheless, the participation of local people could not be denied, a fact that was initially attributed to the sexual misdemeanours and abuses committed by Qing officials. While clearly alluding to the Binjing case, in this respect, the court, ever wary that corruption breeds corruption, even surmised that Councillor Qingxiang may not have been providing the full facts. But whatever the cause of the rebellion, it had to be suppressed. Thus, Changling was instructed that rebels were to be shown no mercy, and where they had been responsible for the death of Qing troops it would be legitimate to eliminate entire cities. On the other hand, if villagers had not assisted in the rising, they were not only to be spared, but troops were to be restrained from harassing them.[23] The emperor, himself, had given much thought to how the imperial army was to proceed against the rebels:

> Start by inspiring awe, in advancing the troops move as and when the need dictates, exterminate thoroughly, so that their hearts are filled with terror and they scatter on the wind. [Only] those who are sincerely compliant must be shown benevolence in order that they may know compassion.[24]

In the middle of winter, some 3,000 of Jahāngīr's men were pressing towards Aqsu when they suffered their first reversal in a battle south of the Hunbashi River. Gradually repulsed in a series of engagements with the forces of the 20,000-strong army that the Qing had amassed in Aqsu, they were forced back across the desert towards Kashgar. After several testing battles, in March 1827 Jahāngīr finally lost control of Kashgar. According to Qing sources, the battle for Kashgar saw tens of thousands of Muslim rebels killed and 4,000 taken captive. In the following weeks, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan were retaken by the imperial forces. The khoja's rule of the southern oasis cities had lasted little more than six months, but for the Qing this had been a protracted, expensive and humiliating campaign. Victory had been won only at the price of re-deploying thousands of troops from all parts of the empire. Yet Jahāngīr

[22] An earlier plan had indicated that Hami would be the military headquarters for the Qing campaign. There is little doubt that this would have been to Jahāngīr's advantage and possibly have led to the ousting of the Qing from all of Altishahr, if not Jungharia as well. HJNFL 15:12b, DG6.7 *xinchou*; Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:36a.

[23] XZSL 102:19b–20a, 23a–b, DG6.8 *dingsi*. At this time, the court was not yet aware of the full extent of Binjing's crimes. See chapter 3.

[24] XZSL 102:23b, DG6.8 *dingsi*.

had managed to escape and several months after the re-conquest, over 20,000 troops were still engaged in his pursuit.[25]

The Daoguang emperor was irritated by Jahāngīr's escape; victory could not be deemed complete without the capture of the main protagonist. Throughout the following months, as the officials of the new administration searched for the bodies of their dead and took stock of the destruction inflicted on their military infrastructure, Changling oversaw the hunt for the rebel leader. As the offer of a sizeable reward failed to draw forth information on Jahāngīr's whereabouts and the imperial troops scoured the Pamirs and the Alai Mountains to no avail, the emperor lost patience and stripped Changling, Yang Yuchun and Wulonga of their freshly conferred titles and honours.[26] Meanwhile, Khoqand was still being given the benefit of the doubt.

The Khoqandi factor

As has already been noted, the Qing court was well aware of Jahāngīr's potential usefulness to Khoqand and it had been reported on at least one occasion that the Khoqandis had discouraged Jahāngīr from surrendering to the Qing authorities with promises of military support.[27] However, in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, the court was hesitant to accuse Khoqand of having instigated the revolt of 1826, cautiously suggesting that it may have been only the Khoqandi traders who were involved.[28] Indeed, despite the fact that Jahāngīr was accompanied from the outset of the attack by the Khoqandi general 'Īsā Dādkhāh and his brother Mūsā,[29] there is no conclusive evidence that Muhammad 'Alī Khān released Jahāngīr in order to have him attack Altishahr.[30] According to one source, 'Īsā Dādkhāh had fallen out with the young khan and had encouraged Jahāngīr to attack Kashgar in an attempt to bolster his own power and prestige.[31] Thus the initial reluctance of the Qing court to attribute guilt to Muhammad 'Alī Khān is not incomprehensible; a few Khoqandi generals did not necessarily constitute an army. However, following the recapture of Kashgar, it was only a matter of time before the Qing authorities there pieced together a picture of the siege of the cantonment and the last days

[25] For a documentary account of the Qing campaign to recover the four western cities of Altishahr, see HJNFL *juan* 23–27. For a narrative version, see Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, *juan* 4.

[26] XZSL 96:4b–5a, DG6.3 *guiwei* and 116:25b–26a, DG7.4 *xinyou*.

[27] HJNFL 6:6a–b, DG5.5 *guichou*.

[28] HJNFL 35:26b, DG6.11 *yisi*.

[29] HJNFL 12:22b, DG6.7 *guisi*; Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, p.138.

[30] *Cf.* Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.361; Lü Yiran, 'Haohan yu Zhangge'er Yusupu zhi luan', pp.100–1 and Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo*, pp.95–6.

[31] Qurbān 'Alī Ayaghūzī, *Tavārīkh-i ḥamsa-i sharqī* (Russsian trans.), p.327.

of Qingxiang and his garrison. It was at this point, that imperial magnanimity was sorely tested.

At the height of the war, the Khoqandi ruler Muhammad 'Alī Khān had appeared outside Kashgar with a force of several thousand troops.[32] What had brought him to Kashgar and why after no more than a dozen days, he withdrew so suddenly, is less clear. From the various sources, it is, however, possible to glean something of what might have happened. In the summer of 1826, as Jahāngīr tried in vain to occupy the Manchu cantonment, he sent a message to Khoqand requesting the khan's assistance. In return he promised rich pickings, and possibly even the division of Kashgar.[33] Muhammad 'Alī Khān was persuaded by his advisers to take this opportunity to lead a *jihād* against Altishahr; the possibility of bountiful loot, control of Altishahr and the glory to be garnered from championing the cause of Islam was an opportunity not to be missed.[34]

According to one version of events, when the khan arrived outside Kashgar, Jahāngīr did not go out to receive him. The khan's personal appearance at the head of such a large body of troops may have been sufficient to indicate to Jahāngīr that he came not to assist but with a view to establishing his own authority over Altishahr. The khoja set two conditions for a meeting with Muhammad 'Alī Khān: first, that they would both be accompanied by their respective troops and second, that neither he nor the khan would dismount their horses—they would meet as equals.[35]

[32] According to the *Tārīkh-i Shahrukhī*, Muhammad 'Alī Khān was accompanied by two-thirds of the entire Khoqandi army. See, Beisembiev, "*Ta'rikh-i Shahrukhī*" *kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*, p.245. Kuropatkin states that the Khoqandi force numbered 15,000, while Wei Yuan says 10,000 and Muhammad Amīn puts the figure at 12,000. Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, p.138; Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:35b; Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.343. The much lower figure of 4,000–5,000 is given by Nayancheng citing a deposition. NWYGZY 59:58a, DG9.2.5.

[33] Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:35b; QSG 529 (*liezhuan* 316):14714. Nalivkin states that Jahāngīr had enticed Muhammad 'Alī Khān with the story that the Qing garrison had a horde of gold buried in the cantonment. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.127.

[34] According to Wathan, Muhammad 'Alī Khān was "irritated at the bad treatment shewn to the Mohammedan subjects of Tartary" (Wathan, 'Memoir of the U'sbek state', p.375), while Kuznetsov implies that it was the failure of the Qing authorities to respond positively to the Khoqandi request for tax-free trade in 1825 that provoked Muhammad 'Alī's involvement. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane*, p.122. A more plausible explanation is provided by the *Tārīkh-i Shahrukhī*, which suggests that Muhammad 'Alī Khān was convinced by his advisors that he had nothing to lose by this venture; even if he failed to conquer the region he would still enjoy the glory of having led a *jihād*. Beisembiev, "*Ta'rikh-i Shahrukhī*" *kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*, p.245.

[35] Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.128.

The meeting did take place, but it did not result in joint military action. Muhammad ʻAlī Khān attacked the cantonment without the khoja's support. After several failed attempts and having lost hundreds of men, the Khoqandi forces blasted the cantonment with gunpowder and finally breached the citadel wall. As the Khoqandi troops stood poised to charge the Qing stronghold and battle to the death with the garrison, the khan suddenly withdrew his army. Accompanied by his generals, ʻĪsā Dādkhāh and Mūsā, he led his men to the *mazār* of Āfāq Khōja where they buried their dead before heading back to Khoqand. A significant number of the Khoqandi troops, over 1,000 according to one Qing source, did not return with the khan, however, and remained in Kashgar under the command of the Khoqandi mingbashi, Haqq Qulī, to assist Jahāngīr's forces.[36] Jahāngīr's own account of this incident makes no reference to a rift between himself and Muhammad ʻAlī Khān stating only that when over one thousand Khoqandis had been wounded, the khan withdrew in fear.[37] Yet while the story that Jahāngīr had tricked a gullible Muhammad ʻAlī Khān with the assertion that the guns and arrows of the Qing soldiers were useless and could not wound people, is doubtless fabrication, evidently there was a degree of jealousy and suspicion between the two leaders that had caused the khan to take independent military action and to withdraw his forces without consultation.[38]

After the Qing re-established control over the four western cities, various reports, including the testimonies of captives, provided evidence that a large number of Khoqandis had, indeed, served in Jahāngīr's forces.[39] Moreover, the depositions also revealed the extent to which Khoqand had been prepared to use the khoja family to pursue its self-interest, for among those captured was Awliyā', Jahāngīr's 12-year-old nephew, who had been taken to Kashgar by the khan—presumably to be used as a pawn in his dealings with Jahāngīr.[40] Despite the overwhelming

[36] Beisembiev, "*Ta'rikh-i Shahrukhī*" *kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*, p.245. Wei Yuan states that 2,000–3,000 Khoqandis joined Jahāngīr's forces. Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:35b.

[37] MQSL vol.2, p.2056. Elsewhere it is suggested that the khan withdrew because his supplies were exhausted. NWYGZY 79:58a–b, DG9.2.5.

[38] NWYGZY 79:58b, DG9.2.5; Wathan, 'Memoir of the U'sbek state', p.375 and (appended) 'Note of a pilgrimage', p.381; Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:35b. Inevitably, these events gave rise to numerous stories. For example, Muhammad Amīn explains that the khan's "immediate and sudden return to Khokand is ascribed to fear engendered by the discovery of a plot laid by the Khoja and his Kashgari friends to murder the Khan while attending their invitation to a feast." Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.343.

[39] According to one account, while in pursuit of Jahāngīr, General Yang Fang and his men were ambushed by over 2,000 Khoqandi troops in the Alai Mountains. Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:40a.

[40] HJNFL 51:15a–17a, DG7.9 *bingzi*. Awliyā' was the eldest son of Jahāngīr's younger brother, the late Babā' al-Dīn.

evidence of Khoqand's role and intentions, still the Daoguang emperor remained reluctant to confront Muhammad ʻAlī Khān directly. In spring 1827, however, he did instruct Changling to inform Khoqand and the Qirghiz that if they continued to harbour rebels or any members of Jahāngīr's family, the imperial troops would advance to eliminate them.[41]

Muhammad ʻAlī Khān was now playing for time. Two months later, Mīrzā ʻAzamat, a Khoqandi official, arrived in Kashgar; his purpose was to persuade the Qing authorities that Khoqand had in fact supported the Qing during the recent rebellion. According to his version of events, Muhammad ʻAlī Khān had brought troops to Kashgar to assist the besieged Qing troops, but when the messenger whom he had dispatched into the cantonment was killed, the khan had returned home with his forces. Changling ignored this guileful explanation and again pressed the khan's messenger as to why Khoqand had not yet handed over Jahāngīr's relatives. Mīrzā ʻAzamat's response was well considered and took into account that Jahāngīr was now believed to be in the region of Darvaz:

> If we hand over his family, then Jahāngīr will be fearful and even less likely to dare to return to Khoqand. Our intention is simply to arrest him first and then hand over the family.[42]

Changling gave Khoqand twenty days to produce Jahāngīr's family members.[43]

When later that summer Mīrzā ʻAzamat once more presented himself in Kashgar, his message again reflected how far Khoqand's perception of Qing power had changed since the days of Qianlong when the mere threat of Qing military action had been guaranteed to elicit compliance. Muhammad ʻAlī Khān now claimed to be prepared to cooperate in Jahāngīr's capture by dispatching 10,000 troops in his pursuit—but only for a price: an unspecified sum of silver *yambu*.[44] Angered, and frustrated, no doubt, by his own failure to hunt down the rebel leader, Changling raised the threat of trade sanctions:

> In the space of about ten days, we killed hundreds of thousands of rebels and took back the four cities one after another. Only the desperate Jahāngīr remained and escaped beyond the *karun*. If we wanted to go in pursuit of

[41] XZSL 116:17a, DG7.4 *renzi*.

[42] HJNFL 47:5a, DG7.6 *gengyin*.

[43] It is revealing to contrast Khoqand's attitude with that of Ladakh where many of Jahāngīr's followers had sought refuge. In 1828, the Qing ambans and regent in Tibet sent a messenger to Ladakh demanding that these fugitives be handed over, Ladakh complied unhesitatingly. Petech, *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet 1728–95*, pp.145, 162–3. At the time of the conquest of Altishahr, Ladakh had shown a similar willingness to comply with the demand that should the two khoja brothers seek refuge in Ladakh, they were to be arrested and extradited. MWDA 1736–03 051–1871, QL23.12.13.

[44] HJNFL 49:22b, DG7.6 *guiwei*.

> him and capture him, what problem could there be, what need would we have of military assistance from you? Yet since you are unwilling to arrest him and hand him over, your people need never again enter the *karun* to trade.[45]

But for the time being, Changling had more pressing concerns: Jahāngīr had to be captured, with or without Khoqand's assistance, and equally importantly, he had to revise his plans for the future defence and administration of Altishahr.

The retrenchment debate

If failure to produce the rebel leader, dead or alive, were not fault enough, Changling's fall from grace had been compounded by the fact that he had already presented the court with an unpalatable rehabilitation policy—one that spoke of retrenchment.

In the course of the campaign to regain the western cities, the emperor had sent a secret memorial to his generals in Altishahr in which he broached the question of whether in future local leaders might be conferred with titles in the same way as were the *tusi* (native chieftains) in the southwest of China.[46] In July 1827, Changling responded stating that with pacification only just complete, it was too soon to be thinking of conferring titles (*fen feng*) on local leaders, but he did have other ideas on the future administration of the region. He proposed that the imperial agents be withdrawn from the four western cities of Altishahr, that the councillor be moved to Aqsu and that control of affairs of the four western cities be entrusted to a senior hakim bek in Kashgar who would be assisted by the hakim beks of Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Khotan. He also suggested that 8,000 soldiers should be temporarily garrisoned throughout

[45] HJNFL 49:23a, DG7.7 *guiwei*.

[46] Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:40a. For a description of the *tusi* system in the southwest of the empire during the Yongzheng period, see Herman, 'Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing reforms to the native chieftain system', pp.47–74 and Huang Pei, *Autocracy at Work*, pp.280–301, 295–6. In fact, it is questionable whether one can legitimately speak of a *tusi* system at all. There were many different types of native chieftain in China. Their authority and responsibilities varied from place to place and the regulations governing them had been frequently reformed since the Ming. All that the emperor appears to have been proposing here is that the local leaders should be given appointments similar to *tusi*, presumably with responsibility for local militia that would relieve the pressure on the banner troops. However, references in Changling's memorial (see quotation below, main text) to "confer titles" (*fen feng*) and "have them defend themselves" (*ling qi zi shou*) indicate that what he understood by the *tusi* suggestion would ultimately lead to the pulling back of the Qing bannermen and the establishment of military native chieftains, who would come under the direct supervision of the Board of War and control their area of jurisdiction with the assistance of a sizeable military force drawn from the local population.

the four western cities, with a view to reviewing the situation in one or two years.[47]

Although sceptical as to whether the garrison commanders would be capable of supervising the affairs of the four western cities without the support of imperial agents, the court was initially satisfied with Changling's plan.[48] Two months later, however, the councillor amended his earlier proposal, reflecting that in the event of future attack by the khojas' descendants, 8,000 soldiers would probably be insufficient to control the area. He even expressed misgivings about his own suggestion to have senior beks administer the region. Those who had proved themselves the most able and loyal, he now suspected, would be unable to win the support of the local community; meanwhile in a crisis they would necessarily have to call on military assistance from the interior:

> If several years after the imperial troops have all withdrawn, the descendants of that rebel come back, waiting for the moment to attack, even with a garrison army of 8,000 stationed throughout the region, it will be difficult to keep a rabble of several million in check. The proposal to leave a garrison is not a plan for securing peace in the long term and, if in one or two years' time we make the decision to confer titles on beks and have them defend themselves, then the problem is that among the present beks there are none with more talent or a better reputation than Ishāq and 'Abd al-Rahmān, but these are not men whom the Muslims of the four western cities would naturally trust. Moreover, since they accompanied the imperial army and assisted in Jahāngīr's capture now they are hated all the more by the Āfāqī Muslims. Even if having been conferred with titles they govern the region, as soon as there is an emergency they will alert the interior and there will be no question of ignoring them, we will still have to exhaust our troops in a distant campaign. And when we have accomplished that, we will again confront the issue of how to deal with the region. So if we do not confer titles on the right people it will be difficult to keep the area peaceful for any length of time.

He and Wulonga, now serving as the councillor at Kashgar, did, however, have another suggestion:

> …as far as the Muslims of the four western cities are concerned, nothing could be better than to select someone who has a reputation surpassing that of Jahāngīr and confer on him the special favour of entrusting him with control of the people, then perhaps he may be able to win over their hearts. In Beijing there is a certain 'Abd al-Khāliq, enlisted in the Plain White Mongol banner, who is the son of Burhān al-Dīn, and every year when the rotation of beks travel to court for their audience with the emperor, they all

[47] HJNFL 46:21b–23b, DG7.5 *guiyou*.

[48] XZSL 119:22b–23a, DG7.5 *guiyou*. Although this and the memorial cited above bear the same date, obviously Changling's memorial was written several weeks before the court's reply.

> visit him at his home to pay their respects and present him with silver. He has been in Beijing for over sixty years, he understands our ways and recognizes the court's prestige. Moreover, I have heard that he appreciates a peaceful life and has two sons and a grandson. He is already a bannerman and I, therefore, humbly propose that, considering the important strategic position of Altishahr, 'Abd al-Khāliq should be granted an official title and put to govern the affairs of the Muslims in the four western cities. We could follow the regulations for the Tibetan Khalkas, except that he would memorialize the councillor. The routine affairs of the region would be managed by the Muslim himself and he would have to select the most intelligent among his sons and grandsons to study from him how to manage affairs, while the others would be kept in Beijing. 'Abd al-Khāliq would be expected to attend the court once every three years and he would take instructions from the councillor. Later when he dies, his post would be taken by one of his descendants, while some of the others would still be kept in Beijing. In this way we would be able to pacify those inside and outside the *karun* and protect the frontier forever.[49]

The Daoguang emperor was not pleased. Two of his most able generals with firsthand experience of Altishahr were all but suggesting that the arduous and expensive campaign in which they had just been engaged had been a futile exercise. In particular, the emperor railed against the suggestion to instate 'Abd al-Khāliq as ruler of Altishahr, concluding that the 69-year-old Changling had become befuddled in his old age and that Wulonga was simply aping his opinions.[50]

'Abd al-Khāliq, who was well in his sixties at this time, had been taken to Beijing as a child after the death of his father, the Āfāqī leader Burhān al-Dīn, in Badakhshan.[51] As the son of a rebel he was initially sentenced to death, but given that he was still a minor, the punishment was commuted and he was enslaved to a family of an official of distinguished service. Eventually, in the third year of the reign of the Daoguang emperor (1822/3) he was freed from servitude, incorporated with his family into the Plain White Mongol Banner and given official employment. During the Jahāngīr revolt, however, the fact that he had retained his position as an eminent figure of the Turkic Muslim

[49] See HJNFL 49:25a–27b, DG7.7 *guiwei*; *cf.* Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:40a. Wei Yuan's 'quotation' is actually a précis of the much longer memorial by Changling. There are a number of significant discrepancies between the two. Note, for example, that in the 'original' Changling does not use the term "foolish Muslims" (*yu Hui*).

[50] XZSL 123:14b–16b, DG7. 8 *guiwei*. This was not the first time that officials recommending retrenchment had incurred the imperial displeasure. In 1754, Liu Tongxun had been appointed acting governor general of Shaanxi and Gansu and was subsequently charged with overseeing the geographical research of Xinjiang. However, in the wake of Amursana's revolt he recommended that the town of Barkol, situated west of Hami, be abandoned, as a result of which he was promptly recalled to Beijing. Enoki, 'Introduction', *Hsi-Yu t'ung-wen-chih*, pp.iv–v; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.533.

[51] See chapter 1.

community in Beijing and that over the years he had frequently received his kinsmen who arrived on tribute missions to the capital did not go unnoticed. Concerned that he might have connections with the rebels, in August 1827, the emperor had ordered that 'Abd al-Khāliq, his two sons and his grandson should be exiled separately to the frontier garrisons of Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi and Fujian where they were to be permanently confined and forbidden any contact with outsiders (*wairen*).[52] Presumably when Changling and Wulonga wrote their ill-received memorial they were unaware of these developments.

As the months passed, the court appeared increasingly unwilling to countenance retrenchment of any kind, while in Kashgar officials increased their estimates for the number of troops necessary to secure the region. In September 1827, still no closer to reaching a firm decision on future policy towards Altishahr, a cautious agreement was given to a proposal put forward by the censor Qian Yiji that garrison troops in Altishahr should be allowed to develop agricultural settlements, as practised in the north.[53] In the long-term, this would undoubtedly assist the defence of the region, but it was not a solution to the present problem and, in the view of officials serving on the frontier, the situation was still critical. Why else should Wulonga have dared to incur the emperor's further displeasure? Clearly no stooge of Changling, in a memorial dated early 1828, he set out his fresh thoughts on the future defence of Altishahr.

The memorial begins by detailing how he had arrived at his most recent figure of 12,000-odd as the minimum number of troops necessary to defend Altishahr:

> If we retain a small number of troops here, they will be insufficient to hold the region and if we retain a large number here, it will be difficult to continue to finance them. In fact, we have seldom had a good policy that has endured for any length of time without problems. If we want a foolproof plan then we must take into account all the eight cities [Altishahr]. The region of the four western cities lies side by side with [the lands of] the outsiders for more than one thousand *li*. Despite the fact that the Muslims have been pacified, they are rebellious by nature and though they may change outwardly, inwardly they do not necessarily change. The outsiders regard the Muslims' interest as their own interest and they [the Muslims of Altishahr] willingly submit to them. Even though pacified and

[52] MQSL, vol.2, pp.2023–4. The women of 'Abd al-Khāliq's family were sent to the garrisons of Jiangning and Hangzhou to be placed in servitude. In October 1832, by which time 'Abd al-Khāliq and his eldest son Bābak had both died of illness, the court decreed that 'Abd al-Khāliq had not, after all, played any part in the Jahāngīr rebellion and six members of his family were allowed to return to the capital. XZSL 220:17a–18b, DG12.9 *dingmao*.

[53] HJNFL 50:22b–23a, DG7.8 *wushen*.

> said to be respectful and obedient, they cannot be completely trusted. This is why we cannot defend ourselves against the outsiders and protect those on the inside without a strong garrison.[54]

Having set out his recommended deployment of the troops (6,000 in Kashgar, 1,500 east of Kashgar, 2,500 in Yarkand and 2,600 distributed between Uch Turfan, Aqsu and Kelpin), he then goes on to acknowledge that the annual rotation of such a large number of troops would not only put pressure on the supply of provisions, but would also adversely affect the stability of the garrisons in the interior. Instead, he recommends a five-year rotation and, in the long-term, military agricultural colonization. However, well aware that given the present financial constraints the court would be unwilling to increase the garrison, he then dismisses his entire argument, only to conclude the memorial with a much more radical proposal—withdrawal from the four western cities:

> …frontier defence is a matter of holding a strategic position. The four western cities have enemies on all sides, the territory is not worth guarding and the people are not worth making into subjects. It is basically a burdensome and cancerous part of Altishahr, unlike the area of the four eastern cities, which is the indispensable bulwark of the main route. Formerly, when we read His Majesty's proposal to confer titles as for the *tusi*, because at that time Jahāngīr had not yet been captured, it was not appropriate to confer titles, so we requested that 'Abd al-Khāliq be put in charge instead of having a heavy military presence, and in that way it was hoped we would save on military expenditure and peace would endure. When we first memorialized on the garrison, time and again, I discussed the two points made above in detail with Changling. Now His Majesty has instructed that troop numbers should remain at their previous level, but in my humble opinion, this is to waste useful military provisions in a useless region. It would be better to pull back the troops and unite them with those of the eastern cities. Thus by cutting military expenditure of the four western cities by half, we will secure the integrity of the realm and there is unlikely to be any need to strengthen further our defence of the four western cities.[55]

Were it not for the difficulty of finding a suitable replacement and Wulonga having becoming ill, the emperor would likely have had both Changling and Wulonga immediately removed from office. As it was, they were given a nominal dishonourable discharge and left temporarily in post (*gezhi liuren*). It was to be more than a year before a replacement was found for Changling.

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[54] For the full text of this memorial see HJNFL 55:7b–12b, DG7.12 *guiyou*. *Cf.* QSG 368 (*liezhuan* 155):11477; Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:40a–b, both of which are abridgements of the original memorial.

[55] HJNFL 55:11b–12b, DG7.12 *guiyou*.

Yet, there was more to the emperor's frustration than disillusionment with two of his frontier officials. The war to regain the four cities had been waged against a backcloth of criticism from officials in Beijing who argued, much as Wulonga had done, that Altishahr, and indeed Xinjiang per se, was a drain on the empire's resources that could not, and should not, be sustained. These critics were not without their opponents, but whereas the emperor might have reasonably expected them to be silenced by the victorious campaign against the four cities, he now found his generals in the field re-opening the debate. The re-conquest of the four western cities constituted the most important imperial endorsement of the dynasty's commitment to retaining Xinjiang since the 1760s. As many realized, however, retention of this vast area by means of the threat of military force alone, was no longer a viable solution.

By the time of Jahāngīr's first successful attack on Altishahr in 1826, the issue of the northwest frontier had already become a topic of widespread contention among interested intellectuals of the empire. Reluctance to countenance the loss of the Altishahr region, or indeed any part of Xinjiang, reflected popular attitudes among a growing body of China's literati;[56] the intellectual and cultural borders of China had gradually expanded to incorporate the 'new frontier'. In the mid-18th century existing Chinese accounts of the region, most of which dated from the Han and Tang, were found to be sorely inadequate. Shortly after the conquest, therefore, Qing officials began work on the compilation of numerous gazetteers and manuals, but they did not limit their writings to the state-sponsored projects. Over the course of more than half a century those posted, or indeed exiled, to Xinjiang had produced a substantial body of private writings, travel diaries, poetry and jottings. Many of these works gradually found their way into the canon of Qing literature where they served a dual function. Firstly, they familiarized, or re-familiarized, Chinese readers with the 'exotica' of the Western Regions. The geography was mapped in greater detail than ever before, the flora and fauna were meticulously recorded, myths were recorded and local customs noted—a pattern familiar in empire-building. Yet, despite the fact that many of the writers were not Han but Manchu or Mongol, they were invariably writing in Chinese and took the Chinese cultural framework as the point of reference for their observations. The other function of these works was, therefore, that even while seemingly celebrating diversity, they were homogenizing, editing and incorporating a Chinese version of the region

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[56] See, for example, the poems of Xu Baoshan celebrating the re-conquest. Xu Baoshan, 'Huyuan shichao xuan', 3:10a–11a and 7:2a–b. For further discussion of the views of the literati see chapter 5.

into the Chinese cultural orbit.[57] In the same way, stories from the Han and Tang, set in the region and featuring Han Chinese protagonists, were retold, while current Turkic or Mongol place-names were identified with their Chinese equivalents (opposed to transliterations) of old. Simultaneously, contemporary accounts bore witness to the extent to which Chinese culture was being exported to the 'new frontier' by merchants and officials alike. Xinjiang was not only part of China, it was becoming Chinese.[58]

Thus for over a century before Xinjiang was officially embraced within the empire as a province of China, links were being formed over time and space that wedded the region to the interior. Against the background of this literary endeavour, by the 1820s, a small body of concerned scholars and officials, including those who had no personal experience of the Western Regions, was engaged in a debate on all aspects of the borderlands and their administration. Scholar-officials and aficionados of the northern frontier such as Xu Song (1781–1848), Zhang Mu (1805–49) and He Qiutao (1824–62) who were wont to gather in Beijing to eat mutton, carouse and entertain one another with talk of the borderlands,[59] played a crucial role in this process; they provided knowledge, inspiration and encouragement for statecraft scholars such as Gong Zizhen (1792–1841) who argued so passionately for the retention of the northwest.[60]

Two of the most pressing issues for statecraft scholars in the early 19th century—which still have a familiar ring at the beginning of the 21st century—were those of overpopulation and the depletion of natural resources.[61] Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan (1794–1857) are perhaps best known among those who in the early 1820s were already vehemently opposed to withdrawal from the Western Regions.[62] Reproaching their

[57] There is a good example of this duality at work in Gong Zizhen's essay, 'Proposal for establishing the Western Regions as a province'. On the one hand, Gong advocates the administrative integration of the region into China, Han colonization, the erecting of altars to the gods of the wind and waters to ensure good harvests and even with time (30 years, he suggests) the introduction of imperial exams. On the other hand, however, he insists that rice, salt, tea, rhubarb, cotton and silks should be the only goods permitted to enter the region from China, in order to prevent the local culture being weakened by "strange and corrupting" goods, and only leather items and melons should be taken to the interior to avoid depleting the region of its resources. Gong Zizhen, 'Xiyu zhi xing sheng yi', p.110.

[58] For further discussion of these points, see Newby, 'The Chinese Literary Conquest of Xinjiang'.

[59] Miao Quansun, *Xu beizhuan ji*, 78:9a and 79:6b–7a.

[60] On Gong Zizhen's respect for Xu Song, for example, see Zhou Xuan and Gao Li, *Qingdai Xinjiang liufang ming ren*, pp.151–2.

[61] For an excellent discussion of these issues in relation to the borderlands see Vermeer, 'Population and Ecology along the Frontier in Qing China'.

[62] Several scholars have examined the views of the statecraft thinkers towards the retention of Xinjiang. For the most detailed discussions, see Kataoka Kazutada, *Shinchō Shinkyō tōji kenkyū*, pp.90–111; Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.241–6.

opponents for their narrow-mindedness and lack of foresight, Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan argued for Xinjiang's total incorporation into the provincial system and large-scale emigration from the interior to the 'new frontier'. These ideas were by no means new. Some fifty years earlier, Wen Shou, the governor general of Shaan-Gan, had also drawn attention to the abundance of cultivatable land in Xinjiang and argued for its integration into the interior,[63] while in later years influential figures such as Hong Liangji, who had been briefly exiled to Xinjiang in 1799, had also suggested that farmers should be moved to the borderlands to ease population pressures.[64] By the 1820s, however, developments both in the heartland of China and Xinjiang had made the issue much more critical. Gong Zizhen's essay on the subject, *Xiyu zhi xing sheng yi* (Proposal on making Xinjiang a province), was written in 1820, but probably enjoyed relatively limited circulation until its inclusion in the *Huangchao jingshi wenbian* (Collected writings on statecraft in the reigning dynasty) in 1827. The thrust behind this composition was the idea that Xinjiang could provide land on which destitute people from the southeast of the empire could be settled. With a 20-year tax exemption, travel expenses, a yurt, farm tools and seed, Gong Zizhen proposed that many might be induced to start a new life in the northwest. He envisaged the establishment of a civil administration in the region, akin to that of the interior, with prefectures, districts and counties extended throughout the province, and Ili serving as the provincial capital. Given the specific problems associated with Altishahr, he suggested that an imperial commissioner should be located in the area of Yarkand and Khotan, at the head of a force of 2,240 men, comprising Manchu, Solon, Sibe, and Green Standard soldiers. Their task would be to control the neighbouring tribes and receive tribute. Yet while Gong Zizhen had clearly availed himself of a detailed geography of Xinjiang to inform his discussion on the establishment of the districts and counties, when it came to the neighbouring peoples, his knowledge appears somewhat hazy. Those mentioned by name are the polities (*guo)* of the Qirghiz, the Qazaqs, Namangan (a city of Khoqand) and Afghanistan.[65]

Wei Yuan, a contemporary and friend of Gong Zizhen, shared many of his hopes for Xinjiang. Although his best-known work, *Shengwu ji* (Chronicle of imperial military achievements), was not published until the early 1840s, it reiterated several of the ideas that he had already

[63] Wen Shou, 'Chen Jiayuguan wai qingxing shu', 81:3a–4a.

[64] Vermeer, 'Population and Ecology along the Frontier in Qing China', p.269; Hong Liangji, 'Juanshige wen jiaji', pp.33–4.

[65] Gong Zizhen, 'Xiyu zhi xing sheng yi', pp.105–12.

formulated in the 1820s.[66] Far from being a drain on the imperial coffers, he argued that the conquest of Xinjiang had saved the empire some 900,000 taels per annum because the natural boundary provided by the region had allowed a reduction in the size of the total standing army in the interior that more than compensated for the size of the Xinjiang garrisons. While the economics underpinning this claim may have been dubious, he was on firmer ground in asserting that the fertile land and abundant natural resources of the region were an invaluable asset to the empire: "With the population [in the interior] increasing by the day, and the wealth of the people becoming daily more deficient, those who wish to close off such a great resource cannot be considered wise."[67] Thus like Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan supported civilian agricultural colonization and land reclamation, and he stressed the case for emigration, proposing that 3,000 people per annum be settled in the northwest. Here again, the focus is on defence through consolidation and entrenchment. Despite the fact that *Shengwu ji* provides one of the earliest non-official accounts of the challenges to the Qing dynasty's hold on Xinjiang and reflects that Wei Yuan undoubtedly had a clearer understanding than Gong Zizhen of the geography and peoples to the west of Xinjiang, nevertheless, he too refrains from passing comment on the management of external relations and control of outsiders.

In the wake of the Jahāngīr rebellion, the proposals for retrenchment suggested by Changling, Wulonga and other high officials were hotly debated. Shen Yao (1798–1840), a young scholar whose erudition drew strong praise from his mentor, Xu Song, penned a persuasive attack against the proposal for withdrawal from the four western cities of Altishahr.[68] Despite the fact that, like Wei Yuan, he had never travelled beyond Jiayuguan, his knowledge of the history and topography of the region was impressive. In his essay *Xinjiang si yi* (A personal proposal concerning Xinjiang), Shen Yao specifically confronted the problem of defence. At the root of his argument was the belief that the empire was sacrosanct and that not an inch of territory conquered in the time of the Qianlong emperor should be lost. The suggestion that the region was too distant and too difficult to defend was dismissed with the contention that the four western cities were the strategic doorway to the whole of the Western Regions; if this position were surrendered, then the defence line would have to be re-drawn at a lesser distance from the heartland, where the topography was less conducive to defence and there would be no

[66] Wei Yuan, 'Da ren wen Xibei bianyu shu', 80:1a–2a.
[67] Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:10a.
[68] QSG 486 (*liezhuan* 273):13414.

savings in military expenditure. Thus, building on the idea that the geography of Xinjiang provided a natural boundary to the empire, making it easier and less costly to defend, Shen Yao was among the first to articulate the 'domino' argument: the security of the interior depended on the retention of Xinjiang and the retention of northern Xinjiang depended on the retention Altishahr.[69] Shen Yao's study of the terrain and waters of Xinjiang convinced him that the lands east of Aqsu should be able to support troops stationed to its west as they had in Han times; he attributed their inability to do so at present to bad management—specifically, the failure to open up land and store grain. But not only did Shen Yao argue that the region of the four western cities was rich and fertile enough to sustain the troops garrisoned there, he also noted that it supplied Ili with large amounts of copper, cloth and cotton, all of which contributed towards military expenditure (*jingfei*). As far as the defence of Xinjiang itself was concerned, like Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan, Shen Yao also advocated emigration. Sino-Muslims and landless Han, he recommended, should be moved to western Altishahr where they could open up land and train as a local militia in their spare time. However, once again there is no mention of policy towards neighbouring peoples and indeed, Shen Yao's only reference to the neighbouring polities comes in his somewhat questionable comment that "it is said that Yangi Shahr is the main route for the 'outer vassals' from all the polities travelling to Altishahr and to abandon it would be to cut off the tribute missions."[70]

At about the same time as Shen Yao wrote his essay, in 1829, Gong Zizhen was sitting the metropolitan examinations, for which he composed a response to an essay on frontier pacification. Here Gong Zizhen reiterates many of his earlier ideas, once more attacking all those who proposed abandoning the northwest. Writing now in the immediate aftermath of the Jahāngīr revolt, his proposal for agricultural colonization could of course be seen as not only the answer to a population and fiscal

[69] This theory is most closely associated with Zuo Zongtang who, in arguing the case for the retention of Xinjiang in the 1870s, memorialized, "The opening of Xinjiang and the setting up of the military establishment was bequeathed to us by our ancestors who conquered the Junghars and pacified the Muslim tribes. The reason they did this was because if we value Xinjiang we can defend Mongolia, and by defending Mongolia we can secure Beijing. The northwest is linked like the fingers to an arm. When the whole structure is intact, there are no cracks to be exploited. If Xinjiang is not secure, the tribes of Mongolia will be unsettled; then not only will Shaanxi, Gansu and Shanxi frequently be vulnerable to attack, but the area of the mountain passes in northern Zhili will not have a peaceful night's sleep." *Zuo wenxiang gong quanji*, *zougao*, 50:76a–b. For a different view see, for example, Gutzlaff, who in commenting on the conquest of the Xinjiang region states, "Nothing could have been so unwise as to extend the Chinese territory beyond its natural border." Gutzlaff, *The Life of Taou-Kwang*, p.80.
[70] Shen Yao, 'Xinjiang si yi', 10a–17b. For use of 'Yangi Shahr', see note 7 above.

crisis, but also to the question of stability and security in the north-western borderlands. Yet despite stressing the need for strict discipline and efficiency among the military, once again he has little to say on relations with the people beyond the *karun*. In the light of the empire's fiscal crisis and the ongoing debate on the cost of maintaining a large military establishment in the region (not to mention his own call for the abolition of the military colony), his suggestion that an imposing military presence would guarantee peace and "awe tribes outside the western limit into submission" appears clichéd, if not anachronistic.[71]

What emerges from all these writings of the opponents of retrenchment is that a certain introspection and preoccupation with domestic problems had impeded their authors from developing any coherent view on how to manage external relations. Even among informed scholar-officials there seems to have been little understanding of the role that had been played by neighbouring peoples in the Jahāngīr rebellion, the special nature of the borderlands, or the relations between the local people of Altishahr and their neighbours beyond the *karun*.[72] As a result, there was no discussion of policy towards the outsiders and little which touched on the local people of Altishahr whose response to any disturbance, whether instigated internally or externally, would inevitably be so crucial to the fate of Qing rule in the region. There was no mention of the importance of external trade to the economy of the region, how large communities of outsiders living in the region should be managed, or how policy with adjacent rulers should be conducted. The role of the tribute mission was accepted without question and without explanation. Statecraft scholars were concerned with the consolidation of their empire and defence, but not foreign policy. Thus, the Jahāngīr rebellion was regarded in much the same way as any other rebellion in the empire and the proposed solution was equally familiar: if the abuses of officials, such as corruption, extortion and sexual misdemeanours were stamped out, then the local people would have no reason to rally to the cause of the rebels.

In the light of the court's procrastination and failure to produce a comprehensive rehabilitation programme for Altishahr, by the late 1820s,

[71] Gong Zizhen, 'Yushi anbian suiyuan shu', pp.112–4; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp.431–4. The fact that frontier pacification was set as a topic in the metropolitan examinations gives some indication of how pertinent a subject of debate it was among scholars.

[72] It should perhaps be emphasised that officials who were exiled to Xinjiang and became 'experts' on the region were, of course, invariably located in the north of Xinjiang, from where all major research on the region was directed. Not surprisingly, therefore, their knowledge of the particular problems in Altishahr was relatively poor. See Waley-Cohen's comprehensive study of exile in Xinjiang. Waley-Cohen, *Exile in Mid-Qing China*.

an increasingly influential group of literati activists in Beijing was loudly voicing its opposition to any form of retrenchment or concessions in the northwest;[73] Xinjiang was a valuable asset that should not be lost to the empire; on the contrary, what was called for was further integration with the rest of China—the key to which was migration and agricultural colonization.

But for the court the issue was more complex for, as James Millward has pointed out, there is a sub-text here that addresses the question of Xinjiang as a Manchu preserve.[74] Even if the finances could be spared to support a garrison of the present size for a few more years, to expose Xinjiang, and notably Altishahr, to still closer links with China, whether in administrative terms or through increased civilian or military colonization, would inevitably spell the end of Manchu, as opposed to Han domination of the region. Discussion of this issue was forbidden (if we are to judge by extant sources), but the implication of the integrationist policies of the statecraft scholars could not have escaped the racially self-conscious, whether Han or Manchu.[75] In the short term, however, the emperor and his predominantly Manchu court, the Han oppositionist literati and the Xinjiang aficionados were united, albeit for different reasons, in their commitment to the retention of Xinjiang and the consolidation of the Qing territorial gains as part of the empire. The attempt by frontier officials to alert the court to the need for a thorough reappraisal of their position in the region fell on deaf ears.

The capture of Jahāngīr

Throughout the late summer and autumn of 1827, on the one hand the emperor pressed Changling to reduce his troop requirement for the

[73] Many of those concerned by what they regarded as the court's weakness and indecision with regard to the future of Xinjiang were to become members of the Spring Purification Circle. In 1829, policy towards the northwest was one of the earliest subjects of discussion by this literati activist group. See Polachek, *Inner Opium War*, p.349, note 26.

[74] Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.242–3.

[75] Some indication of the muted resentment engendered by the policy of retaining the senior posts in the administration of Xinjiang for bannermen can be found in Zuo Zongtang's personal correspondence. In 1874, after he had successfully suppressed the Muslim rising in Gansu and was eager to lead the recovery of Xinjiang, he confided bitterly to a friend that he fully expected that responsibility for the recovery of Xinjiang would be given to a Manchu, thus depriving him of finishing his task and, by implication, reaping his due merit (*Zuo wenxiang gong quanji*, *shupian*, 13:43a). Furthermore, when proposing that Xinjiang be integrated into the empire as a regular province, he made a point of noting, "Manchu and Han would be used indiscriminately to fill all official posts" (*Zuo wenxiang gong quanji*, *shupian*, 21:8a). Forty years earlier it is unlikely that anyone would have dared to express such thoughts even in private correspondence.

defence of Altishahr by 2,000–3,000 men,[76] on the other he searched for someone to replace him and take charge of the rehabilitation policy. Not surprisingly, the emperor's thoughts turned to Nayancheng, the governor general of Zhili, who in early 1828 memorialized that in his view Altishahr could be held with 6,500 men, with a reduction of 2,000 after two years, and a further reduction of 2,000 after five years.[77] He, if anyone, could silence criticism from the literati activists. In late 1828 Nayancheng, a Manchu of the Plain White Banner and grandson of the grand councillor Agui who had participated in the Qianlong conquest of Xinjiang, was transferred from his post in Zhili and appointed imperial commissioner in charge of the rehabilitation of southern Xinjiang.[78]

Meanwhile, the search for Jahāngīr continued throughout the winter of 1827–8 to no avail. Despite the emperor's impatience to see Jahāngīr captured, he was now beginning to show signs of concern for the safety of his generals and appeared to be resigned to the possibility of failure.[79] In early 1828, Ishāq, the incumbent hakim bek of Kashgar who was descended from a family of staunch Qing loyalists, bribed Qirghiz tribesmen to circulate a rumour that the Qing forces had withdrawn from Altishahr. Jahāngīr again approached the Yislik *karun* accompanied by a small force of some three hundred men, just as he had done the previous year. Failing to raise sufficient support from the villagers and having his path blocked by 400-odd Ishāqī followers as he headed towards Artush, he had no alternative but to withdraw. This time his movements were being marked by over 8,000 Qing soldiers who were engaged in scouring the mountains beyond the *karun*. On the Qaratagh Mountain, Jahāngīr was surrounded by a contingent of Sibe and Solon troops. As he and his followers were forced ever higher up the mountain, they abandoned their horses and proceeded on foot. Finally, with only a dozen men left and no ammunition, the khoja's men took to hurling stones down on their pursuers. It was only a matter of time before they were captured.[80]

On February 14th 1828, as Jahāngīr prepared to take his own life, he was captured with less than a dozen followers.[81] When, three weeks later,

[76] XZSL125:13b–14a, DG7.9 *xinhai*.
[77] HJNFL 55:12b–16a, DG7.12 *guiyou* and 67:13a, DG8.7 *xinchou*.
[78] See Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.586.
[79] XZSL 120:18a–19b, DG7.6 *gengyin*.
[80] XZSL132:16a–17a, DG8.1 *guihai*. These events are recorded in a Sibe ballad. See Stary, 'Hasihar-i ucun/Das Lied von Kaschgar', pp.124–7 and Bo Ya, 'Ka-shi-ga-er zhi ge pingjie', p.217.
[81] MQSL vol.2, pp.2042–3. Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.366. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.129. Kuropatakin's account that while sleeping Jahāngīr "was bound by his friend Mamat, the Bek of Oopal, and delivered over to the Chinese" does not tally with other accounts, save for the reference to treachery. Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, p.140.

the emperor received the news, he was delighted. At last the victory could be stamped and sealed. The celebrations that followed reflected the importance the court placed on the re-conquest of Altishahr and suggested a renewed confidence in imperial power. Changling was returned to favour and showered with gifts from the emperor. He and his assistant general, Yang Fang, were afforded hereditary rank, the double-eyed peacock feather and the purple bridle; their portraits were hung in the *Ziguangge*. Memorial tablets were carved to commemorate the campaign and a stele was erected on the Qaratagh Mountain.[82] The official record of the campaign, the *Qinding pinding Huijiang jiaoqin niyi fanglüe* (Imperially commissioned history of the pacification of the Muslim frontier and the capture of the rebels' descendants), was completed in 1830.

Meanwhile, Jahāngīr was taken to Beijing escorted by some 2,000 troops. In June 1828, he was presented to the spirits of the Qing ancestors (*xianfu*) at the *Taimiao* (Temple of the Ancestors) and the *Sheji* (Altar of Harvests) and on the following day he was brought before the Daoguang emperor at the ceremony for receiving captives (*shoufu*). He was then quartered and his head displayed for public view.[83]

For the Qing court, Jahāngīr's capture and ritual slaughter served to reinvigorate the imperial cause. For the Turkic Muslims of the northwest, meanwhile, his life's cause and ultimate fate contributed to their sense of common purpose and shared history. Geographically this sense of unity now spread north and south of Tianshan, for although the Turkic Muslims were still concentrated in Altishahr, by the 1820s, large numbers had been sent north, primarily as agriculturists to provide food for the garrisons,[84] but also as convicted criminals to be placed in servitude. With Jahāngīr's life and death already the stuff of legends, he was now assured a place in the mythology of Xinjiang, both as a military leader and a martyr to the struggle against the infidel. When the French Lazarist missionary, Father Huc, travelled through northern Xinjiang nearly twenty years later, he recorded an account of Jahāngīr's ordeal in the capital; gleaned, no doubt,

[82] XZSL133:30b–31a, DG8.2 *renchen* and 151:7b–13a, DG9.2 *dingmao*; NWYGZY 79:23a, DG8.5.6. Fang Chao-ying notes that Changling was the last official of the dynasty to be raised to a dukedom (*guogong*). Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.69.
[83] This was the third occasion on which the *xianfu* had been performed during the Qing dynasty and the fifth on which the *shoufu* ritual had been performed. It was the last time that either of these rituals, which were closely associated with the capture of non-Han rebels, was ever performed. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.68.
[84] The policy of resettling agriculturalists from Altishahr in the north, primarily in the Ili region, was begun under the Junghars and expanded during the Qianlong era. These migrants, who originated from all over Altishahr, subsequently became known as Taranchis. See Hua Li, *Qingdai Xinjiang nongye kaifa shi*, pp.22–3, 51–3.

from local people, it is graphic in its description of the cruel and barbaric treatment that Jahāngīr suffered at the hands of the Qing:

> L'empereur Tao-Kouang voulut voir ce guerrier dont la renommée était si grande, et ordonna qu'on le lui amenât. Les mandarins prirent aussitôt l'alarme; ils craignirent que le prisonnier ne révélât à l'empereur les causes qui avaient suscité la révolte du Khachghar, et les affreux massacres qui en avaient été la suite. Les grands dignitaires comprirent que ces révélations pourrraient leur être funestes, et les rendre coupables de négligence aux yeux de l'empereur, pour n'avoir pas surveillé les mandarins envoyés dans les pays étrangers. Pour obvier à ce danger, ils firent avaler à l'infortuné Tchankoeul [Jahāngīr] un breuvage qui lui ôta la parole, et le fit tomber dans une stupidité dégoûtante. Quand il parut devant l'empereur sa bouche, dit-on, était écumante, et sa figure hideuse; il ne put répondre à aucune des questions qui lui furent adressées...Tchankoeul fut condamné à être coupé en mourceaux, et à servir de pâture aux chiens.[85]

Ironically, while this account attests to the fact that Jahāngīr had indeed taken his place in the mythology of Xinjiang, with a heroic death overwriting a flawed life, it also hints at another current, rarely touched upon in other sources, but significant in accounting for the ambivalent response to subsequent khoja attacks. The reason for Jahāngīr's revolt and for his gruesome fate was, according to Huc's narrative, simply and tragically that the emperor was being kept in ignorance of the corrupt and abusive practices of his officials, not to mention the "terrible massacres" that followed the rebellion. Was this a touch that Huc added himself, or did it reflect a belief that despite being *kāfir*, the supreme ruler who resided in distant Beijing was, indeed, just and was being kept in ignorance of his people's sufferings by corrupt officials? This would not be so surprising. As others have noted, submission to the non-Muslim ruler who upholds justice and impartiality was well established in the Islamic tradition and the sufi brotherhoods themselves had a long history of association with secular rulers. At the very least, there were historical precedents that justified submission to an infidel ruler.[86]

Another story about Jahāngīr, which was circulating in the northwest in the mid to late 19th century, also highlights that in the eyes of the local people, non-adherence to the Muslim faith did not necessarily preclude the emperor's right to exercise paramount authority over the region. According to this legend, when Jahāngīr was taken to Beijing, the

[85] Huc, *Souvenirs d'un Voyage dans la Tartarie et le Thibet*, tome I, p.489. Nalivkin, who was also drawing on local accounts, states only that in Beijing, Jahāngīr was shown to the people in an iron cage, tortured and killed. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.129.

[86] See, for example, Hamada Masami, 'Le Sufisme et "ses opposants" au Turkestan Oriental', pp.542, 545; Baldick, *Imaginary Muslims*, p.6 and Hartmann, 'Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam', p.28.

emperor was so impressed by his composure and defiance, in the face of the most gruesome of deaths, that he had the sentence commuted. Instead, Jahāngīr was held in custody in order that more could be discovered about his deeds. Three months later, the khoja was sent into exile. An epidemic then swept through Beijing, followed by drought and famine and when the emperor consulted his astrologers as to the cause of these disasters, he was informed that this ill-fortune would not have occurred had Jahāngīr been kept in Beijing. Jahāngīr was thereupon returned to the capital where he was given food, drink and clothing and an allowance from the emperor's own coffers. And the story concludes, "even now the khoja is still in Beijing with the emperor."[87] Once again the narrative reflects a recognition and even acceptance of the Qing emperor as the supreme arbiter and paramount authority, but the twist lies in that while Jahāngīr may have had the misfortune to become the emperor's prisoner, he was the possessor of supernatural (possibly Islamic?) powers, which even the emperor is ultimately forced to acknowledge and revere. Thus, here too, there are signs of ambivalence: on the one hand, the authority of a distant and culturally-alien supreme ruler is acknowledged and respected, but on the other, a local Muslim hero is imbued with legendary powers that surpass even those of the supreme overlord. If during the reigns of the Qianlong and Jiaqing emperors, the Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang and its neighbouring polities had indeed gone some way towards construing the Qing emperor as their khan of khans (*khāqān*), by the mid-19th century this had been seriously undermined.

New sources of tension

The revolt that Jahāngīr inspired did not change the course of history in Xinjiang, but its legacy was potent. It created a regional hero whose fame spread north and south of the Tianshan Range and offered a credible alternative to Qing rule. In their opposition to the Qing the local people had reaffirmed their support for an Islamic leadership rather than the more secular authority represented by the beks. The great Qing empire may have eliminated Jahāngīr, but it had created a Muslim martyr and, more importantly, it had failed to put an end to the Āfāqī line. As Wulonga had pointedly noted, Jahāngīr's relatives, including his sons and his elder brother, Yūsuf, were still alive. In the eyes of the Muslims in this region, as the legitimate rulers of Altishahr and descendants of the Prophet, they had the potential to command no less a following than had Jahāngīr.

[87] Radloff, *Proben der Volksliteraturder nördlichen türkischen Stämme VI Taranci*, pp.7–9. I am grateful to Cynthia Cohen for assistance in the translation of this story.

Moreover, in the seventy years since the conquest of Xinjiang, Khoqand had transformed itself from a precarious and vulnerable city-state into a major regional player. Under the leadership of Muhammad ʻAlī Khān and his advisers, over the next decade the khanate was set to reach the apogee of its economic and political power. The transformation was dramatic: in the late 18th century Khoqand had flaunted its good relations with the Qing court as a form of subtle warning to its neighbours; by the 1820s it was leading a *jihād* against the empire, with at least one eye on enhancing its reputation among the Islamic world.[88] The Qing empire had proven to be a surprisingly benign neighbour and the prospect of wresting control of Altishahr, its resources, trade routes and a substantial Muslim population from the hands of the Qing *kāfir* was inevitably tempting. In the khojas and their followers, whom the khanate continued to provide with sanctuary, Khoqand had more than a pawn to play in a trade dispute—it had the ideal figureheads for any campaign to conquer Altishahr.

While the Khoqandis may have been encouraged by reports of an unpopular, corrupt and decadent administration in Altishahr, they could not have appreciated the extent to which Xinjiang was being increasingly woven into the mental and physical fabric of the empire. For the Qing court the expansion of the empire into the north-western regions remained the pinnacle of their military achievements. More than one hundred years after coming to power in the Chinese heartland, the conquest of the Western Regions had marked the consolidation of Manchu legitimacy to rule, a legitimacy to which the Aisin Gioro lineage would cling with increasing tenacity as the 19th century progressed. Not surprisingly, therefore, despite having no clear view of how the region was to be retained, the emperor showed little tolerance of those frontier officials who now suggested even a partial withdrawal. Meanwhile, as Han Chinese literati gradually re-familiarized themselves with the region, Xinjiang had come to represent not merely an exotic land of plenty, but an integral part of their vast empire, restored once more to its logical and necessary limits. Xinjiang, it was argued, was not only an essential frontier for strategic reasons, but its natural resources and virgin lands held the key to what were perceived as the empire's most pressing problems. Thus, although driven by varying motives, the Manchu ruling elite and a significant body of Han literati were at one in regarding the retention of Xinjiang as non-negotiable.

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[88] For details of the renown that Muhammad ʻAlī Khān did, indeed, receive from the Islamic world for leading the *jihād* against the Qing, see Beisembiev, "*Taʾrikh-i Shahrukhī*" *kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*, p. 246, note 11.

There was, however, another element whose support would be crucial in any contest between Qing and Khoqandi forces for control of this region. In Altishahr, where two generations had already grown up knowing nothing other than Qing rule, the habitual abuse of power and growing social tension had served to unite the Turkic Muslims, Āfāqī and Ishāqī alike, in opposition to the Qing authorities and their bek collaborators. Altishahr was, indeed, well served by stories of exiled khojas and rumours of their imminent return to overthrow the infidel had been dramatically brought to life by Jahāngīr's victory and, albeit brief, rule. Yet, while the ousting of the Qing from the four western cities of Altishahr may have been the realization of a dream for many Turkic Muslims, the débâcle of Jahāngīr's rule could not but have caused many others to doubt whether the khojas really held the answer to their problems.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CLOSING OF THE FRONTIER

The search for a new frontier policy

An ill-equipped band of a few hundred horsemen from beyond the fringes of the empire had triggered a rising to which the local people of Altishahr had responded with enthusiasm. Within a matter of weeks Jahāngīr had been able to field an army of 5,000–6,000 men.[1] He had driven the Qing garrisons from four major cities of southern Xinjiang and even when eventually routed by reinforcements of over 36,000 troops, redeployed from all over the empire, he had eluded capture for over six months. By the end of 1827 the campaign against Jahāngīr had left the imperial coffers depleted by over 11 million taels of silver.[2] An explanation was required.

As the court had suspected, in the aftermath of the rebellion an enquiry carried out by Changling into the conduct of Qing officials in Altishahr uncovered a series of misdemeanours.[3] But for Changling this was only part of the explanation. Both he and Wulonga attributed the widespread response of the local people to Jahāngīr's *jihād* to Islamic fervour and fanatical adoration of the khojas:

> The Muslims adhere firmly to the teachings of the scriptures and worship the khojas. As a result they have no fear of the government troops and no regard for life; they brave death to save others and do so calmly and without complaint. This spring, when the imperial forces advanced to put down the rebellion, every time we joined battle the brigands who were taken alive all freely confessed that they were following the rebels and willingly went to their deaths. Moreover, right up to the point of death some were reciting the scriptures and calling out to the khojas. Even if the rebels are hard-pressed and go out of the *karun* and the government troops seek out and apprehend the remainder of their faction, there will still be those who secretly communicate with them. Such is their adoration of the descendants of the Peighambar [the Prophet Muhammad] that it is an immutable part of their character.[4]

While this was not entirely helpful in the search for scapegoats, it nevertheless suggested that the Āfāqī supporters of Jahāngīr, in particular the Āfāqī beks and akhunds, might have been a good starting point. Yet

[1] Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, pp.126–7. One informant put the figure at 12,000. See Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.343.
[2] XZSL 129:24a, DG7.11 *guichou*.
[3] XZSL 111:36b38a, DG6.12 *xinyou*.
[4] HJNFL 49:24a–b, DG7.7 *guiwei*.

just as in the mid-18th century, after the revolt of the Āfāqī khoja brothers, Burhān al-Dīn and Khōja-Jahān, the Qing authorities had made no move to persecute the Āfāqiyya, so now they made no attempt to carry out a witch hunt. The emperor insisted that Āfāqī and Ishāqī followers were all his subjects, and that the good should be rewarded and the bad punished, irrespective of their adherence to one or other order.[5] Indeed, it could not have been otherwise. Given that the Qing authorities had never taken an active interest in the religious politics of the region, the task of identifying who was an Āfāqī follower would have been almost impossible. In the summer of 1826, Nayancheng, then serving in Zhili, had recommended a draconian rehabilitation plan which not only called for the elimination of all the Āfāqī adherents who had followed Jahāngīr, together with their children, but also the exile of all those who had taken no part in the rising to Yunnan, Guïzhou, Fujian and Guangzhou. The emperor's response appeared to owe more to pragmatism than high-mindedness: such a proposal would be too difficult to implement.[6] Consequently, although the Qing authorities repeatedly demanded the extradition of one Āfāqī adherent, namely Bābak, the 3rd ranking bek who had led the rebels at Yarkand and become one of Jahāngīr's leading supporters,[7] there appears to have been an acceptance by the Qing authorities that to have attributed culpability for the revolt to the Āfāqī adherents per se would not have been conducive to the re-establishment of peace and order. Indeed, Qing officials in Altishahr optimistically reported that having experienced Jahāngīr's rule, the Āfāqī followers regretted having assisted his passage to power.[8] Once again, in eschewing policies designed to divide the Muslim community along sectarian lines, the Qing authorities unwittingly assisted the erosion of those divides and emphasized the boundary between 'believer' and 'non-believer'.

If blame for the revolt could not be attributed to the Āfāqiyya, then an alternative had to be found. Gradually, official attention came to focus on a fifth column—the Khoqandi community resident in Altishahr. The identification, isolation and punishment of this 'bad element' formed a central part of the Qing rehabilitation policy and accorded with the desire to punish Khoqand, if not for participation in the revolt, then for failing to co-operate in the mopping-up operation.

As already noted, throughout the spring and summer of 1827, the Altishahr authorities had repeatedly requested that Khoqand capture and extradite Jahāngīr, his family, and a handful of known supporters.

[5] NWYGZY 79:49a, DG8.12.28.
[6] XZSL 104:16b–17a, DG6.8 *guiyou*.
[7] HJNFL 49:19b–20a, DG7.7 *guiwei*.
[8] NWYGZY 79:43a, DG8.12.28.

Muhammad ʻAlī Khān had resolutely refused to comply and over the next few months, as the attempt to track down Jahāngīr appeared to be ever more hopeless, the notion that trade sanctions might be the most effective way of exerting control over Khoqand had gained acceptance. A trade embargo had first been mooted by officials in the northwest. Eshan, who was acting governor general in Shaan-Gan at the time of the revolt, saw no virtue in wasting military effort and resources in the pursuit of Jahāngīr outside the *karun*. He argued that if the border were firmly sealed, the Khoqandis would soon realize that Jahāngīr was their best bargaining tool. Denied tea and rhubarb, and unable to sell their hides, he anticipated that within two to three years Khoqand would be prepared to hand over the khoja, dead or alive, in order to secure a resumption of trade. Eshan was disciplined for what the court considered a defeatist attitude towards the capture of its most wanted rebel,[9] but he was not alone in appreciating the importance to Khoqand of the Altishahr trade. Changling may have been too astute to suggest that the Qing forces should abandon their pursuit of Jahāngīr, but he had not hesitated to threaten Khoqand with sanctions in order to elicit co-operation.

By early 1828, now that Jahāngīr had been captured, Khoqand was showing even less sign of willingness to co-operate in the arrest and extradition of the khoja's family and supporters. The court was thus persuaded that trade sanctions might be the best way to satisfy the literati opponents of retrenchment, while also providing an answer to the longer-term problem of keeping the frontier peaceful without a substantial increase in the garrison. The court's only remaining concern was whether Nayancheng, the newly-appointed special commissioner with responsibility for the rehabilitation policy, could ensure that these sanctions would be implemented effectively.[10]

Nayancheng arrived in Aqsu in late April 1828 and reached Kashgar in early June. He had previously served as governor general in Guangdong and Guangxi, Shaan-Gan and most recently in Zhili. He was no stranger to frontier affairs or Xinjiang and may well have heard his grandfather, Agui, tell stories of the conquest and expound on Qing administration of the region long before he ever set foot there. In 1806, he had been sent to Ili to take up the post of commandant, but while he was still en route, an investigation into his policies in Guangdong concluded that he had been too liberal in distributing rewards and rank to pirates. As a result, he was stripped of his rank and, on arrival in Ili, was instructed to serve as a minor official under Songyun, then military governor. In late 1809,

[9] Cai Guanluo, *Qingdai qibai mingren zhuan*, pp.900–1.
[10] NWYGZY 73:9b, DG7.12.8.

Nayancheng returned to Xinjiang and served fleetingly in Qarashahr, Yarkand and Kashgar where he was appointed councillor. But his skills were soon needed elsewhere and in early 1810 he was posted to Xining where he assisted Changling in the suppression of the revolt in Kokonor. It is not difficult to see why Nayancheng was selected to overhaul the Qing administration of Altishahr: not only did he have the relevant experience of frontier affairs, but he was adamantly opposed to any form of retrenchment in the northwest and his appointment would, therefore, silence the increasingly vociferous literati opposition. Most importantly, however, his proposal to hold Altishahr with 6,500 troops, a figure which he estimated could be reduced to a mere 2,500 within five years, could not have failed to appeal to a court that found itself increasingly concerned by the expenditure involved in retaining the jewel of the Qianlong emperor's conquests.[11]

As commissioner for rehabilitation, once again Nayancheng's stay in Xinjiang would be brief. He was to hold the post for less than twelve months, but in that time he dispatched over eighty memorials to Beijing relating to the rehabilitation policy. Many of these were directly concerned with relations with Khoqand and had a profound impact on developments in Altishahr over the next twenty years.[12]

Jahāngīr's capture, shortly before Nayancheng's arrival in Altishahr, had been heralded throughout the empire as a triumphant and fitting end to the campaign. Further expeditions to capture a few relatively insignificant rebels would have been an expensive anti-climax. Nayancheng was, therefore, explicitly instructed not to send further troops beyond the *karun* and in the event that Khoqand and Bukhara did not extradite Jahāngīr's relatives, as now seemed highly probable, he was to impose sanctions and close the frontier to trade.[13]

No sooner had Nayancheng reached Kashgar when yet another envoy arrived from Khoqand to congratulate the Qing on the capture of Jahāngīr. The khan was prepared to hand over all those taken as captives to Khoqand, both soldiers and merchants, but he refused to extradite any members of the khoja family; once again it was asserted that this would contravene the teachings of the scriptures. Nayancheng's reply was brusque:

> As you know in the past the awesome military force of the imperial court destroyed the various polities, this time we have [simply] taken the rebel

[11] The emperor actually suggested that the reduction should take place in four rather than five years. XZSL 151:31b–32a, DG7.2 *wuyin*.
[12] On Nayancheng, see Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 584–7; Zhou Xuan and Gao Li, *Qingdai Xinjiang liufang mingren*, p.126; *Guochao xianzheng shilüe*, 23:5a–10b.
[13] *Qingdai waijiao shiliao – Daoguang* [hereafter WJSL], 2:30b–31a, DG8.3.25.

> Jahāngīr alive, so what need is there for congratulations? The tiny territory of your tribe is no larger than one prefecture or one district of China. If the emperor mobilizes troops to punish you, you will be destroyed in a flash.[14]

Nayancheng refused to allow the Khoqandi envoy and those accompanying him to trade their merchandise. The envoy was not entertained at a banquet, nor was he presented with the customary gifts. Instead, within a matter of days, he was accompanied to the *karun* under armed guard. There he was given provisions for his journey and dispatched bearing the somewhat ambiguous message that although it was of little import to the empire whether or not Khoqand extradited Jahāngīr's family members, nevertheless, if Khoqand did not comply, trade would be halted; this, Nayancheng asserted, would necessarily cause the surrounding tribes to look on Khoqand with disdain.[15]

During Nayancheng's first posting to Kashgar in 1809, at the time of the Sālih Jān affair and 'Ālim Khān's ill-judged reference to the emperor as 'friend', he had already formulated the view that Khoqand had greatly inflated ideas of its power and status.[16] Not surprisingly then, this time he was quick to alight upon evidence of similar presumptions in Muhammad 'Alī Khān's letter of congratulations. The letter itself was written, by Nayancheng's own account, in acceptably respectful language and penned in black ink. It was Muhammad 'Alī Khān's seal that caused the problem, embossed as it was in gold. The intention, Nayancheng pointed out, for the benefit of those court officials who may have lacked his perception, was to underline Muhammad 'Alī's self-importance (*you wangzi zunda zhi yi*). Significantly, the new commissioner attributed Khoqand's pretensions, not to any external factors, but to a lack of backbone in Qing policy. According to Nayancheng, in the recent past, "despite their tricks and lies", Khoqandi envoys had always been treated graciously, entertained and lavished with gifts.[17] More often than not, the traders who accompanied them had also been granted tax exemption. These privileges, the imperial commissioner surmised, were then translated into the trading advantages upon which Khoqand had been assiduously augmenting its power and strength among the surrounding tribal polities. In other words, in recent years, by adopting a weak hand towards Khoqand, Qing policy had been upsetting the balance of power in the region.

The proposal to implement economic sanctions, which was so strongly supported by the literati in Beijing found resonance, at least temporarily,

[14] NWYGZY 79:24a, DG8.5.6.
[15] NWYGZY 79:24a–b, DG8.5.6.
[16] On this occasion Nayancheng had had 23 previous missives from Khoqand scrutinized for similar signs of disrespect. NWYGZY 19:2b–5b, JQ14.8.1.
[17] NWYGZY 79:23a–25a, DG8.5.6.

among court officials who, while eager to bolster imperial authority, were equally concerned to avoid further military confrontation. Not only was the application of sanctions a policy that had been tried and tested in the case of the Russians at the border market of Kiakhta,[18] but in that it accorded with the idealized notion of trade as imperial munificence and a reward for compliance, it was a graphic illustration, at little cost, of imperial power. Prior to his arrival in Altishahr, Nayancheng had already received reports which repeated the popular wisdom that the outsiders could not do without the tea and rhubarb of the interior, and that if denied these items they would then become compliant in order to seek a resumption of trade.[19] A few months later, he was reiterating the same beliefs himself, even adding porcelain, silk and other items to the list of China's products, without which he considered the outsiders could not survive.[20] Nevertheless, it was evident to all officials with first-hand knowledge of the north-western frontier that a total trade embargo would not only be virtually unenforceable, it would also cause inflation and considerable economic hardship for all the people of Xinjiang whose livelihoods relied on the animal trade with Central Asia. Nayancheng's attention was, therefore, brought to focus on rhubarb and tea, the mainstays of the Khoqand trade.

The rhubarb and tea trade

Since as early as the 10th century Chinese rhubarb from the northwest (present-day Gansu-Qinghai) had been traded throughout Central Asia, where it was used primarily as a dye, but increasingly for medicinal purposes—as a laxative and purgative. By the 16th century Europeans had also come to value its medicinal properties and two centuries later, it was a staple of the Western medicine chest.[21] Favoured, in particular, by the Russians, it was the Russian merchants who dominated the sales of rhubarb in Europe.[22]

[18] Although Western sources generally refer to the market as Kiakhta, this is the name of the town on the Russian side; the town on the Qing side of the Mongolian-Siberian border was actually called Maimaicheng (lit. trading town). Under the Treaty of Kiakhta in 1727, Kiakhta became the first trading town on the Qing border with Russia. Ili was designated a trading site for Qazaqs in 1761, followed by Tarbagatai in 1764.
[19] NWYGZY 73:9b, DG7.12.8.
[20] WJSL 2:40a–b, DG8.8.3.
[21] Although the medicinal qualities of rhubarb were known to the Greek and Roman worlds by the first century, their rhubarb probably came from the southern Urals or trans-Volga region. Foust traces the first appearance of Chinese rhubarb in Europe to the 8th or 9th century. Foust, *Rhubarb*, pp.1–2.
[22] For much of the 18th century rhubarb was a state monopoly in Russia. See Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin*, pp.164–85; Mancall, 'The Kiakhta Trade', p.29.

In the late 18th century, Chinese rhubarb was transported to Europe by two main routes: the sea route via Guangzhou and overland via Irkutsk, Omsk and St. Petersburg.[23] In the case of the latter route, the rhubarb did not necessarily pass directly from the Chinese merchants to the Russians. By the 1730s, the Bukharans had begun visiting the border market of Kiakhta and soon monopolised the trade in good quality rhubarb. According to the British diplomat Harry Parkes, writing in the mid-19th century, the rhubarb trade at Kiakhta was still in the hands of the Bukharans.[24] But 'Bukharans', it should be noted, was a term often used indiscriminately by Europeans for all Turkic Muslim traders. Moreover, there was a third route that circumvented the official markets: from present-day Gansu or Qinghai via Kashgar and Merv to Aleppo or Beirut and then by sea to Europe. Here the trade across Central Asia was again dominated by Turkic Muslims, and increasingly by the Khoqandis.

The notion that the regulation of trade could be used by the rulers of China as a means of punishing non-compliance and eliciting future good conduct from the outsiders beyond China's northern borders has a long history. In the Han dynasty, it was already an established belief that the outsiders had an insatiable desire for Chinese silks and grain, the denial of which would bring the most errant and recalcitrant of chieftains to heel. Just as in the Han and subsequent dynasties border markets were invariably closed not because of trade disputes but on account of secondary problems, this was also true of the several occasions throughout the 18th century when the Qing halted trade at Kiakhta. In other respects, however, by the late Qing dynasty, the implementation of economic sanctions was considerably changed and considerably more complex. As Qing officials were well aware, border markets were now just one link in the trading networks, official and otherwise, that crisscrossed the world. For economic sanctions to bite it was not sufficient just to halt bilateral trade and close one or two border markets: the essential commodities had to be prevented from reaching their market via other routes and other means.

By the 18th century the Chinese were already convinced that rhubarb was so necessary to the Russians that were they denied it they would soon amend their ways and become respectful,[25] while the people of Hindustan

[23] So-called Chinese rhubarb and Russian rhubarb were actually the same variety and emanated from the same areas of China. Depending on whether the root had been transported by land or sea, it was known as Russian or Chinese rhubarb. Chinese rhubarb was considered to be of lower quality as a result of its long journey and exposure to sea air. Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident*, vol.1, pp.377–8.

[24] Parkes, 'Report on the Russian Caravan Trade with China', p.311.

[25] 'Qianlong 54 nian Zhong-E maoyi', no.11 (QL54.5.7), p.44.

(present-day Pakistan) were said to be so dependent on rhubarb that "if they do not ingest it for a year they will die."[26] This popular belief was reinforced during the ruptures in the Kiakhta trade, when Qing officials repeatedly received reports, embellished no doubt by interested Central Asian parties, that the Russians were suffering from the lack of rhubarb and desperately sought the resumption of trade. In the 19th century Songyun, the long-serving official of the *Lifanyuan* who held the post of military governor in Xinjiang for over seven years, endeavoured to explain this perplexing nutritional dependency when he pointed out that the Russians ate a lot of fish and, therefore, had to eat rhubarb to assist their digestion.[27] But by this time, it was widely held among the elite of the Qing empire that not only Russians but all foreigners were dependent on the regular consumption of rhubarb.

Thus, when the Qing court halted the border trade at Kiakhta, cessation of the rhubarb trade, in particular, was deemed crucial to the success of the policy. Consequently, the sale of rhubarb at Guangzhou also had to be restricted in order to prevent it being transported to Russia via Western Europe.[28] Strict measures were taken simultaneously to halt the trade via Xinjiang; all rhubarb stocks were confiscated and smugglers from outside the *karun* were repatriated with a stiff warning, while those from within the pass were sent to Beijing for trial.[29] Nevertheless, with Kiakhta closed to trade, smuggling through Xinjiang became so lucrative and so pervasive that the resident Qing officials despaired of eradicating it. Holes in the Great Wall at Jiayuguan, which had remained without repair for many years, made it impossible to keep the Chinese rhubarb traders from bringing the root into Xinjiang.[30] And while the role of local Muslims in the illegal trade was much curtailed by the prohibition on their travelling outside the *karun* to trade, keeping a check on the large numbers of merchants from all over Central Asia who travelled back and forth to Xinjiang was a different matter. Many of these merchants were engaged in the livestock trade and any attempt to restrict their access to the markets of Xinjiang would have had grave implications for the local economy.

[26] Qishiyi, *Xiyu wenjian lu*, 43a.

[27] Songyun, *Suifu jilüe*, 1:19a.

[28] Mancall, 'The Kiakhta Trade', pp.25–6, 29. The three lengthy halts in the 18th century occurred from 1766–68, 1778–80 and 1785–92. For further analysis of the causes of these interruptions to trade, see Li Yongqing and Su Fenglin, 'Qianlong nianjian Qiaketu maoyi sanci biguan bianxi'.

[29] 'Qianlong 54 nian Zhong-E maoyi', no.1 (QL54.1.4), p.36. For instances of rhubarb smuggling and the involvement of Khoqandis during the 1785–92 rupture in trade at Kiakhta, see Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan*, pp.369–72.

[30] For a brief description of the Ming construction of the wall in the vicinity of Jiayuguan, see Waldron, *The Great Wall of China*, pp.142–3.

This left Qing officials with little option but to prohibit Central Asian traders from exchanging Russian goods in the markets of Xinjiang—action that they hoped would have the effect of making the illicit trade untenable. In theory, all goods brought across the northern border into Xinjiang by the Central Asian traders were to be taken to Ili. There the merchandise was inspected and only when it was established that it did not include Russian goods or booty would the merchants be issued with a permit to trade within the *karun*.[31] Yet despite their best efforts, Qing officials were unable to prevent rhubarb passing to the Khoqandi and Qirghiz merchants, and then being sold on to the Russians.[32]

The only other commodity that the Chinese believed to be of comparable importance to foreigners was tea. Qing officials frequently cited tea and rhubarb as being the two items without which foreigners could not survive.[33] In an oft-cited letter to Queen Victoria, Lin Zexu famously suggested that foreign countries could not do without these two commodities for even a day:

> Take tea and rhubarb for example; the foreign countries cannot get along for a single day without them. If China cuts off these benefits with no sympathy for those who are to suffer, then what can the barbarians rely upon to keep themselves alive.[34]

Despite the fact that Lin Zexu subsequently acknowledged that he had been ill-informed about the British dependency on rhubarb (though not tea),[35] this famous quotation has frequently been understood to indicate that Qing officials, even of Lin Zexu's standing, seriously believed that the West was gastronomically, if not medicinally, dependent on tea and rhubarb from China. Indeed, such an interpretation strikes a chord with much of the early Western scholarship on the Opium Wars which suggests that many of China's problems with foreign powers in the 18th and 19th centuries arose from the ignorance of its policymakers in respect of foreigners and foreign lands, and an inflated and anachronistic view of China's position in the world.

While Qing officials may have been relatively ignorant of foreign affairs, they were certainly not blind to basic economics. Over the course of many decades, they had monitored the economic importance of

[31] 'Qianlong 54 nian Zhong-E maoyi', no.2 (QL54.1.22), p.37 and no.3 (QL54.2.20), p.38.

[32] In 1790 when Kiakhta was closed, the persistence of smuggling drove one Qing official to suggest strip-searching—the Qianlong emperor was not amused. GZSL1366:3b–4b, QL55.11 *wuyin*.

[33] *Chouban yiwu shimo*, vol.1, 4:30a, 5:25b.

[34] As cited in Fairbank and Teng, *China's Response to the West*, p.25.

[35] See Waley, *The Opium War*, p.102.

rhubarb, tea, and indeed silk, to the West and were consequently aware that their regulation might be expected to elicit certain concessions or co-operation. Hence, when Lin Zexu noted that he had erred in assuming rhubarb was essential to the British, his admission was based on the realization that, unlike tea, the British imported relatively small amounts of rhubarb from China and it did not, therefore, constitute a potential economic weapon. Thus, if Qing officials were wont to refer to a physiological dependency on the products of China that would allow the empire to bring outsiders to heel, it was no doubt because this was the only legitimate framework available to them for the discussion of foreign affairs, and not because they did not understand the concept of balance of payments. What in the West was commonly perceived as ignorance and arrogance, was no more than the mechanism by which Qing officials reinforced and extended their social order beyond the borders of the empire. With no clear ideological divide between the internal and external order, there was no perceived necessity to employ different language, or different symbolism. What Lin Zexu was doing in that notorious letter to Queen Victoria was establishing a framework in which negotiations could take place and most importantly in which, if necessary, the emperor would be able to extend his magnanimity and a consensus could be reached.

It was not until the late 18th century that tea gained wide popularity in Russia and Europe, but it had been drunk throughout Central Asia since at least the 15th century and the popular Chinese belief that foreigners were dependent on tea was already well established in the Ming. As with rhubarb, it was said that without it, foreigners would become ill and die, thus to withhold it would render them docile.[36] Certainly by the early 19th century the experience of the Chinese traders at Kiakhta reinforced the notion that the Russians simply could not get enough tea. According to Parkes, in the mid-19th century, tea never remained unsold, while Russian goods so depreciated in value that they were sometimes held for two to three years before being sold.[37] But for the most part the high return from the re-sale of the tea meant that the Russians could afford to trade their goods at a loss. Indeed, in the early 19th century brick tea served as the monetary unit at Kiakhta (previously it had been nankeens) until it was

[36] See Rossabi, 'The Tea and Horse Trade with Inner Asia during the Ming,' pp.41, 156.

[37] Parkes, 'Report on the Russian Caravan Trade with China', p.307. The Russian view of this was that, at least in the early years, there was an insufficient supply of Chinese goods, the market being attended by fewer merchants from the Qing side of the border than from the Russian side. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin*, p.205.

replaced by silver in 1854.[38] As the Russian consumption of tea grew, so it came to dominate the bilateral trade, accounting by 1825 for over 87% of the value of all Russian imports from the Qing empire.[39] Simultaneously, the amount of tea being exported via Kiakhta rose from approximately 2.5 million lbs. to over 10.7 million lbs. in 1850.[40] Russia became the empire's second biggest tea market and contributed to the intensification of tea-growing in the 18th and 19th centuries.[41]

The illegal tea trade had a long history. Under the Ming, when the Chinese tea trade was strictly controlled by the official tea bureaux and all tea merchants had to be in receipt of a licence (*yin*), the smuggling of tea out of China was already a perennial problem.[42] The tea licence system worked much like that for salt licences. Having purchased their *yin*, merchants were then entitled to buy tea at the plantations or factories in central and south China and to transport it for sale in the frontier regions. As with the salt licences, the tea licences functioned not only as an indicator of the amount of tea that could be purchased and transported, but also as a road pass. At the Tea and Horse Agencies, such as that at Lanzhou, a half of this tea was then collected as tax and sold on as 'official tea' (*guancha*) and the remainder, which the merchants sold privately, was known as 'supplementary tea' (*fucha*). However, by the late 18th and early 19th century, the tea licence system in Xinjiang had almost collapsed—all tea passing through the Lanzhou bureau was now taxed per *yin* in silver, but was still known as *fucha*.[43] In that this was licit (i.e. taxed) tea, much of which was supposedly destined for sale through government shops (*guanpu*) to the garrisons in Xinjiang, the term *fucha*, now shed the sense of being 'supplementary' and instead implied 'official' tea.

[38] Mancall, 'The Kiakhta Trade', pp.29–30. 'Brick tea' was one of the cheapest forms of tea. It was made from pulverized black or green tea-dust which was compressed into slabs or bricks.

[39] Mancall, 'The Kiakhta Trade', p.31.

[40] Gardella, *Harvesting Mountains*, p.39.

[41] British imports of tea had risen from 1 million lbs. in the 1730s to some 20 million lbs. by 1789. It was this escalating demand that fuelled the need to find a commodity that the Chinese would import with equal alacrity. Inglis, *The Opium War*, pp.34–5.

[42] See Rossabi, 'The Tea and Horse Trade', pp.136–68.

[43] The system had collapsed because the empire no longer had the same need for Central Asian horses, for which the tea had been exchanged in the past. On the one hand, the Qing had established its own ranches for horse-rearing in the northwest; on the other, with the defeat of the Mongols, from the mid-Qing, the type of warfare in which the imperial forces were engaged was not so heavily reliant on horse-power. A third possible reason for the decline of the system is suggested by Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi who note that with the development of the economy in the northwest, local people had other items to exchange for tea. See Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi, *Qingdai Xibei minzu maoyi shi*, pp.76–8.

It is unclear what kinds of tea were being traded as *fucha*, but it would appear that it was brick tea, comprising a mixture of the less expensive varieties, and that it was probably identified as *fucha* only by means of its packaging.[44] In addition to the *fucha*, however, a large quantity of tea, of various varieties, was entering Xinjiang—some was sold privately for local consumption, but the bulk was destined for trade across Central Asia. It was these teas that circumvented the Chinese tax bureaux and constituted the illicit tea trade. For much of the time, the Qing administration turned a blind eye to this trade, but periodically, as when Kiakhta was closed, the authorities endeavoured to clamp down on it.

Just as the peoples of Central Asia had been drinking tea since at least the 15th century, so they had long been involved in the tea trade, and notably the illegal tea trade.[45] Although the Russians controlled the tea trade at Kiakhta, when that market was closed, Central Asian traders were quick to capitalise on the growth in smuggling, thereby ensuring that they secured an ever greater stake in the trade after Kiakhta re-opened. The profits to be made on the transport of tea across Central Asia were such that by the 1820s, large quantities of tea were being sold in Xinjiang without licence and at very high prices.[46] The Khoqandis were influential players in this trade. Together the trade in tea and rhubarb, the two items that the Chinese regularly cited as being essential to the West, was fuelling the Khoqandi economy. Acting as middlemen, the Khoqandi merchants worked their way back and forth across the porous borders of Central Asia, making substantial profits.

Trade sanctions and the expulsion of the Khoqandis

Although previous embargoes aimed at Russia had been accompanied by a crackdown on smuggling they had, in fact, benefited the Khoqandis in that during the periods of market closure the profits to be made from the illegal trade increased several fold. The embargo of 1828 was the first to be directed specifically at Khoqand. Nayancheng was determined that it should be effective. As always, however, implementing the embargo would not be easy—not only did the terrain in this part of the world make it impossible to seal any frontier region completely, but for the Qing administration in Xinjiang, the problem was aggravated by the fact that it had no linguistic access to the local society other than through middlemen.

[44] Ji Yun, who was exiled to Xinjiang from 1768–70, noted that *fucha* was said to have qualities that counteracted harm to the stomach inflicted by the local water. As it was heated, it apparently turned from amber to black. Ji Yun, 'Wulumuqi zaji', 2:122b.

[45] As Songyun noted, tea was also used throughout Central Asia for making felts, fertilizer, curing leather and in various dyes. LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.34, DG11.1.19.

[46] NWYGZY 77:44a–b, DG8.7.19.

Moreover, given the ethnic mix of Xinjiang, even with the assistance of the beks, it would be no easy task to distinguish Khoqandis from traders from other parts of Central Asia; without too much difficulty the Khoqandis could pose as Qazaqs, Qirghiz or any other Central Asians.

Nayancheng's initial proposal on the implementation of the embargo was typically draconian: he would close the Altishahr borders, expel all the resident traders from beyond the *karun* (i.e. not only Khoqandis, but Badakhshanis, Kashmiris and Bukharans, etc.) and confiscate all stocks of tea and rhubarb in one fell swoop. The emperor agreed that the expulsion of all the Khoqandis was ultimately the best policy for stabilizing the frontier; however, he advised caution, fearful that such an extreme move might provoke disturbances.[47] Nayancheng's plan was, therefore, modified so as first to expel only those Khoqandis and other traders who had resided in Altishahr for less than ten years. All those who had dwelt in Altishahr for over ten years were to be placed on the tax register as Muslim households (*Huihu*) and made to cultivate the land, but they would be secretly watched and if they continued to engage in the illicit rhubarb and tea trade, or otherwise made trouble, they too would be expelled. The imperial agents of the various southern cities were to report annually on the numbers expelled. By expelling one batch a year, within a few decades it was envisaged that the region would be rid of all outsiders.[48]

In 1828, the first year of the embargo, 289 Khoqandi households were expelled from the six towns of the Altishahr, west of Qucha. This left 1,278 Khoqandi households who had resided in Altishahr for less than ten years. 327 households of Badakhshanis, Bukharans and Kashmiris who had been living in the cities of Aqsu and Yarkand were also expelled, leaving 725 households who had been resident in these two cities for less than ten years. In addition, the official figures showed a total of 2,247 households of outsiders, predominantly Khoqandis, who had lived in Altishahr for over ten years and were incorporated into the tax register.[49] Meanwhile, the policy was extended to the north where the Khoqandi population was considerably smaller and less established; nevertheless, by spring 1829, 1,466 Khoqandis—men, women and children—had departed Ili and crossed beyond the *karun*.[50] Not only did these people lose their

[47] XZSL 135:28a–b, DG8.4 *xinmao*.
[48] NWYGZY 80:83a–88a, DG8.7.19.
[49] *Ibid*.
[50] In September 1828, the military governor at Ili, Deyinga, reported that over 1,500 Khoqandis, realizing that their livelihoods were no longer viable, were voluntarily leaving the Ili area. WJSL 2:37a, DG8.7.2. A few months later, he reported that 1,466 had departed (HJNFL 78:3a, DG9.2 *dingmao*), but presumably this was the same group. Although far fewer in number than in Altishahr, Khoqandis were already trading in Ili in 1811 and possibly much earlier. See Poutimstev, 'Voyage de Boukhtarminsk à Gouldja ou Ili', p.215.

homes and land, but with the confiscation of their stocks of tea and rhubarb they lost their life-savings too. One group of local beks were stirred to comment that having lived side by side with the people of Altishahr since at least the time of Qianlong, the Khoqandis were "no different from the local Muslims." While, at the sight of entire families crying bitterly and railing against their fate as they were escorted to the *karun*, even seasoned Qing officials appear to have been moved by their plight.[51]

Despite the understanding that annual expulsions would be reported, there do not appear to be any figures for subsequent years. By January 1831, the expulsions from north and south were estimated at several thousand.[52] Possibly, deprived of their means of livelihood, the majority of those remaining who had lived in the region for less than ten years left of their own accord. Life in Altishahr was no longer as attractive as it had been. The prohibition on marriage to locals, which had been in place since the Qianlong period,[53] was tightened. Khoqandis were not allowed to marry local women; if they did, the husband would be expelled and the woman charged with an offence against the marriage laws. The children of outsiders were not allowed to marry locals either; those already married had to report the births of all children, while those not yet married were not permitted to set up home.[54] Those who were allowed to remain were not to engage in trade and any Khoqandi who applied for a pass to go beyond the *karun* was to be refused re-entry. Those who possessed property were prohibited from building any more, and their land was not to exceed 100 *mu*. A violation of any of these prohibitions would result in expulsion and confiscation of assets.[55] In the absence of a body of documentation on legal cases, it is impossible to ascertain the extent to which these regulations were implemented. However, one may surmise that after Nayancheng's arrival in Altishahr, life for those Khoqandis who were allowed to remain became distinctly less comfortable.

The search for stocks of tea and rhubarb uncovered substantial quantities held by Khoqandi families in the Altishahr towns west of

[51] ZPZZ MZL 528.1, DG11.1.15.
[52] ZPZZ MZL 558.1, DG10.12.19. According to Bichang, in 1830 only 200 Khoqandi households remained in Yarkand. Bichang, *Shoubian jiyao*, 41b.
[53] GZSL1488:10a–b, QL60.10 *guiwei*. For the correspondence with Nārbutā on this issue and Yongbao's recommendations that gave rise to this prohibition, see MWDA 3512–020 160–3173, QL60.10.4; 160–3565, [QL60.10] and 160–3575, [QL60.10].
[54] *Huijiang zeli*, 8:7a *xucuan*; NWYGZY 77:40a–b, DG9.3.5; Sagachi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan*, p.380.
[55] NWYGZY 80: 84b–85a, DG8.7.19.

Qucha. According to Nayancheng's information, over 9,328 *jin* of rhubarb and over 68,960 *jin* of tea was confiscated from 289 households where family members had resided in Altishahr for less than ten years.[56] At Ili, the military governor Deyinga was adamant that if the embargo were to be effective, equally stringent measures had to be adopted in the north; his investigations uncovered stocks amounting to over 38,000 *jin* of tea and over 4,200 *jin* of rhubarb.[57]

Despite the size and importance of the rhubarb trade through Xinjiang, the root was not used in any great quantity by the local people. Once stocks had been removed, therefore, enforcement of the embargo was simply a matter of preventing it being brought into the region by Chinese merchants. Smugglers were punished harshly and the illicit trade, through Xinjiang at least, soon dwindled. The tea trade, on the other hand, was more complex and proved much more difficult to curtail.

Unlike rhubarb, by the 19th century large quantities of tea were consumed by the local people, as well as the Qing garrisons and the small but growing community of Chinese merchants and exiles. The problem was, therefore, how to prevent tea, destined for export, from entering Xinjiang while maintaining necessary supplies at a reasonable price for the internal market. As already mentioned, by the early 19th century the licence system had disintegrated and a relatively low level of official trade functioned alongside a booming unregulated trade. In the early 1820s, a short-lived attempt to abolish all private sales and thus boost the sale of licences had only served to create shortages and push up prices.[58] Consequently, at the time of the upheavals of 1826, the private, and largely untaxed, tea trade was flourishing.

In the early 19th century, tea entered Xinjiang via two main routes. Merchant firms primarily from Shanxi, Shaanxi and Zhili, the so-called north route traders (*beitao ke*), continued to ply their private trade from the trade centres of Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) or Guihua, across Mongolia to Gucheng in northern Xinjiang, where the Qing had recently established a tax station. Here the tea probably passed to local merchants, who carried it on to Urumchi, before heading further west to Ili or turning north to

[56] NWYGZY 80:83b–84a, DG8.4.19. Saguchi Tōru takes the 30-odd *jin* of rhubarb confiscated at Khotan to mean 3,000-odd *jin*, while Pan Zhiping gives a total figure of 20,338 *jin* which presumably includes this reading, as well as taking the 8 *jin* recorded for Uch Turfan as 8 thousand *jin*. (This would, in fact, give a total of 20,328, rather than Pan's 20,338 *jin*). Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan*, pp.377–8; Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo*, p.109.

[57] WJSL 2:35a–36a, DG8.7.2.

[58] XZSL 56:12a, DG3.8 *gengzi* and 71:18b, DG4.7 *jiachen*. This was a consequence of Nayancheng's recommendation that private sales should be forbidden. XZSL58:16b–17b, DG3.9 *xinwei* and 60:25b–26b, DG3.10 *dingsi*.

Tarbagatai.[59] From the two trading cities of Ili and Tarbagatai, merchandise was distributed throughout northern Xinjiang, and also beyond the northern *karun*. Meanwhile, the west route traders (*xilu ke*), merchants emanating from all over China, travelled to the trade centres of Liangzhou or Jingzhou, where the tea probably exchanged hands before passing through the Gansu Corridor to Hami and Urumchi. In addition to any private trade, it was the west route traders who shipped the *fucha* that was still transported under official auspices in order to ensure a steady and affordable supply of tea to the garrisons.[60] The private sale of *fucha* was expressly prohibited, but there was inevitably some seepage.[61]

Officials in Xinjiang were agreed that to prevent the illegal export of tea from the region, tighter controls were needed not only on the quantity of tea brought into the region, but also on its passage across Xinjiang to its final destination. From Ili alone it was estimated that between 100,000 and 300,000 *jin* of tea, purchased privately at Guihua and brought to Ili via Gucheng, was shipped beyond the *karun* every year. As Deyinga noted, the types of teas most commonly purchased by the Khoqandis to be transported westwards were *xicha* (fine tea) and *zacha* (mixed tea); while *fucha*, *dacha* (big tea) and *jincha* (catty tea)—all cheaper brick teas—were consumed by the garrison soldiers, the Chinese civilian population and the local Mongols and Turkic Muslims. In his estimation, therefore, if the amount of legally imported *fucha*—the only tea traded under licence—were increased by a few hundred thousand *jin* to satisfy the local market and prevent inflation, then a complete clamp-down on the sale of other types of tea at Ili and Tarbagatai would hit only the Khoqandis. Convinced that it was essential to distinguish clearly between teas that could be traded and those that could not, Deyinga proposed that if only the officially traded *fucha* was allowed to enter Xinjiang, in the event that any *xicha* or *zacha* was discovered, it would be immediately apparent that it was contraband.[62]

With the exception of the official shipments of tea that were supplied to the garrisons at Tarbagatai, Ili and Uch Turfan, and which were carried along the northern route, all the rest of the tea that reached the main cities

[59] Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.368; XZSL 56:11b–12b, DG3.8 *gengzi*; 60:25b–26b, DG3.10 *dingyi* and 71:18b–19b, DG4.7 *jiachen*.

[60] WJSL 2:35a–37a, DG8.7.2. On the north and west route traders, see Hua Li, 'Qing zhongye Xinjiang yu neidi de maoyi wanglai', pp.289–96 and Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.160–8.

[61] WJSL 3:35a, DG8.7.2; CWGZN 3:20b.

[62] *Xicha* and *zacha* included teas such as *wuyi* (bohea), *xiangpian* (jasmine), *baihao* (pekoe) and big-leafed *puer* (from Yunnan). *Xicha*, which accounted for over half of all smuggled tea, was the most fragrant and most expensive. WJSL 2:35b, DG8.7.2; CWGZN 3:20b.

of Xinjiang was carried privately by merchants. Nayancheng, who had had his eye on the private tea trade since he first proposed its abolition in the early 1820s, estimated that this trade amounted to 400,000–500,000 *feng* (i.e. 2–2.5 million *jin*) *per annum*. This included 200,000 *feng* that was sold under licence and shipped through Gansu, but still left 200,000–300,000 *feng* being traded privately.[63] There could be little doubt that a substantial amount of this was untaxed and, moreover, was finding its way across the border to Khoqand and beyond. In short, in Nayancheng's view, the government's laissez-faire policy towards the tea trade not only threatened the embargo against Khoqand, it was also depriving the government of substantial tax revenue. Of equal, if not more, concern to some officials was the fact that current policy allowed the predominantly Han and Sino-Muslim merchants who brought the tea into Xinjiang to raise prices to such an extent that they risked provoking unrest among the local people.[64] Nayancheng found that the further west one went, the more expensive the tea became, thus the difference in the price between one *feng* of tea in Hami and the same in Kashgar could be more than 6 taels of silver.[65] Clearly, the further the tea was carried towards the southwest of Xinjiang, where the Khoqandis and other foreign traders were eagerly waiting to purchase it, the higher the price it commanded. Thus, Nayancheng concluded, local people were burdened with exorbitant tea prices as a result of the largely illicit trade between the merchants from beyond the *karun* and those shipping the tea privately from the interior.[66] His solution was a system of regulated prices and tax points.

With Deyinga, Nayancheng now urged the court to set up a system of checkpoints (*tingzi/kabao*) and tax stations, the combined effect of which would be to increase revenue, determine prices and ensure that the embargo against Khoqand was effective. The proposal involved establishing tax stations so that tea carried by the west route traders would be taxed not only at Jiayuguan, as was already done at Gucheng for north route traders, but then again at Urumchi or Aqsu. Urumchi would serve as a tax point for tea destined for Tarbagatai and Ili, and licences would then be inspected at the Kuitun Bridge, the major crossroad north of Qur Qara Usu. For tea being shipped south to Yarkand or Kashgar, Aqsu would be the tax point. In addition to the transit taxes, a final destination tax (*luodi shui*) would also be levied on all tea sold in the major commercial centres.[67]

[63] NWYGZY 77:44b–45a, DG8.7.19.
[64] Speculation by merchants was now considered to have been one of the main causes of the Jahāngīr revolt. NWYGZY 77:44a, DG8.7.19.
[65] NWYGZY 77:44b–45a, DG8.7.19.
[66] NWYGZY 77:49b–50a, DG8.9.3.

Nayancheng's tax plan was opposed by court officials who feared that the new taxes would cause merchants to increase their prices and thus result in renewed unrest.[68] Although the plan was never fully implemented—most notably no tax office was established at Aqsu, Kashgar or Yarkand—the checkpoint was established at Kuitun and as a result some frontier officials believed that the illegal tea trade through Xinjiang ceased completely.[69] Undoubtedly it was significantly reduced, but this was probably due as much to other measures that Nayancheng adopted as to the tax plan.

The expulsion of outsiders from Xinjiang had not been restricted to Khoqandis; however, it swiftly became apparent that an embargo on all foreign trade was impractical. Before Nayancheng left Beijjng, Songyun had warned him that Altishahr needed the trade with the outsiders; if the embargo against Khoqand were to be imposed, it would be essential to allow trade with Badakhshan, Bukhara and other Central Asian polities to continue.[70] This was sound advice. Not only did Altishahr need Central Asian trade to supply its own domestic market, but during the 60 years since the Qing conquest, Altishahr had gradually become increasingly integrated into a complex trade network which linked Europe and Central Asia to China and even beyond.

The peoples beyond the *karun* were important players in this trade as were Han Chinese and Sino-Muslim merchants, but restrictions on movement had meant that the Altishahris had been largely squeezed out of the chain. Few, on the other hand, had profited more than the Khoqandis. The khanate had taken advantage of this revitalization of the ancient silk route to establish itself as a regional power and since the time of 'Ālim Khān, the khanate had striven to control the eastern Central Asian trade with China.[71] This it had achieved by conquest and by capitalizing on its geographical position adjacent to Altishahr. On the one hand, the Khoqandi government had raised taxes on all foreign merchants passing

[67] NWYGZY 77:45b–46b, DG8.7.19 and 77:52a, DG8.9.3; WJSL 2:36a–36b, DG8.7.2; XZSL 146:15a–b, DG8.11 *guimao*.
[68] NWYGZY 77:68a–69a, DG9.2.14.
[69] ZPZZ MZL558.1, DG10.12.19. In 1829, the Household Department (*Hubu*) wanted to abolish the check point at Kuitun, but Rongan, Nayancheng's son, argued strongly that it should be preserved. ZPZZ MZL518.7, DG9.9.20. For evidence that smuggling continued, albeit in this case intercepted, see LFZZ MZL8095.22, DG10.1.8.
[70] NWYGZY 77:6a, DG8.11.3.
[71] This argument has been made most forcefully by Saguchi Tōru. See Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan*, chapter 6, or the English translation, 'The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate'. For further discussion of 'Ālim Khān's control over trade, see Di Cosmo, 'A Set of Manchu Documents', p.165.

through its territory; on the other, it had used its links with the khojas to secure maximum tax concessions for its own merchants who traded in Xinjiang.

Nineteenth century descriptions of Khoqand depict a fertile land where the expansion in agriculture, particularly cotton growing, had been made possible by extensive irrigation projects. Silk and cotton production flourished, and as the cities expanded so there were also profits to be made by those who supplied the urban centres and derived their living from crop farming or animal husbandry.[72] But it was as merchants that fortunes were made and lost. Moreover, it was trade, and the taxes levied on merchandise, that had provided the finance for the military campaigns which, in turn, extended the khanate's territory—east to the Qing *karun*, south to the Alai Mountains and northwest to beyond Aq-Masjid. Nayancheng's prediction in late 1828 that without the Altishahr trade and the taxes from transit traders, Khoqand would be a broken power within 3–5 years was undoubtedly overly optimistic.[73] On the other hand, a weakened Khoqand, however marginally, meant a Khoqand at risk from its foremost adversary—the neighbouring khanate of Bukhara. In the 19th century, trade was a significant element in the economy of all Central Asian polities and as such it was vital for the political stability of these powers and even their continued existence.

Heeding Songyun's advice, soon after Nayancheng arrived in Altishahr he had messengers sent to inform the Bukharans that despite the embargo against the Khoqandis, they would be allowed to continue to trade with Altishahr. However, Nayancheng was determined to prevent tea and rhubarb from being transported beyond the *karun* and to his mind, the most effective way of doing this was to restrict trade with the outsiders to the vicinity of the *karun*, where officials could oversee the proceedings and contact with the local merchants could be kept to a minimum. On the one hand, therefore, he strengthened the *karun* system by establishing two additional guard-posts: one north of Kashgar, and one to its southwest. In addition, he also reinstated the *karun* at Mingyol, northwest of Kashgar.[74] Meanwhile, he set about establishing official shops (*guanpu*) and trading posts (*maoyi ting*) patterned on those in the north. The latter were government-supervised markets, used in the Ili region primarily to regulate the annual conduct of trade with the Qazaqs and to curtail speculation. The official shops, also well established in the north, traded all manner of merchandise, primarily for use by the garrison soldiers, but

[72] Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, pp.190–1.
[73] NWYGZY 77: 11b, DG8.11.3.
[74] XZSL 146:12b–15a, DG8.9 *guimao*.

they also served the local people and by underselling private merchants helped to regulate prices. For the most part, local people and even outsiders appear to have been able to trade freely in these shops. However, following the introduction of the embargo against Khoqand, a sharp watch was put on the Qirghiz who were suspected of trading their livestock for tea and acting as middlemen for the Khoqandis. The Qirghiz were forbidden to trade their sheep, cattle and horses for anything other than grain or cloth; they were to be accompanied to the official shops by soldiers and were to be prohibited from buying more than one *jin* of tea. If either Qirghiz or traders from the interior were found guilty of having violated these regulations, they were to be punished.[75]

Nayancheng now memorialized that in the south, with the Qirghiz on their borders and, beyond them, outsiders in all directions, these trading posts and official shops could play a similarly important role.[76] His first project was tied to the reconstruction of the old *karun* at Mingyol, 80 *li* from Kashgar, and the establishment there of a trade pavilion and official shop.[77] Here trade was to be governed by the same regulations as those in the north: when a caravan of traders arrived at the *karun*, a small detachment of soldiers would be sent to meet it; the number of men, horses, sheep and pack animals would be recorded and the caravan would then be escorted to the trade pavilion. Meanwhile, in Kashgar city two groups of traders, one comprising merchants from the interior and one of local Altishahr traders, would be assembled and, having had their respective details recorded and issued with a certificate, they too would be escorted to the trading post. Trade would be conducted in the presence of officials and with an interpreter on hand. All transactions were to be by barter at a predetermined rate and on no account were domestic traders to be allowed to pay for goods with silver. With the trading over, persons and goods—on both sides—would be checked against the previous records, the local traders would return to Kashgar and the outsiders would be escorted under guard beyond the *karun*.[78]

In the winter of 1828, not long after Bukhara had been informed that despite the embargo on Khoqand, their traders were still welcome to trade with the empire, a party of about one dozen Bukharans, with 20-odd pack animals, arrived at a Qirghiz encampment outside the Upalat *karun*. The

[75] NWYGZY 80:36b–37a, DG9.2.20 and 80:38b–39a, DG9.2.20; XZSL 154:12a–14a, DG9.3 *yimao* and 164:7b–8a, DG10.1 *wushen*.
[76] WJSL 2:40b, DG8.8.3. Millward points to the fact that Nayancheng conflated the two institutions of *maoyi ting* and *guanpu* as an important reason for their failure in Altishahr. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.97–8. However, by the 1820s, there was, in fact, considerable overlap in their function, with outsiders regularly trading at the *guanpu*.
[77] NWYGZY 77:5a–b, DG8.9.3.
[78] WJSL 2:40b–41a, DG8.8.3; ZPZZ MZL 81.1, DG9.2.19.

case of the Bukharans is particularly interesting, as it illustrates how Bukhara used the rift between China and Khoqand to improve its own position in a long-standing power struggle with Khoqand. In other words, just as Nayancheng suggested Khoqand had been doing, the Bukharans now used the opportunity of 'special treatment' by the Qing empire to improve their position vis-à-vis Khoqand. In the past, Bukharan merchants had travelled via Khoqand to Altishahr and been taxed heavily both on the journey out and back. On this occasion, however, because of the embargo against Khoqand, they had suspected that if they travelled via Khoqand they might not be allowed to enter Xinjiang. They had, therefore, made their way towards Kashgar by way of a circuitous route that took them across Darvaz and Qarategin. With over one hundred merchants ready and waiting to travel to Xinjiang, the success of the mission was so important to the khanate that among their number were two Bukharan officials posing as merchants.

Once the Kashgar authorities had confirmed that the traders were definitely not Khoqandis, they sent a small detachment of soldiers to the *karun* to inspect the Bukharans' baggage and accompany them to the village of Tugusak, 40-odd *li* southwest of Kashgar. Here they were housed for several days in the hostel of an old granary and allowed to conduct their trade under official supervision. The conditions of trade were the same as those adopted in the north: only barter was allowed, and although the merchants were permitted to fix their own prices, officials were present to ensure that there was no racketeering and that no silver exchanged hands. Their trade completed (40% for tea and textiles from official shops, 30% with merchants from the interior and 30% with Altishahri Muslims), the Bukharan merchants were then escorted back outside the *karun*. Nayancheng now proposed that a proper hostel for merchants be built at Tugusak and that a hostel and checkpoint be located at Liangar, 80 *li* southwest of Yarkand, for the benefit of those Bukharans wishing to travel via the Badakhshan route in order to trade with Yarkandi merchants.[79]

[79] WJSL 2:45a–47b, DG8.11.3. According to Valikhanov, customs barriers were established at both Tugusak and Liangar. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.322. See Burnes on the two main trade routes from Bukhara to Yarkand. Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, vol. 2, pp.235–6. Despite the success of this Bukharan trade mission, the Altishahr *guanpu*, which were established at Kashgar, Yarkand and Uch Turfan, failed to make a profit. Tea was the mainstay of the *guanpu*, but without the Khoqandi trade to keep the market buoyant prices fell and in late 1829 Zhalonga memorialized successfully to have them closed. ZPZZ MZL 81.2, DG9.11.9; LFZZ MZL 8095.21, DG9.12.11.

The effects of the new policies

With many of his measures to enforce the embargo against Khoqand now in place, Nayancheng set about gathering as much intelligence as possible on the internal situation of the khanate. Over a year after the embargo had been implemented, a report on conditions in Khoqand suggested that although a lack of cottons and silks from the interior was inflating the price of these items, the khanate was not yet suffering from a shortage of tea or rhubarb. This could be explained, at least in part, by the fact that tea and rhubarb had continued to pass to Khoqand from the north of Xinjiang for several months after the implementation of measures in Altishahr. However, with Deyinga's regulations now complementing those in the south, Nayancheng was confident that the problem had been eradicated. Traders from other parts, who had little alternative but to pass through Khoqand in order to reach Altishahr, were already voicing their displeasure at the embargo and pressing the Khoqandis to reach a swift agreement with the Qing authorities. But there were other reasons for Nayancheng to feel confident. Muhammad 'Alī Khān was, by all accounts, "young and ignorant", and control of the khanate was currently in the hands of the mingbashi, Muhammad Sharīf Ataliq.[80] By December of 1828, the latter had already sent a messenger to Kashgar requesting the resumption of trade and the re-appointment of an aqsaqal to oversee Khoqandi merchants passing through or residing in the city. Having been defeated in a campaign against Ura-tube on its western border earlier in 1828, Khoqand had suffered heavy losses, not only of men, but of cattle and horses;[81] denied the trade with Altishahr it would be difficult to replenish the herds. If the court still doubted that Khoqand was a broken power, by the end of the year Nayancheng was confidently reporting that the khanate comprised no more than eight large villages without city walls or moats and that its army, supposedly 3,000 strong, actually comprised little more than 1,000 men. Furthermore, he added that with enemies on all sides, the loss in state revenue caused by the embargo had led the government to increase its tax burden on the local people. Nayancheng's memorials painted a picture of a weak and emasculated power, looked down upon by its neighbours and forced to inflict suffering and hardship on its own citizens.[82] He clearly believed that the sanctions were beginning to bite.

[80] The title *mingbashi* (lit. leader of 1,000 men) was used variously throughout the polities of Turkic Muslim Central Asia, but in Khoqand it denoted a leader of the highest military rank. See Beisembiev, "*Ta'rikh-i Shahrukhi*" *kak istoricheskii istochnik*, pp.68, 70.

[81] WJSL 2:49b–50b, DG8.11.22.

[82] NWYGZY 79:56b–59a, DG9.2.5.

But Nayancheng's policy for the rehabilitation of Altishahr extended beyond the embargo and trade supervision. He was to go further than any other Qing official, before or after, in his efforts to produce a comprehensive policy for Altishahr, whereby internal and external policies were married to ensure long-term security. As far as internal policy was concerned, he recognized that if Altishahr was to be held by a mere 2,500 troops, the peace and security of the region would be dependent, to a considerable extent, on the beks. Thus, in addition to extending the normal rewards for loyalty and exceptional service during the rising, Nayancheng produced a blueprint for the overhaul of the entire bek system. This involved improved emoluments and a series of measures aimed at stamping out corruption and abuse.[83] And it was not only the beks whom Nayancheng found to have been remiss in fulfilling their duties. One of the most important legacies of Nayancheng's tenure in Xinjiang was the introduction of an annual appraisal system for all senior officials in Xinjiang.[84]

Yet while Nayancheng's administrative reforms received the support of the court, other aspects of his rehabilitation programme were not regarded so favourably. Analysis of the Jahāngīr revolt had convinced him that it was the Qirghiz who had provided the main fighting force, both for the khojas and Khoqand. He was also well informed on the series of mistakes committed by Qing officials in their dealings with the Qirghiz over the last decade or so—mistakes which had resulted in the Qing having alienated many of the Qirghiz tribes, and had, in his view, ultimately jeopardized frontier security.[85] Nayancheng set out to make amends for these 'errors'. Soon after his arrival in Kashgar, he had had messages conveyed to the various Qirghiz tribes assuring them that the emperor knew they had been mistreated—Qing officials had erred in imposing the death sentence on Tūrdī in the wake of the Ziyā' al-Dīn affair and in the slaughter of Tāriq's family during the hunt for Jahāngīr; but now in his benevolence, the emperor had expressly bid Nayancheng to placate them and restore good relations. In response, 'Azīz, Tūrdī's son, sent his brother-in-law together with Su-lan-qi's uncle and two nephews to offer their surrender. True to his word, Nayancheng rewarded them with buttons of rank and allowed them to return to Altishahr.[86] But Nayancheng's most important overture was to the 20,000-strong Edigene tribe who had originally dwelt in the region around Osh. Driven into the

[83] See Miao Pusheng, *Bo-ke zhidu*, pp.62–8.
[84] See ZPZZ MZL 63 and 64 for the year-end appraisals of officials dating from the Daoguang to Xuantong reign periods.
[85] NWYGZY 80:9a–b, DG8.12.10.
[86] NWYGZY 80:9a–2a, DG8.12.10.

Congling Mountains by Khoqand, they had been conquered by the khanate in the early 19th century, and now regularly provided troops for Khoqand's military campaigns. When Nayancheng sent word to them requesting that they give their allegiance to the Qing, their leader, a grandson of Hājjī Biy, did not hesitate to send envoys to the *karun* to offer their submission (*toucheng*).[87]

Nayancheng had soon secured the surrender of 18 different groups of Qirghiz: the Edigene, Tolos, Nayman, Qara-teyit, Teyit, Zhetigen, Chong-bagish, Bugu, Sari-bagish, Qushchu, Mongoldor, Solto, Qiliq, Sayak, Baziz, Qahal-sayak and Qipchaq, as well as those dwelling in Qarategin. In every instance, he had issued their various leaders, in all 43, with rewards and insignia ranging from the 2nd to 5th rank, and had granted them a total annual emolument amounting to approximately 3 ingots and 715 taels of silver, 74 bolts of silk and 530 of cotton.[88] The gain, in his view, was well worth the cost. When news of Nayancheng's overtures towards the Qirghiz reached Darvaz, the small principality to the southwest of Kashgar which had long been in conflict with Khoqand, its ruler sent an envoy to Kashgar offering to field troops on behalf of the empire and requesting permission to send tribute to Beijing. Nayancheng was convinced that once word reached Khoqand that the tribes of Darvaz and the Qirghiz had given their allegiance to the Qing "that rabble (*yi*) would be even less inclined to brave emerging from its lair."[89]

Initially the court had welcomed Nayancheng's policy to placate the Qirghiz, but gradually opinion changed. It was, of course, one matter to get these tribes to submit and quite another to keep them submissive. There was no precedent for giving rank and emolument to tribal leaders who had not rendered any particular service to the empire but had simply come to pay their respects and present horses. The emperor now fulminated that this indiscriminate issuing of rewards had no basis in the political system of the empire, nor was it a matter of such urgency that Nayancheng could justify having implemented it without first having sought ratification from the court.[90] Even the submission of Darvaz irked the emperor. Darvaz was already an enemy of Khoqand and the idea that its ruler was sending tribute to court in the hope that the Qing would destroy Khoqand was incompatible, in his view, with the notion of

[87] NWYGZY 80:4a–7a, DG8.11.22.
[88] NWYGZY 80:14a–23a, DG8.12.28.
[89] NWYGZY 80:24a–30a, DG9.2.1. Some of these tribes are not easily identified from the Chinese transliteration. For example, I have found no other reference to Qahal-sayak or to Qara-tiyet (*Ha-la-ti-yi-te*) which may possibly be an error for Qara-terek. In rendering *Tuo-la-er-gen* as Zhetigen, I am hazarding a guess.
[90] XZSL 151:4b–5b, DG9.2 *yichou*.

genuine submission. Thus the emperor denied permission for Nayancheng to present the ruler of Darvaz with gifts of silver and silk and refused to allow him to send envoys to court.[91] This was not the first time in his career that Nayancheng had been deemed over zealous in issuing rank and reward.

Last but not least, Nayancheng's rehabilitation policy was underpinned by a determination not to lift the embargo until he had secured the return of all those taken captive and the extradition of Jahāngīr's relatives. In early December 1828, a Qirghiz, who had been dispatched to Khoqand to seek out information on conditions there, returned to Kashgar with a Khoqandi messenger. They brought with them two letters for Ishāq, the hakim bek of Kashgar. One was from the Khoqandi mingbashi, Muhammad Sharīf Ataliq, and the other was from Mullā Hākim. The latter, who was now in the employ of the Khoqandi government, had been an influential trader in Kashgar before the expulsions and was well acquainted with the incumbent hakim bek, Ishāq.

As a sign of the khan's goodwill the messengers had been accompanied by a group of 22 captives, including Qing soldiers, 'rebel' Altishahris, a 5th ranking Ishāqī bek who had resisted Jahāngīr, and a translator. According to Nayancheng and Wulonga, Mullā Hākim's letter was appropriately respectful. The mingbashi's letter, on the other hand, was less so. While not considered to display the arrogance of the communication delivered by the Khoqandi messenger earlier that year—and to which Nayancheng had given such short shrift, nevertheless, the mingbashi implied that Khoqand was still in a position to dictate terms: only if the Qing authorities agreed to the resumption of trade and the re-establishment of an aqsaqal would Khoqand release the remaining Chinese (*zhongyuan ren*) captives. Nayancheng instructed Ishāq to reply to the mingbashi pointing out the error of his tone, and to Mullā Hākim insisting that only if Khoqand returned all the captives would the emperor be memorialized with a request to lift the embargo.

Ishāq was further required to write a private letter to Mullā Hākim. In this, he claimed not to have shown the mingbashi's letter to the councillor because of its inappropriate tone and impressed upon him the importance of persuading the mingbashi to adopt a respectful attitude. Finally, Ishāq added that, in reality, it was of no import to the Qing empire whether Khoqand handed over the remaining captives, nor whether it refused to hand over Jahāngīr's 6-year-old son, Buzurg. The Khoqandi envoy was not given an audience with Nayancheng, but was kept under guard.

[91] NWYGZY 80:30a–31b, DG9.2.14.

Having been entrusted with the letters of reply, he was then escorted back to the *karun*.[92]

Just as the court had lost patience with Nayancheng's policy towards the Qirghiz, so too its enthusiasm for his enforcement of the embargo was now beginning to wane. As Nayancheng became ever more persistent in his efforts to have Khoqand extradite the rebel leaders and ever more determined that he would not be duped into the resumption of trade by insincere protestations and promises, so the emperor's irritation deepened.

> If because of the embargo, Khoqand repents and extradites Jahāngīr's family and dependants, thus eradicating the roots, then this will be very good, but if we apply threats and they [the Khoqandis] still keep them as pawns, or even send substitutes in their place, then what shall we do? How can that not provoke more trouble?[93]

Meanwhile, despite Ishāq's protestations to the contrary, Nayancheng was, in fact, so convinced that Jahāngīr's young son, Buzurg, was a potential threat to the stability of the frontier that he sent spies to report on the child's situation and was soon stipulating that the boy's extradition was a prerequisite for the resumption of trade.[94] Nayancheng's confidence in his power to augment the conditions for the reinstatement of trade had no doubt been fuelled by his success in securing the release of Ni'mat the pre-eminent Ishāqī akhund who had been captured during the fighting and taken as a hostage to Khoqand. When word reached Kashgar that Ni'mat, was being held in desperate straits in Khoqand, Ishaqī adherents in Kashgar petitioned the hakim bek Ishāq to secure his release. Nayancheng responded by insisting that the Khoqandis release Ni'mat or he would mobilize his troops. The threat produced rapid results: an envoy, who had once served as an aqsaqal in Kashgar, arrived at the *karun* accompanied by Ni'mat and some 30-odd Kashgari captives.[95]

Nevertheless, this minor success did not convince the court that Khoqand was a broken force. By early 1829, with still no sign that the khanate was willing to extradite Jahāngīr's family, the court was already beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with Nayancheng's inflexibility and unwillingness to let sleeping dogs lie. Time and again, he was warned that his task was rehabilitation and that he should not concern himself with external affairs; to insist on the extradition of wanted people or the release of captives to no avail would make the empire an object of ridicule.[96] Finally, accused of being unrealistic and of exceeding the call of duty in

[92] WJSL 2:49a–51b, DG8.11.22.
[93] XZSL 149:26a–b, DG8.12 *guisi*. See also ZPZZ MZL 518.2, DG9.3.19.
[94] NWYGZY 79:36a–37b, DG8.12.10 and 79:51a–b, DG8.12.28.
[95] NWYGZY 79: 43a–49a, DG8.12.28.
[96] NWYGZY 79:40a, DG9.1.12 and 79:54a–b, DG9.2.1.

his attempt to win merit, in mid-February, he was dismissed from his post and subsequently instructed to return to Beijing.[97]

Shifting political dynamics in Beijing

Nayancheng's appointment and premature dismissal were symptomatic of the political dynamics of the court at this time. The accession of the Daoguang emperor in 1821 and the appointment of Cao Zhenyong (1755–1835) as senior ranking minister of the Grand Council had marked the final phase of the transition from the monarchical administration of the Qianlong period to the more ministerial politics of the Daoguang era. The Jiaqing reforms of the Grand Council had not only ensured that a generally higher calibre of (particularly Manchu and Mongol) official now served on the Council, but had also regularized the councillors' relationship with both the emperor and the wider bureaucracy. These developments had coincided with the increasing demands of the non-office holding literati to make their voices heard in the political arena. Thus the expansion of the political base, together with the traditional system of patronage and networking that characterized the scholar-official class, had opened the way for aspiring oppositionist forces to play a much more influential role in government.

Cao Zhenyong himself was a member of the Xuannan Poetry Club that had been established in Beijing in 1814 to facilitate contact and exchange of information between students of the eminent examiner Weng Fanggang (1733–1818).[98] But the moderate oppositionist voices of the Xuannan Poetry Club were soon to be submerged by the more strident criticism emanating from a new generation of literati. For much of the 15 years that Cao Zhenyong presided over the Grand Council, foreign policy floundered as he endeavoured to steer a middle course between, on the one hand, the politics of appeasement and conciliation and, on the other, the call for tougher policies towards foreigners, regardless of the possibility of military confrontation. The former view was represented most notably by Muzhanga (1782–1856) and his associates, while the latter was championed by men such as Gong Zizhen and members of the Spring Purification Circle.

By the time of Nayancheng's appointment in the late 1820s, the succession of challenges to the security of Altishahr had necessitated that the senior officials serving in the northwest were now of considerably higher calibre and competence than those of the preceding decades. Many

[97] NWYGZY 79:53b, DG9.2.1; XZSL 150:11a–12a, DG9.1 *dingwei* and 151:5b, DG9.2 *yichou*.

[98] See Polachek, *The Inner Opium War*, pp.46, 303 note 62.

of those now being posted to Altishahr had built their careers in military campaigns on the frontiers of the empire; their experiences varied, as did their analyses of the north-western frontier crisis, but they were all naturally keen to make their mark and assume responsibility for formulating policy that would keep the frontier peaceful and secure. Nayancheng's hard-line policy had temporarily found favour with the court at a time when it was reluctant to alienate further the oppositionist literati. But as it became evident that Nayancheng's intransigence might lead the empire into yet another costly war, the court grew alarmed and the influence of those who advocated a more moderate, conciliatory policy was brought to bear.

Cast as Nayancheng was in the mould of his grandfather, the style of his politics would perhaps have been better suited to the Qianlong era. In the spring of 1829, he was still insisting that the ruler of Khoqand should refer to himself as 'servant' in his correspondence with the emperor and should avoid the presumptuous use of gold leaf on his seal.[99] Yet, if strict adherence to the demands of etiquette and propriety had been a vital element in dealing with those from beyond the *karun* in an earlier, more heady period of Qing rule, then given the declining military resources of the empire, it might be argued that it was now even more important to maintain the semblance of power and authority, however illusory. Nayancheng's conceptual world may have been circumscribed by traditional Confucian ideals, but there was nothing staid or formulaic about his rehabilitation programme for Altishahr. He was one of the first frontier officials to recognize the intimate connection between the inner administration of Altishahr and its outer relations. More than any other official at this time, he came close to developing an integrated foreign and frontier policy that, with time, might well have borne fruit.

The policies that Nayancheng implemented in his attempt to secure stability on the frontier and their ultimate rejection by the court illustrate, not for the first or last time, a fundamental rift between policy advocated by a senior frontier official and the will of the court. The dismissal of Nayancheng and the signal that a more moderate line was to be adopted towards Khoqand was also unwelcome news to the literati activists in Beijing, many of whom would have preferred to have seen the frontier remain sealed, whatever the consequences. The court, however, acutely conscious of its own weakness and the mounting problems in the interior, was not prepared to take such risks.

As Nayancheng prepared to depart from Kashgar, he continued to report optimistically on the effects of the embargo. In April 1829, he

[99] NWYGZY 80:91a–92b, DG9.4.7.

memorialized that with its wings clipped, Khoqand was growing weaker and more impoverished by the day.[100] He was confident that the khanate could no longer pose a threat to the frontier and would soon be willing to comply with the conditions for the resumption of trade. It is impossible to say how matters might have developed had Nayancheng been allowed to remain in Kashgar, but it should be noted that in early 1829, convinced that the embargo was about to produce the required result, he was already making reference to the need to draw up an agreement (*tiaoyue*) under which the Qing authorities would allow Khoqand to resume trade with the empire.[101]

[100] WJSL 3:7b–8a, DG.9.3.6.
[101] NWYGZY 80:91b–92a, DG9.4.7; WJSL 3:10a, DG9.4.8; ZPZZ MZL 518.4, DG9.5.26.

CHAPTER SIX

KHOQAND'S RESPONSE AND QING REAPPRAISAL

Yūsuf Khōja and the Khoqandi challenge

Less than a year after Nayancheng's return to Beijing, in the early spring of 1830, a Chinese trader named Gao Si was conducting his business in a small village outside Kashgar when he heard a rumour that Khoqand was preparing to attack Altishahr. On returning to Kashgar, Gao Si reported this information to Councillor Zhalonga, but the councillor was not prepared to countenance the unthinkable. He accused Gao Si of rumour-mongering and ordered him to leave Altishahr and return to the interior. Other merchants were made wary by this incident and when, in the following days and weeks, they too became aware of hostile activity beyond the *karun*, they kept silent.[1] By summer, however, other sources indicated that Gao Si's story may not have been unfounded. Ishāq, the hakim bek at Kashgar, began receiving reports from the Qirghiz that there was unrest outside the *karun*. The Khoqandis were said to be planning an attack and it was rumoured that Yūsuf Khōja, Jahāngīr's elder brother, was in Khoqand. Yet, still Zhalonga remained unperturbed.[2] In Ili the military governor Yulin had received similarly worrying reports and was sufficiently concerned to advise postponing the rotation of troops from the south. But even when pressed to investigate by Yulin, Zhalonga responded that the military governor was over-reacting and any delay to the scheduled troop rotation would only cause suspicion and unrest among the neighbouring tribes.[3]

Not until late September was the assistant imperial agent Tasiha dispatched with a small cavalry patrol of 120 men to investigate reports of disturbances at Qarangey *karun*, to the northwest of Kashgar. He was followed two days later by the assistant general Lai Yungui who advanced towards Mingyol leading some 1,600 men. Within days news reached Kashgar that Tasiha and his vanguard had been massacred in an ambush; Lai Yungui and the main force had been routed.[4]

[1] LFZZ MZL 8066.39, DG11.1.18. Unlike in the north where the troops were resident garrisons, in the south the military establishment was manned by troops who were regularly rotated.
[2] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.21, DG11.2.9.
[3] Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji*, 4:44b; XZSL171:7a–9b, DG10.7 *jiazi* and 171:18a–19a, DG10.7 *gengwu*.
[4] XZSL 173:4b–5a DG10.9 *dingsi*; ZPZZ MZL 569.9, DG10.12.24; LFZZ MZL 8066.39, DG11.1.18. Wei Yuan erroneously gives the name of the assistant imperial agent as Taxinha. Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji* 4:44b. According to the deposition of a man from

The troops that were now advancing towards Kashgar included Khoqandis, Qirghiz, Dolans and other Kashgari exiles. Although estimates vary, at its height the army may well have totalled between 30,000 and 40,000 men.[5] Nominally it was headed by Yūsuf Khōja but it was soon evident to the Qing authorities that, in fact, command lay in the hands of the Khoqandi mingbashi, Haqq Qulī, the brother-in-law of Muhammad ʻAlī Khān (or, according to some sources, his foster brother). Assisting him was ʻĪsā Dādkhāh and his brother Mūsā (who, like Haqq Qulī, were both well known to the Qing authorities consequent of their participation in Jahāngīr's revolt), as well as mingbashi Muhammad Sharīf Aliq, and other Khoqandi military officials. The khan himself accompanied his army as far as Osh, although on this occasion he did not venture within the *karun*.[6]

From the depositions of those subsequently taken captive by the Qing soldiers, there emerges a fairly coherent, if surprising, version of the events that took place beyond the *karun* prior to the attack. Earlier in the year, the hakim bek of Kashgar, Ishāq, was believed to have instructed a Qirghiz sheep trader to deliver a letter to the ruler of Khoqand. The missive professedly informed Muhammad ʻAlī Khān that the Qing garrison had been largely withdrawn from Altishahr and if Khoqand attacked, Ishāq would ensure that the local people would rally to their support. The khan and his advisers who, despite the departure of Nayancheng from Kashgar, were still making no progress in their efforts to have the embargo lifted, received the proposal with interest. They were well aware, however, that their cause would be lost unless they could take the cantonments of the four western cities before Qing reinforcements arrived. They had to be sure that the local people of Altishahr would respond en masse and turn their weapons on the Qing garrisons; for this, they would need religious sanction and the participation of the khojas. A

Tashkent who was captured by the Qing forces, 500–600 Qing soldiers were killed and over 50 were taken captive and sent to Khoqand. WJSL 4:4a, DG10.11.15. Assistant general Lai was among those who survived. XZSL 176:4b, DG10.10 *bingxu*.

[5] Valikhanov states that there were 20,000 Khoqandis, 15,000 Tashkentis, 2,000 Tajiks from Qarategin and several thousand Kashgari exiles. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.323–4. See also Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, p.142. Yulin reported a probably exaggerated figure of 70,000 Khoqandis and Qirghiz who were said to be attacking Kashgar (XZSL177:2a, DG10.10 *yiwei*), while Changde, the imperial agent at Uch Turfan, gives a more conservative estimate. In late 1830, he reported that the rebels numbered no more than 10,000 or so. Of these, he estimated that half were attacking the cities of Kashgar and Yangi Hisar, and the rest were looting. XZSL179:48a, DG10.11 *wuchen*. At least one thousand rebels were said to have approached Altishahr from the Sariqol region, to the southwest of Yarkand. XZSL 173:10a, DG10.9 *wuwu*.

[6] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.9/13, DG11.1.18; XZSL 177:2a–b, DG10.10 *yiwei*, 181:27a–b, DG10.12 *jiawu*. See also Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.369. and Grigor'ev, *O nekotorykh sobytiiakh v Bukhare, Khokande i Kashgare*, pp.36–40.

messenger, disguised as a dervish (*qalandar*), was therefore sent to Bukhara, where Yūsuf Khōja was still living quietly as an impoverished ahkund. Yūsuf was then smuggled into Khoqand and persuaded to head the attack on Kashgar, with the assurance that weapons, money and troops would all be provided by Khoqand.[7] With Yūsuf enlisted as a figurehead, the Khoqandis set about raising an army, or so the story went.

The Kashgari exiles who had served in Jahāngīr's forces and had long been hostile to Qing presence in the region would doubtless have needed little encouragement to join a *jihād* led by his brother, but the Qirghiz were more ambivalent in their support. While the Baziz, Qipchaq and Chong-bagish tribes were quickly enlisted, others needed more persuasion. To what extent this was the legacy of Nayancheng's charm offensive, as opposed to a pragmatic assessment of where their best interests lay, can only be surmised.

Certainly, Tuo-yi-mo-te, a Qiliq Qirghiz chieftain who had been awarded the button of the 2nd rank by Nayancheng, and whose tribes pastured in the Aqsu-Uch Turfan region, remained loyal to the Qing throughout the attack, despite the allure of rich rewards.[8] By early 1831, three chiefs of the Chong-bagish were also reported to have made demonstrations of submission to the authorities at Uch Turfan.[9] There is even some confusion as to whether the Sayak leaders A-tan-tai and Tāriq, well-known for their hostility to the Qing, had in fact participated.[10] Early reports seemed to confirm their presence among the rebels and at one point, concerned by the lack of response from local people, Tāriq was said to have withdrawn outside the *karun* to raise more men.[11] However, according to Ishāqī adherents who were taken prisoner while fleeing their villages, although relatives of A-tan-tai and Tāriq had participated they

[7] This version of events is pieced together from several depositions, some of which differ slightly in their detail. LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.9/12/13, DG11.1.18; LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.17/18, DG11.1.23. One testimony, for example, suggests that the incriminating missive was the letter which Ishāq sent to Mullā Hākim (see chapter 5). LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.10, DG11.1.18.

[8] WJSL 3:48a, DG10.10.13. Elsewhere, Qing sources state that Tuo-yi-mo-te was of the Chong-bagish tribe. See WJSL 4:15b, DG10.12.19.

[9] WJSL 4:15b, DG10.12.19.

[10] Tāriq was well known to the Qing authorities because of his involvement in the attack on the assistant imperial agent Bayanbatu and his men (see chapter 3). Like Tāriq, A-tan-tai had also supported Jahāngīr during the rebellion, but subsequently it was reported that both had offered their submission to the emperor. After the Yūsuf revolt, A-tan-tai sent gifts to Zuhūr al-Dīn, the then hakim bek of Kashgar, re-confirming his loyalty to the emperor and asserting that neither he nor Tāriq, who was by then dead and whose tribes were under A-tan-tai's leadership, had participated in the recent revolt. LFZZ MZL 8067.41, DG11.7.23.

[11] LFZZ MZL 8057.7 [DG9.10.15 – 10.9.10]; XZSL171:7a, DG10.7 *jiazi*; 177:2a, DG10.10 *yiwei* and 179:20a–22b, DG10.11 *gengshen*.

themselves had remained outside the *karun*.[12] Evidence from a Khoqandi captive who had been sent to conscript among the Qirghiz would seem to support this, suggesting that although A-tan-tai and Tāriq may have sent supplies they had been persuaded not to participate, at least in part, by the warning from A-tan-tai's elder brother:

> The empire has a large army; even if you take all the cities of Kashgar and thereabouts, you will not be able to defend them. You'll cause the imperial forces to come and devastate our lands and when they've taken them, then where will we go to dwell?[13]

Fear of the Qing forces, therefore, may still have played a part, if not in preserving the peace, at least in limiting the hostilities. While, not surprisingly, many captives taken by the Qing authorities claimed to have been unwilling participants in the rebellion, there is certainly evidence that in the case of the Qirghiz their vacillation resulted, in part, from their being caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one side stood the imperial forces and a high probability of death; on the other, the Khoqandi pressgangs, who not only threatened to drive the Qirghiz from their pastures if they refused to ride with them, but resorted to other methods of persuasion such as looting homes and breaking the legs of those who showed signs of reluctance.[14]

As the Khoqandi troops pressed down on Kashgar in late September, Zhalonga was forced to confront the fact that the Kashgar garrison was pitifully inadequate. Even after he had withdrawn all those troops stationed in outlying areas he could muster no more than 2,000 men. Chinese merchants who had moved into the cantonment were swiftly organized into militia units. Meanwhile, 200 local Ishāqī families, known to be loyal to the Qing, were given shelter within the confines of the cantonment. Although these Kashgaris, who included several beks and ahkunds, were disarmed on admission to the *gulbāgh*, it is unlikely that Zhalonga's motives for admitting them were purely humanitarian. At this stage, he had little idea of the size of the approaching enemy forces and with his ranks already sorely depleted, he could not afford to turn away professedly loyal and able-bodied men.

Finally, having had a large area of the Muslim city razed in order to better defend the cantonment, the councillor ordered the gates to be shut and secured. Inside the cantonment tension escalated. As the residents awaited the first onslaught, rumours that the hakim bek Ishāq was a traitor working for the Khoqandis began to circulate among the Chinese

[12] WJSL 4:3a, DG10.11.15.
[13] WJSL 4:4a, DG10.11.15.
[14] WJSL 4:3a–4a, DG10.11.15.

merchants. Fear that the local Muslims who had been taken into the cantonment would turn against their protectors spread a wave of terror throughout the Chinese community. Left largely unchecked by Zhalonga, the mounting hysteria reached its inevitable conclusion. On the night of September 29th, just hours after the Khoqandi forces had made their first assault on the Muslim city, inside the Qing cantonment a mob of several hundred merchants attacked Ishāq's *yamen* where a large number of beks had taken refuge. Zhalonga's belated attempt to assuage the merchant mob went unheeded and Ishāq's *yamen* was duly looted and set on fire. Ishāq, together with his family and a handful of beks, escaped unscathed, having been led to the safety of the councillor's compound, but by dawn on September 30th, over 200 Kashgaris, including some seventeen beks, had been killed.[15]

There was yet more bad news for Zhalonga that morning: in the course of the night the Muslim city had fallen. The Qing troops that advanced to meet the first assault on Kashgar Muslim city had been forced back into the cantonment and the city had been taken. Yūsuf Khōja assumed authority over the city and Bābak, the Āfāqī bek from Yarkand who had fled to Khoqand after the collapse of Jahāngīr's rule, was appointed as the hakim. The Khoqandi army now divided, with one contingent continuing the siege of the Kashgar cantonment under the leadership of the Khoqandi general 'Īsā Dādkhāh, Tilā Khān, Yūsuf's nephew (on his wife's side), and Katta Tora, Yūsuf's son, while the other headed towards Yangi Hisar and Yarkand.[16] For the next two and a half months, the cantonment at Kashgar was besieged, but neither cannon fire, flooding, nor tunnelling could bring the Khoqandis the complete victory they sought.

In Yangi Hisar, which lay two days journey to the southeast of Kashgar, the hakim bek Sādiq came out for the rebels. He greeted the force of some 400 Khoqandis with gifts including boxes of tea and riding jackets and had his beks organize the local people to assist in the capture of the cantonment. The Qing garrison here was small, no more than 480 men and with the Muslim city in rebel hands and communications cut, the situation was critical. Nevertheless, the Qing troops sallied forth killing a number of Khoqandis and Qirghiz, and twice destroying the rebels' cannon platform. As the Muslims scoured the surrounding villages for more recruits, Yūsuf Khōja, accompanied by a dervish and a group of vagrant Muslims, arrived from Kashgar. Sādiq presented the khoja with a

[15] This account is the numerous depositions found in LFZZ MZL and MZZZ WJL/ZE. For a vivid and detailed description of this incident drawn from the archival sources LFZZ MZL, see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, pp.213–23.
[16] XZSL 176:10a, DG10.10 *wuzi*. Katta Tore, Yūsuf's son, is here identified by one of his other names, (Mullā) Muhammad Amīn. See chapter 8, note 47.

gold and green silk *khalāt* (robe) and had a feast prepared in his honour. Undoubtedly, Yūsuf was a figurehead, but by no means a passive or reluctant one. His presence in Yangi Hisar seems to have galvanized the insurgents and he urged them to rebuild the damaged artillery platform and to attack the cantonment with renewed vigour. Nor did he shirk his responsibilities. When the platform was again destroyed by the Qing soldiers and he was informed that five beks were suspected of treachery, he had them put to death and their families dispatched to Khoqand.

The Khoqandi troops encamped outside Yangi Hisar had now swelled to 3,000, but still they failed to penetrate the walls of the Manchu cantonment and when flooding also brought no results, Sādiq and one of the Khoqandi leaders mounted the artillery platform and addressed the Qing soldiers who were manning the parapets. If they came down and surrendered, he promised that those who wanted to return home would be given *yambu* and escorted to Aqsu, while those who did not want to return could cut their queues (i.e. convert to Islam) and would be provided with land and 'good women'. The garrison troops remained steadfast. Eventually, as news arrived that the imperial army was advancing from Aqsu, Sādiq departed for Khoqand with his family in tow. The Khoqandi, Khudāyār, who replaced him as hakim, held the Muslim city for another seven to eight days. Then in late December, as the Qing forces approached, he too fled accompanied by his men.[17]

At Yarkand, historically an Ishāqī stronghold, the failure of the rebels to take either the Muslim city or the cantonment was primarily down to the leadership of the imperial agent, Bichang. With only about 1,400 men, including Muslim troops, at his disposal to defend the city, he was not expected to hold out for long.[18] All the Chinese merchants as well as those from Balt, Kanjut and Badakhshan were admitted to the cantonment and employed in the defence of the city. Bichang then turned his attention to the task of securing the support of the local populace against the imminent attack; if the local people went over to the rebels and the Muslim city fell, so would the cantonment situated to its west. The hakim bek 'Abd al-Rahmān was charged with rallying the Muslim populace and persuading them that although the future might look bleak, their best interest lay in supporting the imperial troops. In a stirring and persuasive proclamation he urged them to consider their fate:

> You must seek life in the face of death. If the rebels come to rally you, tell them that this time the imperial troops are awesome and you do not dare to follow them. Then you can shut yourselves in the Muslim city and watch us kill the rebels, but if one Muslim goes out of the city, the imperial troops will kill him there and then.[19]

[17] LFZZ MZL 8066.52, DG11.1.27.
[18] XZSL 179:19a, DG10.11 *gengshen*. Bichang himself gives a figure of 1,200. Bichang, *Ye'erqiang shoucheng jilüe*, 2a.

By early October communications with Aqsu were broken and Yarkand was isolated. Within days the Khoqandis launched an attack with a force of over 10,000 men. As Bichang subsequently recalled, the atmosphere within the cantonment was tense:

> ...The scout reported that several tens of thousands of rebels were approaching from the northeast. They were already 10 *li* past the Liangar *karun* and I climbed the tower on the northern gate and gave the order for the bugle to be sounded. All the troops mounted the city walls and I ordered that no one was to fire an unnecessary shot. We waited in silence. The day was overcast and dust billowed all around. Many of the newly rotated troops, who though trained had never encountered enemy forces, could not help but look frightened. I jumped onto the parapet and with a smile addressed the troops saying, "Now is the time for you to render distinguished service. You have the city wall to protect you and you have only to wait conserving your strength while the enemy approaching from afar exhausts itself. What is there to fear?" Then the troops all stood up straight, and faced ahead with an air of vigour.[20]

As the Khoqandis fought their way into the old city and destroyed the shops surrounding the cantonment, the merchants—Chinese, Badakhshani, and Kashmiri—made a sortie. The Khoqandi troops retreated into the Muslim city, where their kinsmen, some 200 households in all, went into hiding, while the local men and women turned out onto the streets to drive the attackers back. With the local people and the non-local merchant community thus staunchly united against the common enemy, Bichang and his troops were able to withstand the repeated Khoqandi attacks until relief forces arrived in December and the Khoqandi forces beat a retreat.

With Yarkand remaining firm, only a small contingent of Khoqandis saw fit to advance towards Khotan. Here the garrison was no more than 230 strong, including those troops who manned the outlying *karun* and military posts. But like 'Abd al-Rahmān in Yarkand, the hakim bek of Khotan, Ismā'īl, was unwavering in his loyalty to the Qing. Rallying to the assistance of the imperial agent, Shulunbao, Ismā'īl mustered over 3,000 Muslims to participate in the defence of the city and collected tens of thousand of *jin* of provisions. Consequently, Khotan, too, was able to

[19] Bichang, *Ye'erqiang shoucheng jilüe*, 1b.
[20] *Ibid*, 2b.

withstand the siege until the arrival of Qing forces at the end of December.[21]

The Court's response

On hearing of the critical situation in Altishahr, the Grand Council instructed 6,000-odd troops to be deployed to the south from Ili, Urumchi, Qucha and Qarashahr, including some 2,000 Mongol Torghuts and Khoshots. 3,000 troops were to be moved forthwith from Sichuan to Gansu and generals Yang Fang and Hu Chao were sent beyond the pass to take control of the military operation.[22] Changling, now over seventy years of age, was again conferred with the title of *yangwei* general and sent to Xinjiang to direct the campaign. As the crisis deepened, the court responded by dispatching yet more troops. By November the number of men, including local militias and civilian convicts (*minqian*), either deployed to Altishahr or mobilized for active service there, had risen to 40,000.[23]

Aqsu had again been designated as the military headquarters for the campaign to relieve the four western cities. Rongan, Nayancheng's son, was at this time serving as councillor in Ili. In mid-October, he arrived in Aqsu ahead of the other commanders. Provisions were still being stockpiled, but whether for this or some other reason, Rongan failed to advance his force of 4,500 men southwards towards Kashgar and Yarkand, along the route where the rebels were known to be active. Instead, he dispatched 3,000 of his men to approach Yarkand from the east via Khotan, with instructions that if the situation was unfavourable they should not attack but await the contingent advancing from Urumchi. The remainder of his troops were retained to defend the area around Aqsu and Uch Turfan.[24]

In fact, Rongan's hesitancy may well have been due less to the cowardice of which he subsequently stood accused, than to the hope that

[21] Bichang, *Shoubian jiyao*, 41b; LFZZ MZL 8064.23, DG11.11.24 and 8064.24, DG11.11.24; ZPZZ MZL 524.5, DG10.8.23.

[22] XZSL 173:5a–b, DG10.9 *wuwu*.

[23] XZSL 175:23a–24a, DG10.9 *xinsi*.

[24] Much was made of this incident and Rongan's 'crime' was repeatedly referred to in correspondence to and from the court at this time. Indeed, so relentless was the criticism of Rongan that it might well be conjectured that his case was being used to further disgrace his father, Nayancheng, and those who supported hard-line tactics towards the outsiders. See for example, XZSL177:11a, DG10.10 *dingyou*; XZSL 177:25a–26a, DG10.10 *xinchou* and 178:14a–15b, 20a–20b, DG10.10 *wushen*; NWYGZY 80:104a–108b, DG10.10.14 – 11.2.9. Although Rongan took the brunt of the blame for this decision, Changqing, the imperial agent at Aqsu and Hafenga, the commander-in-chief at Urumchi, were also disciplined. XZSL 178:8b–10a, DG10.11 *dingwei*. For Changqing's apology, see ZPZZ MZL 549.1, DG10.11.8.

the emperor would ratify a plan that he and the military governor at Ili, Yulin, had memorialized a few weeks earlier. Reports of the Khoqandi advance in the south had arrived at a time when developments to the northwest were already causing concern in Ili. As part of Khoqand's mission to extend its territorial control and dominate the trade routes, its troops had been gradually moving eastwards, driving the Qirghiz tribes from their pastures. In the region of the Chu and Talas rivers, the Khoqandis were now reported to be building towns and settling people. Unprotected by natural defences to the west, Ili lay less than 1,000 *li* and just seven days' ride away from these settlements.

Disturbed at the prospect of northern Xinjiang being left vulnerable as more and more troops were deployed to the south, in early October, Yulin and Rongan had memorialized a plan that involved the dispatching of an additional 20,000 crack troops to Xinjiang. One force would be sent out from Ili to level the area of Chu and Talas, before advancing southwards towards Khoqand. Simultaneously, the second force, having driven the Khoqandis from Altishahr, would march on Khoqand from the southeast. With a pincer action of this magnitude Yulin and Rongan reckoned that they could eliminate all the hostile tribes and ensure the security of Xinjiang permanently.[25]

The court's reply, which at the time of Rongan's arrival in Aqsu would not yet have reached Ili, rejected the proposal. The idea of launching a campaign against Khoqand had, the emperor asserted, long been on his mind, but this was a matter easier said than done (*ke yan er bu ke xing*). The problem of securing supplies for such a campaign deep in enemy territory was, he had concluded, insurmountable. Moreover, even if the imperial troops were successful in destroying Khoqand, there could be no guarantee that others would not fill the vacuum and cause trouble at a later date—the sacrifice would be too great.[26] The court was not, however, unconcerned by the vulnerability of Ili and had already ordered that once Rongan had escorted his troops to Aqsu, he should hand over his command to the imperial agent, Changqing, and return promptly to make plans with Yulin for the defence of the north.[27]

Whatever the reason for Rongan's hesitancy, his decision to send his troops south by the circuitous route was swiftly condemned. It meant that Kashgar and Yangi Hisar would have to hold out against the rebels for at least another eight weeks. In the event, it was late December before the bulk of the reinforcements redeployed from the north approached

[25] WJSL 3:36b–38b, DG10.8.26.

[26] XZSL 174:9a–b, DG10.9 *yisi*.

[27] XZSL 173:38b–39a, DG10.9 *yichou*.

Kashgar. Yet while they were still several days' march from the city, the main body of the Khoqandi troops withdrew, to be followed shortly afterwards by Yūsuf and his forces.[28] Once again, the reason for the sudden Khoqandi withdrawal is unclear. It seems likely, however, that internal problems and an attack by Bukhara played a decisive role.[29]

Thus as Yūsuf, the Khoqandi generals and their troops retreated, pillaging and looting as they went, the imperial troops arrived in the western cities and without having to engage in battle, began the mopping-up operation.[30] All Āfāqī adherents who had followed the rebels were to be eliminated, while those who had merely assisted them were to be killed or pacified as necessary. The Dolans, many of whom had again joined the revolt, were pulled from their hideouts in trees and marshes to suffer the same fate.[31]

Explanations of the revolt

As with the Jahāngīr revolt, even before the rising had been suppressed, Qing officials were seeking to explain its causes. Clearly, the response of the local people to Yūsuf's arrival had not matched the fervour of the welcome afforded to Jahāngīr four years earlier. Although early reports suggested that in Kashgar and Yangi Hisar large numbers of Āfāqī adherents had rallied to the support of the khoja, this was not true elsewhere. In Uch Turfan, for example, where there were also many Āfāqī

[28] XZSL 181:13b–14a, DG10.12 *xinmao*.

[29] Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', vol.2, p.324. Notwithstanding Bellew ('History of Kashgar', p.184), whose account at this point is drawn largely from Valikhanov, the only other reference that I have been able to find to the attack on Khoqand by Bukhara at this time is in a somewhat garbled report given to Qing officials in Altishahr by Tuo-yi-mo-te, the Qirghiz leader. According to Tuo-yi-mo-te's informants, a local governor (presumably of Ura-tube) had been killed by the Khoqandis and another established in his place. The two sons of the dead man had then escaped to Bukhara where the amir had married his daughter to the eldest of the sons and led several tens of thousands of troops against Khoqand in order to avenge the death of his son-in-law's father. The Bukharans surrounded the city, killed the new governor and established the amir of Bukhara's new son-in-law in his place. The amir of Bukhara then wrote a letter in the name of the 'bek' (presumably, the khan) of Khoqand recalling the Khoqandi troops from Altishahr on the pretext that Khoqand was being attacked by Ura-tube. Meanwhile, he sent men to the area of Terek-davan to ambush 'Īsā Dādkhāh and his men as they returned. WJSL 4:15b–16a, DG10.12.19.

[30] Yūsuf was subsequently reported to have died of illness (presumably in Khoqand) in spring 1835. XZSL283:2a, DG16.5 *guiwei*.

[31] XZSL 181:5b–8b, DG10.12 *bingwu* and 180:32a–33a, DG10.11 *guiwei*; ZPZZ MZL 556.3, DG10.12.24. Many Dolans apparently fled the area surrounding Kashgar, but in the vicinity of Yarkand some 700–800 were reported to have participated in the rising. XZSL178:18b–19a, DG10.10 *wushen*. Whether or not the mopping-up operation involved the elimination of entire villages is unclear, but proposals to remove the Āfāqī adherents per se, whether from the whole of Altishahr or just the Kashgar-Yarkand region, appear to have been dropped. NWYGZY 80:98b–99a, DG10.10.5.

followers, the city remained peaceful. The Ishāqī adherents were even less inclined to support the rising and as Yūsuf and the Khoqandis approached Kashgar, many fled to safety in Aqsu.[32]

On December 26th, three days after the Khoqandis had withdrawn, a crowd of local Muslims arrived outside the walls of the Kashgar cantonment. They were unarmed and brought with them gifts of sheep, grain, melons and wine. Declaring themselves to be Ishāqī followers, they wanted to pay their respects to the councillor and to offer the Qing soldiers their congratulations on having withstood the siege. The gates of the cantonment had not yet been re-opened, for fear that the enemy withdrawal was feigned. Presumably it was this same acute sense of fear that now induced the soldiers to hoist the Ishāqī followers up onto the parapet one by one, to manoeuvre them out of sight and then kill them. When some 70–80 had been dispensed with in this way, the matter was finally reported to Zhalonga, who ordered that the killing be halted and a few of those who remained alive be brought to him for questioning. One of those summoned before Zhalonga was able to prove his loyalty by producing a list of the names of those non-Muslim soldiers whose lives he had saved—but for most it was too late. So charged was the atmosphere in the cantonment, and so weakened was Zhalonga's authority that the councillor was powerless to prevent the deaths of at least three other Muslims who were still being held in custody by the magistrate.[33]

The restrained, and in part hostile, response of the local people to the rising may be explained partly in terms of war fatigue and a lack of confidence in the belief that the khoja's forces, with or without Khoqandi assistance, might be able to triumph. It is also possible that the strong Khoqandi presence in the leadership of the army left the Altishahris in no doubt that this was primarily a Khoqandi rather than a khoja enterprise.[34] But equally inescapable is the conclusion that the disillusionment and fear of the destruction that had accompanied Jahāngīr's retreat a mere four years earlier also played a significant role in accounting for the muted local response. On finding that the Muslims of Altishahr were not willing to come out en masse in their support, many among the attacking forces

[32] XZSL 173:40a, DG10.9 *yichou* and 177:2a, DG10.10 *yiwei*. In the wake of the Jahāngīr revolt, Changling had noted that schisms had appeared among the Ishāqī adherents; however, he recommended that advantage should not be taken of this development on the grounds that the Muslims were "fickle by nature" and their loyalty could not be relied upon. XZSL 114:39b–40a, DG7.3 *renshen*.

[33] ZPZZ MZL 569.9, DG10.12.24.

[34] Not surprisingly perhaps, the issue of to what extent the Jahāngīr and Yūsuf revolts were 'wars of national liberation' opposed to Khoqandi-sponsored invasions became the subject of some contention between Chinese and Soviet scholars in the 1980s. See, for example, Lü Yiran, 'Haohan yu Zhangge'er Yusupu zhi luan', p.100.

decided to make what they could of the unfavourable situation by looting, pillaging and abducting children, before hastily beating a retreat.[35] It was fear of just such conduct that the imperial agent, Bichang, and his hakim bek at Yarkand, 'Abd al-Rahmān, had so skillfully manipulated in rallying the Muslims to the Qing side.[36] Nevertheless, Qing officials still needed to explain both why the attack had occurred and why it had been able to achieve, albeit limited, success.

Suspected treachery

A few days after the end of the siege, on December 31st, General Yang Fang, stationed in Aqsu received a communication from councillor Zhalonga. This report triggered what was to become known as the Ishāq affair. In short, on the basis of the depositions of captives, Zhalonga now appeared to have been persuaded by the earlier suspicions of the Kashgar merchant community; Ishāq, the hakim bek of Kashgar, stood accused of treachery, of having served as the eyes and ears of Khoqand and even of having persuaded Khoqand to attack. Zhalonga informed Yang Fang that Ishāq and his family were being held in solitary confinement while they awaited interrogation. Others implemented in the plot had already been put to death.[37]

By the time this matter was reported to the emperor, Yulin and others had already voiced their suspicions. Ishāq was the grandson of Hudī who had assisted the Qianlong conquest of Altishahr. Ishāq himself had begun his career as a minor bek in the town of Shayar and risen slowly but surely through the ranks of officialdom. In 1827, he had accompanied the Qing army in the campaign to retake Kashgar and played a crucial role in the capture of Jahāngīr. For these efforts he was not only afforded the position of hakim bek, the title of *junwang* (prince of the 2nd order) and the privilege of being allowed to wear a queue—the first bek ever to be allowed to do so, he was also appointed to the office of assistant imperial agent, an office which no other native of Xinjiang had held since Iskandar in the 18th century.[38] He had made the journey to court with other beks, and his eldest son Ahmad, who had followed him into a career of service to the dynasty, currently held the post of hakim bek in Aqsu. Ahmad's

[35] ZPZZ MZL 556.1, DG10.10.29; XZSL 78:32a, DG10.10 *guichou*.
[36] Bichang, *Shoubian jiyao*, 7b.
[37] LFZZ MZL 8066.39, DG11.1.18.
[38] Iskandar served as hakim bek of Kashgar for over twenty years and was the 5th (possibly 6th) son of Amīn of Turfan who had assisted the Qing forces during their conquest of Xinjiang. For the early genealogy of this family that remained in the service of the Qing for some 150 years, see HJTZ 4:1a–11a. For Hudī and his descendants, see chapter 4, note 20.

conduct in supporting the imperial campaign during the recent troubles had been deemed faultless. And doubtless his exertions were attributable, at least in part, to the knowledge that his father was among those besieged in Kashgar, the mere thought of which is said to have brought tears to his eyes on several occasions.[39] Thus, for four generations the family's well-being, power and not inconsiderable fortune had depended on a symbiotic relationship with the Qing. While the problem of bek-loyalty was one that perennially irked the Qing administration in Altishahr, Ishāq was one of a handful of native officials from whom the court could reasonably expect unswerving fidelity.

The emperor judiciously suspected that Ishāq was unpopular among many Altishahri Muslims for his past role in the suppression of the Jahāngīr revolt and the capture of hundreds of Āfāqī rebels; now perhaps the bad feeling that had apparently long existed between Ishāq and Zhalonga had persuaded the latter to give credence to malicious rumour. But there were other problems with Zhalonga's story. If, as he suggested, Ishāq had been preparing for the revolt by stashing weapons in the *yamen* then, the emperor queried, why had the councillor not been alert to this? Zhalonga was immediately removed from office and Changling, who had remained in Altishahr as imperial commissioner in order to oversee the rehabilitation policy, was charged with conducting a reinvestigation of the affair.[40]

Preliminary findings revealed that Zhalonga's conduct throughout the siege had been less than exemplary and his version of events raised more questions than it answered.[41] As Changling pursued his enquiries into the Ishāq affair, he soon uncovered mounting evidence of Zhalonga's negligence and ineptitude. By late 1830, when the emperor added the rescript "A crime that damages the state should be punished" to one of the many memorials on the case, Zhalonga's fate was already sealed.[42] But it was not until the summer of 1831 that Changling finally filed his report. His findings exonerated Ishāq and concluded that in an attempt to cover up his failure to prevent the massacre in Ishāq's *yamen*, the councillor had

[39] XZSL 181:25a, DG10.12 *jiawu*. For his services during the revolt, Ahmad was subsequently granted the title of *taiji* of the 1st rank and the double-eyed peacock feather (*shuangyan hualing*). On the death of his father in 1842 he inherited his title as prince of the 2nd order (*junwang*) and in 1850 he was appointed to the post of hakim bek at Yarkand. However, despite his undeniable loyalty to the Qing, he was not incorruptible and in 1852 he was found guilty of extortion and removed from office. See Alateng Aoqier (Altan-Ochir), *Qingdai Yili jiangjun lungao*, pp.155–7.
[40] XZSL 181:26a, DG10.12 *jiawu*.
[41] ZPZZ MZL 569.9, DG10.12.24; WJSL 4:7b–8a, DG10.12.7.
[42] ZPZZ MZL 528.1, DG11.1.15.

given false testimony and falsified the depositions of others to suggest that Ishāq had indeed plotted to betray the city.[43]

While there is little doubt of Ishāq's innocence, there is, however, no doubt that the rumour of Ishāq's treachery was very real. Ishāq's own testimony suggests that word of his dealings with Khoqand was circulating outside the *karun* well before it reached Kashgar. Despite minor conflicting details in the depositions of Khoqandi and Qirghiz captives, and the difficulty of ascertaining exactly which had been tampered with, clearly it was widely believed that Ishāq had instigated the attack on Kashgar. It would appear, therefore, that the rumour had been started outside the *karun* and relayed to Kashgar by perhaps Qirghiz, Qazaq or Khoqandi traders. Once word of Ishāq's treachery reached Kashgar, it would have been readily seized upon by the nervous Chinese merchants who had long borne a grudge against the hakim bek—not least because he was said to have confiscated their stocks of tea and sold them on to Khoqandis for private gain.[44]

The question of where precisely, or with whom, the rumour originated is more difficult to determine. It may, of course, have been triggered by a chance remark, or a misunderstanding, and then carried on the back of hopes and fears from village to village and settlement to settlement, all the while gathering detail to meet the demands of credibility. But idle rumour seldom spreads so far or fast without assistance. As already noted, the Chinese merchants were not Ishāq's only enemy. He was resented by many Āfāqī followers, Qirghiz and exiled Altishahris for his role in Jahāngīr's capture and the suppression of the revolt. Yet if the story were started simply to make trouble for Ishāq, then it is puzzling that it should portray Ishāq as a supporter of the Khoqandi-khoja cause. How could his enemies have been sure that the Chinese merchants would react as they did? And why should they have supposed that the Qing officials in Kashgar would be persuaded by such idle gossip, even if it were to reach their ears? A more plausible explanation might be that the rumour was part of an orchestrated plan to take Kashgar. If the Khoqandis and Yūsuf were to enlist support among the Qirghiz and others, it was crucial that it should be generally believed that the Qing garrison at Kashgar had been reduced and that the people of Kashgar were ready to rebel. If Ishāq, the influential hakim bek of Kashgar, was thought to be working with the

[43] Zhalonga was sentenced to death but, because he was deemed to have made a significant contribution to the defence works in Kashgar and had already been detained for three months, his execution was postponed until after the autumn assizes. In the meantime, he was placed in the cangue in Aqsu, where he died two months later. XZSL 193:8b–12b, DG11.7 *guiyou*.

[44] LFZZ MZL 8066.50, DG11.1.27.

Khoqandis and prepared to lead the Kashgaris in revolt, many doubts would have been assuaged. Whether or not the rumour was planted by the Khoqandi leadership, it seems highly likely that it would have encouraged its circulation.

As so often, rumour took on a life of its own, influencing events in a manner that its originators could not have imagined. As far as Zhalonga was concerned, if the stories of Ishāq's treachery gained credence at court, they might not only detract from his failure to take early warnings of the attack seriously, but might also serve to relieve him of responsibility for the massacre of Tasiha's troops and, of course, the attack on the *yamen* which had resulted in the slaughter of so many 'loyal' beks. But, if this were not enough, there was yet another reason why Zhalonga would have wished to discredit any evidence given by Ishāq in the aftermath of the revolt.

At the height of the siege of the Kashgar cantonment, a large body of Khoqandi traders had gathered outside the city walls to plead for the restoration of trade.[45] The incident graphically confirmed the views of those officials who already suspected that the sanctions were at least partially responsible for the revolt.[46] An assessment of the effects of the embargo and a re-appraisal of how it was implemented and managed would be crucial to the rehabilitation policy. If, in the context of all the other incidents that had occurred in the course of the revolt, Ishāq gave evidence of Zhalonga's failure to report that since Nayancheng's departure, the Khoqandi merchants had on several occasions sent messages to Kashgar to plead for the resumption of trade, then Zhalonga knew he would not escape the most severe of punishments.

The debate on trade sanctions

The widely-held belief that there was a lack of interest in, and knowledge of, foreign affairs among court circles in the early to mid-19th century would appear to be borne out by the paucity of debate that had followed the Jahāngīr revolt. Confined as this debate was to questions of retrenchment and the size and distribution of the garrison, issues of foreign policy seemed barely to impinge on the consciousness of even the most concerned of Qing officials. Now a mere four years later, however, there was a marked difference in the quality and nature of the exchanges that followed the rebellion of 1830. One reason for this, no doubt, was the

[45] XZSL 183:27b–28a, DG11.1 *renshen*; ZPZZ MZL 569.9, DG10.12.24. See below for further details.

[46] WJSL 4:1a, DG10.11.6; LFZZ WJL/ZE 7700.33, DG10.11.6.

increasingly assertive criticism emanating from the literati.[47] However, equally important was the fact that since the early Daoguang period, Songyun, Changling and Yulin had successively held office as grand councillors.[48] This trio not only had extensive first-hand experience of the northwest, but also understood the politics of the inner court. While serving on the Grand Council their opinions were cloaked by the voice of imperial centrality, but by the late 1820s, released from office on the Council, they all entered passionately into the debate on the northwest. Unlike the literati, whose tenuous understanding of the region and its problems led them to think along the traditional lines of either war or the total denial of trade, the frontier officials themselves had begun to grapple with how to deal with the outsiders in a manner that revealed a far greater understanding of the complex issues. Moreover, of paramount importance in the case of Altishahr, they were prepared to make the link between external policy and internal security. Ironically, the man who had first highlighted the importance of instituting a comprehensive policy for the region, a policy which took into account both internal and external policy, was now to be held personally responsible for the recent crisis in Altishahr.

Nayancheng had departed Kashgar in the spring of 1829 but, like many senior officials who had served in the borderlands, he retained a strong interest in the northwest, and continued to memorialize on matters concerning the region.[49] After hearing of the renewed outbreak of violence in Altishahr, in November 1830 he memorialized the throne, resolutely defending his implementation of the embargo against Khoqand and arguing that it had nothing to do with the present troubles. On the contrary, in his opinion the relaxation of sanctions at this juncture would merely send a signal to the outsiders that the empire could no longer control the frontier.[50]

It was not until after the suppression of the revolt, however, that the debate on sanctions gained momentum. In early 1831, Yulin, who was serving as military governor at Ili, emerged as one of the staunchest

[47] Polachek notes that as early as 1829 the Spring Purification Circle had already met to protest against the government's reluctance to engage in military confrontation with Khoqand. Polachek, *The Inner Opium War*, p.349, note 26.

[48] Songyun served on the Grand Council from 1821–2, Changling from 1823–4 and Yulin from 1824–9. For a biography of Yulin, see *Qingdai qibai mingren zhuan*, pp.1333–8.

[49] In October 1830 when Rongan, Nayancheng's son, was being criticized for dereliction of duty, Nayancheng offered to return to Xinjiang, claiming that responsibility for the revolt so soon after his departure from Altishahr must lie with his own failure to complete his duties satisfactorily. The emperor declined his offer. NWYGZY 80:95a–b, DG10.9.6.

[50] NWYGZY 80:102b, DG10.10.5.

opponents of the embargo on tea and rhubarb. The thrust of Yulin's argument was that the recent troubles had been inflamed, not by the religious fervour associated with the Jahāngīr revolt of 1826, but by the sanctions themselves. In a passionate memorial that also bears the name of Buyantai, the new councillor at Ili, Yulin set out his views in detail.

He begins his appraisal by reminding the court that the initial suggestion for the tea and rhubarb embargo had been a short-term measure designed to secure Khoqandi co-operation in the capture of Jahāngīr. The implementation of the embargo by Nayancheng had not only been stringent but, he implies, extended unnecessarily beyond Jahāngīr's capture with a view to securing the release of relatively unimportant members of the khoja family. Even when Nayancheng had been removed from his post in Kashgar for being over-zealous in his efforts to root out the potential source of future trouble, the court had still hesitated to lift the embargo. But Yulin goes on to point out that, contrary to Nayancheng's suggestion of the previous year, his own investigations had revealed that the Khoqandis were still acquiring tea via other routes. Khoqand was being inconvenienced by the sanctions, but that was all. The empire, on the other hand, was being made to look ridiculous. If the first half of this memorial is unusually direct, it is the latter that is the more striking, for it constitutes nothing less than a staunch defence of foreign trade and an acknowledgement that Qing rule of the Western Regions was dependent on Xinjiang's economic integration with the polities to the west. In Yulin's opinion, to disrupt the natural flow of goods and to deprive people of their livelihoods was not only a case of misrule in humanitarian terms, it also endangered the political stability of the region:

> For the Khoqandis and the various tribes of outsiders, [tea] is regarded as a daily necessity. If they yearn for it and cannot get it, how can we keep the ignorant outsiders peaceful as in the past? The fact of the matter is that if we continue in this way we shall not be able to control Khoqand and will just incite the other outsiders. Furthermore, all the towns on the southern circuit can trade with outsiders, but the prohibition of the internal trade on both the west and north route affects the sale of goods on the internal market and we are putting the administrative system at risk. This seems inappropriate, and of even more concern to me is that ignorant soldiers will act badly in carrying out their duties and will use the inspections as a pretext to taunt and recklessly cause trouble, so that the traders will be reluctant to come and the result will be inflation…
>
> In the 8th year of Daoguang [1828/9], when Nayancheng was dealing with the Andijanis [Khoqandi traders], an edict was issued stating that the emperor considered that just because many of these people had been here for a long time, we should not be lenient and allow them to become entrenched and foster trouble, but in wishing to drive them all out, if we did not manage things properly, we would provoke trouble. Now the Qirghiz

outside the *karun* at Uch [Turfan] report that the reason the rebels rose up on this occasion was because the Andijanis were not allowed within the *karun* to trade and so they joined forces with Khoqand and recklessly planned to plunder the Muslim villages to satisfy their greed. Although there is no evidence to verify their words they do not seem to be completely unfounded. This prohibition on tea and rhubarb and the expulsion of the Khoqandis is only a short-term solution, ultimately it is not a long-term policy for peaceful external relations.

In my humble opinion, in the important frontier regions it is surely right to punish traitors rigorously and in planning a course for the frontier, we must always govern with sensitivity and use a proper mixture of severity and gentleness. We must ensure that the [Chinese] citizens and Muslims in the cities can make a living peacefully and not cause the outsiders beyond the cities to be too covetous. Ili and Tarbagatai have long been focal points for traders. Soldiers and citizens all rely on the flow of trade for their livelihood. The greater the number of traders, the more prosperous the area will be. As for the cities of Altishahr, until now they have not been garrisoned by soldiers with their dependants and so it is even more appropriate that the sojourning traders regard it as a land of promise and make it prosperous. If officials govern well and alleviate the people's burdens, so that in a crisis they have someone to rely on, then soldiers, citizens and Muslims will be united. We will not have to deal with those shapeless threats from outside the *karun* and they will die out of their own accord. In the 70 years since the empire opened up Xinjiang, the fact that there has been no need for us to impose rigorous [trade] restrictions nor to station thousands of troops there and yet the area has been peaceful and trouble-free is clear proof of this…let us apply the old regulations, so that the citizens and the outsiders can both share the peace and enjoy the profit, then both inside and out will benefit from the situation.[51]

This comprehensive condemnation of both the embargo and the expulsions must be read in the context of the emperor's recent rejection of Yulin and Rongan's proposed military solution to the Khoqandi problem—a pincer attack against the khanate.[52] The court's dismissal of the plan had amounted to a clear admission that no matter what the circumstances it was no longer prepared to conduct a campaign that would involve Qing troops venturing into hostile territory beyond the limits of the empire. Yulin makes no mention of that proposal here, but it may be surmised that underpinning this analysis is an acute awareness of the folly of sanctions that cannot be backed by military force. The abolition of the

[51] ZPZZ MZL 558.1, DG10.12.19. For a slightly different version of this memorial, see WJSL 4:16a–18a, DG11.1.11.

[52] Shortly after Rongan's "cowardice" had been exposed, the emperor reflected that the main responsibility for the proposal of this "inappropriate" plan probably lay with Rongan and not Yulin, whom he considered to be "too lacking in resolution" (*tai wu gangjue*). XZSL 178:20a, DG10.10 *wushen*. In fact, even if the idea had not originated with Yulin, it is highly unlikely that he would have put his name to such an important proposal without due consideration.

embargo and a return to the former trade policy was, he considered, the only way to ensure the future security of the frontier.

Nor were Yulin and his staff the only frontier officials to query the wisdom of the sanctions. Bichang, for example, deemed the embargo to have been ill-conceived because the Jahāngīr revolt had been instigated by the khojas, not Khoqand; hardly surprisingly then, the punishment of Khoqand had had disastrous consequences.[53] A few weeks after Yulin had dispatched his indictment of the sanctions policy, Changling also added his reservations to the debate. Despite having himself been instrumental in introducing the sanctions, all the evidence that he was now marshalling in the aftermath of the rebellion indicated that the embargo and the expulsion of the Khoqandi traders had been, if not the cause, at least a contributory factor to the initial incursion. Qirghiz informants reported that the destitute Khoqandi traders, stripped of their livelihoods and unable to elicit any redress from the Kashgar authorities had, in desperation, allied with the Qirghiz and marched on Kashgar.

The desperation of these traders had been graphically illustrated when, several days into the siege of Kashgar, they had gathered outside the walls of the cantonment and, not for the first time, pleaded their case. One of the Khoqandis had approached the walls shouting out to the soldiers to hold their fire. As he did so, the crowd of 1,000-odd Khoqandi merchants fell to their knees. An interpreter relayed their message to the soldiers standing guard on the parapets:

> We are the Andijanis who were expelled from Kashgar, Aqsu, Ili and the other cities. We had traded within the *karun* for many years and we did not participate in Jahāngīr's revolt. Suddenly in the 8th year [1828–9] all our tea and rhubarb was confiscated by the authorities without compensation and we were driven out of the *karun* with no means of making a livelihood. Later Qirghiz came to our encampment bringing tea that they boasted had been presented to them by the emperor. Then we became even angrier and this is why we have entered the *karun*. All we want is that our tea and rhubarb be returned to us and that we be allowed to trade again within the *karun*, that will be favour enough.[54]

When this incident had been reported to Zhalonga, he had apparently replied that the expulsions had been carried out under his predecessor, Nayancheng, and were nothing to do with him. He had refused to give the traders licences (*yinpiao*) and once again, Changling learned, had turned a

[53] Bichang, *Shoubian jiyao*, 5b–6a.

[54] XZSL 183:27b–28a, DG11.1 *renshen*; ZPZZ MZL 569.9, DG10.12.24. It is not clear how the Qirghiz acquired this tea, but presumably it was either smuggled or given as a reward to those who had participated in suppressing the Jahāngīr revolt. In any event, the Khoqandi traders clearly reckoned that it was *their* confiscated tea.

deaf ear to their pleas.[55] Changling was wary of making hasty judgments about either the cause of the revolt or the direction of future policy,[56] but his memorials at this time increasingly reflect his own misgivings about the embargo and, in particular, the expulsions.

Even before Changling had concluded his inquiry into the Ishāq affair, in spring 1831, he sent word to Khoqand that if the two Khoqandi generals 'Īsā Dādkhāh and Mūsā, and Bābak the former Yarkandi bek who had participated in the rebellions of both 1826 and 1830, were extradited, then trade relations would be resumed.[57] But by August, when Changling finally submitted his rehabilitation programme, there had been no progress and, increasingly irritated by Khoqandi intransigence, he reiterated his opinion that only if the khanate handed over the rebel leaders, asked forgiveness and offered submission, should the restrictions on tea and rhubarb be dropped and trade restored.[58]

The emperor ratified Changling's decision, but at least one official was adamant in his opposition. In Beijing, Songyun, now a chief secretary of the Board of War, continued to concern himself with developments in Xinjiang. Always sceptical of the use of sanctions, even in the aftermath of the Jahāngīr revolt, he had opposed the embargo and suggested instead that the Khoqandi traders should be given 50% tax exemption with the understanding that if they handed over members of the khoja's family, then they would be afforded free trade.[59] Not surprisingly, Songyun had no reservations in attributing the revolt to Nayancheng's over-zealous implementation of the embargo and the expulsion of the Khoqandis. Arguing just as forcefully as Yulin, he advocated that all restrictions on trade should be lifted and that those who had had their property confiscated and been expelled should be allowed to resume their livelihoods: "If from now on they trade as in the past, the frontier can be peaceful for ever."[60] In his view, trade, and in particular free trade, meant security. Noting that the issue of tax on merchandise, which the Khoqandis regularly claimed to be 'the khan's goods', i.e. tribute trade, was a constant cause of friction, Songyun proposed that Khoqand be given complete tax exemption as a gesture of imperial munificence. This, he suggested, would pose no great financial loss to the empire and would

[55] ZPZZ MZL 528.1, DG11.1.15.
[56] See, for example, ZPZZ MZL 556.3, DG10.12.24 and 556.9, DG11.2.25.
[57] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.29, DG11.2.29.
[58] ZPZZ MZL 556.14, DG11.6.29; XZSL 193:19a–b, DG11.7 *guiyou*.
[59] HJNFL 45:19a, DG7.5 *xinhai*.
[60] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.36, DG11.8.26.

secure the extreme gratitude of the Khoqandis.[61] For the time being, however, this was deemed a concession too far.

The debate on retrenchment and defence

The debate over sanctions was, in fact, just part of the wider discussion on the rehabilitation policy and the re-opening of the question of retrenchment. Eshan, who as acting governor general of Shaan-Gan had opposed retrenchment after the Jahāngīr revolt, was now one of the first to speak out in its favour. Starting from the premise that for financial reasons it was impractical to keep a sufficiently strong military presence in the region, he argued that it was not worth fighting the Khoqandis and Qirghiz because even if these peoples' lands were taken, they were not suitable for cultivation. Moreover, periodic campaigns were no solution because in defending the northern border, the Qing, like earlier dynasties, faced the problem that the enemy was wont to flee when the imperial troops advanced and return when they withdrew. In his view, to continue with the present policy would be to waste the state's valuable military resources on a 'desolate corner' of the empire. Although mindful not to suggest establishing an Āfāqī khoja to administer the region, Eshan's proposal closely echoed that made by Wulonga in the wake of the Jahāngīr revolt. The garrisons, he suggested, should be withdrawn from the four western cities, the councillor relocated to Aqsu, and the region placed under the control of local leaders (*tusi*), both administratively and militarily. Once the hakim beks were given responsibility for the region, Eshan was confident that with the interests of their descendants at heart, they would strive to defend it from the neighbouring tribes. With a commandant and 2,000 soldiers stationed in a new cantonment at Barchuk on the main route from Aqsu to western Altishahr, a commandant and 1,000 men at Shayar on the Khotan-Qucha route, and with the addition of two new block-houses (*tubao*), each manned by 100 soldiers and located at strategic points: one on the grasslands between Khotan and Aqsu and one at Kelpin, Eshan reckoned that the region could be held, while reducing the pressure on the imperial troops and making savings in the military budget.[62] But his plan was not to be put to the test, for even among experienced frontier officials, in the current political climate, those arguing in favour of retrenchment were now few and far between.

Yulin was one of several officials, including both Nayancheng and Yang Fang, who were not persuaded by Eshan's analysis. Applying the domino theory, Yulin argued that since the time of the conquest under the

[61] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.34, DG11.1.19 and 7701.36, DG11.8.26.
[62] ZPZZ MZL 556.1, DG10.10.29; XZSL 178:36a–37b, DG10.10 *jiayin*.

Qianlong emperor, the eight cities of southern Xinjiang had constituted the defence barrier of the Western Regions. If Altishahr were peaceful then, so the argument went, the Mongols and other peoples to the north would also be peaceful. According to Yulin, during the latest crisis many Muslims had remained loyal to the Qing, and the situation could not, therefore, be compared with that of the Jahāngīr revolt when entire cities had been lost and had had to be regained. For Yulin then, as for Nayancheng whose views on the embargo he so vehemently opposed, the key to retaining the Western Regions lay in further consolidating the loyalty of the local people so as to ensure that any future incursion from beyond the *karun* would be repelled, first and foremost, by the people of Altishahr themselves. If, on the contrary, the garrisons were removed and the Muslims allowed to govern themselves, he feared that the local people would become disaffected, the Qirghiz would stir up trouble and the region would rapidly fall to the outsiders. With the four western cities lost, Aqsu would be a frontier city and Qucha, Qarashahr, Turfan and Hami would gradually become unsafe. In short, Yulin stated, "if the lips are lost, the teeth will be cold."[63]

For Changling, who shouldered responsibility for the rehabilitation programme, there was no easy solution. Harking back to suggestions made in the wake of the Jahāngīr revolt, he again dismissed the proposal for retrenchment and the establishment of *tusi* to control the region on the grounds that the loyal and competent beks such as Ishāq and 'Abd al-Rahmān, who had served as hakim beks in Kashgar and Yarkand respectively, were so despised by the rebels that to hand control of the four western cities to them would be to invite trouble. On the other hand, if the councillorship were to be left at Kashgar, a mere 100 *li* from the *karun,* there had to be troop increases with a concomitant and unacceptable, as far as the court was concerned, increase in the military budget.[64]

While the question of retrenchment was heatedly debated, there was almost universal agreement that the councillorship should be removed from its present exposed location at Kashgar. Songyun, for example, who was far from suggesting retrenchment of the order proposed by Eshan was, nevertheless, also an early advocate of the proposal to move the councillorship to Aqsu. He suggested that Kashgar could be administered by two assistant imperial agents, and Yarkand and Khotan by one each, while at Yangi Hisar, because of its proximity to both Yarkand and

[63] ZPZZ MZL 556.12, DG11.2.25; QSG 367 (*liezhuan* 154):11464–5; NWYGZY 80:100a–b, DG10.9.6.
[64] ZPZZ MZL 556.2, DG10.12.1.

Kashgar, there would be no need for a high-ranking Qing official and a hakim bek of the third rank would suffice. At Kashgar, which in Songyun's scheme would have become the second most important city of the region, he proposed that the hakim bek Ishāq should be appointed as an assistant imperial agent and allowed to memorialize with the Manchu imperial agent.[65]

Yulin, on the other hand, opposed the suggestion that the councillorship be transferred some 2,000 *li* north to Aqsu, on the grounds that the area around Aqsu was too confined and inadequate for the development of a major city. Instead, he favoured Yarkand, which had the merit of being an already populous city with room for expansion. Located some 500-odd *li* from Kashgar, which was invariably the first target of any attack from the west, Yarkand was neither too far from, nor too near to, that city. Yulin, therefore, suggested that the councillor and the imperial agent be relocated to Yarkand, from where all the eight cities of Altishahr could be administered. Strategically speaking, he argued, Kashgar would then be the first line of defence, Yangi Hisar would be the hub, Yarkand the nerve centre, and Khotan an additional back up. His plans for garrisoning Altishahr included the suggestion that a citadel (*chengyuan*) should be built at the strategic point of Maralbashi, near Barchuk, as had also been proposed by Eshan, Yang Fang and others. Clearly, therefore, his proposal would involve some increase in expenditure, but he was convinced that these measures would result in long-term savings.[66]

Songyun's memorials on the rehabilitation policy at this time are not only notable for his staunch insistence on the resumption of trade, preferably free trade, with Khoqand, they are also noteworthy for their emphasis on the need to eradicate corruption and malpractice among the troops and to alleviate the burden imposed on local people by the garrisons. Some months after making his initial proposal that the councillorship be transferred to Aqsu, he amended this suggestion in favour of Uch Turfan, where the Qing administrative and military headquarters of Altishahr had been located from 1765–88. Songyun had obviously been persuaded of the unsuitability of Aqsu, but his argument for the removal of the administrative and military centre from Kashgar (and presumably his opposition to the proposal of Yarkand) remained the same: given the logistical difficulties of supplying provisions so far to the southwest of the region, any further increase in the number of troops in

[65] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.34, DG11.1.19. Presumably, at the time of writing, Songyun already knew that Ishāq had been exonerated.
[66] ZPZZ MZL 556.12, DG11.2.25.

this area would inevitably place an additional burden on the local Muslims and possibly lead to a fresh outbreak of trouble.[67] While several officials including Yulin and Nayancheng touched upon the importance of reconciliation and fostering the loyalty of the local populace, only Songyun detailed how this might be done. The whole thrust of Songyun's proposal was that while maintaining a presence throughout all Altishahr, the Qing administration should reduce the burden it imposed on local people and loosen the reins of control. In a poignantly revealing memorial, he posited, that if the rotating troops were withdrawn in favour of colonizing troops, then the local people would not be burdened with having to supply fodder and fuel; if troops were not allowed to scout outside the *karun*, then they would not provoke incidents; if high-ranking officials were not allowed to be accompanied to the region by their families and servants, then the abuse of local women by members of their households could be avoided; if sanctions were lifted, then trade could flow freely; if officials oversaw tax collection rigorously, beks would be prevented from raising taxes illicitly; and if the Khoqandis were again allowed to marry local Muslims, then Altishahr would, according to Songyun's analysis, be perpetually peaceful. In particular, this ageing aficionado of frontier affairs worried about the livelihoods of the local people and the possibility that the suffering inflicted by the rebellion and the exactions of some 10,000 troops might drive them to further unrest. Noting that at Kashgar the locals had been compelled to chop down their apricot and mulberry orchards in order to supply the troops with fuel, he now advised that melon and clover seeds should be distributed to those without work and that they should receive grain to tide them over the coming winter and spring. An inveterate opponent of monopolies, he even raised the issue of abandoning the Qing control of jade mining in the region and re-opening the jade mountains at Yarkand to local miners.[68]

While Songyun's proposals advocated military colonization with a view to self-sufficiency for the garrison, others argued for a more radical proposal. In 1827, although the court had given a cautious agreement to the proposal of the censor, Qian Yiji, that colonization in Altishahr should be allowed along the lines of that already occurring in the north; in the event little had come of the idea.[69] Now, however, four years later, the idea was again receiving strong support. Yulin argued forcefully that the

[67] ZPZZ MZL 556.13, DG11.6.7; XZSL190:7a–8a, DG11.6 *dinghai*.
[68] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.34 DG11.1.19 and 7701.36, DG11.8.26; ZPZZ MZL 556.13, DG11.6.7; XZSL 190:7a–8a, DG11.6 *dinghai*. Some 30 years earlier, Songyun had been demoted for memorializing that the government monopoly on the production of salt and coinage should be lifted. QSG 342 (*liezhuan* 129):11115.
[69] See chapter 4.

south should be opened up for settlement by Chinese from the interior,[70] while to give up the fertile region of the four western cities and to retain the less fertile eastern area was, to his mind, equivalent to handing out food to the enemy.[71]

Gradually the ideas that the statecraft thinkers had been voicing for nearly a decade were beginning to bear fruit. However, these ideas were being driven, not by the need to find solutions to the socio-economic problems of the interior, but by the concerns of frontier officials and a court that could not afford politically to lose its hold on the region, nor economically to secure it with an inflated garrison. If, the argument went, people from the interior—whether soldiers, farmers or traders—were allowed to settle on the frontier, relocate their families and acquire property and land there, they would have a vested interest in defending the region. Then, with time, not only would state farms and local agriculture be able to support the troops stationed in the region, but a substantial community of settlers, willing to take up arms and repulse aggressors, would reduce the need for a large and costly garrison.

While the generals Yang Fang and Halanga, who were overseeing the mopping-up operations, grew increasingly anxious to have a programme for rehabilitation implemented as quickly as possible,[72] Changling proceeded cautiously. In the spring of 1831, he was still grappling with a long list of unresolved problems including: how to capture the Khoqandis who had started the rebellion; how to resolve the problem of defence without increasing the troop numbers; how to provide supplies for the defence of the region without wastage; how to ensure that provisions reached vulnerable areas; how to defend the frontier permanently against incursions by outsiders; how to make the people content with their livelihoods so that they are not easily incited to rebel and, if there were trouble, how to conserve the strength of the military.[73] Aware that this time there was no room for mistakes, he decided to return to Beijing to consult with court officials arguing that, in any event, this would be quicker than dispatching memorials back and forth. But the exactitudes of the preceding few months had taken their toll on the septuagenarian and his "old illness" was soon playing up again. Having reached no further

[70] ZPZZ MZL 556.12, DG11.2.25.
[71] ZPZZ MZL 556.12, DG11.2.25; QSG 367 (*liezhuan* 154):11464–5; NWYGZY 80:100a–b, DG10.9.6.
[72] ZPZZ MZL 556.5, DG10.12.26 and 556.8 [DG10.10.29 – 12.9.17].
[73] ZPZZ MZL 556.9, DG11.2.25.

than Suzhou (in Gansu), he took to his bed and was subsequently instructed to return to Xinjiang and not to proceed to Beijing.[74]

It was not until several months later, therefore, that Changling finally memorialized his solution to some of the above problems. As far as the embargo on tea and rhubarb was concerned, he advised that there should be no relaxation until the rebel leaders had been handed over together with a full apology and sincere submission; only then should trade be allowed to resume. In addition, he proposed that the councillorship be moved to Yarkand. In future, if rebels attacked, Kashgar would be the first line of defence, the rotating troops stationed there would then alert Yarkand, thus affording the councillor a vital few days leeway in which to prepare for the attack. Yet, in Changling's view, even this would not ensure the security of the region. Just as he had proposed in 1827–8, he again submitted that troop numbers in the four western cities be raised; this time, from the current 6,000–7,000 to 12,000–14,000. This increase, which would necessitate an additional 300,000 taels expenditure per annum, he estimated, could be funded by a cut of 2% in the expenses of the Green Standard troops stationed throughout the provinces of the empire.[75]

In ratifying Changling's proposals, the rise in troop numbers, which amounted to a six-fold increase since the Qianlong period, did not escape the court's notice. Over the next few months, the Daoguang emperor became increasingly dissatisfied and Changling was soon being upbraided for producing a rehabilitation plan that merely relied on an expansion of troop numbers:

> If it was going to be necessary to increase troops in order to augment our authority, officials could have come up with that long ago. Why wait until now? Since ancient times there has never been an occasion when the military strength of the interior was drained in order to control the outsiders and the situation endured for any length of time. How much the more foolish would it be to use military force to wield political power on the distant Muslim frontier? [76]

Whatever the validity of this tirade, there could be no clearer evidence of a change in imperial ethos since the Qianlong era. As had been so vividly presaged by Zhaohui's military demonstration for the benefit of the

[74] ZPZZ MZL 556.2, DG10.12.1 and 556.9, DG11.2.25; XZSL 184:41a, DG11.2 *wushen*.
[75] In fact, the breakdown for Changling's figures totalled 11,000, or 14,000 including Barchuk, i.e. Kashgar 3,000, Yangi Hisar 1,500, Khotan 500, Yarkand 6,000 and Barchuk 3,000. XZSL 193:17b–18b, DG11.7 *guiyou*. Changling subsequently modified these figures to give a total of 14,000, i.e. Kashgar 4,000, Yangi Hisar 1,000, Yarkand 5,000, Khotan 500 and Barchuk 3,500. XZSL 198:19a–b, DG11.10 *jichou*.
[76] XZSL 199:17b, DG11.10 *renyin*.

Qirghiz, it had been, above all, force and the threat of force that had held Altishahr under Qing rule for so long. Yet as Khoqand had grown steadily more confident of its power, so the court's inclination, and indeed capacity, to employ the increased military strength needed to hold the khanate in check, had gradually declined.

The court went on to insist that at Yarkand, the new regional headquarters, a garrison of 5,000 troops, rather than Changling's proposed 6,000, would suffice, while at Kashgar, Changling's suggested figure was to be slashed by 2,000, to a mere 1,000 men. Significantly these reductions were justified not by reasons of expenditure, but rather by recourse to Songyun's view that more troops meant more provisions and this would only increase the burden on local people.[77] There was still more bad news for Changling when calculations carried out at court brought to light that a 2% cut across the Green Standard troops throughout the empire would produce an approximate saving of 184,000 taels per annum and not the 300,000 that he had calculated.[78] By early 1832, the court had cut his proposed figure for the Altishahr garrison from 14,000 to 9,000 men.[79]

Agricultural colonization and settlement

For Xinjiang, the most important repercussion of the Khoqandi-Yūsuf revolt was that having now spent nearly 20 million taels on military campaigns in Altishahr in less than five years, the court was forced to confront the escalating cost of retaining control of the region; as a result, it finally gave hesitant support to the proposal that the four western cities be opened up for agricultural colonization and settlement. Following the Jahāngīr rising, in response to proposals by the censor Qian Yiji, Changling, Wulonga and others, a small number of Muslim troops had been permitted to open up land in the vicinity of Kashgar,[80] but now the court agreed to allow non-Muslim troops and migrants from the interior to settle in Altishahr.

In autumn 1831, it was decreed that Sino-Muslims and Han Chinese traders and farmers from the interior, were to be permitted to settle in Altishahr with their families and either to open up land or lease land from the local people. Garrison soldiers who wished to settle with their dependants were also to be permitted to do so, and if any of the new settlers wanted to enlist in the army, they were to be given a grain

[77] XZSL 199:18b, DG11.10 *renyin*.
[78] XZSL 193:18b, DG11.7 *guiyou* and 199:27a–28b, DG11.10 *dingwei*.
[79] XZSL 202:22a–b, DG11.12 *jichou*.
[80] XZSL 145:7a–b, DG8.10 *guiwei*. See chapter 4.

allowance. It was anticipated that several years hence half of the garrison would comprise settlers and half would be rotating troops, thus significantly reducing government expenditure. In the meantime, however, the court was satisfied that for every dependent who became a soldier, one of the rotating troops could be withdrawn and a saving made. Moreover, agricultural colonization also offered the prospect that the produce of Altishahr might eventually supply all the necessary provisions for the Altishahr garrison. To this end, the Daoguang emperor instructed his officials in the region to look into the practicalities of opening up virgin land and to set up procedures so that the new settlements and influx of immigrants did not impinge on the livelihoods of the local Muslims.[81] What is striking about these discussions is that, according to extant documents, at no point was any reference made to the experience of 'sinification' in Mongolia or the northeast,[82] nor to the fact that the entry of large numbers of Chinese to the region would mark an end of what had been essentially a Manchu enclave in Xinjiang.

Although, as others have noted, these developments marked a dramatic shift in policy,[83] initially the impact was slight. In 1832, the censor Da Yong put forward his draft regulations for altering the troop rotation and establishing extensive military colonization in Altishahr. These proposals were far more ambitious than had originally been envisaged by the frontier officials and were bitterly opposed by Changling. Most significantly, Changling pointed out that there was little, if any, land immediately available in the west of Altishahr for the settlement by troops and their dependants. Even in the cities, there was no space for the building of new houses and, with fuel having to be transported a distance of over 100 *li,* soldiers who were accompanied by family members would have had to divert all their time and effort to providing for their dependants. The problems were manifold. In short, according to Changling, if in the immediate future large numbers of soldiers and their

[81] XZSL 197:18a–19a, DG11.9 *wuyin* and 193:19a, DG11.7 *guiyou*. The opening of the four western cities to colonization following the practice north of Tianshan did not, however, mean that all the cities in Altishahr were now open to settlers. In 1835, Elejin, the imperial agent in Qarashahr, memorialized requesting that agricultural colonization and settlement should be extended to the eastern cities of Altishahr. In particular, he requested that local Muslims should be allowed to lease their land to settlers and that traders be allowed to bring their dependants to the area. ZPZZ MZL 82.1, DG15.4.24.

[82] Although often associated with the late 19th century, the Han influx into Mongolia (and the northeast) was well under way by the early 1800s and the cause of some concern to the court. See Fletcher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia', pp.47, 57, 'Sino-Russian Relations, 1800–62', p.332 and 'Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet', p.356. For a study of Chinese economic penetration of Mongolia during the 18th and early 19th centuries, see Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule*.

[83] See, for example, Hua Li, *Qingdai Xinjiang nongye kaifa shi*, p.182 and Zhao Yuzheng, *Sichou zhi lu tunken yanjiu*, p.243.

families moved to Altishahr and settled there, they would be no better than prisoners: unable to support themselves and unable to afford to return. The court agreed; Da Yong's proposal went too far, too quickly.[84]

What was needed in advance of any migration programme was large-scale irrigation and reclamation projects. Efforts focussed on two main areas of western Altishahr: one near Kashgar and one near Barchuk. The former area comprised land confiscated from local Muslims who had fled during the recent troubles and was not, strictly speaking, 'reclaimed'. By March 1832, over 500 people had already been resettled in this area and were cultivating more than 20,000 *mu*.[85] At Barchuk, on the other hand, the land reclamation project did not begin until 1832 and necessitated extensive irrigation works, but nevertheless, two years later, over 360 immigrants had been resettled on 24,000 *mu*.[86] By 1836, the amount of reclaimed land here was estimated at 100,000 *mu,* but contrary to the predictions of Gong Zizhen and his like-minded associates, there was no large-scale influx of families from the interior. The initial optimism gradually faded as the practical difficulties of both administering and farming these areas were driven home. In the area around Barchuk, by 1838, mal-administration had resulted in settlers suffering such deprivations that, unable to repay loans on seed and tools, they simply abandoned their land and fled.[87] Indeed, so reluctant were people to move to the region that incentives were offered to any exiled official who could manage to effect the relocation of one hundred or more families to Altishahr. In nearly a decade, only one exiled official, a certain Tan Chuntai, appears to have qualified for the reward. He was given a button of the 6th rank and allowed to return home.[88]

Not only were re-settlers not queuing up for relocation to Altishahr, but a question mark hangs over the seemingly impressive figures for the amount of land reclaimed in the early 1830s. As has already been noted, some was recognized to be land confiscated from local people who had fled during the 1830 rising. However, time and again in the early 1830s,

[84] XZSL 214:28a–b, DG12.6 *wuxu*.

[85] XZSL 206:14b–15a, DG12.2 *gengzi*.

[86] XZSL 249:1a, DG14.2 *bingshen*.

[87] *Xiyu tongzhi*, p.468. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the reclaimed land was found to contain saltpetre. XZSL 315:32a–34a, DG18.10 *wuxu*. One profitable use to which Chinese immigrants and Muslims put the more remote areas of opened up land was the growing of opium. *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao* [hereafter YZDS], (DG19.12.22), vol.1, p.787. For further discussion of the opium trade in Xinjiang, see chapter 8.

[88] *Xiyu tongzhi*, p.468. Lin Zexu, who had at this time been exiled to Xinjiang, purposely did not avail himself of this opportunity out of concern that his critics in the capital would assume that he had been behind the original proposal. Yang Guozhen, *Lin Zexu zhuan*, pp.500–1.

memorials from court voiced concern that the immigrants should not be settled on land belonging to the local Muslims and stressed that the reclamation projects should not be allowed to disrupt the livelihoods of local people. Despite assurances from the frontier officials to the contrary, it seems probable that the figures for newly-opened land included areas where Muslims were driven from their land, whether or not compensated with land elsewhere. So anxious did the court become that the anticipated large numbers of immigrants from the interior would cause conflict that in 1834 it was suggested that Muslims, rather than Han Chinese, should be settled on the reclaimed land.[89] This not only reflected the long-established belief among Qing officials that there was an inherent danger in bringing different peoples into close contact with one another, but also hinted at a tension in the motives for opening up Altishahr. What was the prime purpose: to ease the population pressure in the interior, to reduce the expenses of the garrison, to provide a living for landless local Muslims, or to secure the frontier? And if the most pressing issue was to secure the frontier, who was likely to do this most effectively: local Muslims, or immigrants from the interior?[90]

These questions remained unanswered, but ultimately, the migration policy continued and time assuaged any fears that a massive influx of Han Chinese would cause unrest. Indeed, some ten years later, the court was again more concerned by the lack of migrants from the interior. When lands were being reclaimed in the vicinity of Aqsu and Khotan, the Daoguang emperor was critical of the officials in both these areas for settling local Muslims, rather than Han Chinese. Perhaps, he should not have been entirely surprised to be informed by frontier officials that the area was so remote and desolate that no Han Chinese was prepared to settle there.[91]

Yet despite the fact that the opening-up of Altishahr to colonization saw no dramatic influx of settlers and, in the near future, was to have far less social and economic impact than comparable policies in Mongolia and the northeast, its significance should not be underestimated. The dual threat posed by Khoqand and the khojas to Altishahr had wrought a sea change in Qing policy towards the region, a change which had symbolically removed one of the greatest hurdles to the integration of the

[89] XZSL 252:24b–25a, DG14.5 *dinghai* and 254:9b–10a, DG14.7 *gengwu*.

[90] Hua Li suggests that the driving motive of the Daoguang emperor was to alleviate over-population in the interior and to populate the frontier, while frontier officials, such as Jirui, the imperial agent at Aqsu, were more concerned to provide livelihoods for local Muslims. Hua Li, *Qingdai Xinjiang nongye kaifa shi*, p.187.

[91] XZSL 409:21a–22a, DG24.9 *dinghai*; 410:3a–b, DG24.10 *dingshen* and 419:18b–19b, DG25.7 *dingchou*.

region into the empire. But if land reclamation and colonization were long-term solutions to pressing security issues, what the Daoguang emperor required in 1831 was a quick and cheap fix. Unbeknown to Changling, he was already beginning to have second thoughts about how best to pursue relations with Khoqand.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ZENITH OF KHOQAND'S POWER

Negotiations to restore relations

By spring 1830, the Qing forces had reasserted their control of western Altishahr and already Khoqand was pressing for the re-establishment of bilateral trade. The tripartite dialogue that now took place between the government of Khoqand, Qing officialdom in Xinjiang and the court in Beijing is deserving of detailed examination, both for its insights into the process by which frontier policy was formulated and because of its impact on the next 30-odd years of Qing rule in Altishahr. Furthermore, it is in this period, the early 1830s, that Joseph Fletcher and others in his wake have suggested that China concluded its 'first unequal treaty' involving 'full extraterritoriality'—imposed upon it by no less likely a power than Khoqand.[1]

In summer 1831, a delegation from Khoqand arrived in Kashgar. Without reference to the conditions that had been relayed to Khoqand some six months earlier, the envoys requested the resumption of trade. Changling, the imperial commissioner, responded by reiterating the two conditions as now ratified by the court: trade would be restored provided that rebel leaders were handed over and civilian prisoners were returned. He then dispatched four envoys, including an akhund, named Īshān Hājjī, to accompany the returning Khoqandi party. Meanwhile, one of the Khoqandi envoys, Doghar Bay, was detained in Kashgar.[2]

As the weeks passed and there was no news from Khoqand, the court began to show signs of impatience with Changling's inflexible approach and specifically his failure to reduce projected troop requirements for western Altishahr. Songyun's solution—"let Khoqand trade and the frontier will be peaceful and untroubled"—began to appeal.[3] In November, a mere three months after the emperor had approved Changling's conditions for the restoration of trade, the court backtracked and instructed that not only should the Khoqandis be allowed to trade according to the 'old regulations' (*jiu zhang*), but they should also be

[1] Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', pp.375–85.
[2] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.35, DG11.8.23.
[3] After the re-establishment of trade with Khoqand, Songyun was rewarded for this advice, promoted to the 1st rank and made an assistant commander of the martial troops of the Plain Yellow Banner. XZSL 214: 22b, DG12.6 *dingchou*.

granted tax-free status. The requirement that the rebel leaders be extradited and civilian prisoners returned was to be dropped completely.

> If, speaking sternly and forcefully, the general issues a clear instruction that due to the emperor's expansive virtue the outsiders are to be allowed to trade as before, with no restriction on rhubarb and tea and without having to pay tax, the unruly Khoqandis will be grateful for the emperor's kindness and will be more compliant than before and then naturally there will be no further trouble. The matter of extraditing the rebel leaders and returning the civilians, Muslims and non-Muslims, can be put aside as an expression of magnanimity.[4]

Quite obviously, the reasoning behind this decision was disquiet with Changling's troop requirements and the additional military expenditure, for it was in the same edict that the Grand Council cut by a third the number of troops that Changling had recommended be stationed in Kashgar.[5] If for economic reasons, the court had decided to resist enlarging the garrison, then by the same measure it could not risk another military engagement with Khoqand. However, justification for the U-turn steered clear of any direct discussion of financial considerations; nor was there any sign of concern that such a radical change in policy at this juncture might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Whatever doubts Changling and his colleagues in Xinjiang may have had about the wisdom of this show of imperial magnanimity, unlike the Beijing literati, they had no possibility of voicing their dissent.

Meanwhile, the Qing envoys who had departed Kashgar in September had reached Khoqand and delivered Changling's conditions to Muhammad 'Alī Khān and the mingbashi Haqq Qulī. Once again it was pointed out to the Qing envoys that there was no law providing for extradition in the Islamic scriptures and that everyone who entered Khoqandi territory was free to leave or return at will. Some ten days later, however, when Īshān Hājjī insisted that the renegade Yarkandi bek, Bābak, be extradited, Haqq Qulī had the three envoys placed under guard. Īshān Hājjī was subsequently detained in Khoqand while his two associates were dispatched towards Kashgar under armed escort. This time the message conveyed to the Kashgar authorities contained the semblance of a threat: if the Khoqandi envoy Doghar Bay were returned with word that the conditions had been dropped and trade reinstated, all would be well.[6] Despite the fact that the returning Qing envoys were accompanied by some fifty prisoners of war, evidently Khoqand had no intention of handing over the rebels; moreover, Īshān Hājjī was in effect being held to ransom.[7]

[4] XZSL 199:18a, DG11.10 *renyin*.
[5] XZSL 199:18a–b, DG11.10 *renyin*.
[6] ZPZZ MZL 555.3, DG11.10.29.
[7] ZPZZ MZL 555.3, DG11.10.29 and 555.4, n.d., probably a continuation of 555.3.

The envoys also delivered a letter from Īshān Hājjī to Zuhūr al-Dīn, the new hakim bek of Kashgar.[8] According to Īshān Hājjī, who had no complaints about his treatment, the Khoqandis were sincere in simply wanting to resume trade without tax. In his opinion, if refused they would cause trouble. Undoubtedly, the Khoqandis did anticipate further military engagement with the Qing forces at this time because they were actively endeavouring to raise support from among the polities of Bukhara, Darvaz and Qarategin.[9] They had even sent an unsuccessful mission to Russia, complete with an elephant, to seek support.[10]

In his lengthy memorial to the court, in early December, Changling carefully weighed up the pros and cons of attacking Khoqand. He estimated that with 40,000–50,000 crack troops and assistance from Khoqand's hostile neighbours, he could engineer a three-sided attack on the khanate and secure a victory that would ensure ten years of peace. But ultimately, assessing the financial and logistical factors together with the perilous nature of the terrain, which would necessitate his men passing in single file through a deep ravine in the heart of Edigene Qirghiz territory, he concluded that it would be wiser to strengthen the defence of the frontier. Thus while, on the one hand, Changling informed the emperor that he intended to instruct Zuhūr al-Dīn to send a letter to Khoqand insisting yet again that no request could be made to the emperor to allow the resumption of trade unless the rebel leaders were extradited, on the other hand, he anxiously began to make contingency plans to ensure that

[8] According to Valikhanov, Zuhūr al-Dīn had been taken prisoner in 1830 and removed to Khoqand but he escaped, making his way to Petropavlovsk on the Siberian border. From there he travelled to Kazan and then through Sempalatinsk to Ili where he presented himself to the governor general. He was subsequently appointed first *ishikāghā bek* (assistant hakim bek) and then hakim bek in Kashgar. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.326.

[9] ZPZZ MZL 555.3, DG11.10.29. Further evidence of the tension in Khoqand at this time is provided by a Solon soldier who was taken prisoner by Khoqand in 1830 and made his escape to Kashgar in summer 1832. According to his testimony, prior to Doghar Bay's return mission, villagers in Khoqand had genuinely feared a Qing attack. LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.52, DG12.7.1.

[10] XZSL 197:6a–b, DG11.9 *wuchen*; LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.31, n.d.. The latter is the deposition of Zhu Tianchao, a Chinese who had been exiled to Xinjiang for practising Catholicism. At the time of the Jahāngīr revolt, he was wounded during the attack on Kashgar and, along with Chinese traders from the interior, was taken to Khoqand and placed in servitude. Eventually, he had managed to escape via Bukhara to the Russian border region of Orenburg from where he was returned to Chinese territory. Because Zhu Tianchao was unwilling to give up his faith, he was sentenced to servitude in a 'Muslim city'. Meanwhile, the Chinese traders who had shared his fate were returned to their hometowns where local officials were instructed to keep them under close guard. XZSL 217:1b–2a, DG12.8 *yihai*.

both the military and civil administration of Altishahr were in competent hands. He was convinced that a Khoqandi attack was imminent.[11]

It must have been shortly after Changling dispatched this memorial that he received the Grand Council's edict of late November ordering him to drop all conditions and reinstate trade with Khoqand. In the event, therefore, the letter that Zuhūr al-Dīn had Doghar Bay relay to Khoqand was very different from that originally intended by Changling. It omitted all mention of any conditions and was couched in a conciliatory tone. The best that Changling could do was to endeavour to regain some degree of moral authority. To this end, the dialogue was now conducted through the hakim bek, Zuhūr al-Dīn. As a fellow Muslim, Zuhūr al-Dīn was able to cast himself in the role of an intermediary who was prepared to represent Khoqandi interests to the Qing authorities and to give advice on how to realize their objective:

> I know that the scriptures of the Muslims state that we will not extradite men of our own religion. I also know that since we prohibited trade your people's livelihoods have suffered. I have informed the military governor and the imperial commissioner of the situation and asked them to memorialize the great emperor requesting that he bestow exceptional grace and allow your people to resume trading. If your people receive the benevolence of the emperor as in the past, then their livelihoods will no longer suffer. The military governor and the imperial commissioner agreed to memorialize, but we do not yet know the outcome. I have explained all this to Doghar Bay and I know that when he returns, he will explain it to you. Then you should quickly send another envoy to come and make your request, let him bring just a few items to trade and I shall manage matters for you. If the great emperor bestows his favour on you and allows you to trade, this will be your good fortune.[12]

In the meantime, the court had received Changling's memorial in which he had proposed that Zuhūr al-Dīn should send a letter to reiterate the conditions. Not withstanding the fact that just a few months earlier the court had sanctioned the terms for reinstating trade, Changling and his officials were now reproached:

> [They were] never given specific instructions to make the bek of Khoqand hand over the rebel leaders nor to insist he send back [Chinese] citizens and Muslims. How can the outsiders not ponder on the fact that the general and his officials are so insistent on having these people and that such a mighty and civilized empire is so concerned to restrain Khoqand?[13]

This was much the same criticism that had been levelled against

[11] ZPZZ MZL 555.3, DG11.10.29.

[12] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.39, DG12.1.19. This and all the following quotations from the exchanges between Altishahr and Khoqand, unless otherwise stated, are taken from Chinese translations of the correspondence.

[13] XZSL 201:17a, DG11.11 *renshen*.

Nayancheng some three years earlier: to show too much interest in the rebel leaders would only make Khoqand value them all the more. Yet while Nayancheng had been removed from office, Changling was merely instructed to implement a policy that he quite clearly regarded as ill-advised. Moreover, in the same edict the court took its proposal for conciliation a step further. Not only was trade to be reinstated unconditionally and Khoqand to be granted full tax exemption, but the confiscated property of the Khoqandi traders was to be returned.

In the light of these instructions from Beijing, Zuhūr al-Dīn was hurriedly ordered to write a second letter informing Muhammad ʻAlī Khān that his request had been ratified, impressing upon him the full extent of Khoqand's good fortune and lavishly praising the emperor's bounty and magnanimity.

> I think you will have received the letter that I entrusted to Doghar Bay to deliver to you and I think you will have understood everything I said. The military governor and the councillor have memorialized about the resumption of trade that you are seeking and have already received the imperial response. The great emperor has taken pity on your hardship and allowed your people to enter the *karun* as in the past to trade. Moreover, they will not have to pay tax on their goods and even the trade in tea and rhubarb will not be prohibited. The military governor and the councillor have asked me to write to you to explain that this is the exceptional grace of the emperor. Indeed, all Khoqandis have been favoured by Heaven. In future you must be even more grateful and respectful. I am writing to you at the wish of the military governor and the councillor to let you know that you should speedily send envoys to give thanks for this benevolence. If in future you simply concern yourselves with coming to trade then your people will receive the munificence of the emperor in perpetuity and we will be on good terms forever.[14]

Even before this second missive reached Muhammad ʻAlī Khān, it seems the Khoqandis had sensed the wind of change in Qing policy, and the khan now stipulated his own terms for the renewal of relations. Doghar Bay returned to Kashgar in March 1832 accompanied by Īshān Hājjī and bearing a letter in which the khan addressed the imperial commissioner and military governor in forthright terms. He set out four requests. According to the Chinese translation of the letter, these were: the establishment of head traders (aqsaqals), tax exemption, the return of confiscated property and permission for all those traders who had been expelled to return to Altishahr:

> ... previously, all those Muslims who were expelled from Kashgar said that it was because Khoqand had made trouble that they had been expelled and those that fled back here from various places resented us. Now we request that you pardon them all and have them back; that you compensate us for the houses, land and tea that you confiscated; that you allow all Muslim outsiders to enter the pass to trade; that we be allowed to establish head traders to control them and that all trade should be tax-free. Subsequently Īshān Hājjī told me that I should send Ma-mai-te-na-hai and Doghar Bay to go together to make known to you our four requests. If you are in agreement then send me an official document with a seal and both sides will be on good terms; would this not be good for all the Muslims inside and outside [the *karun*]?[15]

[14] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.40, DG12.1.19. Presumably, it is Changling, the imperial commissioner, who is here referred to as the councillor.

As a seasoned envoy who had considerable experience in dealing with the Qing authorities, Doghar Bay would undoubtedly have been wary of how such a letter, or its bearer, would be received.[16] Thus, his own verbal report was nothing less than a masterly attempt to soften the khan's demands. He stressed that far from intending provocation, the khan had interpreted earlier messages as a warning that Qing forces were about to make an attack, and it was with a view to averting war, therefore, that he had sent this letter earnestly seeking the resumption of trade and setting out 'the four requests' to ensure its peaceful conduct.

> Our Bek [the khan] was afraid that the imperial troops would go beyond the *karun* and felt extremely concerned and fearful. He reflected that for more than 60 years we have been truly grateful for the munificence of the empire, and so he sent us to come to Kashgar to ask the military governor and the imperial commissioner to memorialize the emperor beseeching him to show exceptional mercy and allow us to trade within the *karun* as before. The route from Khoqand to Kashgar is long and hard and there is nothing special among the goods we bring to sell. All the Muslims traders are exceptionally poor so we request that they be exempt from taxes. Also, in the past when Andijanis [Khoqandis] traded we have sent head traders. They were all expelled in the 8th year [1828/9]. Our Bek is afraid that if we trade without a head trader in charge of the Muslim merchants who come from outside, they will not go about things properly and will not abide by the laws peacefully. Now we request that we be allowed to establish one as in the past. In the 8th year the Andijanis had all their property and tea confiscated. These poor Muslims all relied on the capital of our Bek to make a living within the *karun*. If you implore the emperor to take pity on the impoverished Muslims and compensate them for the confiscated property and tea, it will allay their suffering. In the 6th year [1826/7] there were Muslims in every city of Kashgaria [Altishahr] who rose in support of Jahāngīr and after the troubles they all fled. It had nothing to do with us, but

[15] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.43, DG12.3.13. It is not clear from the Chinese translation whether the reference to 'head trader' is singular or plural; however, subsequent events indicate that it was understood by both parties that, as in the past, there would be an aqsaqal in all the major cities of Altishahr, with a chief aqsaqal in Kashgar. For the original of the letter from Khoqand, see Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo*, p.141.

[16] Doghar Bay may well have been the same envoy sent to Kashgar by 'Umar Khān in 1821. See, for example, MWDA 3955–019 192–0015, [DG1.3] and 3964–022.1 192–1781, DG1.9.22 where the envoy's name is transcribed in Manchu as 'Dzogūr' and 'Dzohor' respectively.

> unfortunately, some of the Muslims fled to Khoqand. They all resent us and say it was because of the trouble that Khoqand had caused that they are being made to suffer. It is really an intolerable injustice. They beg for food everywhere in Khoqand and are quite pitiful. Our Bek cannot look after them and so now he is asking the military governor and the imperial commissioner to memorialize requesting that the emperor pardon the Muslims who fled and allow them back, in order to relieve the burden on our region and alleviate the resentment. If you assent to the four matters set out above, our Bek is willing to present a document with the seals of all the leaders, and beseeching [the emperor's] mercy, he will be eternally respectful and obedient. This is the heartfelt sentiment of our Bek ….[17]

However sceptical Changling might have been of Doghar Bay's interpretation, given the emperor's intervention he had no alternative but to accept the khan's requests. In early April 1832, Doghar Bay returned to Khoqand accompanied by an envoy from Altishahr and bearing Changling's reply:

> Since the time of the Qianlong emperor, you Khoqandis have received the grace of the emperor. Now that you have recognized your crime I, the *yangwei* general [Changling], the military governor of Ili [Yulin] and the councillor [Wulonga] have memorialized on your behalf and it appears that the emperor will certainly not punish you for your crime. As for your request that you be allowed to enter the *karun* to trade tax-free, the emperor has already shown his favour and given his permission for you to trade tax-free as in the past. Moreover, since you are being allowed to resume trade, you will be allowed to establish a head trader as in the past. In respect of the land and tea that was confiscated in the 8th year [of Daoguang], according to Doghar Bay, all your people are poor and you beseech us to compensate them. According to the records, a year or so ago the Qazaq Prince Jān Khōja from Ili requested that the emperor show mercy and compensate him for the tea that had been confiscated from his people and it was all returned to him. Now that you have come and requested that I, the *yangwei* general, the military governor of Ili and the councillor memorialize the emperor, he will certainly extend his grace and provide compensation for these things in the same way as he did for Jān Khōja. All these things we can permit you. As for the Muslims who fled from the various towns, in fact it was because they had risen in support of Jahāngīr that they were to be punished. Now since you are sincerely requesting that they be pardoned, the laws of our empire are that we officials cannot make these sort of decisions and we must memorialize the emperor and ask him to show magnanimity….[18]

Meanwhile, Changling had already forwarded the four requests to the

[17] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.44, DG12.3.13. The only record of Doghar Bay's report appears to be this Chinese translation. As usual in Chinese documents, the khan of Khoqand is here referred to as 'bek'. This may reflect Doghar Bay's own sensibilities to Chinese propriety, or those of the translator.

[18] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.45, DG12.3.13. For the return of the tea to the Qazak Jān Khōja, see LFZZ WJL/ZE 7663.37, DG11.1.11.

emperor, who authorized them in mid-April. From Kashgar another envoy was then sent to Khoqand in early May bearing the terms of the agreement.[19] On June 14th 1832, Doghar Bay returned to Kashgar accompanied by some eighty Kashgari captives and over one hundred traders.[20] He brought with him the trade agreement, referred to in the Chinese sources only as the document (*biaowen*), and a letter in which Muhammad 'Alī Khān avowed his unswerving loyalty to the emperor:

> From now on we shall be peaceful. Although I, Madalī [Muhammad 'Alī], am a foreigner in my heart I am as a Chinese man. Nothing will ever change this heart of mine. Khoqand has never rebelled against the empire. Now that all bad feelings have gone and only respectful obedience remains, if I, Madalī, should ever go back on my word and cause the Muslims to suffer I shall have committed a great crime. I swear faithfully on the scriptures that I shall be eternally obedient and always thankful for the imperial favour.[21]

By this time Changling had already returned to Beijing, but Doghar Bay was received in Kashgar by the imperial agent Halanga to whom he presented the document. This was then translated and checked against the Chinese version that had been approved by the court. A few days later, with the agreement confirmed and trade reinstated, Doghar Bay was entertained at a banquet.[22]

Despite a certain amount of concern that the quantity of goods and livestock brought by the Khoqandi traders who had accompanied Doghar Bay would take an unacceptably long time to sell, the officials at Kashgar were keen to ensure that the trading would pass off smoothly—there was to be no official interference in the proceedings, no extortion, and no profiteering. When the caravan departed Kashgar, so successful had it been that the Khoqandi merchants took with them over eighty Kashgari porters to carry their goods and herd the horses and sheep that they had purchased.[23]

The court's intervention had almost certainly averted a major crisis on the north-western frontier. Turning a deaf ear to the protests of the literati movement and overriding its frontier officials, it had effected a radical shift in policy. The question that remains, however, is whether the Qing empire had indeed backed down and struck a humiliating bargain with a paltry neighbouring power, so derisorily described by Nayancheng as comprising no more than eight large villages without walls or moats.

[19] CWGZN 3:33b–34a; XZSL 207:26a–b, DG12.3 *gengshen*, LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701. 42, DG12.3.13.

[20] XZSL 214:19a, DG12.6 *bingshen*.

[21] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.49, DG 12.6.21.

[22] XZSL 214:22a–b, DG12.6 *dingchou*; LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.49, DG12.6.21.

[23] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.53, DG12.9.20; XZSL 214:19a–b, DG12.6 *bingshen* and 214:23a, DG12.6 *dingyou*.

Interpretations of the trade agreement

It is now widely acknowledged that many elements associated with late 19th century extraterritoriality in the Treaty Ports were in fact rooted in traditional Chinese practices; they were not so much ruthlessly imposed on the empire as negotiated by it in an effort to seek accommodation with Western traders. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising to find that in Altishahr, some ten years before the Opium Wars when the Qing faced similar mercantile pressure from foreigners, it did not submit to any radical departures in policy but rather reaffirmed and reintroduced an array of well-worn practices for dealing with foreigners.

The office of aqsaqal had, of course, existed in Altishahr pre-1760 and the institution was continued after the Qing conquest, thus its re-establishment in the cities of Altishahr was undeniably a return to an old arrangement. There was no suggestion that the Qing authorities had forfeited the right to confirm the appointment of aqsaqal, still less that through this office the ruler of Khoqand would now exercise legal jurisdiction over his subjects residing in Altishahr. As far as the tax issue was concerned, although here a concession was clearly granted, it was hardly new or particularly damaging to the empire's interests. Hitherto, Khoqandi traders had officially been taxed at 3.3% and 2.5%, but throughout the 1820s, in view of the various disruptions to trade and numerous 'special cases', it is probable that the taxes had so rarely been collected that abolishing them constituted no great loss to the imperial treasury.[24] Finally, there is no evidence in Qing sources that the resumption of trade was to be conditional on Khoqand holding the khojas in check,[25] while in dropping the demand that Khoqand hand over the rebel leaders before being allowed to resume trade, the court was merely upholding its long-established view that to insist that Khoqand extradite 'rebels' would only play into the khan's hands.

Qing official correspondence at this time repeatedly refers to the resumption of trade with Khoqand according to the 'old regulations'. There is no evidence, however, that the 'old regulations' had ever been set out in documentary form, and the upheavals suffered by the Qing

[24] In March 1829, in response to a memorial from Nayancheng on the decline of the tax system in Altishahr, the court had instructed that all foreign traders in the region should be taxed at the old level of 3.3%. In future, the imperial agents were forbidden to authorize any reductions, but it is not clear to what extent this was implemented. XZSL 151:31a–b, DG9.2 *wuyin*. See Kuznetsov, who is of the opinion that prior to 1832 the Khoqandi traders paid little, if any, tax. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane*, pp.136–7.

[25] The suggestion that Khoqand undertook to restrain the activities of the khojas as part of the agreement is made in several Central Asian and Western sources. See, for example, note 29 below.

administration of Altishahr in the 1820s, involving a rapid turn over of high-ranking personnel, were not conducive to procedural continuity. Herein lay the problem. For the khan of Khoqand, the very fact that his merchants were now officially relieved of paying tax to the Qing government meant that he could have the aqsaqals levy taxes on *his* behalf in Altishahr. This was to become one of the primary duties of the aqsaqal. Thus, not only would the aqsaqal in Kashgar be an official representative of the khan, with considerably enhanced authority among the Khoqandi trading community, but he would, naturally, be appointed by the khan. The question of whether the aqsaqal was an appointee of the khan or merely elected from among the traders by the hakim bek was, of course, an old bone of contention that had been highlighted initially by the Sālih Jān affair in 1808–9 and subsequently by 'Umar Khān's repeated efforts to establish one or more representatives who would oversee the affairs of the Khoqandi community in Altishahr without reference to the Qing authorities. As suggested above, neither in 1832 nor at any time previously had the Qing authorities ever conceded that the aqsaqal was an officer of the Khoqandi government, but in recent years the issue had not been contested and it seems probable that, as in the case of Sālih Jān's reappointment, the hakim beks had fortuitously concurred with Khoqand's nominations.

Yet the real seeds of future trouble lay in the wording of the agreement and the way it was interpreted by each side. The Qing authorities believed that they had consented to grant the Khoqandis tax exemption, a favour that was also to be extended to all other outsiders trading at Kashgar and Yarkand.[26] The Khoqandis, on the other hand, were subsequently to insist that what had been agreed was that *all* merchants from beyond the *karun* who traded in Altishahr were to enjoy tax exemption and, as implied in the Chaghatai version of the agreement, that Khoqand should have the right to collect all these taxes.[27]

[26] XZSL 209:18a–b, DG12.4 *wuzi*.

[27] In the original letter from Khoqand, the khan's fourth request is that the Qing authorities '*…kalgan karvanlarning bacini barsangiz*" i.e. "give [to Khoqand] the customs duties [levied against] caravans coming [from outside]", LFZZ WJLZ/E 7000.41, DG11.12.21 (Tur.). The Chinese translation of this letter, however, reads "*zai qiu maoyi lai de huowu ye mian women de shui*" i.e. "[I] further request that we also be given tax exemption on goods brought for trading", LFZZ WJLZ/E 7001.43, DG12.3.13. Contrary to some suggestions, to date, no copy of the actual agreement in Chinese/Manchu or Chaghatai has come to light. However, subsequent references to the agreement in Qing sources leave no doubt that this, or very similar wording, must have been used in the agreement. Meanwhile, subsequent Khoqandi demands to be allowed to collect taxes from the Badakhshanis and Kashmiris suggest that in the Chaghatai version of the agreement, the wording used in the khan's original request, or a close approximation, had been retained. Whether the discrepancy in translations resulted from an oversight (not identified

So was this the 'treaty' or agreement so frequently referred to by 19th century scholars and more recently deemed China's first 'unequal treaty'?[28] According to W.H. Wathan, Persian Secretary to the government of Bombay, whose account dating from the early 1830s is possibly the earliest Western source to mention the issue, the agreement was made in the wake of the Jahāngīr revolt when Khoqand dispatched an envoy to Beijing to negotiate a peace settlement. This, Wathan claims, the emperor agreed to "on condition of the Muhammadans at Kashgar being subjected to the rule of a deputy of the KHÁN in all matters of religion, the KHÁN being allowed a share in the transit duties, and binding himself to keep the Kirghiz in subjection, and to assist the Chinese in the case of any insurrection in Chinese Tartary."[29] Muhammad Amīn's account, that appeared in R.H. Davies' trade report of 1862, mentions a mission to Beijing by a Khoqandi envoy named 'Alim Badshàh' (i.e. 'Ālim Pāshāh, or 'Ālim Pādishāsh), but like Wathan, he indicates that this took place following the Jahāngīr revolt and as a consequence the "emperor granted to the Khan permission to appoint aksakals as requested, but rejected his application to receive the Thibet duties levied at Yarkand as being quite

in the final checking of the Chaghatai and Chinese/Manchu versions of the agreement) or an intentional fudging, is impossible to deduce. See Pan Zhiping and Jiang Lili, '1832 nian Qing yu Haohan yihe kao'.

[28] To my knowledge, the earliest reference explicitly suggesting that Khoqand was given a form of extraterritorial status at this time appears in a survey of the history of Xinjiang prepared for the British Foreign Office in 1945 (although Valikhanov had, of course, implied this in the 19th century). The anonymous writer states, "Khokand ceased to pay tribute to China and became a promoter of disturbances in Sinkiang; much of the trade of Sinkiang was in the hands of the Khokandis, who in 1832 were given a kind of extra-territorial status and had a great influence over the Moslem co-religionists." 'Outline History of Sinkiang' FO371/46189, p.6, August 1945 (Public Records Office, London). It is doubtful, however, that Fletcher had seen this document when he applied the term 'extraterritoriality' to the situation enjoyed by the Khoqandis in Altishahr by the mid-1830s. Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.378.

[29] Wathan, 'Memoir on the U'sbek state of Kokan', p.375. Wathan is here following information obtained in conversation from an Uzbek and his two sons who had been on pilgrimage from Khoqand to Mecca. Their account reports that the consequence of the campaign [against Jahāngīr] "was that the Chinese agreed to our king's supremacy over their Muhammadan subjects, on the other hand, he is to keep the country in order, and to be responsible for the Kirghiz and Muhammadan population." Wathan, 'Note of a Pilgrimage', p.381. The conflating of the Jahāngīr and Yūsuf-led revolts appears to have permeated most Central Asian and thus also Western accounts. See, for example, Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, pp.341–6; also the account of the controversial German missionary Karl Gutzlaff, who states that in the wake of the Jahāngīr revolt the khan of Khoqand "came to an agreement with the Manchoos that they should pay him a round sum; that he should be the umpire in all differences between the Usbeck, take the lead in religious questions, and collect a certain sum of money from the caravans on their way to Turkistan." Gutzlaff, *The Life of Taou-kwang*, p.87. Much could, of course, be made of this conflation of events in terms of selective memory and myth-making.

unreasonable."[30] It is Valikhanov's account, however, which served as the source for many later 19th century studies, and undoubtedly prompted the 20th century claims that Khoqand had been granted extraterritorial status, according to an agreement that Fletcher later identified as China's 'first unequal treaty'. Chokan Valikhanov, the young Qazaq Chingissid who held the rank of first lieutenant in the Russian army and carried out his researches in Altishahr in the late 1850s, claims that 'Ālim Pāshāh journeyed to Beijing in 1831 where he made three requests:

1. Duties on merchandise brought by foreigners to Altishahr, e.g. Uch Turfan, Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Aqsu, Yarkand, and Khotan should be paid to Khoqand.
2. In order to collect these duties, in each of the above towns, Khoqand would have a superintendent of trade—an aqsaqal—under the authority of a head supervisor, the superintendent in Kashgar, who would also have political authority over them.
3. All foreigners arriving in the six cities should depend on the Khoqand agents in administrative and political matters.[31]

This might well reflect a Khoqandi interpretation of the agreement, but it was certainly not what the Qing authorities believed had been agreed.

In addition to the three concessions suggested by Valikhanov, a Khoqandi source of 1874 notes that Khoqand collected the taxes of merchants, presumably foreign merchants, in the north of Xinjiang as well as Altishahr.

> …the taxes (zakāt) of the merchants of the dependencies of Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aqsu and Uch Turfan, and the taxes of Chata [the Moghul steppe], and the taxes of the Ili region, and the taxes of Moghūliyya [Jungharia], as far as the locality of Qïzïl Jaru on the side of Urgench and Aq Masjid and Kumush Qurgan, came under the power of Muhammad 'Alī khan.[32]

However, although Khoqand may have been collecting taxes from merchants in all these areas by the mid-19th century, the source does not indicate that this was an official arrangement with the Qing government. There is one final problem, however; according to Fletcher, the exchanges in 1832 resulted in no more than an informal understanding and it was only in

[30] Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.345. Presumably the "Thibet duties", is a reference to duties on traders who travelled via the Karakorum Range and Sariqol into Altishahr, i.e. from Badakhshan, Kashmir and Ladakh.

[31] Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.325.

[32] *Tārīkh-i Ṣighārī* (Persian, completed 1874, anon, British Library MS Or. 8156), 8b–9a, following the translation in Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.377. Fletcher implies that the collection of taxes in Jungharia may also have been part of the agreement. See also Bellew, who cites this section of the *Tārīkh-i Ṣighārī*. Bellew, 'History of Kashgar', p.192.

1835 that the treaty was formalized and extended, in Beijing.[33]

The Qing sources attest that in 1834, a Khoqandi envoy named ʻĀlim Bay, and therefore undoubtedly the same ʻĀlim Pāshāh, did accompany a bek tribute mission to Beijing. Arriving in Beijing in early 1835, he had an audience with the emperor together with the beks from Xinjiang, and envoys from Korea, Thailand and the Ryukyu Islands.[34]

A record of this meeting appears in a Khoqandi source:

> When he had arrived close to Beijing, they brought word to the emperor that an ambassador from Muhammad ʻAlī Khān had come. The emperor ordered that they should bring the ambassador with all respect and kindness to the ambassadorial residence and accommodate him there. He ordered appropriate banquets and royal clothes for him. And after forty days he asked for the ambassador. ʻĀlim Pāshāh entered the imperial court and offered the due salutations. The emperor looked and saw what a wonderfully tall, strongly-built, masculine and wise man he was; he indicated a seat for him and ʻĀlim Pāshāh passed and handed the letter from the khan…to the emperor. He called for an interpreter and gave him the letter to read… "I led expeditions as far as Kashgar and the second time, I ordered Haqq Qulī mingbashi, my servant, to launch an expedition and he brought us out of our bondage and I brought under my rule [territory] as far as Ustrushan, Yam, Zamin, and Ab Achi. *Inshallāh*, I trust in God the Creator that one day I shall rule from the frontiers of Greece to those of Cathay, so I call upon the emperor of China that he must choose one of three actions:
>
> 1. That those khojas who were captured and taken to Beijing should be given to me with gifts that are worthy of descendants of the Prophet.
> 2. That you should give the government of the Seven Cities [Altishahr] which are not currently under Muslim rule to me, so that I myself may place there a governor in accordance with the noble sharīʻa.
>
> [3.] Following this, my last request is that you should give us every year from Beijing the sum of 10,000 *yambu* in tribute.
>
> Choose one of these three or else, if you do not, be prepared that we shall lead a military expedition to the frontiers of Qomul [Hami] and sift the earth of those provinces through a sieve…"
>
> The emperor became bewildered as to what answer he should give, so in the end he called a committee of ministers. The ministers said to him that they saw no other expedient route apart from conciliation, but [added] "of the three proposals, which one should we accept?" They considered, "If we send back the khojas, it would not be good for the dignity of the emperor. Moreover, they will attack us again and we shall not be rid of these attacks. If we pay 10,000 *yambu* a year, giving tribute to the king of Ferghana, nothing will be left of the sovereign's prestige; for all that he is emperor of China. In any case, there will be a probability that every year the tribute will be increased and once again this problem will continue until the insurrection ends. It is better that we surrender the rule over the Muslims of the Seven Cities and send presents, and thus take the route of compromise'. This advice found favour with the emperor, and he assigned a purse to the khan himself, which he handed to the ambassador, for which the tax of one province was spent…[but] he [the emperor] was left anxious lest the khan might be so powerful that he might want to wage war and come and take Beijing and [having done so] stay. So once more several thousand *yambu*, several thousand wonderful porcelain articles, and several thousand vessels and ewers and trays of wonderful porcelain and several boxes [?] of fragrant teas were given….[35]

[33] Fletcher acknowledges that Chinese sources make no mention of his claim that in 1835, the Khoqandis had the earlier 'understanding' converted into "a direct agreement with the Ch'ing throne and expanded it." Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.377. Fletcher's sources on this point are in fact circumstantial and it is also unlikely that Valikhanov (who erroneously links ʻĀlim Pāshāh with the 1832 agreement) would have overlooked such a significant development.

[34] XZSL 261:36b, DG14.12 *jiawu*.

ʻĀlim Pāshāh would not, of course, have been allowed to put any form of 'demand' to the emperor in person. According to the protocols for audience, foreign envoys did not approach the throne and the ceremony provided no opportunity for them to hand a petition directly to the emperor.[36] Yet, highly fictionalized as this account may be, it does give an important insight into the self-perceived power of Khoqand at this time, and also reflects what was apparently a common belief in Khoqand: that following ʻĀlim Pāshāh's journey to Beijing, Khoqand was granted some form of political jurisdiction over Altishahr.

Even in respect of 'the demands', the account is not without some basis in reality. ʻĀlim Pāshāh did go to Beijing armed with a petition. The Qing records recount that some two weeks after his audience, ʻĀlim Pāshāh visited Changling (now in semi-retirement) at his home, bringing with him presents of local products and a petition. In accepting the gift of grapes, Changling may have made an error of judgment, but in passing the petition to the *Lifanyuan*, he had no doubt as to his responsibilities.[37] The petition contained five requests:

1. the return of prisoners still enslaved in Altishahr;

[35] *Gharāʼib-i sipāh* (Persian, anon, n.d., probably late 19th century, MS 5408, Institute of Oriental Studies, Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent). I am grateful to Timur Beisembiev and Paul Bergne for this translation. The reference to the khojas who had been "captured and taken to Beijing" presumably refers to members of the khoja family and their descendants who had been compelled to reside in Beijing since the 18th century.

[36] In this respect, it is surprising that it has taken so long for scholars to question whether Lord Macartney did actually hand the jewel-encrusted box containing King George III's letter to the emperor, as recorded in Macartney's diary. See Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar*, p.168 and note. The protocols for audience are set out in the *Da Qing tongli* (Comprehensive rites of the Great Qing) and the *Libu zeli* (Precedents of the Board of Rites).

[37] The 80-year-old Changling was subsequently censured for accepting the grapes. The matter was referred for disciplinary action, but in view of his long service on the frontier, his sentence was nominal. XZSL 262:20b–22a, DG15.1 *wuyin*; 262:24a–25b, DG15.1 *jimao* and 262:27a–b, DG15.1 *renwu*.

2. the return of, or compensation for, the land confiscated from the expelled Khoqandis;
3. the removal of all tax on Badakhshani and Kashmiri traders;
4. the repatriation of four Khoqandi criminals held prisoner in Xinjiang;
5. the return to their families of all Muslim women who had married Han Chinese after their husbands had fled during the revolt.

The *Lifanyuan* did not deal directly with ʻĀlim Pāshāh and there is no evidence that a formal reply was ever sent to Khoqand. However, over the following weeks and months the various issues raised in the petition were investigated and addressed. In respect of the Khoqandis still enslaved in Altishahr, there was some confusion as to whether this referred to a group of 36 who were enslaved in Ili but who, on investigation, did not wish to be repatriated, or, a larger group of some 151 Muslims who were enslaved to beks in various cities throughout Xinjiang but who, according to the Grand Council, were not Khoqandis and were not to be released. The request for the return of land confiscated from the expelled Khoqandi traders was refused on the grounds that it had been sold and monetary settlement already made to all those who were eligible (i.e. those who were expelled and not those non-Khoqandis who had risen in support of the rebels and subsequently fled to Khoqand). In any case, the court argued, there was no question of the Khoqandis having land returned to them because, theoretically at least, as outsiders, they were not allowed to own land in Altishahr. The demand that Badakhshan and Kashmir be permitted to trade tax-free is puzzling. Already in 1833, a Khoqandi envoy to Yarkand had been upbraided for suggesting that a Khoqandi aqsaqal would collect tax from all traders coming from outside the *karun*. This, according to officials in Yarkand, had never been part of the agreement; all traders had been granted tax exemption specifically so that no one group should be advantaged. Thus ʻĀlim Pāshāh's request that Badakhshan and Kashmir be allowed to trade tax-free would perhaps suggest that, despite the court's reprimand, the Khoqandis were, nevertheless, secretly exercising their self-assumed right to levy taxes on other outsiders, and that the Badakhshanis and Kashmiris (who were among the most active groups of traders in Altishahr) were possibly refusing to co-operate, perhaps even having tricked the Khoqandis into believing that they still paid tax to China. In any event, the court did not investigate why Khoqand was making this unlikely representation and simply dismissed the matter as being of no concern to Khoqand. The repatriation of the four Khoqandi criminals, about whom there is little information, was also rejected on the instruction of the *Lifanyuan*. And lastly, although early investigations had apparently failed to reveal any Muslim women who had married Chinese men after their husbands fled during the disturbances of 1830, nevertheless, the court was

sufficiently concerned about the practice of intermarriage to insist that further inquiries be made throughout the villages of the region.[38]

Putting aside the misunderstanding about the actual substance of the agreement of 1832, placed in its historical context, there is little to suggest that the Qing court had wittingly conceded anything that might be termed extraterritoriality, in the modern sense. What it had done was to afford, or re-afford, to Khoqand several privileges which the empire had traditionally employed to regulate relations with foreign traders. The appointment of a native headman to oversee a foreign trading community and settle disputes between their kinsmen was a long-established practice throughout the empire and in no sense implied that the traders fell outside the emperor's legal jurisdiction. The restoration of trade had indeed constituted a patent backing-down on the part of the court, but if it had knowingly been forced to concede political and economic authority in Altishahr, then it would certainly be difficult to explain the response to Khoqand's requests in 1835. Contrary to the suggestion made in many Western and Central Asian accounts, neither in 1832, nor in 1835 did the Qing court believe it had agreed that a Khoqandi aqsaqal should be stationed in every major city of the Altishahr region *with the authority to tax all foreign merchants*. In the following year, 1836, when another Khoqandi envoy arrived in Yarkand and petitioned to be allowed to levy taxes on Badakhshani and Kashmiri traders, once again the request was refused by the Grand Council on the grounds that even though the Kashmiris and Badakhshanis had, like Khoqand and all the peoples from beyond the *karun,* been granted exemption, "the document that Changling previously gave them [the Khoqandis] merely allowed them to establish a *hūda-i da* [aqsaqal] to control their merchants and have them trade peacefully, there was absolutely no suggestion that they should be allowed to raise taxes from Kashmir and Badakhshan."[39] The granting of tax exemption to all foreigners trading in Altishahr was no alien concept imposed upon the Qing authorities but rather a well-worn component of the imperial repertoire—the strategic bestowal of the emperor's magnanimity and impartiality.

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[38] XZSL 257:8a–10b, DG14.9 *renwu* and 262:21b–23a, DG15.1 *wuyin*; LFZZ MZL 8073.5, DG15.1.27. According to Fletcher, another concession won by Khoqand at this time was permission to send a tribute-caravan annually from Kashgar to Beijing. This is not, however, attested in the Chinese sources and there is no evidence of such missions having subsequently taken place on an annual basis. Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.377.

[39] XZSL 283:1a–b, DG16.5 *guiwei*.

Khoqand's territorial expansion towards the Qing frontier

Khoqand's promotion of the Yūsuf-led attack and its subsequent efforts to negotiate the restoration of trade are best understood against the backcloth of the khanate's final bid to monopolize the trade routes of eastern Central Asia and secure its position vis-à-vis Bukhara, its main regional rival. The late 1820s to mid-1830s, witnessed a new wave of Khoqandi expansionism, northwards in the direction of the Chu and Talas region, and south to the Pamirs and Sariqol. The former offered the possibility of control over trade between northern Xinjiang and Russia, while the latter would enable Khoqand to tax the rich trade that flowed between Yarkand and Ladakh, Tibet, Badakhshan and Kashmir. The court's reaction to these developments beyond the *karun* was not essentially different to that of earlier years in that on no occasion were troops sent beyond the *karun* with intent to engage in battle. Moreover, not only was the threat of force now employed with far more caution than in the past, but the language of recrimination and opprobrium emanating from Beijing was considerably muted. As a result, the court repeatedly failed to elicit the required response from Khoqand, revealing just how far the empire's ability to inspire fear and awe had diminished.

The first signs of renewed Khoqandi expansionism towards the Qing frontier of northern Xinjiang can be traced back to late 1827 when the Qazaq leader Ab'ul reported that Khoqand had sent troops to Pisket (present-day Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan) and, having ordered the Qazaqs to leave, had begun building fortifications there. Pisket lay in what was primarily Qirghiz territory on the lower reaches of the River Chu, to the east of the River Talas, and just 1,000-odd *li* west of Ili.[40] This was an area which, although lying outside the *karun*, had been penetrated by Qing troops at the time of the conquest and, as former Junghar territory, the court had considered it part of the empire for over seventy years. After 1763, Qing patrols were dispatched annually beyond the northern *karun* primarily in the Ili and Tarbagatai regions to evict all intruders, including any Qazaq and Qirghiz tribes, that may have entered Qing territory.[41] Gradually, however, the Qazaqs and Qirghiz were increasingly allowed to rent pastures to tide them over the harsh winters. By the 19th century pressure from Russian annexation was pushing these tribes ever eastwards; meanwhile Qing patrols had become lax. It was only a matter

[40] XZSL 131:16b–17a, DG7.12 *xinsi*.

[41] For a detailed study of the patrol system in northern Xinjiang, see Li Sheng, 'Qingdai Xinjiang xunbian zhidu yanjiu', pp.406–25. Along the entire Qing northern frontier the distances which these patrols travelled from the *karun* ranged from 400 *li* to over 1,400 *li*. Sun Zhe, *Kang Yong Qian shiqi yutu huizhi yu jiangyu xingcheng yanjiu*, p.240.

of time before Khoqand took advantage of the situation. Yet in 1827, the court's response to Khoqand's activities in the Chu and Talas region had been measured: the situation was to be investigated, but the reach of the patrols was to be pulled back so as to avoid unnecessary trouble. The court had adopted a similarly defensive stance some three years later when, at the time of the 1830 rebellion, Yulin, the military governor, had warned that if large numbers of troops were sent south to Altishahr, Ili would be vulnerable to a Khoqandi attack from the west.

Time and again in the early 1830s, the concerns of the frontier officials were brushed aside by a court that was so intent on avoiding military confrontation that it was disinclined to take any measures to check the Khoqandi advance. In 1832, there was extensive unrest among the Qazaqs and Qirghiz who pastured in the area of the River Narin and Issiq kol. The Khoqandi envoy, Doghar Bay, who happened to be in Kashgar on one of his many missions to secure the lifting of the trade embargo, offered an explanation. The Russians, he claimed, had made several incursions into Khoqandi territory in the north and the khan had, therefore, led his troops through the Narin region in order to engage them in battle. This activity, he reported, had unsettled the Qazaqs and Qirghiz of the region who had spread rumours that Khoqand was causing trouble.[42] When Doghar Bay's explanation was forwarded to the court, the response was once again one of indifference. Khoqand and Russia, it was noted, were both located far outside the *karun* and if they clashed it was their business. The court's one and only concern was that the frontier should remain peaceful; there was no question of sending troops beyond the *karun* for a matter of such little consequence.[43]

In the autumn of 1832, a Qing patrol clashed with Khoqandi troops at Pisket, but again the court made it clear that its interest lay only in keeping the peace. If Khoqand was expanding into a region that was distant, difficult to defend and inhabited only by Qirghiz and Qazaqs, then the Grand Council was not unduly concerned.[44] Yulin, now drew up an amendment to the regulations governing patrols that formally limited their reach in the Chu and Talas region, and focused on strengthening the role of the *karun*.[45] No mention was made of the fact that this was territory that had hitherto been regarded as lying within the empire, and that the Qazaqs and Qirghiz who pastured the region had been regarded as tax-paying subjects, a tax that was paid annually in the form of several dozen horses.

[42] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7701.44, DG12.3.13.

[43] XZSL 207:26b–27a, DG12.3 *gengshen*.

[44] XZSL 219:35a–37a, DG12.9 *dingsi*.

[45] Li Sheng, 'Qingdai Xinjiang xunbian zhidu yanjiu', p.420.

It was not until the following year, however, in November 1833, that Khoqand forced a political show-down. An envoy was sent to Ili to request that the Qazaqs who had taken refuge within the Qing *karun* in order to avoid Khoqandi taxes should be driven out, otherwise the khanate would send 20,000 troops to extract their dues. The court objected strongly to Khoqand's "posturing", and privately, at least, condemned its "insatiable covetousness" and "reckless self-aggrandizement", and yet it concluded that there would be no gain for the empire in seizing Khoqand: its territory would not bring wealth, and its people would not make good soldiers. As for the fate of the Qazaqs, the emperor had reportedly reflected long and hard before concluding that despite being tax-paying subjects of the empire, they should not be allowed to flee within the *karun* and expect the Qing authorities to defend their interests against Khoqand. They were to be instructed that while they must continue to pay tax-tribute to the empire, whether or not they also paid tax to Khoqand was there own concern. The court recognized that the Qazaqs formed a humane palisade for the empire, and if they were oppressed too harshly it would be damaging to the imperial interest, but once again frontier officials were warned against taking troops beyond the *karun* without good cause. Only in the event that the Khoqandis used the excuse of pursuing the Qazaqs to attack the *karun* were officials instructed to assess the situation and consider appropriate action.[46] With so little support from Beijing, officials in Xinjiang chose the path of non-action. As a result, Qing rule over the Chu and Talas region was tacitly withdrawn leaving it, to all intents and purposes, under Khoqandi control.

Meanwhile to the south too, by the 1830s, Khoqand's growing influence as a regional power was forcing the court to re-examine and clarify its commitment to the extremities of its frontier. If the Qing authorities were not going to allow Khoqand to collect taxes from the Badakhshanis and Kashmiris in Yarkand, then the Khoqandis decided they would take control of the area of the Pamirs that the Badakhshani and Kashmiri traders had to cross before reaching Yarkand. In effect this meant control of Sariqol.

Sariqol, which was part of the ancient kingdom of Ferghana, numbered among those polities whose rulers had submitted to the Qing after the conquest of Altishahr in the 18th century.[47] By the early 19th century, the region was regularly suffering incursions from the neighbouring polities of Shughnan, Wakhan and Kanjut, whose people raided Sariqol for human

[46] XZSL 244:18b–19b, DG13.10 *bingchen* and 244:39a–41b, DG13.10 *yichou*.
[47] Davies notes that Sariqol paid an annual tribute to the Qing in the form of a large quantity of saltpetre. Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.347 (note).

booty to sell into slavery. In the late 1820s, forced to take desperate action, the ruler of Sariqol, Shāh Muhammad, who nominally held office under the Qing as a hakim bek of the 5th rank, travelled to Yarkand to seek Qing protection for his people. During his extended absence, representations were made by his people to the khan of Khoqand and many of them left Sariqol to seek refuge in the relative safety of Khoqand. Shāh Muhammad eventually returned from Yarkand, but his mission appears to have elicited little more than verbal reassurances. In the winter of 1830/31, Khoqandi troops joined forces with over 10,000 Qirghiz from Qarategin to attack and plunder Sariqol. Their mission accomplished, the Khoqandi troops retreated, taking with them Shāh Muhammad who reportedly died before reaching Khoqand.[48]

Khoqand now tightened its grip on the Pamir region. In autumn of 1833, it sent a force of 500 Qirghiz under the leadership of a Khoqandi officer to collect taxes from the various villages of Sariqol. In Yarkand, the Khoqandi envoy, Doghar Bay, was questioned about these developments. A message was sent to Khoqand registering the disapproval of the Qing authorities and instructing the khan to withdraw his troops: if trade were to continue, Khoqand had to control its people. But this was as far as the court was prepared to go and the authorities at Yarkand were ordered not to attribute undue importance to the matter. In language reminiscent of that used in respect of the Chu and Talas region to the north, the Grand Council noted that Sariqol lay far outside the *karun*, troops should not be dispatched without good cause, and frontier officials should instead focus their effort on securing the *karun*.[49]

On this occasion the Khoqand forces seem to have withdrawn, yet still Sariqol continued to suffer at the hands of not only Khoqand but other neighbouring tribes, such as the Qirghiz of Darvaz and Shughnan who regularly kidnapped Sariqoli women. The new ruler of Sariqol, Qulchaq, who like his predecessor Shāh Muhammad was recognized by the Qing as hakim bek of the region, made representations for assistance to the Qing authorities in Altishahr. Again the response was ambivalent. Instructions were issued that the women of Sariqol be returned and that an apology be submitted to Yarkand but, as the various tribes and polities of the region would undoubtedly have noted, the Qing authorities showed no inclination to back their words with military action.

By late 1834, Muhammad 'Alī Khān of Khoqand had concluded that the failure of the Qing authorities over recent years to take action in defence of the people of Sariqol amounted to a renunciation of their claim

[48] LFZZ MZL 8061.41, DG10.10.19 and 8074.37, DG11.3.4.
[49] XZSL 249:2b–3a, DG14.2 *bingshen*.

to the territory, and he therefore instructed his mingbashi, Lashkar Qushbēgī, to take control of the region. Lashkar Qushbēgī duly dispatched a letter ordering Qulchaq to submit to Khoqandi rule. On learning of these developments, the Qing authorities in Altishahr made the most unequivocal statement yet of their claim to the region. Khoqand was informed that the region belonged to Yarkand: it had been annexed by the Qing during the time of Qianlong and no less than eight beks had been established to administer the region which paid an annual tax of 27.7 taels of silver, 1,700 *jin* of saltpetre and 150 bolts of cloth to the court. Sariqol, it was pointed out, might lie outside the *karun*, but it was Qing territory and if Khoqand wished to retain the privilege of tax-free trade with the empire, then it would have to desist from causing trouble in the region.[50]

Khoqand appears to have been undaunted by the response from Altishahr and in early 1835 Khoqandi troops were again causing disturbances in Sariqol. On this occasion, they claimed to have been arresting thieves and soon retreated, but throughout the following year, the incursions continued. Qulchaq was repeatedly praised by the emperor for his dogged resistance and encouraged to stand firm.[51] But he needed more than words.

In November 1836, Lashkar Qushbēgī again led more than 2,000 men to invade Sariqol. Cannons were fired at the walls of the main town of Sariqol and several surrounding villages were attacked. Qulchaq and one of his grandsons were both killed in the fighting, while other members of his family and dependants were taken captive. As Qing officials in Altishahr prepared to attack, the Daoguang emperor ordered restraint: troops were not to be dispatched beyond the *karun*. Again a message was sent to Khoqand reaffirming that Sariqol belonged to the empire and informing Muhammad ʻAlī Khān that if he wanted trade to continue then, whether or not he was responsible for the attack, he should ensure that the Khoqandis involved withdrew and were punished.[52]

According to Qing informants, having seized control of over half of the settlements of Sariqol, Lashkar Qushbēgī sent men to the tribes of Darvaz, Shughnan, Kanjut and Wakhan to "stir up trouble." He also sent an envoy

[50] XZSL 261:10b–12a, DG14.12 *guisi*; LFZZ MZL 8072.37/38, DG14.12.3 and 8073.2, DG14.11.15. From the position of personal slave to ʻUmar khan, Lashkar Qushbēgī rose through the ranks of officialdom to govern the areas of Tashkent and Dashti Qipchaq where he remained in power almost continuously from 1816 to 1841. It was he who established the chain of fortresses in this region including Aq-Masjid and was largely responsible for Khoqand's expansion to the north. Meanwhile, in the south he led successful campaigns against Kulab and Darvaz in the 1830s. Beisembiev, *The Life of ʻAlimqul*, p.31, note 71.

[51] XZSL 267:19b–20a, DG15.6 *jiyou*. See also XZSL 283:2b, DG16.5 *guiwei*.

[52] XZSL 291:25b–27a, DG16.11 *yiwei*.

to Yarkand to notify the Qing authorities that he had occupied Sariqol and killed the hakim bek Qulchaq because the latter had been responsible for the deaths of so many Qirghiz.[53] Temporarily at least, Khoqand had achieved its objective, now it could collect taxes from the Badakhshani and Kashmiri traders as they journeyed back and forth to Yarkand.

Lashkar Qushbēgī withdrew from Sariqol, leaving 200 men there under the command of a certain Adina. The court remained unperturbed by these developments and the emperor's nephew, Yishan, who was serving as councillor at Yarkand, was instructed that he should do no more than encourage the Sariqoli Muslims to resist the Khoqandi inroads into their territory; nothing should be done that might risk inflaming the situation.[54]

In July 1837, Khoqandi troops who had remained in the city of Sariqol went to neighbouring settlements to plunder, leaving Adina and seven others behind. Local Muslims then entered the city and captured all eight remaining Khoqandis whom they took to Yarkand where they were tried and put to death. When the court was informed of these events, it expressed strong displeasure and insisted that this had simply been a case of the local Muslims settling private scores—Yishan should not have become involved, still less should he have had Adina and his associates put to death without first memorializing on the matter. Now, the court nervously predicted that Khoqand would have an excuse to cause trouble and if there were disturbances, it would mean that precious state resources would be drained because of a personal grudge in Sariqol; Yishan was to be punished.[55]

Meanwhile in Yarkand, Yishan sent a message via the returning Khoqandi aqsaqal, notifying the khan of the reason for the executions and, for the first time in many years, Khoqand was threatened with military action. Reiterating that Sariqol belonged to the empire, Yishan warned Muhammad ʻAlī Khān that if Khoqand provoked further disturbances, he would expel Khoqand's traders from Altishahr and send troops against the khanate.[56] It seems unlikely, though by no means certain, that Yishan had received the court's earlier admonition at the time of sending this missive but, in any event, for a fleeting moment policy had passed back into the hands of a frontier official and Khoqandi designs on Sariqol had been checked.

[53] XZSL 292:3b–5a, DG16.12 *renzi*.

[54] XZSL 293:23b, DG17.1 *jichen* and 294:24b–25a, DG17.2 *jisi*.

[55] XZSL 298:31a–32b, DG17.6 *jiaxu*. In the event, Yishan was simply transferred to become the councillor at Ili. He remained in Xinjiang until 1841 when he was moved to Guangdong to command the troops engaged in hostilities with the British. See XZSL 301:10a, DG17.9 *gengshen* and Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p.391.

[56] LFZZ MZL 8072.49, DG17.9.5.

In summer of that year, when the new Khoqandi aqsaqal arrived in Yarkand, he was accompanied by an envoy bearing a letter from Muhammad ʻAlī Khān. The khan made no mention of the Adina incident but, in an attempt to justify the events of the previous year, he claimed that it was Qulchaq's men who had originally caused the disturbances, stealing 200 horses from people he had sent to an area outside Sariqol. When the Khoqandis went to retrieve the horses, according to the khan, 40–50 of them had been killed and consequently he had sent Lashkar Qushbēgī to punish the Sariqolis, but now all was peaceful. Indeed, so respectful and conciliatory was the tone of the missive that no one, whether in Yarkand or Beijing, appears to have queried the khan's somewhat ambiguous remark that, "Our people will not be allowed to venture within the *karun* and make trouble in that area again and as for those outside the *karun* we can control them ourselves."[57] Sariqol, of course, lay *outside* the *karun*. Meanwhile, the court ordered that those Muslims from Sariqol who had fled to within the *karun* should not be allowed to stay, and in any future communication with Khoqand, the councillor was instructed not to threaten to send out troops.[58]

The decade since the suppression of the Jahāngīr rebellion had witnessed a significant shift in policy towards the polities lying beyond the *karun*, including those territories which had hitherto been regarded as part of the empire. As China's agrarian crisis of the early 1830s deepened, as the inadequacies of the imperial troops became increasingly apparent and the trade dispute with the British intensified, there was now not only an unwillingness to use force beyond the *karun* but a reluctance even to threaten its use. The court simply could not finance a military presence in Altishahr of the size that its frontier officials deemed necessary. By the end of 1831, the court had already reduced the garrison in Altishahr to 9,000 men, some 5,000 less than Changling had originally proposed in the wake of the Yūsuf-Khoqandi revolt. In 1832, further reductions at Barchuk and Yarkand had cut the figure to 6,500, and by spring 1833 a mere 2,500 Qing troops remained in Altishahr.[59] The effect of these cuts was that the focus of the military presence in the south of Xinjiang was now almost entirely directed towards defending the *karun*.

The shifting concept of the empire's limits

For over fifty years, the soldiers stationed at the *karun* to the south and

[57] LFZZ MZL 8072.48, DG17.9.5.
[58] XZSL 301:8a–10a, DG17.9 *gengshen*.
[59] XZSL 201:21a, DG11.11 *guiyou*; 202:22a–b, DG11.12 *jichou*; 203:13a–15b, DG11.12 *yihai* and 230:23b–26a, DG13.1 *bingshen*.

southwest of Altishahr had functioned as the eyes and ears of the Qing authorities, monitoring the comings and goings of those passing along the main trade routes in and out of the region. For the traveller who was heading for the towns and villages of Altishahr, these checkpoints or guard-posts also served as a tacit reminder that he was now within the legal jurisdiction of the empire and would be subject to its laws and regulations. Yet, while to all practical intents and purposes the emperor's legal authority may have extended no further than the *karun*, among many Qing officials there had never been any question that the territories of the empire stretched far beyond the *karun*, as did the moral authority of the emperor. In this respect the permeable, unbounded nature of the north-western frontier signified the spatial totality of imperial rule and rested comfortably alongside the notion of universal empire.

By the 1830s, however, the repeated inability of the Qing court to exert its military or, indeed moral, power beyond the *karun* had created a vacuum which Khoqand and others were competing to fill. The vague and unbounded limits of Qing territory in the northwest had become a liability. Even with the right political and military will an abstraction is difficult, if not impossible, to defend. In 1835 the court approved new regulations on patrolling the *karun* and sentry posts, which in effect abolished the long-distance patrols beyond the *karun* of northern Xinjiang.[60] Meanwhile, to the south, the security of Altishahr also increasingly came to be associated with the *karun*. Only if the *karun* were impermeable would Altishahr be secure. Thus despite their scattered locations, unconnected by road, river or mountain, the *karun* were gradually becoming synonymous with the concept of a territorial boundary. Almost by default, the notion of Altishahr as an open frontier and all that that symbolized in terms of expansion and extension of power was fading.

Logically, this hardening in the conceptualization of the frontier required a concomitant redefinition not only of which territories lay within or outside the empire, but also who was or was not a subject of the emperor. While in terms of Khoqand and similarly distant polities or tribes, the Qing court had upheld the promises of the Qianlong emperor not to interfere in the internal politics of those who 'submitted', and had not subjected them to the laws of the empire, taxed them or issued their leaders with titles, nevertheless, this was not entirely true for those peoples whose lands lay adjacent to the *karun* and used pastures within the *karun*. Although the Qing court may have refrained from interference in the domestic politics of these polities, the fact that the rulers of Sariqol and Kanjut, for example, and various Qazaq and Qirghiz chiefs had

[60] Li Sheng, 'Qingdai Xinjiang xunbian zhidu yanjiu', pp.422–3.

annually sent tribute to the Qing authorities and that the court had reciprocated with titles, emoluments and grazing rights, necessarily raised issues that now required clarification. As has been seen, although the court was consistently averse to allowing peoples from these areas to take refuge within the *karun,* presumably for fear of retaliation, its attitude towards the territories themselves was more ambivalent. How could these lands be kept free of hostile forces while the military limits of the empire extended no further than the *karun*; how could the universal emperor be seen to concede his authority over lands where he and his ancestors had conferred titles on the ruling elite and from whom he, like his forbearers, had received an annual tribute? These were questions which the Daoguang court preferred to shelve, so bequeathing to future generations a bitter legacy of territorial and boundary disputes.

Thus as politically, militarily and economically the court grappled with the reality of the situation on the frontier, ideologically it conceded little. In this respect, the great virtue of the trade treaty of 1832 was that it did not demand an ideological break with the past but, on the contrary, represented a return to traditional arrangements. Unfortunately, however, for officials in Altishahr, it was not accompanied by a return to the political norms of the 18th century whereby the Qianlong emperor had periodically promulgated homilies on the universality of his rule and threatened the use of force for the slightest misdemeanor. The court no longer scrutinized and advised on all policy matters, great and small, but only on those issues that it deemed might provoke the peoples outside the *karun* and result in military engagement. The empire's failure to so much as flex its military muscles meant that the court's frequent admonitions to the peoples outside the *karun* went unheeded. As a result, the frontier region was left in the hands of a debilitated administration that would struggle in vain to maintain its authority for the next 30-odd years.

The re-opening of trade with Khoqand in 1832 had further alienated the Beijing literati from the court, but on one point there was still agreement: Qing rule of the Western Regions was not negotiable. Inevitably, this raised the question of what constituted the Western Regions: how far did Qing rule extend? Enforcing the trade embargo had been primarily a matter of securing the *karun* and tightening checks on travellers, but the very notion of determining the limits of military power was far more problematic. The need to clarify where these limits lay was instrumental in the shift from a nominal notion of 'frontier' to a much more concrete definition of 'border'. Whether clinging irresolutely to the Sariqol region in the south or conceding the vast area of Chu and Talas further north, the

Qing court was, in effect, having to qualify its understanding of universality and to reappraise its position in the world.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DECLINE OF THE OLD ORDER

Dissension in Khoqand

At its height, Khoqand's military success and domination of the regional trade routes seemed almost unstoppable, but the khanate's ascendancy was to be short-lived. By the mid-1830s, the signs of decline were already in evidence and, thereafter, the khanate was increasingly beset by domestic problems and rivalries that ultimately contributed to the inevitability of the Russian advance and the subjugation of Khoqand in 1868.[1] On the other hand, by the late 1830s, the power of the Khoqandi merchant community in southern Xinjiang and, on a lesser scale, in the north, was firmly re-established and continued to prosper, with only minor interruptions, for the next 25 years. Steering a self-confident path between the troubled Khoqand and an emasculated Qing administration, this was a community that enjoyed an increasing independence from any political centre.

In early 1840, frustrated by the frequent incursions that the Khoqandis were making into the northeast of Bukhara and the heavy taxes that were extracted from Bukharan merchants as they travelled across the khanate, amir Nasr Allāh (r.1827–60) of Bukhara attacked Khoqand. The hostilities dragged on and by October, Ura-tube and Khojand had fallen to the Bukharans. Nasr Allāh appointed Sultān Mahmud, Muhammad 'Alī Khān's brother, as governor of the region, but despite the fact that in the past Sultān Mahmud had made several attempts to dislodge Muhammad 'Alī from the throne of Khoqand, by late 1841 the brothers had reconciled their differences and retaken all the territory that Bukhara had seized as far as Ura-tube.

It was at this time that Muhammad 'Alī Khān is said to have grown increasingly decadent and licentious, earning the disapproval of many of his Muslim clerics. One theory attributes his decline to remorse at having put to death the mingbashi Haqq Qulī, who had for so many years counselled him and served as his right-hand man.[2] Before long, Nasr Allāh was accusing Muhammad 'Alī of offences against Islam on account

[1] The Russian advance into Khoqand's territory began in 1853, culminating in the treaty of 1868 under which Khoqand surrendered virtually all its political autonomy to Russia. It was not until 1876, however, that Russian troops entered the city of Khoqand and the khanate ceased to exist.

[2] Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol.1, appendix I, p.343. In fact, Haqq Qulī was killed in 1832, several years before Muhammad 'Alī Khān is said to have fallen into decline.

of his having allegedly married two of his step-sisters as well his step-mother, the widow of 'Umar Khān. Muhammad 'Alī responded by imprisoning the envoys who had delivered these charges and launching a campaign against Bukhara. Despite the fact that he led the advance in person, his troops scattered before engaging in battle and he was forced to flee. In spring 1842, urged on by disaffected Khoqandi clergy, once again Nasr Allāh dispatched his army against Khoqand. Muhammad 'Alī Khān escaped, but when that winter he returned to sue for peace, he was captured by Bukharan forces and subsequently put to death.[3]

Nasr Allāh appointed Ibrahīm Dādkhāh, a former governor of Samarqand, to administer Khoqand and sent two envoys to Altishahr to inform the Qing authorities that Bukhara had conquered Khoqand. Tuminge, the councillor at Yarkand, congratulated Nasr Allāh on his good fortune and informed him that as long as he kept the Khoqandis under control and trade was conducted peacefully and fairly, his people would continue to enjoy the emperor's favour. To underscore the point, the returning envoys and their servants were showered with gifts: 16 bolts of silks for Nasr Allāh, and yet more silks, teas and silver for themselves. The court was pleased with this action, concurring that Bukhara was a distant realm and that its conflict with Khoqand was of no concern to the empire. It was almost as an afterthought that Tuminge was instructed to dispatch Muslim spies to find out why Bukhara had invaded Khoqand.[4]

Preliminary enquiries among the Qirghiz suggested that Muhammad 'Alī, and others who had participated in what was generally considered to have become a corrupt and rapacious administration, had received their just deserts. But by the time the Qing spies, dispatched by Tuminge, returned to Yarkand that winter, events had moved on. So oppressive was the rule of Ibrahīm Dādkhāh that within months of his having been installed by Bukhara, the Khoqandis were again in revolt. With the support of the Qirghiz from the areas of Talas and Namangan, Shīr 'Alī (r.1842–44), a nephew of Nārbutā, the former ruler of Khoqand, and thus perceived, by at least some, as having a legitimate claim to the throne, had ousted the Bukharan administration and seized control of Khoqand.[5] The

[3] According to one account, Muhammad 'Alī Khān was not the son of 'Umar, but of one of his wives and a courtier. Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, pp.136–7. See also Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, pp.308–14; Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol.1, appendix I, pp.343–4.

[4] Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol.1, appendix I, p.345; LFZZ MZL 8072.25/26/27, DG22.2.27; XZSL 378:26a–b, DG22.7 *guiyou*.

[5] In the 18th century, the Ferghana Valley was principally inhabited by three groups of peoples: the Sarts, a term given to sedentary Uzbeks, Tajiks and other urban dwellers; the nomadic Qirghiz; and the Qipchaqs, a peoples who followed a semi-nomadic, semi-agriculturalist life-style. Problems arise with ascribing the term Qipchaq because while as early as the 16th century one branch had already integrated with the Uzbeks and become

Bukharan forces retaliated, but the Khoqandi army, now dominated by Qipchaqs, withstood the onslaught. Shīr ʻAlī's account of these events delivered to Tuminge in January 1843 tallied, more or less, with the information that the councillor now received from his informants. The spies, however, additionally reported that, although Shīr ʻAlī and his supporters had recaptured the main areas of the former Khoqandi territory, many villages remained in Bukharan hands; moreover, Bukhara was believed to be planning another attack.[6]

The response of the Qing authorities in Yarkand to these developments was once again to express support for the new incumbent ruler; Shīr ʻAlī was informed that he had acted justly in taking back the lands of his ancestors and his good fortune was welcome news. Silks, teas and silver were again dispatched with the time-wearied admonition that the Khoqandi merchants would be allowed to continue to trade, as long as they refrained from causing trouble, adhered to the laws and conducted their business fairly.[7] What the court did not appear to grasp was that the situation in Khoqand was now highly volatile. Against a backcloth of increasing Russian pressure on all the Central Asian polities, not only was Khoqand's conflict with Bukhara unresolved, but also internally the khanate was now dangerously divided. During Muhammad ʻAlī's reign the townspeople, or Sarts, had gained dominance over the Qipchaq tribes, but now that the throne was occupied by Shīr ʻAlī, who had taken refuge from his second cousin among the Qipchaqs, married two Qipchaq women and seized power with Qipchaq assistance, the struggle between the semi-nomads and the sedentarists had been rekindled.

Shīr ʻAlī could do little to control the situation and increasingly lost power to the Qipchaq leaders, notably the mingbashi Mussulman Qulī. After a mere two years on the throne, Shīr ʻAlī was assassinated in a palace insurrection. His nephew, Murād, grandson of Nārbutā and son of ʻĀlim Khān, briefly took the throne, but within a matter of days he had been ousted by Mussulman Qulī who had Shīr ʻAlī's 13-year-old son, Khudāyār (r.1844–58), appointed ruler in his stead.[8] Mussulman Qulī, who assumed the role of regent, now had the young khan dispatch a letter to the councillor at Yarkand with an account of recent events in Khoqand:

semi-sedentarized in the Ferghana Valley, another had moved east where they retained their primarily nomadic life-style. In the 18th and 19th century, Qing sources referred to the latter as Qipchaq Qirghiz.

[6] LFZZ MZL 8072.32 /35, DG23.1.26; XZSL 388:32a–b, DG23.1 *jisi*.

[7] LFZZ MZL 8072.33, DG23.1.26.

[8] Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol.1, appendix I, pp.345–7; Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, pp.160–3.

> We had led a number of men out [and ridden] for several days to a place where there were some bad Qirghiz who were our enemies. We did battle with them. We killed over a half and those remaining were frightened and desperately beseeched us to let them submit and follow us. We took all their weapons, horses and chattels back with us. I was very happy. As we were returning, we heard that some bad Khoqandis, who had accepted our hospitality, had turned against us and had sent a letter to Murād Bek, ʻĀlim Bek's son, saying that there was no one in Khoqand and if he [and his supporters] came there, Murād Bek would be made leader. When they arrived in Khoqand they killed my father Shīr ʻAlī. This was a matter determined by Heaven. We were angry but fearless. Riding a good horse, I made haste to lead my men to Khoqand where we entered the city. Then I arrested Murād Bek and all the bad people, killed them, and took my territory back.[9]

But the purpose of the letter was not merely to inform the Qing authorities of Khudāyār's ascension to the throne, it went on to affirm the continuation of Khoqandi trading privileges according to the agreement of 1832. The reply from Yarkand was almost identical to that sent to Shīr ʻAlī two years earlier: trade would continue according to the four conditions stipulated in the agreement, as long as the Khoqandi traders were peaceful and law-abiding. Silks, teas and silver were once again dispatched.[10]

Khoqand's trade with Altishahr

In fact, trade not only continued, it flourished. The vibrant markets and comfortable life-style to be found in Kashgar and other cities of Altishahr had long attracted the sojourning Khoqandi merchants. In a region where trade was always at the mercy of war, Altishahr represented relative stability. Here, living under a non-oppressive regime, Khoqandi traders were free to practise their religion while, if they so pleased, also indulging in the sensual pleasures for which Kashgar and Yarkand, in particular, was renowned throughout much of Central Asia.[11] Yet, why the number of

[9] LFZZ MZL 8073.11, DG24.10.29. The actual correspondence between Khoqand and Altishahr which relates to these events is undated, but it is filed in the First historical Archives as an enclosure from Yijing, the coucillor at Yarkand, and dated November 1844. If correct, this confirms not only that Shīr ʻAlī's died in 1844, but also that Murād and Khudāyār came to the throne in late 1844, and not early 1845 as is frequently suggested.

[10] LFZZ MZL 8073.12, DG24.10.29.

[11] In terms of religious orthodoxy and despotism, many travellers noted that the regimes of both Khoqand and Bukhara were more oppressive than that of Altishahr under the Qing. See, for example, Wathan, 'Memoir on Chinese Tartary', p.654; Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, pp.283–4, 307; and Ahmad Shāh, 'Narrative of Travels', p.355. In particular, however, it was the independence and beauty of the women in Altishahr that attracted attention from Westerners and Central Asians alike. "The Mohammadens of Yarkand appear to differ from their brethren elsewhere, for the fair sex have a power and influence not known in other places. They take the seat of honour in a room, associate

Khoqandi merchants residing permanently, or otherwise, in Altishahr was now considerably higher than it had been prior to the embargo and the expulsions of 1828, is not altogether obvious. Although the 1832 agreement had essentially provided for the transfer of tax-collection from the Qing authorities to the Khoqandi aqsaqals, this did not necessarily mean that the Khoqandi merchants trading in Xinjiang were paying substantially less.[12] Perhaps Khoqandi traders now had, or felt they had, more flexibility to negotiate their tax dues with the aqsaqal than they had previously with the Altishahr officials, or perhaps the fact that in recent years the Qing authorities had been somewhat lax in respect of tax-collection had merely opened the way for graft and extortion by beks and officials at the *karun*. Whatever the case, the fact that Khoqand was now raising taxes on its merchants in Altishahr seemed to have no adverse effect on an indomitable mercantile energy. On the contrary, Khoqandi merchants had the security of knowing that no matter who held power in Khoqand, as important contributors to the government coffers, they would receive unequivocal support in any conflict with the Qing authorities.[13] In addition, the Khoqandi merchants who flocked to Altishahr in the early 1830s would have been aware that the prospects for trade in the region were better than ever. Khoqand's control of the eastern trade routes leading to Altishahr ensured a ready supply of goods for those who resided in the region. Meanwhile, the decision of the Qing authorities in the aftermath of the 1830 rebellion to allow merchants from the interior, together with their dependants, to settle in the south, had led to a significant increase in the number of Chinese traders who either resided

freely with the men, and do not veil. When a Bokhara merchant visits Yarkund, he marries one of these beauties during his sojourn in the city; and the pair separate as they joined, quite as a matter of convenience, when he leaves the country. Their wives are as cheap as beautiful, and purchased at a premium of two or three tillas (24–36 rupees); and the merchants long after leaving the country, sing the praises of the fair ones of Yarkund." Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, p.232. *Cf.* the reserve and modesty of the women of Khoqand as depicted by Nazarov in *Voyage à Khokand*, pp.36,38. For further indication of how vibrant the city of Yarkand was before the imposition of Ya'qūb Bek's Khoqandi-style rule, see Forsyth, *Mission to Yarkund*, p.36.

[12] If the aqsaqal were levying the *zakāt* (Islamic tax), i.e. 2.5%, this would, of course, have been significantly lower than the 3.3% that the Qing authorities in Altishahr had been instructed to levy since 1829. However, it is doubtful whether the Qing authorities had actually been collecting these taxes in any effective manner prior to 1832. See chapter 7, note 24.

[13] There are no available figures for the total annual tax levied by the Khoqand government from Khoqandi merchants trading in Altishahr after 1832. One mid-19th century Russian source, however, suggests that after 1832 Kashgar was sending 10,000 tillas (120,000–180,000 rupees) per annum to Khoqand. It is possible that this was tax remittance collected from Khoqandi merchants rather than 'payment' by the Chinese, as suggested by the author. 'Obozrenie Kokandskago khanstva v nyneshnem ego sostoianii', p.195.

permanently, or sojourned, in Altishahr.[14] Consequently, the Khoqandis were not only tapping into a growing local market (including the dependants of both traders and soldiers), but also a burgeoning trade with the Chinese interior. For earlier periods, taxes rendered in kind provide a useful picture of the types and amounts of goods being traded across the *karun*,[15] but given that after 1832, the Qing authorities no longer levied tax on outside traders, there exist no records to reveal which particular commodities might have shown an increase attributable to demand from the interior. The expanded trade network to which the Khoqandis now had access meant that it was not unknown for them to have articles of European origin among their merchandise.[16] Most probably, however, the bulk of the increase was spread across items that had traditionally been brought into the region from the west; thus in addition to the furs, hides, wool, and other animal products, there were vast quantities of precious stones, spices, sugar, saltpetre, and various metals and alloys changing hands daily in the bazaars of Altishahr. But there was one additional item that had now become a lucrative component of the trade that flowed between the khanate and the empire, namely opium.

Small quantities of opium were probably already being carried into Xinjiang for local consumption before the early 19th century, but it was only in the late 1830s that the drug became a serious object of concern for frontier officials, by which time the interior was already held in the thrall of the social, economic, and political consequences of its trade and consumption. In 1839, the court's 'New Regulations' on the prohibition of opium were finally completed. The original intention was that these new, stringent regulations that sanctioned the death penalty for both traffickers and users would be rigorously implemented throughout the empire. It was swiftly realized, however, that certain concessions would have to be made with regard to border regions where the nature of the problem, in terms of trafficking, was fundamentally different from that on the coast. Frontier officials were, therefore, instructed to examine the local conditions and memorialize on any proposals for regional modifications.[17] In autumn 1839, officials in Xinjiang carried out an investigation into every aspect of

[14] Millward's figures show that there were fewer than 888 Han Chinese merchants in Kashgar in 1828–30 and 2,000 Han Chinese shops by 1861. For Yarkand, he gives the figure of *c.*400 Han Chinese merchants in 1828–30 and *c.*5,000 merchants and family members in 1861. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, p.148. While these figures provide only a rough guide, they nevertheless attest to the substantial increase in commerce between Altishahr and the interior after 1830.

[15] For lists of tax rendered in kind in the Qianlong period, see Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi, *Qingdai Xibei minzu maoyi shi*, pp.512–30.

[16] Wathan, 'Memoir on the U'sbek state', p.376.

[17] YZDS (DG19.7.27), vol.1, pp.675–7.

the trade in opium and its consumption within the region. Their findings revealed that relatively small quantities were being brought into the area from the interior of China, but of far greater concern was the discovery that not only did the remote areas of Xinjiang, far from official gaze, provide an ideal environment in which to grow the poppies and produce the drug, but large quantities were also being brought into the region from Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent.[18]

It would have been surprising if by the 1840s, traders from Kashmir and Hindustan had not been involved in carrying opium into Altishahr, but less predictable perhaps was the role played by the Khoqandis.[19] In mid-1840, two Khoqandi traders were arrested in possession of a substantial amount of opium as they crossed the *karun* outside the northern Xinjiang city of Tarbagatai.[20] Quite clearly, however, most of the illegal trade was passing through Altishahr. In spring 1840, after the councillor Entehenge had drawn up the 'Regulations for the Investigation and Prohibition of Opium in the cities of Xinjiang's Southern Circuit',[21] traders were asked to hand in their opium 'voluntarily' on the understanding that they would be exempt from punishment. From Yarkand, Entehenge reported that the hakim bek Ismā'īl, had confiscated and destroyed 100,000 taels of opium handed over by outside traders,[22] but no attempt appears to have been made to produce a complete set of figures for the various cities nor to identify the place of origin of the traders concerned. Nevertheless, isolated incidents, such as the discovery of four Khoqandi traders who were crossing the *karun* at Khotan in possession of 4,800 taels of opium,[23] would seem to bear out the suspicions of Hui Fang, President of the Court of Judicature (*Dalisi qing*), that Khoqand was an important player in this

[18] YZDS (DG19.12.22), vol.1, pp.785–9.

[19] Relatively little has been written about the import of opium into China overland. In respect of Xinjiang, see Xiao Zhizhi, 'Lin Zexu lingdao xia de jinyan yundong zai Xinjiang'; Chen Chao, 'Wan Xinjiang jinyan shulun'; and Bello, 'Opium in Xinjiang and Beyond'. All these articles draw attention to the cultivation of opium within the region, as well as its import from the west.

[20] Bello, 'Opium in Xinjiang and Beyond', p.132.

[21] These regulations which adapted the 'New Regulations' to the particular circumstances in Xinjiang met with criticism at court, not least because the punishments were considered insufficiently harsh. Tuminge, who succeeded Entehenge as councillor in Yarkand, subsequently agreed to the harsher punishments. See Chen Chao, 'Wan Qing Xinjiang jinyan shulun', pp.24–5.

[22] XZSL 332:24a–b, DG20.3 *yimao*. If 1 tael = 1.3 oz., 100,000 taels = approx. 8,124 lbs.

[23] LFZZ MZL 8096.37, DG20.5.20; XZSL334:21a–b, DG20.5 *jichou*. Interestingly, just weeks earlier the Khoqandi aqsaqal at Khotan had handed over 540 taels of opium collected from amongst his traders. XZSL 330:30a, DG20.1 *gengshen*. If 4,800 taels represents a typical amount being smuggled at any one time, the handing over of a mere 540 taels, collected from the entire Khoqandi trading community in Khotan, would seem to be nothing more than a perfunctory gesture.

trade.[24] While for many officials in Beijing the primary concern was to prevent opium passing from the Khoqandi traders to merchants in Gansu and thence to the interior,[25] others, including Hui Fang, recognized that the most pressing danger was that the spread of addiction in Xinjiang would severely jeopardize security.[26] Opium addiction in Xinjiang was not found predominantly among the local people[27] but as Yishan, who was now serving as military governor in Ili, pointed out, among the exiled convicts who brought their habit with them from the interior[28]—and from whom it had already begun to spread to the garrisons.

Following the promulgation of the regulations on opium prohibition and the initial period of grace, during which time foreign traders were encouraged to hand over their supplies of opium in return for freedom from prosecution, efforts were made to clamp down on smuggling, but where and when arrests were made, invariably traders pleaded ignorance of the new laws and were let off with a warning. Indeed, even after the 18 months' period of grace that officials in Xinjiang introduced before fully implementing the regulations, there is no evidence that any Khoqandi or other foreign trader was executed in Xinjiang for smuggling opium. At worst, the opium would be confiscated and the guilty trader expelled, presumably only to return after a prudent interval.

In fact, so wary were officials of enforcing the prohibition too stringently that it is doubtful that the new code had any significant impact on the flow of opium into Xinjiang. Since 1832, when the Qing authorities had waived taxes on trade from Khoqand and most other Central Asian polities, baggage had only been searched at the *karun* if traders were suspected of smuggling prohibited goods. Now, with the reintroduction of baggage inspections, officials were at pains to avoid any incident that might lead to conflict, and in the case of Khoqand, the possibility of a renewed outbreak of hostilities. No Qing soldier (whether Manchu, Mongol, Han or Sino-Muslim) was, therefore, to be permitted to carry out the checks on traders from outside the *karun*; these were to be executed instead by the local hakim bek, in the company of the relevant aqsaqal.[29]

[24] YZDS (DG19.7.27), vol.1, p.676. Hui Fang had previously served as Chief Prosecutor (*ancha shi*) in Gansu and was therefore well aware that quantities of opium passed into Gansu from Xinjiang. Note that he erroneously refers to Khoqandis and Andijanis as though they were different 'tribes'.

[25] See, for example, XZSL 333:12b–13a, DG20.4 *gengwu*.

[26] YZDS (DG19.7.27), vol.1, p.676.

[27] Accounts by contemporary travellers frequently make reference to the common practice among local people of smoking hashish (see, for example, Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.278), but significantly make almost no mention of opium addiction.

[28] YZDS (DG20.1.14), vol.2, pp.5–6.

[29] YZDS (DG19.12.22), vol.1, p.786.

The practical impossibility of this arrangement, in terms of the demands it would have placed on the hakim beks and aqsaqals, not to mention the potential it offered for bribery, suggests that frontier officials knew only too well the price of implementing trade restrictions too rigidly.

In 1841, after several Khoqandi merchants in Kashgar had been briefly arrested and their opium confiscated, a stiff letter from Muhammad ʻAlī Khān demanded an explanation, leaving Qing officials in no doubt as to the importance of the opium trade to the khanate.[30] The authorities at Yarkand returned the envoy to Khoqand laden with gifts and a reply that carefully avoided any escalation in tensions:

> As for opium, it destroys lives and for this reason the court has stringently prohibited it. If there are any who engage in its trade, they are to be given the death sentence and summarily executed. Reflecting that the Muslims from Khoqand were ignorant [of this fact] our councillor memorialized the throne and the emperor gave permission for them to appeal against the death penalty. In addition, he ordered your *hūda-i da* [aqsaqal] to write a letter to you requesting that you instruct your people that they are not to sell opium within the *karun* anymore. It is already two years since the law was promulgated and all is peaceful.[31]

Muhammad ʻAlī Khān replied in similarly polite vein with assurances that his aqsaqal had already appointed two men to make random checks on his merchants to ensure that in future they would not engage in the opium trade.[32] Needless to say, the fact that there are no further records of Khoqandi arrests for opium smuggling is no indication that the Khoqandis ceased to be involved in this illicit trade which continued to flourish in Xinjiang throughout the latter half of the 19th century.[33]

Deteriorating conditions in Altishahr

By the 1840s, the increasing number of traders in Altishahr would suggest that the region enjoyed a vibrant and expanding economy. Yet, this was primarily transit trade dominated on the one side by merchants from outside the *karun*, and on the other, by the Chinese, Han or Sino-Muslim.

[30] LFZZ MZL 8096.38/40, DG21.12.6.

[31] LFZZ MZL 8096.41, DG21.12.6. The same letter also mentions the case of a Khoqandi who had become involved in a fight with a Kashgari over the sale of a horse. Here, once again assurances were given that nothing untoward had taken place and the case had been dealt with by the hakim bek, in conjunction with the akhunds and the Khoqandi aqsaqal, according to Islamic law.

[32] Xiao Zhizhi, 'Lin Zexu lingdao xia de jinyan yundong zai Xinjiang', p.207.

[33] See, for example, Davies who notes that in the early 1860s opium smuggling in the region was prevalent and that 'Tartar' (presumably Central Asian) merchants sold the opium on to Chinese merchants for its weight in silver. Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.22.

While local exports of shawl wool and hemp products no doubt received a boost,[34] there is little indication that Altishahris themselves were reaping any significant benefit. Contemporary accounts by travellers tend to focus on urban life and provide little more than a bird's eye view of local conditions. Only rarely do they draw comparisons with other regions and inevitably they fail to reflect—that acid test of discontent—whether, at any particular juncture, the lives of the local people were improving or deteriorating. Thus, for example, Ahmad Shāh, a Muslim scholar and teacher who journeyed from Kashmir to Yarkand in the early 1840s, gives a typically utopian picture of Yarkand as a place where "people appear generally contented", where the fruit is plentiful and there are no taxes save the land-tax.[35] There is, however, one notable exception among descriptions of Altishahr dating from this period.

In early 1845, Lin Zexu, the Han Chinese official who had been famously exiled to Xinjiang in 1843 for his role in the Opium War, set out on his tour of the south to survey the reclaimed land (*kentian)*. Travelling over 12,000 *li* in less than six months, this was nothing if not a lightning tour. Lin's hagiographers have made much of his great contribution to the development and 'opening-up' of Xinjiang, but in fact, as Qi Qingshun has argued, he performed his task somewhat perfunctorily, often stopping only one or two days in each place, just long enough to measure the amount of reclaimed land and elicit some general comments from officials before departing.[36] Nevertheless, Lin Zexu's diary, his poems and reports of his journey through some of the remotest parts of Altishahr form one of the most intimate and revealing contemporary accounts of conditions in the region penned by a Chinese official. At nearly sixty years old, with a lifetime of service in various parts of the empire behind him, Lin was no stranger to the sight of poverty and suffering, and yet he was moved by the appalling destitution that he witnessed in Altishahr: people dressed in rags and going barefoot in all weather conditions, people whose staple diet consisted of dry bread and who greedily stripped the trees of their fruits as soon as they were ripe in order to stave off hunger. In Lin's view, the living conditions that he witnessed among the local people of Altishahr would not have been endured by Han Chinese (*Hanmin*).[37] This is not the

[34] The hemp products would have included hashish and *charas*, the resinous excretion of hemp that was used as a stimulant.

[35] Ahmad Shāh, 'Narrative of the Travels', pp.348–9.

[36] Qi Qingshun suggests that Lin's primary motive in undertaking the survey was to gain credit in the eyes of the Daoguang emperor and so secure an early recall from exile. Once embarked upon this arduous journey, therefore, his aim was to complete the task and return as quickly as possible to Ili. See Qi Qingshun, 'Cong Lin Zexu de "Yili Riji" kan ta de nanjiang zhi xing'.

[37] *Lin Zexu quanji*: *zougao*, p.892; Yang Guozhen, *Lin Zexu zhuan*, p.509.

picture of Xinjiang for which his friends among the Beijing literati would have prepared him.

Lin Zexu's comments on the social conditions in southern Xinjiang did not go unnoticed, at least in Ili. He was a close friend of the then military governor, Buyantai, and during Lin's inspection of Altishahr the two corresponded regularly. On the basis of Lin's reports, Buyantai identified corruption among the beks as the prime cause of the hardship and poverty that so many in the south were now suffering. Extortion and oppression by the beks had, it appeared, reverted to the levels that had existed before Nayancheng's reforms in the late 1820s. The court was sympathetic to Buyantai's concerns but did no more than instruct that it was the responsibility of the imperial agents to root out corruption among the beks.[38] No recommendations were forthcoming as to how this was to be done and there was little appreciation of the significance and severity of the problem. The possibility that senior Qing officials might themselves be involved in the abuses was not even broached. Meanwhile, Lin Zexu had already been recalled to Beijing and by the spring of 1846, Buyantai had been transferred to Shaan-Gan to take up the post of governor general.

In Altishahr the deteriorating conditions had come to a head in the summer of 1845 when a band of Qirghiz broke through the Tumshuk *karun*, west of Yangi Hisar. Encouraged by leaders from the village of Sokluk, several hundred local people joined forces with the Qirghiz and turned their weapons on Han Chinese residing in the area. Officials professed to be particularly disturbed by reports that senior Muslim clergy in the cities of Aqsu, Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar were in contact with Qirghiz outside the *karun*. Nevertheless, the disturbances were swiftly suppressed. The ringleaders were reportedly killed, but among those taken captive was one whom Yiijing, the new councillor at Yarkand, asserted to be none other than Buzurg, the son of Jahāngīr Khōja.[39] In 1842, Bichang had reported a rumour that Buzurg had been taken from Khoqand to Bukhara,[40] since when the Qing authorities had received no further information of his whereabouts. His capture was just the sort of boost that the flagging administration in Altishahr needed and would undoubtedly have served to distract the court's attention from the possibility that local grievances and mal-administration may have provoked the revolt.

The trophy prisoner was sent to Ili along with other important captives to be interrogated. Before long, however, Buyantai reported from Ili that there were problems with the case and false accusations had come to light.

[38] XZSL 425:9b, DG26.1 *jisi*.
[39] XZSL 417:2a–3a, DG25.5 *renxu*; 417:6a–7a, DG25.5 *yichou*; 417:12b–13b, DG25.5 *jisi* and 417:21a–22a, DG25.5 *xinsi*.
[40] LFZZ MZL 8072.30, DG22.8.19.

It was suspected, no doubt correctly, that confessions had been extracted by force. When Buyantai was transferred to Shaan-Gan, the investigation was taken over by his replacement, Sayinga. By the summer of 1846, Sayinga had concluded that the man they had captured was not Buzurg, but a certain Shams al-Dīn who had not, in fact, even participated in the rising. Nevertheless, as the latter's crimes were found to include excessive drinking, gambling, reneging on debts and abducting women, he was duly sentenced and deported to another part of the empire. Meanwhile, several officials who had been involved in the original investigation in the south were removed from their posts and Yijing, the councillor at Yarkand and nephew of the emperor, was sentenced to hard labour in Heilongjiang.[41]

A single example of official error in Altishahr is, of course, hardly indicative of a failing administration—there had been several such incidents in the early 19th century without dire consequences. On the other hand, if one compares this case with Songyun's meticulous investigation into the causes of the Ziyā' al-Dīn affair and the subsequent inquiry into his own conduct of that investigation, some thirty years earlier, the differences are striking. On this occasion, not only was the court's involvement perfunctory, but there was no instruction for a full inquiry into the cause of the initial disturbance. It is only from Lin Zexu's writings that we gain some insight into the nature of the tension that sparked the rising in Sokluk:

> There are over one hundred Muslim households in this village and there are about 20-odd Han Chinese families who run shops. All of them extend loans to the Muslims and their interest rates are high. Every seven days, there's a bazaar and if the original loan is not repaid, they increase the interest. When the Muslims rose up this time and killed nineteen Han Chinese, it was because they were being exploited by high interest rates to such an extent that they turned to violence.[42]

The court's failure to insist on a full investigation meant that there was no attempt to link the disturbance with the worsening economic situation in Altishahr, still less the broader political developments outside the *karun*.

Khoqand's renewed demands

In Khoqand, by early 1846, the regent Mussulman Qulī had had Khudāyār Khān's elder brother, Sarimsāq, poisoned and provided the young khan with a wife from among his own daughters. With his power consolidated, Mussulman Qulī now turned his attention outwards and presented the authorities in Yarkand with a fresh set of grievances and demands. Some

[41] XZSL 432:22b–24a, DG26.7 *gengwu*.
[42] Yang Guozhen (quoting Lin Zexu), *Lin Zexu zhuan*, p.514.

of these were communicated in a letter from Mussulman Qulī himself, while additional issues were raised by his messenger and the chief Khoqandi aqsaqal who was stationed in Kashgar, Ni'mat Jān.

Not for the first time, the rulers of Khoqand sought to win the approval of their clergy and promote the khanate's position regionally by asserting its role as a protector of Islam. Once again, the Khoqandis complained that in Altishahr Chinese were marrying Muslim women, a practice which was forbidden by the Islamic scriptures. The Khoqandi envoy requested that the aqsaqal be allowed to arrest these "bad women" and hand them over to the *yamen*.[43] There was no suggestion that the Khoqandis be allowed to administer justice themselves but, nevertheless, their interference in the legal process of Altishahr was unwelcome. Intermarriage, Mussulman Qulī was informed, was illegal under the Qing code and would be dealt with by the Altishahri authorities; the intervention of the Khoqandi aqsaqal was quite unnecessary.

The issue of intermarriage, however, was little more than a secondary problem. The real substance of the requests comprised a series of propositions regarding taxation that, if granted, would have considerably extended the tax-collecting powers of the Khoqandi aqsaqal. Firstly, Khoqand submitted that the annual land rents from the Qipchaq Qirghiz living in Altishahr should be paid over to Khoqand or, if the Qing authorities were not prepared to do this, then the Qipchaqs should be driven out of the *karun* and 'returned' to Khoqand. Not surprisingly, this notion received a stiff rebuttal from the Qing officials. These Qipchaqs, it was pointed out, had long dwelt within the *karun*; they had submitted to the Qing, received rank and emoluments, and thus Khoqand had no business with them. A similarly indignant rebuttal greeted a further request that Kashmiris, Badakhshanis, Qipchaqs and Khoqandis who farmed land in Altishahr should be exempt from paying the annual grain tax to the Qing authorities, which would instead be collected by the Khoqandi aqsaqal. Tax exemption, Mussulman Qulī was reminded, had been granted to the traders alone; everyone who cultivated land, no matter whence they originated, had to pay an annual grain tax to the emperor. Were this not the case, it was pointed out, Altishahr would be swamped by outsiders all wanting to rent land. Finally, once again, Khoqand made known its wish to collect taxes from Badakhshani, Kashmiri and Ladakhi traders on the approach routes to Yarkand. Since Yishan had put a halt to Khoqandi inroads into Sariqol in 1837, the issue of tax-collection had lain

[43] When this issue had been raised in 1835, the Khoqandis had merely requested that Muslim women who had married Chinese be returned to their families, and there had been no attribution of guilt to the women. *Cf.* chapter 7.

dormant; now, however, it transpired that the Khoqandi aqsaqal, Ni'mat Jān, had already positioned an official on the Ladakh road through Sariqol and was intending to build a tax check-point on the Badakhshan route. While the Qing authorities were reluctant to become embroiled in any discussion regarding taxation along the route taken by the Badakhshani traders outside the Sariqol area, they were still insistent that Khoqand was not to collect transit taxes within Sariqol and to this effect they sent men to oversee the dismantling of the tax point on the Ladakh route. Meanwhile, more evidence of Khoqandi high-handedness reached Yarkand when it was reported that Ni'mat Jān had sent a letter to the Qipchaq Qirghiz outside the *karun* ordering them to return their insignia conferred by the Qing authorities or prepare for attack by Khoqandi troops.[44]

Although the Qing authorities had seemingly thwarted Khoqand's immediate plans it is clear that despite, or perhaps because of, the khanate's increasing internal problems, Altishahr was still viewed by some as a potential source of revenue and target for political domination. Once again, the khojas were to prove a willing vehicle for Khoqandi designs. This time, although on a lesser scale than either the Jahāngīr or Yūsuf revolts, once kindled the troubles dragged on intermittently for twenty years and involved several members of the Makhdūmzāda khoja family.

The campaign of the Seven Khojas

In late spring of 1847, several descendants of Burhān al-Dīn Khōja and their Khoqandi and Qirghiz followers gathered in the mountainous region outside Kashgar. While the councillor at Yarkand, Saishiyaletai, continued to memorialize that all was quiet outside the *karun*, they began to raise forces in preparation for an attack on Altishahr.

In August, the khojas broke through the Tishuk-tash *karun* and making their way via Artush just as Jahāngīr had done, they surrounded Kashgar Muslim city. The siege continued for twelve days until Ni'mat Jān, the Khoqandi aqsaqal at Kashgar, opened the gates during the night and the city fell to the khojas. Dozens of Chinese merchants who had remained in the Muslim city were slain; those who survived fled to the cantonment together with the beks who had led the resistance.[45]

[44] LFZZ MZL 8073.13/14/15/16/17/18/19, DG26.7.11; XZSL 428:19a–b, DG26.4 *wushen* and 432:8a–10a, DG26.7 *jiawu*.

[45] *Yishan Xinjiang zougao*, pp.10–12; Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.326–7; Bellew, 'History of Kashgar', p.186.

As when Jahāngīr first appeared on the political stage, so now when reports of this khoja attack were first received in Beijing, there was some scepticism at court as to whether the khojas were indeed involved.[46] It was not long, however, before the protagonists were identified. The attacking forces were led by Katta Tore—the son of Jahāngīr's deceased elder brother, Yūsuf Khōja, and Valī Khān—the son of Jahāngīr's deceased younger brother, Bahā' al-Dīn. Also involved were Kichik Khān—another son of Yūsuf Khōja, Tavakkul Tore, possibly Buzurg Khān—Jahāngīr's son and Katta Tore's sons—Hākim Khān and Qāsim Khān.[47]

In Kashgar Muslim city, Katta Tore was now proclaimed ruler, while the Khoqandi aqsaqal, Ni'mat Jān, was rewarded for his efforts by being raised to the rank of mingbashi.[48] To the displeasure of many local Muslims, several other Khoqandis were also placed in high office.[49] While one detachment of the khojas' forces laid siege to the Kashgar cantonment where some 3,000 Qing soldiers assisted by the Chinese merchants countered their attack, other detachments of the khojas' forces advanced towards Yangi Hisar, Yarkand, and Aqsu. At Yarkand, Councillor Saishiyaletai, mortified by his failure to avert the escalating crisis, took his own life.[50] However, at Aqsu the city did not fall and only at Yangi Hisar did the khojas' forces successfully take the Muslim city before proceeding to lay siege to the Qing cantonment under the direction of Valī Khān.[51]

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[46] XZSL 446:29a–b, DG27.8 *jiaxu* and 447:25a, DG27.9 *renchen*. Muhammad Amīn's rather confused account erroneously dates this rising as having occurred in 1852–1853. Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, pp.349–50.

[47] There is some confusion over the identities of the so-called 'Seven Khojas', not least because the individuals concerned were often known by two, if not three, different names. See Saguchi Tōru, *18-19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan*, pp.512–3. Tavakkul Tore was also said to be a descendant of the Prophet and therefore regarded as a khoja. He was originally from Peshawar and was otherwise known as Sayyid Ahmad Khōja. See Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.327, and Beisembiev, 'Farghana's Contacts with India', p.128. It is uncertain whether Buzurg Khān and Katta Tore's sons actually participated in this revolt, but all sources are agreed that Katta Tore, Valī Khān, Kichik Khān and Tavakkul Tore were actively involved. See Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.349 (note), XZSL 449:9a–11a, DG27.11 *gengchen*.

[48] Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.327.

[49] Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, pp.144–6.

[50] XZSL 457:13a, DG28.7 *yiyou*. Saishiyaletai is here said to have been the councillor at Ili, instead of Yarkand. The explanation for his death was provided by his elder brother, Buyantai, one year after the event, but initially the circumstances surrounding Saishiyaletai's death had been considered suspicious. See XZSL 445:12a–15b, DG27.8 *dingsi*.

[51] Unless otherwise stated, details of the 'revolt' are taken from XZSL. See 446:4a, DG27.8 *jiazi*; 446:22a, DG27.8 *xinwei*; 446:23b–25b, DG27.8 *renshen*; 446:28b–29a, DG27.8 *jiaxu*; 446:33a–34b, DG27.8 *bingzi*; 448:38b–40b, DG27.10 *yihai*; 449:18a–b, DG27.11 *wuzi* and 449:31b–32b, DG27.11 *dingyou*.

The court, still hopeful that having satisfied their thirst for looting and pillaging the rebels would withdraw of their own accord, hesitated to send reinforcements from the interior. But from Ili, Sayinga had dispatched an army of some 10,000 troops under general Yishan who headed south towards Aqsu and Barchuk. As the relief troops approached Yarkand in November, Katta Tore endeavoured to return to Kashgar, but his army of some 18,000–20,000 men was intercepted to the northwest of Yarkand. Forced to do battle, his troops were swiftly overpowered and dispersed by a Qing force of less than 6,000 men. A few days later, the khojas' troops were again routed 30 *li* outside Yangi Hisar and the cantonment which had been besieged for seventy days was relieved. As the Qing troops prepared to advance on Kashgar, all the remaining forces under the khojas' command began their retreat towards Khoqand, pillaging and plundering as they went.

The entire episode had lasted less than three months. In terms of expenditure and military effort, for the Qing it constituted a relatively minor event. By early December, the mopping-up operation was all but complete and notwithstanding a few cannon platforms which had still to be dismantled and tunnels which remained to be filled in, all signs of the siege had been removed. For the officialdom in Altishahr there was even a positive repercussion in that the court decided to shelve plans to cut troops and military expenses. An additional 2,300-odd troops currently garrisoned in the north were instructed to remain in Kashgar, at least until it had been ascertained that the rebels had really dispersed and were not simply biding their time in the Alai Mountains. The possibility of retrenchment was not even broached.

For the local people of Altishahr, on the other hand, the economic impact and social upheaval had been devastating. Whether for reasons of disenchantment, apathy, or fear of the economic consequences, this younger generation of khojas had not been able to command the same level of support as had Jahāngīr or even Yūsuf. Although many, notably the Dolans, had initially rallied to meet the khojas, Qing reports make no mention of widespread local support, even among the Āfāqī adherents. On the contrary, the arrival of the khojas seems only to have inspired fear and the anticipation of further hardship and suffering.

According to Valikhanov, during the course of the rising some 20,000 families had fled beyond the *karun* from Altishahr,[52] but whether they fled "fearing the wrath of the Chinese", as one Russian source suggests,[53] or

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[52] Valikhanov actually states that this number fled from Kashgar, but presumably he means the Kashgar region, if not 'Kashgaria' which was commonly used as a substitute for Altishahr. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.328.

[53] Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, p.146.

that of the pillaging rebels—or perhaps both—can only be surmised. As part of the Qing rehabilitation policy, those who wished to return were allowed to do so without recrimination: "one less Muslim within the *karun* meant one more rebel outside the *karun*."[54] But for many it was too late. Thousands had not survived the journey, while others who had arrived in Khoqand, impoverished and starving, had had no alternative but to sell their children for a mere 4–6 roubles.[55] When some thirty years later the Russian colonel, A.N. Kuropatkin, who led the Russian embassy of 1876 to Kashgar, journeyed through the Terek Pass, his party came across the skeletons of men, women and children who had died as they attempted to flee across the treacherous mountain passes in the winter of 1847–8. According to the harrowing accounts of eyewitnesses, frost bite, snow drifts and hunger took so many hundreds of lives that for years afterwards the Qirghiz would not drink the water of the River Terek, for fear that it was contaminated by rotting corpses.[56]

As for the khojas who made the return journey on horseback, accompanied by a train of camels laden with silver, while still some distance from Osh, they halted to divide their booty. Shortly afterwards, a force of Qipchaqs arrived from Khoqand, disarmed the khojas, confiscated their booty and took Katta Tore prisoner.[57] By April, an envoy from Khudāyār Khān had arrived in Yarkand, his purpose to absolve Khoqand from any involvement in the attack. The young khan claimed to have been out of the country leading his army on a campaign at the time when the khojas struck. He insisted that the khojas had acted in secret and that all those who had participated had now been arrested and punished. But Khoqand's main concern was, once again, that trade should be allowed to continue and that Khoqand should be permitted to appoint a new aqsaqal to replace Ni'mat Jān, who had fled as the imperial forces approached.[58]

The resumption of trade with Khoqand

There is no indication in the Qing sources that either the frontier officials or the court wished to take a strong line against Khoqand. The priority was to prevent the outbreak of further disturbances in this increasingly volatile region. The depositions of captives were said to confirm that the

[54] XZSL 449:32b, DG27.11 *dingyou*.
[55] Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia*, p.168.
[56] Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, pp.147–8.
[57] *Ibid*.
[58] ZPZZ MZL 593.9 [DG27.12.13–28.10.23]. Contrary to the Qing sources, Valikhanov states that Ni'mat Jān was reinstated as the aqsaqal of Kashgar after the revolt. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.328.

khan had not instigated the rebellion, while Mussulman Qulī's name was not even mentioned, despite the fact that the Qing authorities in Altishahr were well aware of his pre-eminent position in Khoqand.[59] The aqsaqal Ni'mat Jān was reported to have been working independently, and in a gesture of extraordinary goodwill, the court proposed that if the khojas were surrendered, the not inconsiderable amount of silver that he had left behind when he made his escape should be handed over to the khan.[60] Whether or not this happened is unclear, but within no time, even the requirement that the rebel leaders should be extradited as a condition of the reinstatement of trade had been dropped. Content to accept the khan's word that he had dealt with the rebels, the resumption of trade and re-establishment of the chief Khoqandi aqsaqal was swiftly and unconditionally sanctioned by the court.[61]

By the end of May 1848, a new Khoqandi aqsaqal had arrived in Altishahr accompanied by 19 traders. Throughout the following weeks, the number of Khoqandi traders arriving in Kashgar and Yangi Hisar rose until they totalled 515 with 1,170 bundles of merchandise, and more than 4,100 sheep and horses. Meanwhile, officials in Altishahr were also having to contend with the return of thousands of local people who had fled during the recent troubles. Having received reassurances that they would not be punished, between April and May, nearly 19,000 men, women and children returned to their homes within the *karun*. An additional 4,000–5,000, who reportedly also hoped to return, were still encamped in the area around Osh, unable to set out either because the river waters were too high or because they lacked sufficient provisions to make the journey.[62]

On his arrival in Kashgar, the new Khoqandi aqsaqal fell ill and was unable to travel to Yarkand to present his credentials in person. His letter of introduction from Khudāyār Khān was, however, forwarded to Yarkand. To the fury of Councillor Jiming and his officials, the letter

[59] Significantly, perhaps, there is a dearth of extant depositions from this revolt.
[60] GZZZ MZL 593.8 [DG27.12.13–28.10.23]; *Yishan Xinjiang zougao*, 5a. Whatever Ni'mat Jān's role in the disturbances, he was certainly perceived by local people to have official backing from Khoqand. In summer 1848, once again the Qirghiz reported that bandits had returned to their territory, 80 *li* outside Yarkand, bringing with them a letter from Ni'mat Jān which claimed that he had been instructed to inform the Qirghiz that all those who had received caps and insignia from the Qing were to return them, and if they did not obey, they would be killed. As the Qing authorities deduced, this may well have been the work of troublemakers or wily Qirghiz who knew such information would be likely to elicit substantial gifts from the Qing authorities. ZPZZ MZL 593.5, DG28.7.4.
[61] XZSL 453:7a, DG28.3 *gengchen*.
[62] GZZZ MZL 593.9 [DG27.12.13 – 28.10.23] and 593.10, DG28.8.4. By April 1849, over 1,000 of those still remaining in Khoqand appear to have returned to Yangi Hisar and Kashgar. XZSL 466:3a, DG29.4 *guimao*.

revealed that the Khoqand authorities were still assuming that their aqsaqals would collect taxes from all outsiders who traded within the *karun*.[63] Despite a firm rebuttal, within months Khoqand was repeating almost the same elaborate demands made two years previously. The Khoqandi envoy, Rahmān Qulī, who arrived in Yarkand in autumn 1848, repeated the requests that Khoqand be allowed to collect taxes from all outsiders, that Khoqandis who cultivated land in Altishahr should not have to pay the annual grain tax, and that the Qipchaqs should be 'returned' to Khoqand. When reprimanded for this continued impertinence, Rahmān Qulī reportedly struck his head against the ground and could say nothing to defend himself, other than that he was carrying out the instructions of Mussulman Qulī. A letter dispatched to Khudāyār Khān once again set out in detail why these requests could not be entertained. This time, Jiming did actually go as far as to threaten that if Khoqand caused trouble again "we shall memorialize the emperor and he will expel all your traders and dispatch troops",[64] but there is no evidence that this was a reflection of a new, firmer approach emanating from the court. On the contrary, when early the next year it was reported that Khoqand was still endeavouring to collect taxes outside the *karun* (presumably in Sariqol) and that the chief Khoqandi tax collector had been killed by Qirghiz, the court again instructed officials at Yarkand not to get involved.[65]

Russian Overtures

Against this backcloth of ongoing problems with the khojas and the tension with Khoqand, in 1847 and 1849 the *Lifanyuan* refused Russian requests to open trade at Ili, Tarbagatai and Kashgar. In the north of Xinjiang, Russian merchants were already heavily involved in trade at Ili and Tarbagatai but, hindered by its unofficial nature, their profits in these cities remained substantially smaller than those at Kiakhta. After 1830, as Russia's control over the Qazaqs had increased, so Russian merchants had become ever more frustrated by their inability to engage in direct trade in Xinjiang. However, Qing officials were reluctant to sanction the extension of Russia's trading privileges into the region, despite the fact that they appear to have been prepared to turn a blind eye to the proxy trade facilitated by the Qazaqs, not to mention the numerous caravans accompanied by Russian traders posing as Central Asians, that had been arriving in northern Xinjiang and Altishahr since the early 19th century.

[63] GZZZ MZL593.10, DG28.8.4; LFZZ MZL 8073.26/27, DG28.8.7.
[64] LFZZ MZL 8073.32, DG.28.11.23; ZPZZ MZL 593.11, DG28.11.23.
[65] XZSL 466:3b, DG29.4 *guimao*.

More importantly, perhaps, although in the late 18th century Qing officials in northern Xinjiang had kept a watchful eye on Russian inroads into Qazaq pastures and made their objections known to some effect, by the mid-19th century, as the Russian advance began in earnest, the mood of the court could not have been more different. The bureaucracy was demoralized and the recent defeats inflicted by the British in the Opium War had only aggravated the trend towards economic decline and social instability that defined the early 19th century. The Taiping Rebellion was fermenting and the court's attention was firmly elsewhere.[66]

Not surprisingly, therefore, when in 1850 the Russians reopened the issue, Qing official correspondence reveals no attempt to link the Russian enthusiasm for trade with political designs on the region. In the north, officials advised that to continue to prevent the Russians trading officially at Tarbagatai and Ili would only aggravate the situation, but 'the situation' referred to appears to be no more than the Russian perception that they were being treated unfairly and that their profits were being stolen by the Khoqandis and Qazaqs. Consequently, officials on the north-western frontier and in Beijing agreed that as long as a treaty agreement was drawn up, Ili and Tarbagatai could be opened to Russian trade. Like the Qazaqs, the Russian traders were to be restricted to the trade posts outside the cities, they were not to be allowed to mix with the locals as they were accustomed to doing at Kiakhta, and regulations were to be established to govern disputes arising between the Russian, Chinese and Muslim traders.[67] These deliberations culminated in the 1851 Treaty of Kuldja (Ili).

In Kashgar, however, the situation was deemed to be quite different. Although, once again, no mention was made of a Russian threat, the wariness of the Qing officials and their sense of the fragility of their hold over the region is almost palpable in their communications with the court. Managing the demands of the large number of foreigners in Kashgar was already proving an onerous task for officials and the prospect of adding Russians to the ethnic mix was daunting. How would disputes between Khoqandis (or indeed any Muslims) and the Russians be handled? The Russians would not be inclined to accept Islamic law and the Muslims would not accept Qing law. Would the Russians not hold the Qing authorities accountable if their traders were attacked by Qirghiz? And if the long-distance trade proved unprofitable for the Russian merchants, as indeed it had done for many Chinese traders from the interior, would this

[66] See Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860*, pp.20–34 and Fletcher, 'Sino-Russian Relations, 1800–62', pp.318–32.
[67] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7663.28, DG30.3.21 and 7663.29, DG30.4.3.

not be a source of additional friction? Thus, despite the lack of reference to any form of explicit Russian threat, there is clear indication that, as in the discussions on opening trade at Tarbagatai and Ili, Qing officials in Altishahr were being guided by their concern to minimize the possibility of confrontation with Russia on the frontier. Similar concerns, no doubt, also underpinned the argument that if the Russians were allowed to trade in person in Kashgar, rather than via their Qazaq proxies, then the English, whose territories were much closer to Altishahr than those of Russia, would soon be making a similar request. The consensus was that Kashgar should not be opened to trade with Russia.[68]

The crisis in Qing administration of Altishahr

The late 1830s to 1850 was a period of lost opportunity and decline for Qing rule in Xinjiang. In Altishahr, while trade flourished, the critical economic situation and the inability of the Qing administration to exert its authority over day-to-day affairs was reflected in the increasing corruption and malpractice among the beks. As the Khoqandi grip on the local economy tightened, so the situation became ever more acute. The mass exodus that accompanied the events of 1847 is a clear indication that vast numbers of Altishahris were now living at subsistence level; the prospect of further upheaval left them with no alternative but to abandon their homes and fields and to risk the perilous trek across the snow-covered mountain passes. But if by its very nature the Qing administration in Altishahr, with its dependence on the beks for the exercise of civil duties, was ill-placed to safeguard the livelihoods of the local people, it was the failure to protect Altishahr from external attack by a motley group of khojas and their forces that revealed the true weakness of Qing rule in this part of the empire. The fact that, despite the lack of any substantial local support, the khojas and their followers had once again managed to strike at the heart of Altishahr, attests to the contempt with which Qing rule in Altishahr, was regarded not only by the khoja descendants, but also Khoqand and all the surrounding polities.

The paralysis in the Qing administration in Altishahr at this time is evident, not least, in the perfunctory nature of the communications between the frontier officials and the court. The court's insistence on avoiding any move that might endanger peace and stability in the region placed heavy constraints on frontier officials, both in terms of instituting internal reforms and formulating external policy. In such circumstances, there was little incentive for frontier officials to gather intelligence about

[68] LFZZ WJL/ZE 7663.29, DG30.4.3 and 7663.40, n.d.. Less than a decade later, however, Kashgar was opened to Russian trade under the 1860 Treaty of Beijing.

developments in Khoqand, or concern themselves with the world beyond the *karun*. Had they done so, they might have been able to avert at least some of the problems of the 1850s and 1860s. Instead, the court's absolute commitment to defence and the avoidance of military confrontation, combined with the failure to introduce any significant social or economic reform in Altishahr, only contributed to the impending crisis.

CHAPTER NINE

THE FINAL PHASE OF MANCHU RULE IN ALTISHAHR

Renewed khoja activity

In 1852 there was a rising against the Qipchaqs in Khoqand. Within three months 20,000 Qipchaqs including Mussulman Qulī had been killed. The coup, which may well have been backed by Bukhara, resulted in Khudāyār Khān taking control of Khoqand in his own right.[1] But this was not the end of Khudāyār's problems; over the next few years he had to contend with several challenges to his throne from the Qipchaqs and his younger brother, Mallā.

For Altishahr the renewed political turmoil in Khoqand meant that there would be little, if any, attempt to curtail the activities of the khojas. In June 1852, Buzurg, Tavakkul Tore, and a band of armed men entered the *karun* north of Kashgar but were swiftly driven back by Qing troops. Undeterred, they approached the *karun* outside Uch Turfan where the Qing soldiers slept soundly as the rebels set fire to the guardhouse. They then proceeded to harry the surrounding settlements, before being repelled by troops dispatched from Uch Turfan. The following month, Valī Khān and a force of some 200 Qirghiz entered the *karun* at Tishuk-tash and headed east to Artush. As Qing troops under the leadership of General Guiling advanced, Valī Khān and his followers fled, but three days later they again crossed the *karun* at Yilanwas, north of Artush, and attacked a nearby village. This time Guiling's troops joined battle. Several of his men were lost in the fighting and others were taken captive, but eventually the khojas' forces were put to flight.[2]

Meanwhile, in Beijing the court lacked information: why had the khojas been able to cross the *karun* so many times in such quick succession; why had the guards at the *karun* put up no defence; had any Qing troops been killed or wounded; had local villagers been coerced into participating; why had the rising taken place and why, if there had been only 200 rebels, was it not possible to report the number of deaths?[3] No answers appear to have been forthcoming from Yarkand, but neither did the court press for a response.

[1] The suggestion that Khudāyār Khān may have had a hand in Mussulman Qulī's death cannot be discounted. Boulger, *Central Asian Portraits*, p.171.

[2] *Wenzong shilu* [hereafter WZSL], 66:4a–b, XF2.7 *jiwei*; 80:1b–2a, XF2.12 *bingshen* and 67:3a–4b, XF2.7 *gengwu*.

[3] WZSL 67:6a–7a, XF2.7 *gengwu*.

Despite the fact that Guiling had been instructed to strengthen defences at the *karun*, in August the khojas again penetrated the *karun*. This time Valī Khān and Tavakkul Tore were accompanied by Kichik Khān and Katta Tore, the latter having apparently secured a swift release from Khoqandi custody. Once again the khojas reached Artush and engaged with the Qing forces before being repelled. The *karun* outside Uch Turfan had also been penetrated but here, too, the khojas' forces were driven back. The cities of Altishahr were put on alert and ordered to secure their defences.[4]

While the Muslims of Altishahr may have been reluctant to respond to the incursions led by the khojas, by the mid-1850s outbreaks of discontent across the region reflected the deteriorating economic situation in which many local people found themselves.[5] In 1854, Shāh Mu'min from the Kashgar village of Khan-ariq, who claimed to be a descendant of Yūsuf Khōja, led an attack on a post-station. Several buildings were razed and lives were lost, but the revolt was swiftly repressed and 18 of the ringleaders were put to death.[6] At Qucha, too, discontent was simmering.

In the summer of 1855, the khojas once again penetrated the *karun*. Even if Khudāyār Khān himself had not been directly involved in the khoja campaigns of recent years, clearly there were still those among the leadership of Khoqand who were tempted by the prospect of wresting control of Altishahr from a weakening Qing administration. Husayn Khōja Īshān was married to Khudāyār Khān's elder sister. In early 1855, having accompanied his brother-in-law on a hunting trip, Husayn Khōja Īshān then proceeded to his home village in the vicinity of Osh with the purportedly benign intention of visiting the surrounding tribes to administer the smallpox vaccine to children.[7] At this point, he appears to have been approached by two Khoqandi merchants who traded in Altishahr and who persuaded him that the Muslims of Artush were disaffected and could be relied on to respond to a call to rebel. Despite attempts by Khudāyār's brother to persuade Husayn Khōja Īshān to return to Khoqand city, the latter crossed the *karun* to Artush, where he and twelve of his supporters were promptly arrested by local Muslims. There is no evidence in Qing sources that Husayn Khōja Īshān was in league

[4] WZSL 67:18a–b, XF2.7 *jiaxu*; 70:7a–8a, XF2.8 *renyin* and 71:17a–18a, XF2.9 *wuwu*.

[5] Ji Dachun notes ten outbreaks of social unrest in the region from 1854–63. Ji Dachun, 'Shilun 1864-nian Xinjiang nongmin qiyi', p.38.

[6] WZSL 143:38a–b, XF4.8 *bingyin*; Fletcher,'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.391.

[7] Between 1851 and 1856 outbreaks of smallpox struck the cities of Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan. It is not exactly clear how the vaccine would have been administered, but the Chinese text states that Husayn Khōja Īshān made his living in this way (*zhong dou wei sheng*). LFZZ MZL 8063.16, XF5.12.18.

with Valī Khān and Tavakkul Tore but within days of his crossing the *karun,* Valī Khān and Tavakkul Tore were leading a force of several hundred men towards Artush.[8]

With Husayn Khōja Īshān already taken captive, Valī Khān and Tavakkul Tore were met by Qing troops and swiftly put to flight, but this was not quite the end of the incident. Khudāyār Khān now sent a letter to Yarkand asking for the release of his brother-in-law and protesting his innocence. The court replied that it would only have Husayn Khōja Īshān released if Khoqand handed over the two khoja leaders.[9] A deadlock ensued, suggesting that the khojas still had powerful support in Khoqand, or at the very least were a law unto themselves. Nearly three years later, with the dispute unresolved, Husayn Khōja Īshān died in prison.[10]

Throughout 1856, Kichik Khān and Valī Khān attempted several incursions into Altishahr but failed to penetrate any distance inside the *karun*. Clearly, the Qing authorities had been working hard to strengthen defences and internal security in this trouble-stricken area just 100 *li* northeast of Kashgar. Time and again, on crossing the *karun* the khojas and their supporters had headed first for the villages of Artush, a centre of Āfāqī support and site of the *mazār* of Satūq Bughrā Khān, before turning south towards Kashgar. Harsh working conditions endured by copper miners at Artush meant that resentment was festering and the area was ripe for revolt.[11] Moreover, anti-Qing sentiment had a focal point here in the person of the keeper of the *mazār*, Mīr Ahmad, an akhund of considerable wealth and power among the Āfāqī community. In 1857, when disturbances among the copper miners finally developed into open revolt, he assumed a leading role. Whether or not he was already in communication with the khojas beyond the *karun* is unclear, but there is no doubt as to where his sympathies lay; he was subsequently to marry his daughter to Valī Khān and hold office under him.[12]

Sĭmultaneously, in the area of Qucha where discontent had been stirring for several years, the Muslims of three villages refused to pay the grain tax and rose in revolt. The reaction of the Qucha authorities

[8] SGXHFL 1:3b–6b, XF5.8.5 and XF5.12.12; LFZZ MZL 8063.16, XF5.12.18; WZSL 174:13a–14b, XF5.8 *guisi* and 174:16b–17b, XF5.8 *yiwei*.

[9] WZSL186:9b–10a, XF5.12 *xinchou* and 186:25a–b, XF5.12 *dingwei*.

[10] *Qingying Guqing zougao* 3:23a–25a, XF8.5.29.

[11] LFZZ MZL 8063.16, XF5.12.18.

[12] SGXHFL 10:16b, XF8.9.16; XZSL 265:3–4b, XF8.9 *jiawu*; Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.389. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.329, 333. Muhammad Amīn suggests that Mīr Ahmad was forced to give his daughter in marriage to the khoja, but this is at odds with other sources. Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, p.351. See also Hamada Masami, 'Le Mausolée et le Culte de Satūq Bughrā Khān', p.81.

reflected the pervasive climate of tension and oppression. The rising was suppressed and, without reference to the military governor at Ili, 30 captives were hastily executed, 15 of whom were not even given the opportunity to make a deposition.[13] There was no enquiry.

The rule of Valī Khān

Meanwhile, in early 1857, Valī Khān had again been reported to be in the vicinity of the *karun* outside Kashgar, from where he dispatched pillaging raids to secure cattle and horses. In June, he began another advance towards Kashgar at the head of a force of some several hundred men. The Qing sentinels who were allegedly smoking opium in the barracks at the *karun* were caught off guard and killed.

The next day, using wood that had been brought for sale and left outside the southern gate of Kashgar Muslim city, Valī Khān and his men started a large fire on the banks of the River Qizil in the early hours of the morning. The Khoqandi aqsaqal, Nūr Mehmet, encouraged the Khoqandis inside the city to respond by lighting fires. The city gates were then blasted open and as the rebels surged in, one of their number rode through the streets of the city shouting: "All hail to Buzurg Khān Tore." There is no evidence that Buzurg actually participated in this rising, but the potency of his father's memory was not lost on Valī Khān. If any of the khojas were able to catch the hearts and minds of the Altishahris, it would be Buzurg, son of Jahāngīr. Immediately, Valī Khān let it be known that he had come to avenge the death of Jahāngīr and issued orders for the capture of the hakim bek Ahmad, whose father, Ishāq, had been instrumental in Jahāngīr's capture. Ahmad, along with several leading beks, had in fact already fled to the cantonment but several members of his family were not so fortunate.[14] Within days Valī Khān's men, now grown in number to several thousands, were advancing on Yangi Hisar, Yarkand and Barchuk. To the north they were within striking distance of Aqsu, while to the south they were pressing towards Khotan. In the face of such a large and rapid onslaught, the Qing garrisons, now substantially

[13] *Qinding pingding Shaan-Gan Xinjiang Huifei fanglüe* [hereafter SGXHFL], 1:11a–13a, XF7 intercalary 5.2 and XF7 intercalary 5.19; WZSL 227:8a–b, XF7 intercalary 5 *renwu*; 228:7a–b, XF7 intercalary 5 *jihai* and 228:22a–23a, XF7 intercalary 5 *yisi*; Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.391. Fletcher's reference appears to relate to the events of 1857, rather than 1855.

[14] Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', pp.391–3. Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, pp.350–1. For an account of the rising drawn primarily from local eye-witnesses, see Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.328–37 (also Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, pp.149–52 which closely follows Valikhanov) and for a full documentary account of the rebellion from the Qing perspective see SGXHFL *juan* 3–10.

reduced in size, were unable to launch an effective offensive and withdrew within their cantonments.

The khojas could not have made such swift progress had thousands of local people not come out in their support, but once the initial euphoria had subsided, the harsh reality of life under the new regime was brought home. Something of the oppression and hardship suffered by the Muslims of Yarkand is captured in a 19th century *qasīda*:

> During 3 months this evil-minded crowd hung around the city: sequestering the fields, gardens, plains and orchards.
>
> They seized the fields like the people of Yâjûj (of old) [i.e. the biblical equivalent of Gog]; pillaging everything they found; and set fire to 1000,000000 [sic] crops.
>
> If the Chinese made a *sortie* from the town, the bandits would flee away like a fox in an osier-bed: but they would (quickly) return and shoot arrows at the Muhammadans.
>
> ...
>
> Rice rose to 10 tangas and even 15 tangas: and the people perished from the drought. In the eyes of the people a loaf became as scarce as a bit of moon.
>
> Day and night the people, in their houses, were grinding their handmills.
>
> Those people who had no desire for sugar could not even get dumplings to eat.
>
> Such desolation had never been brought upon the Muhammadans, either by the Jews, Armenians, Christians, Hindus or the Râfizis [i.e. Ismā'īlis] of Multan.
>
> ...
>
> The bandits perpetrated on the country people every kind of tyranny and injustice. Neither a cooking-pot, not a tea-pot—nay, out of a thousand houses in only one was a blanket (bed-cover).[15]

Other sources confirm the brutal nature of the new regime that appears to have made no distinction in meting out violence towards Āfāqī and Ishāqī adherents alike. Valī Khān was reportedly a hashish addict and given to acts of tyrannical cruelty. Stories abound of his bloodthirsty deeds and while the "pyramid of human skulls" that he had piled high on the banks of the River Qizil[16] has become legendary, among Westerners he is often best remembered as the man responsible for the grizzly death of the

[15] Citing Ross's translation in Ross, *Three Turki Manuscripts from Kashgar*, pp.17–8. These Chaghatai manuscripts were contained in three volumes of what Ross believed to be an incomplete work on the history of Turkestan. The copier of one of the other manuscripts gives the date of transcription as 1904, and it would seem likely, therefore, that the description of the Valī Khān revolt was first recorded while the events were still within living memory, but there is no information on the writer. The *qasīda* is written in praise of Afredun, the hakim bek of Yarkand, who played an important role in leading the resistance.

[16] Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.331–2.

Prussian explorer, Adolph von Schlagintweit, who had the misfortune to be travelling through Kashgar in the summer of 1857.[17]

Valikhanov, who reached Kashgar in 1858 and conducted his research while disguised as a Muslim trader, gives graphic examples of the reputed cruelty of Valī Khān and the terror he inflicted. But his account also sheds light on another factor, which had already been evidenced at the time of the 1847 incursion. While many local people may have risen in support of the khoja, by far his strongest and most enduring support lay among the Khoqandis who in Kashgar alone now numbered some 5,000.[18] Having lived most of his life in Khoqand, Valī Khān was, to all intents and purposes, more Khoqandi than Kashgari. Not surprisingly, therefore, he not only drew on Khoqandis to serve as his closest advisers but, foreshadowing the rule of Ya'qūb Bek, his policies had a distinctly Khoqandi and overtly Islamic flavour. According to Valikhanov:

> Because the customs of Kashgar differed from those of Khoqand, they were displeasing to the khoja, and he repressed them. The national costume was prohibited; the women had to cover their hair with a white scarf, in the way that the Andijanis [Khoqandis] did and were not allowed to go out unveiled. They were also forbidden to plait their hair, and the police kept a strict eye on this. If they violated this rule their braids were cut off. Males from the age of six had to wear a turban and to visit the mosque regularly, which the Kashgarians were not accustomed to doing.[19]

After two months, as supplies in the besieged cantonments of Kashgar and Yangi Hisar ran short, the 5,000 troops dispatched from Ili and Urumchi under the command of the councillor Fafuli arrived in the south and engaged with the insurgents in the vicinity of Yarkand and Yangi Hisar. Having routed the khoja's forces, the imperial troops then advanced towards Kashgar. Valī Khān's army was reportedly well organized and according to one account now comprised a cavalry of some 70,000 and 4,000 foot soldiers. Nevertheless, as the Qing relief forces advanced to relieve the besieged cantonment, the khoja's troops broke rank and scattered. Valī Khān managed to escape towards Darvaz and although Qing troops scoured the area immediately outside the *karun*, it was considered fruitless to venture further afield in his pursuit.[20] Once again khoja rule had lasted no more than three months.

[17] *Ibid*, p.332. See also Mullā Mūsa Sairāmī, *Tārīkh-i Hamīdī* (Chinese trans.), pp.111–2.

[18] The estimate given by Batashan, the councillor at Kashgar, was 4,000–5,000. ZPZZ MZL 610.1, XF7.9.11. Valikhanov, however, estimates 6,000. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', p.343.

[19] Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.332–3.

[20] *Ibid*, p.330; WZSL 228:15a–16a, XF7.5 *renyin* and 237:14b–15a, XF7.10 *jiayin*; SGXHFL 1:13a–15a, XF7.5.2; LFZZ MZL 8070.65, XF8.3.3.

The precarious livelihoods of the people of Altishahr had suffered yet more severe disruption. Thousands had fled their homes, crops had been devastated and houses looted, but this still was not the end of the suffering. As in the past, the Qing mopping-up operation made no attempt to distinguish Āfāqī and Ishāqī adherents but, according to Valikhanov, the repression suffered by all was brutal and far-reaching. Unrestricted by their superior officers, the Qing troops reportedly abused and violated the local people at will. The local economy stagnated and trade ground to a halt.[21]

Khoqandi involvement in the rising

An inquiry, ordered by the court, into the causes and handling of the rebellion resulted in the impeachment of several officials for derogation of duty.[22] However, the rehabilitation policies did little to strengthen Qing control of the region, still less to address the fundamental causes of the rising. Once again blame for the social and economic problems was attributed to the beks, but other than a general instruction that the beks should not be trusted and that in the Kashgar area they should be 'checked' annually, there were no concrete proposals as to how bek corruption was to be eradicated. In Kashgar, the highest-ranking Qing official was upgraded to the rank of imperial agent so that he could memorialize the throne directly, but with no increase in the garrison and an instruction that troops were to be rotated every six, instead of three, years it was evident that the court's priority was still to cut the cost of retaining this far-flung outpost of the empire.[23]

Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, there was no attempt to assess the extent of Khoqandi involvement in the events and the question of the resumption of trade was soon pressing. In the autumn of 1857, the councillor at Yarkand, Qingying, dispatched an envoy to Khoqand to inform the khan that only if Valī Khān and the other rebel leaders were extradited would trade be resumed.[24] A few months later an envoy from

[21] Valikhanov identifies the Qing forces who were guilty of these abuses as the Mongol contingents. Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.335–6. Undoubtedly, this was not the first time that abuses had been committed by Qing soldiers during the mopping-up operations that followed the various revolts (*cf.* chapter 6, note 31). It may, however, have been the case that this time the reprisals were more far-reaching (and random) than in the past. Not surprisingly, Qing sources provide relatively few details of mopping-up operations, but tellingly perhaps, neither is this a subject that is much discussed in earlier non-Chinese accounts.

[22] WZSL 235:24a–25b, XF7.9 *wuzi* and 265:3b–4a, XF8.9 *jiawu*.

[23] WZSL 237:9a–b, XF7.10 *gengwu*; 258:6b–7b, XF8.7 *dingyou* and 267:4a–5b, XF8.10 *yimao*.

[24] WZSL 238:19b, XF7.10 *yihai*.

Khoqand arrived in Yarkand with the message that Valī Khān had been apprehended and if the Khoqandis were allowed to trade, they would punish him and his associates in accordance with Islamic law.[25]

Unwilling to engage in a stand-off and bereft of new ideas, the court clung to the axiom that the frontier had to be kept peaceful. Officials in Yarkand were instructed that in view of the fact that Islamic law did not provide for extradition and that preventing trade was likely to cause more trouble, trade should be reinstated; officials were not to insist on knowing the nature of Valī Khān's punishment, but could endeavour to elicit the information secretly.[26]

In Yarkand, however, officials were still worried. In their view, Khoqand was by no means contrite. Even before permission had been granted for trade to resume, the Khoqandis were again raising the issue of intermarriage and taxation of the Badakhshanis, Kashmiris and Qipchaq Qirghiz. Khudāyār Khān was also demanding an explanation as to why, at the onset of the rising, the aqsaqal at Yarkand had been imprisoned.[27] Fearing that the failure to impose any sanctions on Khoqand would inevitably lead to a repetition of the events of the previous years, the Ili military governor, Zhalafentai, proposed that in future the Khoqandi aqsaqal and traders should be made to live one or two *li* outside Kashgar, as the Qazaqs lived outside Ili and Tarbagatai in the north. The court approved the proposal, but with the reservation that no pressure should be placed on the Khoqandis to comply; consequently the ruling was never implemented.[28]

As is clear from all the reports, quite independently of their khan's involvement in the rising, the Khoqandi aqsaqals in the cities of Kashgar, Yarkand and Yangi Hisar had supported the rebels and either played or, in the case of the Yarkand aqsaqal who had been hastily imprisoned, might well have played a leading role in the revolt.[29] As men of considerable political standing within their community and still nominally functionaries of the Khoqandi government they may have reckoned that khoja rule of the region backed by Khoqand would be to their personal advantage. Qing sources from the 1840s and 1850s reveal numerous instances of Khoqandis, and in particular Khoqandi aqsaqals, flouting Qing authority. According to Valikhanov, by the 1850s the Khoqandi aqsaqal in Kashgar

[25] WZSL 247:13a–b, XF8.3 *yimao*.

[26] *Ibid*.

[27] LFZZ MZL 8070.65, XF8.3.3.

[28] SGXHFL 8:7b–8a, XF8.9.16; 10:14a–15a, XF8.9.1 and 10:24a, XF8.10.13; WZSL 236:1b–2a, XF7.9.16 and 267:5a, XF8.10 *yimao*.

[29] LFZZ MZL 8070.65, XF8.3.3.

even possessed his own personal militia.[30] For Fletcher and others, this was evidence of the extraterritoriality enjoyed by Khoqandis in Altishahr at this time. But in fact, this lack of accountability to Qing authority had little to do with the agreement of 1832 and was more a reflection of the wealth and self-confidence of the community in the face of a debilitated Qing administration.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that traditionally merchant groups had supported the Āfāqiyya in their struggle against the Ishāqiyya,[31] the role of the ordinary Khoqandi traders is difficult to comprehend. What advantage would they have gained from ridding Altishahr of Qing rule? Did they anticipate that trade with China would continue undisrupted by such an event? One possible explanation is that many of those who supported the rising may not have been traders. Although Qing sources generally refer to all the Khoqandis in Altishahr as traders, in fact a substantial number were engaged in farming and other activities. With estimates of 4,000-6,000 residing in Kashgar alone (not including those of mixed race),[32] it goes without saying that their number would probably have included many who were servicing that community in a variety of ways. Yet, however seemingly ill-judged, there can be no doubt that substantial numbers of Khoqandis, including merchants, did support Valī Khān's attempt to oust the Qing from Altishahr.

Death of a Khoqandi envoy

As social and economic conditions in Altishahr continued to deteriorate in the wake of the 1857 rebellion, the influence exercised by the affluent Khoqandi community was enhanced. If the Qing officials were aware that the Khoqandis had acquired a power and status that placed them beyond the authority of the local beks, they did little to curb it. Despite the repeated insistence that Khoqandi farmers, like all others who cultivated the emperor's land, must pay grain tax, the Khoqandis repeatedly refused to pay their dues. Unable to exert any authority over the Khoqandi community, the beks, who were charged with tax-collection, simply compensated for the shortfall by extorting more grain from the local people.[33]

Some further measure of the self-confidence and bravado that existed among the Khoqandi community in Altishahr at this time can be gleaned from an incident that occurred in 1859. The events are significant, not

[30] Valikhanov, 'O sostoianii Altyshara', pp.333.
[31] Togan, 'Differences in Ideology and Practice', p.36.
[32] See above note 18.
[33] LFZZ MZL 8074.45, XF10 intercalary 3.23.

merely because they brought Khoqand and the Qing empire to the brink of war, but also because in refusing to accept the court's authority to sanction a tribute mission, Khoqand, in effect, posed a fundamental challenge to the ideological fabric of the old Qing order. The irony is that by this time the khanate was too weak to see the challenge through, and swiftly backed down.

In Khoqand, Khudāyār Khān had now been deposed and his brother, Mallā Khān (r.1858–62), had succeeded to the throne. As was customary when a new ruler assumed power, in the autumn of 1859, a Khoqandi envoy named 'Abd al-Karīm arrived in Yarkand and requested permission to proceed to Beijing. In normal circumstances, envoys bearing tribute would make the journey to court together with the annual rotation of beks from Xinjiang. However, as the rotation for that year had been cancelled, the councillor Yurui refused the envoy permission to proceed. He was ordered to return home, but was given the option of leaving the tribute goods in Yarkand with assurances that they would then be forwarded to Beijing and the Yarkandi authorities would reciprocate with the customary gifts. Claiming that he had to consult with the new khan as to whether he should leave the goods or take them back to Khoqand, 'Abd al-Karīm thereupon took up residence in the Muslim city of Yarkand to await his instructions.[34]

Hereafter, the story must be pieced together from various reports and depositions. According to Councillor Yurui's initial memorial, in the following weeks and months as 'Abd al-Karīm awaited a reply from Khoqand, his conduct degenerated into wanton debauchery. He abducted women and repeatedly assaulted local people as well as garrison soldiers and Chinese civilians. The hakim bek, Ahmad, made several attempts to discipline him, but without success. Eventually, according to Yurui, a banquet was organized to present 'Abd al-Karīm with the appropriate gifts to convey back to Khoqand. 'Abd al-Karīm attended the *yamen* as requested, but refused to accept that he was not to be allowed to travel to Beijing. He was defiant and spoke insultingly to Yurui, at which point Ahmad, who was also present, was instructed to escort him from the room. As 'Abd al-Karīm was removed, he shouted an order to the men who had accompanied him, and taking out knives and axes they fell upon the attending Qing soldiers. The soldiers retaliated. In the fray that ensued, 13 of the soldiers were injured, but 'Abd al-Karīm and 24 of his followers were beaten to death. Subsequently, the Khoqandi aqsaqal, Bātur, and some 14 others who were believed to have been involved with the envoy were arrested. As further evidence of 'Abd al-Karīm's guilt, it was

[34] WZSL 293:19a–b, XF9.9 *guiyou*.

reported that when the hakim bek Ahmad had searched his residence in the Muslim city, he had found there 17 young Muslim girls, all of whom were being held against their will.[35]

While condemning the envoy's conduct, the court was angered that matters had been allowed to get so out of hand. Yurui and Yingyun, who had succeeded the former as councillor, were to be disciplined. Suspecting that this was not the full story, and fearing that on learning of the death of their envoy, the Khoqandi leadership would be sure to retaliate, the court instructed that the garrison be put on alert and precautions taken against the possibility of attack. Meanwhile, Zhalafentai, the military governor at Ili, was to carry out a further investigation of the incident.[36]

Zhalafentai's enquiries revealed that, as the court suspected, there were aspects of Yurui's account that were "neither correct, nor complete" (*bu shi bu jin*). Over the next few weeks a story came to light that had far more grave consequences for frontier security and revealed the full extent of Khoqandi power in Altishahr at this time.

Aware, no doubt, of the seriousness of what had happened and the implications for themselves, Yurui and Yingyun submitted a long memorial citing the depositions of various Khoqandis who had been involved with 'Abd al-Karīm. The picture that now emerged was that 'Abd al-Karīm had for some time been planning to stir up trouble in Altishahr. In December of 1859, having still received no reply to his first missive to Mallā Khān, 'Abd al-Karīm wrote again as follows:

> The Muslims in China all read the Islamic scriptures and look forward to being governed by a ruler like you. Large numbers of Muslims gather at the *mazār* and all through the night they wail and recite the scriptures as they long for your highness. Now we await you, *inshallāh*. It looks as though the region governed by the Chinese is deteriorating day by day. Everyone looks forward to when all the land west of Hami will be under your control.[37]

It had been intended that the letter, which also detailed 'Abd al-Karīm's various activities in Yarkand, would be smuggled across the *karun* sealed in a gourd, but the messenger had got no further than Kashgar when, for reasons that are not entirely clear, 'Abd al-Karīm had him summoned back to Yarkand. Several of those arrested confirmed that 'Abd al-Karīm was angry at having been refused permission to proceed to Beijing and had been planning to create trouble for several months. He had involved the Khoqandi aqsaqal, Bātur, in his plot and forced him on pain of death to have his assistants collect weapons. According to Bātur, the original

[35] WZSL 307:15a–17a, XF10.2 *renyin*.
[36] WZSL 307:17a–19b, XF10.2 *renyin* and 308:18a–19a, XF10.2 *yimao*.
[37] LFZZ MZL 8074.40 [XF10.3.23–10.8.18] (Chinese).

plan was that on the day of the bazaar, mounted men would gather at the west gate of the cantonment, now tellingly known as the Han city (*Hancheng*). Most of 'the Chinese' (*zhongyuan ren*) would be at the bazaar, so the Khoqandis planned to leave the Muslim city and head straight for the east gate of the cantonment; simultaneously the mounted men hidden outside the west gate would attack and seize control of the city. However, a few days before this rising was to take place, a letter arrived from Mallā Khān apparently urging 'Abd al-Karīm to proceed to Beijing and not to leave the tribute goods in Yarkand to be forwarded. The receipt of this instruction may explain why 'Abd al-Karīm had his own messenger intercepted in Kashgar and recalled, with his letter to the khan undelivered—'Abd al-Karīm had decided to make one last effort to persuade Yurui to change his mind. With this objective, he went to the hakim bek's *yamen* and asked him to accompany him to see the councillor. If still refused permission, one way or another he intended to make trouble.[38]

However fragmentary and anecdotal, this information goes some way to explain the background to the sudden eruption of violence in the councillor's *yamen* that day. It would appear that 'Abd al-Karīm had arrived at the *yamen* accompanied by one hundred men of whom only twenty were admitted. Having failed to cajole Yurui into allowing him to travel to Beijing, 'Abd al-Karīm became aggressive. The hakim bek Ahmad was instructed to escort him from the room, but as he did so, a canon fired outside. With tensions already high, 'Abd al-Karīm rushed out and shouted to his men to defend themselves.[39]

So why had 'Abd al-Karīm reacted so strongly to the refusal to allow him to proceed to Beijing? Leaving aside the lost trading opportunity and personal humiliation that he was to be denied an experience enjoyed by his father some years earlier,[40] 'Abd al-Karīm had clearly been charged to deliver a petition to the court in Beijing. As is evidenced in the letter intended for Mallā Khān but never delivered, he had been instructed to raise four familiar issues in the capital: the problem with the Qipchaqs, the levying of taxes on the Kashmiris and the Badakhshanis, the payment of grain tax by Khoqandis (notably in Yarkand and Aqsu) and inter-

[38] If refused permission to proceed to Beijing, one deposition states that 'Abd al-Karīm intended to "return to the Muslim city and await the troops from Khoqand" and another that he intended "to make trouble and fight." LFZZ MZL 8074.42, XF10.2.20 and 8074.47, XF10.8.7 respectively.
[39] LFZZ MZL 8074.41/42, XF10.2.20.
[40] LFZZ MZL 8074.34, XF10.5.23.

marriage.[41] As for this last issue, 'Abd al-Karīm had apparently been instructed not only to raise the matter in Beijing, but also to take action personally to deal with it.[42]

According to the reports of the Qing officials, while in Yarkand 'Abd al-Karīm had abducted at least two Han soldiers and one Chinese (presumably Han) merchant, all of whom were tied up and detained overnight before being released; he was also said to have abducted the 17 young girls who were found at his lodgings after his death. At first glance it might appear that these were indeed the acts of a lawless, debauched and profligate character, as suggested by Yurui, but this does not explain why 'Abd al-Karīm should have found it necessary to detail these exploits, together with the fact that he had shaved off a prostitute's hair, in his letter to Mallā Khān.[43] Given the context, there can be little doubt that the men detained by 'Abd al-Karīm overnight had been entertaining themselves with Muslim women and their detention was a warning to them to mend their ways. As for the girls, four Khoqandis and thirteen Yarkandis between the ages of 12 and 16 years old, although according to their depositions they had been lured by 'Abd al-Karīm's men and forced to "be his wife", it is not impossible that they had been 'fraternizing' with non-Muslims, a fact which they would not have wished to admit in their depositions.

Zhalafentai's investigation failed to uncover the real reason for 'Abd al-Karīm's outbursts of violent and seemingly wanton behaviour, but it did reveal the extent of the danger he had posed to the security of

[41] LFZZ MZL 8074.40 [XF10.3.23–10.8.18]. According to Muhammad Amīn, 'Abd al-Karīm's intention in going to Beijing was to alert the emperor to "the absurd weakness and cowardice of the Khan Amban [councillor] and his Chinese assistants, in having allowed themselves while in command of a large Chinese force on the spot to be cowed by a robber, meaning Valî Khan." Muhammad Amīn then goes on to suggest that it was because the councillor feared the consequences of the emperor receiving such a report that he had had 'Abd al-Karīm and his associates killed. See Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, pp.351–2 where 'Abd al-Karīm is referred to as 'Mizra Abdul Kaîm'. However, Muhammad Amīn's account is not convincing (what would 'Abd al-Karīm's motives be in reporting in this way to Beijing two years after the event?) and is not substantiated by any other sources. In fact, the 'robber' referred to by Muhammad Amīn may well have been not Vālī Khān, but 'Abd al-Karīm himself. As will be seen below, Khoqand dispatched an envoy to protest at 'Abd al-Karīm's death and expressed incredulity that he could have engaged in the lawless behaviour of which he was accused, in a city garrisoned by thousands of Qing troops. Fletcher follows Muhammad Amīn's version of events and, therefore, surmises that it was in order to cover up his crime that the councillor concocted the story of 'Abd al-Karīm's attack on the *yamen*. Fletcher, 'The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order', p.394.

[42] This is clearly evidenced in 'Abd al-Karīm's letter to the khan in which he states that in the event of his having to return to Khoqand, responsibility for dealing with the issue of the violation of Muslim women by Chinese should be entrusted to the aqsaqal. LFZZ MZL 8074.40 [XF10.3.23 – 10.8.18].

[43] *Ibid*; XZSL 313:27a–28b, XF10.3 *jiayin*.

Altishahr. Like the court, the military governor was strongly critical of the officials in Yarkand for having allowed events to develop to such a degree, but in fairness to Yurui and Yingyun, who remained in Yarkand throughout the investigation; this was symptomatic of a trend that had been developing for some time. By the late 1850s, the Khoqandi community was largely immune to the authority of the local beks on whom the Qing officials relied to maintain law and order.

Ironically, with his death 'Abd al-Karīm had probably posed an even greater threat to the security of Altishahr than when he was alive. When news of his demise reached Khoqand in early February, the Khoqandi mingbashi, 'Ālim, immediately sent a letter to Yarkand demanding an explanation and professing not to have informed Mallā Khān for fear that, being young and headstrong, the khan might overreact.[44] However, when the Qing envoy finally arrived in Khoqand equipped with an explanation of events which explicitly stressed 'Abd al-Karīm's lawless conduct, the Khoqandi authorities were incredulous. According to the mingbashi's reply to the hakim bek Ahmad:

> These are not the words of a clear-sighted person, but of someone who is confused or mad. It is totally unbelievable. The way I look at it, with 4,000 troops currently in Yarkand and a Prince-Hakim bek such as you to keep the city peaceful, how could our envoy get up to no good? Who could believe the things stated in the letter that was delivered? It is all false.[45]

In an earlier period, the Khoqandis could not have wished for a better opportunity to attack Altishahr, but Khoqand was by now a broken power; pressures, both internal and external, were such that it could no longer entertain the possibility of attacking Altishahr without grave consequences. Instead of raising troops, therefore, the Khoqandi authorities decided to investigate the matter for themselves and dispatched a certain Nizām al-Dīn to Altishahr. Meanwhile, ignorant of Khoqand's internal problems, the court grew increasingly concerned that Khoqand would endeavour to avenge the envoy's death; defences were strengthened and officials at Yarkand were instructed to pay special attention to keeping the local people calm in order to prevent an internal response.[46]

On his arrival in Yarkand, Nizām al-Dīn was shown the evidence supporting the Qing authorities' claim that 'Abd al-Karīm had been planning a rebellion, had committed crimes and run amok. The officials in Yarkand were at pains to convince Nizām al-Dīn that 'Abd al-Karīm's conduct had justified his fate; and they were even under instruction from

[44] LFZZ MZL 8074.29/30, XF10.2 (no day).

[45] LFZZ MZL 8074.34, XF10.5.23.

[46] XZSL 310:4a–5b, XF10.3 *bingzi* and 314:9a–10a, XF10 intercalary 3 *dingsi*.

the court to reduce the aqsaqal's sentence if need be. Lacking any significant intelligence from Khoqand, the Qing authorities appear to have been somewhat taken aback when Nizām al-Dīn conceded that 'Abd al-Karīm had indeed received his just deserts. The court even suspected trickery, and feared that once officials in Altishahr dropped their guard, the khanate would attack.[47] Only two months later, in September, were the Khoqandis finally allowed to present their tribute at the *yamen* in Yarkand, the aqsaqal Bātur and the 14 other Khoqandis still being held in prison were released, and trade was resumed.[48] Meanwhile, in the memorials and edicts that continued to pass between the court and its frontier officials, there is a marked absence of any reference to the worsening crisis in Khoqand, not to mention the momentous political developments unfolding across Central Asia generally.

The new political landscape

The heyday of the 19th century long-distance trade across Central Asia had passed, and the Khoqandi traders in Altishahr knew they could no longer rely on the previously unflinching support of their hard-pressed government. They remained, however, a forceful economic presence in Altishahr. The khojas, too, were still active but, as even officials in Yarkand must have realized by this stage, they were now acting completely independently of any Khoqandi authority. In June 1861, some 200 men crossed the *karun* at Qarangey and headed towards Artush. Details concerning this rising are scanty, but Buzurg's son was said to have been involved, and it was reportedly led by 'Abd al-Rahīm, the son of an akhund, Mīr Ahmad, who had been put to death by the Qing after the revolt of 1857. Valī Khān was also raising troops at this time, but his efforts to mount another incursion were rapidly suppressed by Qing forces.[49]

The power of the Āfāqī khojas to lead a large-scale revolt was all but spent. The adherence of the Qing officials to a policy of minimal interference in the religious life of Altishahr, and their reluctance to exploit the divisions between the Āfāqī and Ishāqī adherents, may well have undermined these two orders, which had thrived for so long on their oppositional politics. On the other hand, under the umbrella of Qing rule, Islam had prospered and extended its reach unhindered into every corner of the region. Unfettered by state-sponsored orthodoxy, by the mid-19th

[47] XZSL 318:26a–28b, XF10.5 *gengzi* and 320:11b–12b, XF10.5 *bingchen*.
[48] XZSL 325:24a–25a, XF10.7 *jiyou*.
[49] Muhammad Amīn in Davies, *Report on the Trade and Resources*, pp.351–2; SGXHFL 111:14b–18b, XF11.6.28–11.8.3.

century, the Sufi orders were flourishing and providing a focus for the escalating local grievances.

Meanwhile, by 1862, Khoqand was again in turmoil. Malla Khān was killed and the throne passed to his nephew, Shāh Murād (r.1862). Within months, Shāh Murād had been removed by his uncle Khudāyār, who had been deposed some four years earlier. With equal speed and predictability, the latter was then dethroned by Mallā Khān's son, Sultān Sayyid (r.1862–5).

As conditions in Xinjiang deteriorated and social unrest fermented, so Muslim rebellion broke out in Shaanxi and began to spread west. By 1864, local conflicts had erupted across Xinjiang and the tentative grip that the Qing authorities held over the region had been all but broken. The way was now open for the Khoqandi official, Ya'qūb Bek, assisted temporarily by Buzurg, to eradicate the last vestiges of Qing power. Having cut loose from the crumbling political authority of Khoqand, Ya'qūb Bek went on to unify the divided region. Building on foundations laid throughout the past 100 years of Qing rule, he established an independent political entity that would ultimately span most of modern Xinjiang, excluding the Ili valley which was swiftly annexed by Russia. Not for some twelve years, in 1877, would the Qing general, Zuo Zongtang, re-conquer the region and tether it firmly to the Chinese, as opposed to the Qing, world. By this time Khoqand would be firmly incorporated into the Russian empire. The power that the khanate had once wielded and the threat it had posed to this outreach of the Qing empire would by then be a distant memory.

CONCLUSION

The endurance of the old order

There is, of course, a sense of artificiality in viewing Qing relations with Khoqand in isolation from the dynasty's interaction with other foreign powers and independently of the major domestic upheavals that were taking place across the empire. Policy decisions concerning Khoqand and its involvement in Altishahr were not reached without reference to other extraneous influences and pressures that were being played out in Beijing and beyond. Nevertheless, here on the north-western fringes of the empire, away from the glare of the so-called clash of cultures, or the posturing of empires with universalistic aspirations, we have the opportunity to reappraise the changing nature of the Qing court's relations with foreign powers during the mid-18th to mid-19th century, and to assess how this affected the nature of its control over the territories on the fringes of the empire.

The 100-odd years of diplomatic contact between Khoqand and the Qing empire, from 1760 to 1864, covers a period which Fairbank labelled "the twilight of the tribute system" and has long been considered a time of transition in the empire's relationship with the outside world.[1] Undeniably external pressures played a significant role in effecting that transition. In its dealings with the West, the Qing empire bore the full brunt of an encounter with an intractable cultural and political tradition, backed by superior cannon power that was poised to aim at the very heartland of the empire. Yet, there was no such threat on the north-western frontier. Like the Western powers, first and foremost, the polities of Central Asia wanted to trade, but they posed no danger to the basic values of the Qing world order, still less to the heart of its empire. In order to explain, therefore, why the period of 'twilight' endured for so long, it is necessary to recognize not only the magnitude of the change that was occurring, but also the continued viability of the old thinking and diplomatic traditions until well into the 19th century.

Qing officialdom searched for a means of controlling its northern neighbours in much the same way as the rulers of China had done since the time of the Han. In an effort to keep the north-western frontier peaceful, it adopted many traditional Chinese diplomatic practices, from

[1] See Fairbank, 'The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order'. Fairbank actually identifies this transitional period as 1840–80, with 1860 marking the end of a process by which the West opened China by treaty, and 1880 marking China's entry into the 'family of nations'.

the bestowal of lavish rewards for good conduct to the control of trade and restriction on private contacts. Equally, it relied on many of the same rituals and institutions that had characterized the Ming diplomatic tradition: the reception of envoys in the frontier regions, the granting of permission to journey to the capital, the ceremonial audience with the emperor and so on. The ritual and rhetoric required at every stage of this process was designed to enhance the emperor's image of supreme rulership and bolster the illusion of imperial suzerainty over distant rulers. As has been seen, in the late 18th and early 19th century, at their most effective, the procedures and ceremonial practices associated with China's diplomatic tradition not only symbolized the assertion of the emperor's moral authority far beyond the limits of the empire, but also served to facilitate negotiation with peoples from beyond the *karun* and to effectuate desired outcomes.

In the northwest, despite the increasing problems with Khoqand, these instruments of diplomacy were still effective until, at least, the late 1850s. Not until the Khoqandi envoy, 'Abd al-Karīm, refused to accept the fact that he was not to be granted permission to travel to Beijing in 1860 were the traditional diplomatic practices seriously challenged, and even then, in ultimately accepting the Qing authorities' explanation of his death, the Khoqandi government was, in effect, validating the Qing world order.[2] For the Qing court, the ritual and form of the tribute protocol was predominantly employed to moderate or balance a wide range of relationships. Thus, it was considered by many (the opponents of the embargo, for example) just as important that it be maintained in times of tension and adversity as in times of harmony and peace. Khoqand was under no compulsion to send tribute missions to the court, but it chose to do so, not least because its power and authority among the polities of Central Asia was heavily dependent on trade with Altishahr. This is not to suggest that the Khoqandis ever accepted their position within a Qing ideological framework—as evidenced by their support of the khojas and incursions into Altishahr—but they were, for the most part, prepared to co-operate and function within it for their own benefit. In the northwest, therefore, certain features of China's traditional diplomatic intercourse were retained until well into the 19th century, quite simply because they were still effective tools in the management of foreign affairs. These practices and procedures did not necessarily define relationships in which

[2] 'Abd al-Karīm's insistence that he be allowed to journey to Beijing does, of course, resonate with the demands of Westerners for unrestricted trade. However, the obvious difference lies in that the Khoqandi envoy was not challenging the existing system.

the balance of power lay in the empire's favour,[3] but they allowed the Qing court to exercise a range of concessions (and punishments) that enabled it to achieve its greater purpose—the integrity of the empire and, increasingly, its own legitimacy to rule.

Mid-Qing conceptualization of the empire and world beyond

Beyond the instruments and practices of diplomacy, there remains the question of the wider conceptual framework that informed the court's relationship with the outside world in the mid-Qing. As is now generally accepted, the Qing conceptualization of empire differed radically from that of the Ming and it is no longer sufficient to consider the Qing empire as synonymous with a Chinese empire.[4] The evidence for the construction of a specifically Qing model of the empire lies in the mid-Qing universalist ideology, and is perhaps most keenly reflected in the late 18th century production of multi-lingual thesauruses which glossed the 'official' languages of the empire, the multi-lingual inscriptions on steles and paintings and, not least, the Qianlong emperor's own claim to linguistic prowess in Mongolian, Tibetan and Chaghatai (*Huiyu*). But if this challenge to the Chinese language as the font of civilization and bedrock of the empire were not evidence enough, there were other signs too of a divergence between Qing and traditional Chinese concepts of empire.

While the mid-Qing bureaucracy continued to use the distinctly Confucian language of transformation and civilization in official documents and correspondence, in reality the Qing authorities showed little interest in changing the cultural traditions of the people of Central Asia who now fell within the empire. On the contrary, having restructured and re-ordered the entire socio-political map of the northwest with little sign of anything that might pass as respect for another's culture, the Qing court accommodated various categories of diverse peoples into a pluralistic empire and was at pains to ensure that the distinctive traditions of its new constituencies remained discrete, not least by forbidding intermarriage. What the Manchu elite seemed to fear most among their

[3] In this respect, Pan Zhiping's argument that by 1820 Khoqand's relationship with the Qing had shifted from that of a tributary state (*shuguo*) to that of an independent neighbouring state (*linguo*) appears to be based on a somewhat Sino-centric understanding of 'tribute relations', in which the relationship is determined by the empire's ability and willingness to exercise superior power in all circumstances. Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya Haohanguo*, p.24. For discussion of the historical use of the term *shuguo* and an analysis of whether it should be applied to the Qazaqs and Qirghiz, see Zhang Yongjiang, *Qingdai fanbu yanjiu*, pp.155–65.

[4] See, for example Okada Hidehiro, 'China as a Successor State to the Mongol Empire', p.15; Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, p.268 and Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp.355–61.

new constituencies was the very malaise from which they themselves suffered, and fought so hard to overcome—an unstable identity.

The Qianlong emperor emerges, therefore, as the supreme moral arbiter in a culturally diverse empire ordered into categories of people to whom he could speak directly in their own, albeit standardized, tongue and whose allegiance he commanded through different representations of power. The rich fabric of symbols, ritual, language and artifacts that the emperor drew upon in order to assert political and religious authority over his constituencies in Mongolia and Tibet has been thoroughly documented.[5]

Unlike Tibet, Xinjiang and specifically Altishahr, was not plundered as an ideological storehouse to enhance the emperor's status as the universal monarch. Although the Qianlong emperor, and to a lesser extent his successors, legitimized their rule over this region of the former Mongol empire by laying claim to the Chinggisid lineage and title of *khāqān*, that claim was underpinned by an appeal to Buddhism and the patronage of Lamaism. Quite clearly, therefore, it addressed itself primarily to the Mongols, not to the Turkic Muslims. Indeed, there is, perhaps, no stronger indication of the incompleteness of the mid-Qing conceptualization of its empire, no stronger sense of a project left unfinished, than the Qianlong emperor's failure to assume any form of mantle or guise that would have enabled him to assert religious authority over his Islamic constituency.[6]

Since establishing control of the heartland of China in the 17th century, the Manchu rulers had made little attempt to patronize Islam, or to incorporate its rites and rituals into court practices.[7] The Sino-Muslims, who had long sought accommodation with Confucianism, were addressed through the Confucian medium and there was, during the first century of Qing rule, no need to employ the voice of Islam, which by its monotheistic nature would never have sat comfortably alongside Qing patronage of Buddhism and Daoism. As for the northwest, the early Qing preoccupation with the Mongol threat, the unanticipated extension of Qing power into Altishahr and the lack of any Chinese, not to mention Manchu, contact with the region since the Tang era, all appear to have predisposed the court to underestimate the extent and significance of the Islamization of Altishahr at the time of the conquest. Indeed, when officials finally acknowledged that Islam was a political threat to the stability of this

[5] This and associated ideas have been variously explored by Crossley, Farquhar, Millward and Rawski, among others.

[6] Possible reasons for this failure are discussed in chapter 1.

[7] Rawski provides one or two examples of the protection and patronage of Islam by the Qing court, but they amount to little more than a superficial gesture. Rawski, *The Last Emperors*, pp.199, 225.

outreach of the empire, Qing rule had already been inadvertently nurturing the faith for some 60 years, providing the context in which it rooted itself ever deeper into the Tarim Basin, while also extending its reach north of Tianshan to much of Jungharia. Given the position of Altishahr on the doorstep of the Islamic world, even in the 1760s, suppression of the faith would not have been an option. But if, at that time, the court had recognized the potential threat of Islam, as it came to do in the wake of the Muslim revolts in Gansu during the 1780s, might it not have sought, however inadequately, to incorporate some semblance of the faith into the imperial ritual? We can only speculate, but clearly the court's failure to develop an Islamic voice was to have severe consequences for Qing relations with the Muslim peoples of its empire—and indeed with Khoqand and the other polities of Central Asia.

In the light of the dearth of theoretical exposition on how the mid-Qing court viewed its empire in relation to the outside world, one is again forced to turn to material representations. In the 1770s, the Qianlong court produced two 'universal' maps: the *Huangyu fangge quantu* (Complete map of the imperial domains based on orthogonal projection) and a less well-known map now held in the British Library;[8] both were closely related to the much better known *Huangyu xiege quantu* (Complete map of the imperial domains based on trapezoidal projection, or 'Qianlong Atlas'). As has been frequently noted, what is significant about these two maps is that while all the inscriptions inside the Great Wall are written in Chinese, everything beyond the Chinese heartland (and the map extends to the Gulf of Finland, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean) is written in Manchu. This is a pattern which was first established in various versions of the *Huangyu quanlantu,* the so-called 'Kangxi Atlas',[9] but in the wake of the territorial expansion of the mid-18th century and the emigration of vast numbers of Han Chinese into the borderlands, it is telling that in the Qianlong era this form of representation was still considered viable, or indeed necessary. The production of these two maps may be interpreted as one of many symbolic attempts by the Qianlong emperor to bolster Manchu authority and/or identity, on the basis that language is of primary

[8] The latter, the only known copy of which is held in the India Office Map Collection at the British Library [BL IOR x3265], has often been mistaken as being identical with the former. See, for example, Enoki who refers to the India Office map as the *Da Qing yitong yutu* (The Great Qing universal map). Enoki, 'Hsi-yü-t'ung-wen-chih, introduction', pp.vii–x. Confusingly, Li Xiaocong refers to the same map as the *Qianlong fangge neifu yutu* (Qianlong map of the inner domains based on orthogonal projection). Li Xiaocong, *Ouzhou shoucang bufen Zhongguo gu ditu*, pp.203–4. For further discussion of these maps and others linked to the Qianlong Atlas, see Simon and Nelson, *Manchu books in London*, pp.97–8 and Millward, 'Coming onto the map', pp.70–1.

[9] See Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, p.75.

importance and thus maps, like the prefaces to certain imperially commissioned books, or the inscriptions on certain paintings and other artifacts, must be given a Manchu voice. If, however, these maps are viewed as a vital reflection of how the court saw the world at this particular time, or indeed the view of the world it wished to project, then on the one hand they serve to reinforce the inviolate nature of the heartland of China and, in accordance with the map's legend, affirm Qing expansionism as part of an essentially Chinese enterprise. On the other hand, the pointed failure of these maps to differentiate by any means of demarcation between the limits of the Qing empire and the rest of the world is also a comment on the nature of Qing universalism whereby the territories of non-Chinese peoples, whether inside or outside the empire, are seen not through a Chinese, but a specifically Manchu, paradigm. Unlike the traditional Confucian conceptualization this did not grade peoples hierarchically in terms of distance from the civilized centre, and while it upheld geographical and locational notions of 'inside' and 'outside', in respect of the *karun* for example, the cultural implication of these terms had no relevance for the Qing empire. Those who submitted were considered to have 'come onto the map' (*ru bantu*), just as the Muslims of Xinjiang had done; thus they fell within the orbit of the emperor's moral order, despite not being recorded in the household registers of the empire.[10]

Further indication that the mid-Qing court envisioned a less intentionally stratified view of the world than that associated with traditional Chinese dynasties is suggested by the officially compiled and much cited example of the *Huang Qing zhigong tu,* a collection of illustrations of tribute peoples of the Qing empire. Here peoples of Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe are described invariably as outsider/barbarian (*yi*), while a second grouping, those from the various polities of Central Asia outside the *karun* as well as areas of Xinjiang, Gansu and Tibet, are variously described as subjects or Muslim subjects (*min*, *Huimin*) or, in the case of Tibet, again as outsider/barbarian (*fan*). The third, and largest, grouping comprises those non-Han peoples from the southern Chinese provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hunan and Guizhou, but also the more northerly Shaan-Gan. These figures, all of whom are identified with a specific locality, are variously labelled *fan*, *fanmin*/*bu*, *man*, *yi*, or alternatively attributed to a generic group such as *Miao*, *Gelao*,

[10] For one of the clearest indications that the term '*ru bantu*' was understood to indicate submission to the moral authority of the emperor rather than literally 'to have entered the household registers and maps' and thus become part of the empire, see the untitled and anonymous Qianlong work published as *Xiyu dili tushuo zhu*, p.121.

Luoluo and so on.[11] Just as there is little attempt to standardize the terminology employed for the different peoples, so the organization of the peoples into chapters (*juan*) is also less than coherent.[12] Thus, while the Muslim peoples of Badakhshan and Andijan, and the Qazaq and Qirghiz tribes, as well as the peoples of the Xinjiang cities of Uch Turfan, Qucha and Ili, all feature in the second chapter, the Muslims of Afghanistan, Khoqand and Uryangkhai are placed alongside the Torghut Mongols in the ninth chapter.[13] This final chapter appears to have been an afterthought, for the groupings of peoples in the first eight are roughly divided according to geographical location. There is, however, no attempt to rank them according to the frequency, or otherwise, of their missions to court nor, with the exception of a small number of peoples in the southern provinces who are described as *sheng* (wild) or *shu* (civilized), to indicate any relativity of perceived level of civilization. Thus the book, which was produced in various editions, is a sketchy, incomplete and uneven record of tribute-bearing peoples, in which some 300 peoples, all illustrated by female and male representations (and in some instances elite as well as commoners), are defined according to their geographical origins rather than culture, socio-political organization or relationship with the empire. The world of the *Huang Qing zhigong tu* is loosely divided into distant regions, the northwest and the south/southwest, but beyond this, it is the very absence of any attempt on the part of its compilers to conceptualize or order their world that is so striking. Such an ill-defined world-view might be expected to have placed the Qing court in a better position than a traditional Chinese dynasty to accept and adapt to other visions of world order, but this was not to be the case.

The decline of universalism and re-thinking the frontier

In the 18th century, when the army of the Qianlong emperor advanced into Jungharia and Altishahr, the most important issue on the minds of court officials was the security of the frontier, the defence of the heartland that lay east of the Gansu Corridor. The notion of military glory and territorial aggrandizement only developed as an indirect and almost unforeseen consequence of that concern. The retrospective objective of the campaign,

[11] Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, pp.42–3.

[12] The *Huang Qing zhigong tu* was produced in several different editions, and also as a set of hand scrolls. Hostetler, *ibid*, p.42. I am here following the 1790 edition in the *Siku quanshu*.

[13] The fact that both Andijanis and Khoqandis are featured in the work, when only Khoqand was actually represented by envoys to the court, is symptomatic not only of the confusion surrounding the term 'Andijani', but of the general lack of any clear scheme or coherence in the book.

to re-establish the imperial boundaries of the Han and Tang, was therefore a rationalization which had more to do with reaffirming the legitimacy of Qing rule and the assertion of universalism than notions of what was, or was not, historically part of a Chinese empire.

For the first forty to fifty years after the conquest, the links that bound Xinjiang to the interior remained more tentative than those in any other frontier region of the empire, save perhaps Tibet. Such was the moral authority and stature of the Qianlong emperor that he was able to hold together this nebulous and conceptually imperfect empire but with his death, the fragile, incomplete and highly personal world-view that he had crafted failed to endure and his successors were left to pick up the ideological pieces. By the early 19th century, cracks had begun to appear in the empire's relations with Xinjiang.

With the end of the Qianlong era, the omniscient involvement of the emperor in seemingly every aspect of policy formation and implementation on the northwest frontier receded. For Altishahr, this meant a weakening of the local administration and a concomitant increase in corruption, abuse of power and hence, social discontent. Against such a background, the khojas re-emerged on the political scene. Jahāngīr's overtures were welcomed by the local Turkic Muslim population and his success, albeit brief, was to have an enduring impact. Meanwhile, the Jiaqing reforms had strengthened the hand of senior Manchu and Mongol officials, so that by the mid-1820s, and particularly in the wake of the Jahāngīr crisis, Xinjiang was being administered by a singularly more self-confident and able officialdom. Their views may not have constituted a unified and coherent vision, but it would have been surprising if these high-ranking Manchu and Mongol officials, who had frequently built their careers in military campaigns against tribal peoples on the frontiers of the empire, did not have a perspective on foreign management that differed from those who had never ventured beyond Jiayuguan. These men clearly recognized the untenable nature of the empire's relationship with Altishahr and its increasingly powerful neighbour, Khoqand. Thus it was that in the wake of the Jahāngīr revolt, they urgently sought to redefine that relationship with regard to a broader understanding of defence. Their influence was, however, to be short-lived. Just at the time when it seemed possible that the court might be persuaded to rethink the definition of its empire and consolidate the frontier according to the military and political reality, the strongly vocal and oppositionist Han literati began to assert their influence and new fault-lines emerged.

Despite the fact that the conquest of Xinjiang had been a primarily Manchu enterprise and Han Chinese officials were excluded from the

upper echelons of administration in the region, nevertheless, many of those Han officials who had been exiled to Xinjiang, the statecraft scholars and the radical literati who opposed any policy that smacked of concessions to foreigners, now came together to argue for Xinjiang as a non-negotiable part of a Chinese empire. The court was hoist by its own petard. The claim of the Qianlong emperor at the time of the conquest—to have restored the empire's historic frontiers—had been vigorously reasserted in the celebrations that followed the reconquest of Altishahr and Jahāngīr's capture in the late 1820s. But herein lay the paradox: the very acts designed to bolster the martial reputation and legitimacy of the Manchu ruling elite ultimately undermined its own special relationship with the north-western frontier. Not least by dint of the court's own actions in heralding its military victories and sponsoring numerous imperial projects to celebrate and document the region, by the 19th century what had originally been a vaguely defined and ultimately negotiable buffer zone had, in the minds of many literati, already become a clearly delimited region of China that only awaited administrative reform to seal its incorporation as a province of the empire. The claim of the predominantly Han Chinese literati that Xinjiang was and must remain part of the empire at all costs effectively stymied any possibility that frontier officials might convince the court to rethink its position in Altishahr. On the contrary, the result was a backlash, and an increasingly hard-pressed and floundering court was pushed further into the hands of the conservatives. Intent, on the one hand, to avoid war and, on the other, to cling to the legitimacy of power as represented in the territorial integrity of the empire, it silenced dissenting views amongst Manchu and Mongol frontier officials, thus suppressing the possibility of any significant innovation in frontier policy by those with first-hand knowledge of the issues. Responsibility for the formulation of policy towards the outsiders was pulled back to Beijing and with the failure of the embargo; conciliation and appeasement became the order of the day. This was represented not only in the lifting of the sanctions against Khoqand and the agreement of 1832, but in the repeated instructions of the court that frontier officials should take no action that might provoke the khanate. The determination not to concede political authority, still less territory in Altishahr, combined with the imperative to avoid military confrontation, left Qing frontier policy flawed and enfeebled.

The very processes, of mind and matter, by which Altishahr was gradually transformed from frontier garrison territory to non-negotiable part of the empire, also brought into question the status of those Qing territories that lay beyond the Altishahr *karun*. The unequivocal nature of

the Qing commitment to the defence of Altishahr could not but highlight the empire's ambivalence to its adjacent territories. Throughout the Daoguang years, the invisible boundary of power was increasingly tested and pushed back towards the Altishahr *karun*. As the conflict with Khoqand and the khojas persisted, and Qing military forces were repeatedly required to respond to the threat to Altishahr, so partly by self-ascription and partly by ascription of the outsiders, the *karun* increasingly came to represent the limits of Qing territory and power. The north-western reaches of the empire were still unbounded and unmapped, but an inclusive border consciousness was giving way to an exclusive concept of boundary. While the court appeared unperturbed, if not oblivious, to this shift, for frontier officials it was a reality with which they grappled daily in their exercise of power. The 'regime of truth' that had underpinned their legitimacy and role in this distant part of the empire, was under challenge; boundaries had less to do with universal empires than proto-national states.

Old medicines for new ailments?

Studies of the Opium Wars and policy on China's eastern seaboard have invariably linked the so-called period of appeasement with the ascendancy of Muzhanga within the Grand Council and his assumption of the post of senior Councillor in 1836. The diplomatic prudence which characterized the Qing court's seaboard policy from the late 1830s was in fact already in evidence on the northwest frontier more than a decade earlier. Muzhanga may not yet have risen to the position of seniority on the Grand Council, but the cautious influence with which he and his supporters were to be associated was already being felt. With the departure of Changling and Yulin from the Grand Council, by the early 1830s none of those serving on the Council had any firsthand experience of the north-western frontier and there was little sympathy for the small body of long-serving frontier officials to whom it was increasingly apparent that, in future, security in the northwest would have to depend on an enlarged military presence and the management of an intimate relationship between internal and external factors. Even the accession of the Xianfeng emperor in 1850 and Muzhanga's removal from office failed to bring about any dramatic shift in policy towards the northwest.

The experience in the northwest highlights that it was not the inertia and rigid conservatism of a central government system wed to Confucian ideology that prevented the development of a pragmatic and considered foreign policy in the 18th century, but rather the constraints imposed by a beleaguered self-conscious Manchu court elite, which was all too well

aware of the empire's weakness and the fragility of its own position. On the one hand, the court was under pressure from the military establishment for increased resources, on the other, Han Chinese officials and literati oppositionists were exhibiting a tendency towards warmongering and the xenophobia frequently associated with proto-nationalism. The common ground between these two groups and the potential for concerted action was disturbing. The sequence of events in Altishahr in the aftermath of the Jahāngīr revolt—embargo, war and appeasement, followed by the emergence of an increasingly self-confident and demanding foreign presence—was to have strong echoes in developments on the eastern seaboard. Yet, if Xinjiang was the testing ground for policies subsequently adopted in the interior, few lessons appear to have been learned.

By the 1830s, the Manchu officials on the north-western frontier, several of whom were subsequently to serve on the eastern seaboard, had been all but silenced. The literati, however, whose voice had briefly swung the pendulum of Qing foreign policy in the northwest, were to reassert themselves under the direction of Lin Zexu in Guangzhou. Here once again they gambled on an embargo, with little evidence that it could be enforced by superior military strength; the disastrous consequences left the court with no alternative but to appease the British aggressors in time-honoured manner. If the trading rights granted to Westerners in the treaty ports in the 1840s do appear to echo those acquired by the Khoqandis in Altishahr in the wake of the hostilities of 1830, it is simply because they were based on established traditions. While by the late 1830s, the high price of appeasement may have been obvious to frontier officials in the northwest, in the eyes of the court the traditional granting of concessions was still proving an effective policy; it was preserving the integrity of the empire and would continue to do so until the 1860s.

For Xinjiang itself, insulated from the mainstream of Central Asian politics, throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries, the emergence of the political entity that straddled north and south of the Tianshan Range was fuelled by developments in Altishahr and a gradually deepening sense of cultural identity among the Turkic Muslims. One of the most important elements in forging that identity was the role of Khoqand and its championing of the khoja cause. By the latter half of the 19th century the Ishāqī–Āfāqī antagonism was in decline and the power of the Āfāqī leaders to instigate rebellion in Altishahr was largely spent. Nevertheless, as was apparent in the 1860s, opposition to Qing rule was now firmly associated with the saintly lineages.[14] The economic dislocation and human tragedy that had inevitably followed the Khoqandi and khoja

[14] See Kim Ho-dong, 'The Muslim Rebellion', chapter 1.

incursions contributed to a sense of shared historical consciousness—a consciousness that, on the one hand, drew inspiration, however controversial, from the khojas, as legitimate spiritual leaders and, on the other, was marked by a keen sense of distinction from the Khoqandis. The challenge of the Khoqandi–khoja threat was the context that shaped much of Qing policy towards the region. From the inexorable increase in the size of the garrison with its concomitant impact on the local economy, to the opening up of land, and the immigration of Han Chinese settlers, all major policy towards Altishahr was intrinsically linked to the external threat. Khoqand was not the only factor in determining the transformation of Xinjiang from a Qing enclave and optional bulwark to a non-negotiable part of a Chinese empire. However, the role of this little-known and relatively ephemeral Islamic khanate in contributing to the shaping of Qing policy towards Xinjiang, the consolidation of a regional identity, the history of the region's incorporation into the empire, and the decline, if only in a small way, of the 'Great Qing Empire' should not be underrated.

Shāhrukh
1709/10–1721/2

'Abd al-Karīm
r. 1733/4–1750

Sulayman
r . 1769

Shādi Bek

'Abd al-Rahmān
r. 1750/1

Hājjī Bek

Shīr 'Alī
r. 1842–1844

Sarimsāq

Mallā
r. 1858–1862

Shāh Murād
r. 1862

Sultān Sayyid
r. 1862–1865

Khudāyār
r. 1844–1858
r.. 1862

'Abd al-Rahīm
r. 1721/2–1733/4

Bābā Bek
r. 1752/3

Irdana
r. 1751/2
r. 1753–1769

Nārbutā
r. 1770–1799

'Ālim
r. 1799–1811

Murād
r. 1844

'Umar
r. 1811–1822

Muhammad 'Alī
r. 1822–1842

The rulers of Khoqand 1709/10–1865

Mahkdūm-i A'zam
1461/2–1542/3

Īshān-i Kalān
1520–1597/8

Muhammad Yūsuf
1591/2–1655?

Hidāyat Allāh Āfāq
d.1694

Yahyā

Ahmad

Burhān al-Dīn
d.1759

Khōja-Jahān (Yahyā)
d.1759

Sarimsāq
1755–1809

Qāsim

Bahā' al-Dīn

'Abd al-Khāliq

(Muhammad) Yūsuf
d.1835

Jahāngīr
1790–1828

Bahā' al-Dīn
1793–1825

Katta Tore
1815–1869

Kichik Khān

'Abd Allāh

Buzurg Khān
1824–1869

Awliyā'
1816–1827

Valī Khān
1821–1865

The Āfāqī khoja lineage (1461/2–1869)

APPENDIX C

COUNCILLORS IN ALTISHAHR 1761–1865

The Councillorship was not, in fact, formally established until 1763, but several officials who held the title of councillor served in various cities of Altishahr prior to this. Yarkand retained its councillor, Eerjinge 額尔景額 until 1765.

The dates below reflect actual service rather than dates of appointment and removal, hence only those who actually assumed their post are included.

Kashgar:		
Shuhede	舒嚇德	1761
Yonggui	永貴	1761–1763
Nashitong	納世通	1763–1765

The Councillorship moved to Uch Turfan in 1765.

Uch Turfan:		
Yonggui	永貴	1766–1768
Shuhede	舒嚇德	1769–1771
Jingeli	旌額理	1771
Yiletu	伊勒圖	1771–1773
Antai	安泰	1773
Chuoketuo	綽克托	1773–1778
Yonggui	永貴	1778–1779
Shenbao	申保	1779–1781
Chuoketuo	綽克托	1781–1784
Hailu	海禄	1784–1785
Mingliang	明亮	1786–1788

The Councillorship returned to Kashgar in 1788.

Kashgar:		
Mingliang	明亮	1788–1792
Mingxing	明興	1792–1793
Yongbao	永保	1793–1795
Langgan	琅玕	1796

Changlin	長麟	1796–1799
Fujun	富俊	1799–1802
Tuojin	托津	1802–1803
Hening	和寧	1803–1806
Jinchang	晉昌	1806–1807
Fanjianfeng	范建豐	1807–1808
Chengning	成寧	1807 (acting)
Chenglin	成林	1808 (acting)
Jinakan	積那堪	1808–1809
Songyun	松筠	1809
Nayancheng	那彥成	1809
Yikenge	伊鏗額	1809–1810
Tiebao	鐵保	1810–1811
Fanjianfeng	范建豐	1811–1812
Enchang	恩長	1812–1814
Yikenge	伊鏗額	1814 (acting)
Chengning	成寧	1814–1815
Songyun	松筠	1815 (acting)
Gongchukezha	貢楚克札	1815 (acting)
Songfu	松福	1815–1818
Binjing	斌靜	1818–1820
Xiukun	秀堃	1820 (acting)
Wulonga	武隆阿	1820–1822
Xiukun	秀堃	1822
Buyantai	布彥泰	1822
Yongqin	永芹	1822–1825
Mukedengbu	穆克登布	1825 (acting)
Qingxiang	慶祥	1825–1826
Wulonga	武隆阿	1827–1829
Zhalonga	扎隆阿	1829–1831
Bichang	璧昌	1831

The Councillorship moved to Yarkand in 1831.

Yarkand:		
Bichang	璧昌	1831–1833
Changqing	長清	1831–1834
Xingde	興德	1834–1837

Lianjing	廉敬	1837–1838 (acting)
Entehenge	恩特亨額	1838–1840
Tuminge	圖明額	1840–1843
Lianshun	聯順	1843
Jirui	輯瑞	1843 (acting)
Yijing	奕經	1843–1844
Linkui	麟魁	1844–1845
Saishiyaletai	賽什雅勒泰	1845–1847
Shuxinga	舒興啊	1848 (acting)
Yishan	奕山	1848
Jiming	吉明	1848–1849
Deling	德齡	1849–1853
Changqing	常清	1854–1856
Qingying	慶英	1856–1857
Yurui	裕瑞	1857–1859*
Yingyun	英蘊	1859–1862
Jinglian	景廉	1862–1864

*The Councillorship returned to Kashgar in 1858, with a councillor remaining in Yarkand

Kashgar:

Guqing	固慶	1858–1859
Kuiying	奎英	1859–1865

Sources: *Qingdai gedi jiangjun dutong dachen deng nainbiao 1796 –1911* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965) and archival documents.

APPENDIX D

MILITARY GOVERNORS AT ILI 1762–1864

Mingrui	明瑞	1762–1767
Agui	阿桂	1767–1768
Yiletu	伊勒圖	1768–1769 (acting)
Yonggui	永貴	1768–1769 (acting)
Zenghai	增海	1769
Yiletu	伊勒圖	1769–1771
Shuhede	舒赫德	1771–1773
Yiletu	伊勒圖	1773–1783
Suonuomuceling	索諾木策凌	1776 (acting)
Mingrui	明瑞	1783 (acting)
Hailu	海祿	1783 (acting)
Yiletu	伊勒圖	1783–1785
Kuilin	奎林	1785–1787
Yongduo	永鐸	1787
Baoning	保寧	1787–1790
Yongbao	永保	1790–1791 (acting)
Baoning	保寧	1791–1795
Mingliang	明亮	1795
Baoning	保寧	1795–1800
Songyun	松筠	1800
Baoning	保寧	1800–1802 (acting)
Songyun	松筠	1802–1809
Jinchang	晉昌	1809–1813
Songyun	松筠	1813–1815
Changling	長齡	1815–1817
Jinchang	晉昌	1817–1820
Gaoqi	高杞	1817 (acting)
Qingxiang	慶祥	1820–1825
Deyinga	德英阿	1825 (acting)
Changling	長齡	1825–1826
Deyinga	德英阿	1826–1829
Yulin	玉麟	1829–1832
Teyishunbao	特依順保	1832–1838

Yishan	奕山	1838–1840
Guanfu	關福	1839–1840 (acting)
Buyantai	布彦泰	1840–1845
Shuxinga	舒興阿	1845 (acting)
Sayinga	薩迎阿	1845–1850
Yishan	奕山	1850–1854
Zhalafentai	扎拉芬泰	1854–1856
Changqing	常清	1860–1864

Sources: Alateng Aoqier, *Qingdai Yili jiangjun lungao* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1995), and archival documents.

LIST OF CHINESE TERMS AND TITLES

Characters are provided for all those terms and titles appearing in *pinyin* in the text and notes, omitting characters for the Chinese cyclical calendar and the titles of works in Chinese which are cited in the References.

a-hong	阿訇
a-ke-sa-ka-er	阿克薩卡爾
ancha shi	安察使
a-qi-mu bo-ke	阿奇木伯克
Bacheng	八城
baihao	白毫
baimao Hui	白帽回
banshi dachen	辦事大臣
beile	貝勒
beilu	北路
beitao ke	北套客
bianwai xiaoyi	邊外小夷
biaowen	表文
bi-tie-shi	筆帖式
bo-ke	伯克
Bu-lu-te	布魯特
bu shi bu jin	不實不盡
canzan dachen	參贊大臣
chaojin	朝覲
chengyuan	城垣
chengxin neifu	誠心內附
chenpu	臣僕
dacha	大茶
Dalisi qing	大理寺卿
Daoguang	道光
dingdai	頂戴
donglu	東路
dou	斗
dutong	都統
fan	番, 藩
fanmin, fanfu	番民, 番婦
fei Hui	非回, 匪回
fen feng	分封

feng	封
feng'en jiangjun	奉恩將軍
fengjian shizhong	豐儉適中
fucha	附茶, 副茶
fuguo jiangjun	輔國將軍
fujiang	副將
fuse	服色
ga-le-cha	噶勒察
Gelao	仡犵
gezhi liuren	革職流任
gongjue	公爵
guancha	官茶
guanpu	官鋪
guifu Zhongguo	歸附中國
guihua	歸化
guo	國
guogong	國公
han	汗
Hancheng	漢城
Hanmin	漢民
heimao Hui	黑帽回
huguapi yong	狐瓜皮甬
hualing	花翎
Huangyu fangge quantu	皇輿方格全圖
Huangyu quanlantu	皇輿全覽圖
Huangyu xiege quantu	皇輿斜格全圖
hu-dai-da, hu-dai-yi-da	呼岱達, 呼岱依達
hua-yi	華夷
Hubu	户部
Huibu	回部
Huicheng	回城
Huihu	回戶
Huijiang	回疆
Huimin	回民
Huiyu	回語
jiangjun	將軍
Jiaqing	嘉慶
jie	界
jimi	羈縻
jin	斤
jincha	斤茶

jingdian	經典
jingfei	經費
jiuzhang	久章
juan	卷
junji chu	軍機處
juntai	軍台
junwang	君王
kabao	卡堡
ka-lun	卡倫
ka-lun nei/wai	卡倫内/外
kanei yi Hui	卡内夷回
Kangxi	康熙
ke yan er bu ke xing	可言而不可行
kentian	墾田
Laiyuansi	徠遠司
laojiao	老教
li	里
liang	兩
liang Hui	良回
Libu	禮部
liezhuan	列傳
Lifanyuan	理藩院
ling qi zi shou	令其自守
lingdui dachen	領隊大臣
linguo	鄰國
longquan	龍泉
lufu zouzhe	錄副奏摺
luodishui	落地稅
Luoluo	猓玀
maimai touren	買賣頭人
man	蠻
Mancheng	滿城
maoyi ting	貿易亭
min	民
minqian	民遣
minzu lei	民族類
mu	畝
muhua laigui	慕化來歸
nanlu	南路
neidi	内地
neifan	内番, 内藩

neifu	内附
nianban	年班
pi	疋
puer	普洱
Qianlong	乾隆
Qianqing	乾清
ru bantu	入版圖
shangmu	商目
shanhou	善後
Sheji	社稷
sheng	生
shi	石
shiquan wugong	十全武功
shoufu	受俘
shu	熟
shuguo	屬國
shuangyan hualing	雙眼花翎
siyi	四夷
ta-er-tang	塔爾糖
tai wu gangjue	太無剛決
taiji	台吉
Taimiao	太廟
taizi taibao	太子太保
tianxia	天下
tingzi	亭子
tongshi	通事
toucheng xiangfu	投誠降服
touren	頭人
tubao	土堡
tusi	土司
waifan	外藩, 外番
waijiao lei	外交類
wairen	外人
waiyi	外夷
wei dahuangdi chenpu	為大皇帝臣僕
wei jie	為界
wen	文
wumen	午門
wuyi	武夷
Xianfeng	咸豐
xianfu	獻俘

xiang hua laigui	向華來歸
xiangpian	香片
xicha	細茶
Xifan	西番
xilu ke	西路客
xincheng	新城
xinggong	行宮
xinjiao	新教
xu	續
Xuannan	宣南
Xuantong	宣統
yamen	衙門
yan-qi	燕齊
yangwei	揚威
yi	夷
Yili zongtong tushuo	伊梨總統圖說
yi yi zhi yi zhi li	以夷制夷之力
yin	引
yinpiao	引票
you wangzi zunda zhi yi	有妄自尊大之意
yuanbao	元寶
yue jie zhi shi	越界之事
zacha	雜茶
zhangjing	章京
zheng	正
zhong dou wei sheng	種痘為生
Zhonghai	中海
zhongyuan ren	中原人
zhupi zouzhe	硃批奏摺
Zhunbu	準部
Ziguangge	紫光閣

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